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
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GENERAL REVIEW.

VOL. XVII.

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THE

CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

No. LXIV.

NEW SERIES — No. XXXIV.

SEPTEMBER, 1834.

Art. I. — *Foundations of Faith. One of a Course of Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity, lately delivered before the Young Men of Boston.*

Faith, in the sense in which I propose to use that term in the following discourse, is defined in Scripture as being "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." By it we can and do regard many things, which lie beyond the sphere of our senses and actual experience, as really existing, and are affected by them as realities. By it the spiritually minded of all religious persuasions, in proportion as they are spiritually minded, feel a confidence and practical assurance in the existence and reality of the spiritual world. It is this principle which constitutes man, unlike the inferior animals, a religious being; and it is by a right developement of this principle that we become capable of seeing Him who is invisible, of being affected by those things which pertain to our inward and spiritual life as if addressed to the senses, and of holding free, intimate, and habitual communion with the Unseen, the Infinite, and the Eternal.

Now it is remarkable of the infidelity of the present day, that it strikes at the very existence of this principle, considered as an element or property of the human soul. Not content with disputing in detail the evidences of natural and revealed religion, or driven, perhaps, from this ground, it thinks to cut the matter short by denying that man has any faculties for the apprehension of spiritual existences, or of any existences but such as are cognizable

by the senses, and so far as they are cognizable by the senses. I have no fears that many amongst us, or that any who are accustomed to contemplate and study the workings of their moral and spiritual nature, will be seduced and carried away by this gross form of sensualism; which they must feel and know to be contradicted and entirely set aside by the facts of their own inward experience. Still it may be well, in connexion with the evidences of Christianity, to begin by setting forth, in the simplest and clearest language of which the subject is susceptible, the true philosophy of man's moral and spiritual nature in regard to the foundations of faith.

In the present discourse I shall endeavour to establish, illustrate, and enforce, as much at length as my limits will permit, the three following propositions:

First, that a little reflection will convince every one, alive to noble thoughts and sentiments, that the *existence* of those spiritual faculties and capacities, which are assumed as the *foundation* of religion in the soul of man, is attested and put beyond controversy, by the *revelations of consciousness*.

Secondly, that *religion in the soul*, consisting as it does of a manifestation and developement of these spiritual faculties and capacities, is as much *a reality in itself, and enters as essentially into our idea of a perfect man*, as the corresponding manifestation and developement of the reasoning faculties, a sense of justice, or the affections of sympathy and benevolence.

And *thirdly*, that, from the acknowledged existence and reality of spiritual impressions or perceptions, we may and do assume *the existence and reality of the spiritual world*; just as, from the acknowledged existence and reality of sensible impressions or perceptions, we may and do assume the existence and reality of the sensible world.

These three propositions being established, it will follow, that our conviction of the existence and reality of the spiritual world is resolvable into the same *fundamental law of belief*, as that on which our conviction of the existence and reality of the sensible world depends.

I. My first proposition is, that a little reflection will convince every one, alive to noble thoughts and sentiments, that the *existence* of those spiritual faculties and capacities,

which are assumed as the *foundation* of religion in the soul of man, is attested and put beyond controversy by the *revelations of consciousness.*

Some writers contend for the existence of an unbroken chain of beings starting from the lowest form of inorganic matter, and mounting upwards by regular and insensible gradations to the highest order of created intelligences. Others insist on a division of substances into material and immaterial, and make one of the principal arguments for the soul's spirituality and immortality to depend on the nature of its substance, and not on the nature of the laws and conditions imposed upon it. Happily neither of these questions is necessarily implicated in the views I am about to offer, and both may therefore be dismissed at once from the discussion; the former as being a little too fanciful, and the latter as being a little too metaphysical for the generality of minds. It is enough if persons will recognise the obvious fact, that, in the ascending scale of being, as the vegetable manifests some properties which do not belong to crude and inert matter, and as the animal manifests some properties which do not belong to the mere vegetable, so man, as man, manifests some properties which do not belong to the mere animal. He is subject, it is true, to many of the laws and conditions of crude and inert matter, to many of the laws and conditions of vegetable life, and to many of the laws and conditions of animal life; but he also has part in a still higher life, — the life of the soul. He brings into the world the elements of a higher life, the life of the soul, the acknowledged phenomena of which can no more be resolved into the laws and conditions of mere sensation, than into those of mere vegetation, or mere gravitation. This higher life, consisting, among other things, of a developement of conscience, the sentiment of veneration, and the idea of the Perfect and the Absolute, constitutes the *foundation* of religion in the soul of man, the existence and reality of which is attested, as I hold, and is put beyond controversy, by the revelations of consciousness.

I do not suppose, of course, that the existence of the abovementioned properties or affections of the soul is matter of sensation. I do not suppose that we can see, or hear, or feel, or taste, or smell a mental faculty, a moral sentiment, or an idea. Their existence, supposing them

to exist, *could* be revealed to us by consciousness alone; and by consciousness it *is* revealed to us; and the evidence of consciousness in a question of this nature is final and decisive. It is not a matter of sensation, nor of logic; but of consciousness alone. We are conscious of their existence; and being so, whatever we may say, or however we may argue to the contrary, we cannot, practically speaking, doubt it, even if we would, any more than we can doubt the testimony of the senses. Reflect for one moment. What evidence have you of the existence of your own mind, — of the power of thought, or even of the power, or the fact, of sensation itself, but the evidence of consciousness? Nay, what evidence have you of your own individual being and personality, — that you are yourself and not another, that you are a man and not a horse or a tree, that you are awake and alive, and not asleep or dead, but the evidence of consciousness? None whatever. You can say, "I am conscious of being what I am;" and that is all you can say. An archangel cannot say any thing more. It is not a matter of sensation, or of argument, but of consciousness alone. If, therefore, you are conscious of possessing not only a sensual and an intellectual, but also a moral and spiritual nature, you have as good evidence for believing that this moral and spiritual nature really exists, and that you possess it, as you have for believing that you exist at all.

"True," the sensualist may say; "this does prove the existence of something which we call our moral and spiritual nature; but it does not prove that this *something* belongs to our original constitution, that it has its root and foundation in the soul, that it cannot be resolved into a mere figment of the brain." And then, in the accustomed vein of this philosophy, he will be likely to urge, "Your conscience, — what is it? One thing in the child, and another thing in the man; one thing in this age or country, and another thing in that; here expressly forbidding what there it as expressly enjoins. And your sentiment of veneration, — what is it? To-day prostrate before stocks and stones, to-morrow adoring the host of heaven; among one people, deifying a virtue, among another, a man, among another, an onion; now manifesting itself under the forms of the grossest superstition, and now breaking out into the excesses

of the wildest fanaticism. And your idea of the Absolute and the Perfect, — what is it but a hallucination of the metaphysically mad, — the finite vainly thinking to comprehend the infinite? Do not all these things, therefore, though they exist, or are thought to exist, in the human mind, when a little more carefully examined, look very much like figments of the brain?"

How long is the plain, practical good sense of mankind to be abused by a sophistry like this, which owes all its apparent force and pertinency to a sort of logical slight of hand, that, with a quickness making it imperceptible to slow minds, substitutes for the real question at issue, another having nothing to do with the subject? So far as the present discussion is concerned, it matters not whether conscience, as already instructed and educated, always decides correctly, or never decides correctly. I am not contending, as every body must perceive, who is capable of understanding the argument, for the correctness or uniformity of the *decisions* of conscience, a circumstance which must depend, of course, on the nature and degree of instruction and education it has received, but for the *existence* of conscience itself, not as a figment of the brain, but as an element of our moral and spiritual nature. What I maintain is simply this; that every man is born with a moral faculty, or the elements of a moral faculty, which, on being developed, creates in him the idea of a right and a wrong in human conduct; which leads him to ask the question, "What is right?" or, "What *ought* I to do?" which summons him before the tribunal of his own soul for judgment on the rectitude of his purposes; which grows up into an habitual sense of personal responsibility, and thus prepares him, as his views are enlarged, to comprehend the moral government of God, and to feel his own responsibility to God as a moral governor. My reasonings and inferences, therefore, are not affected, one way or another, by the actual state of this or that man's conscience, or by the fact that probably no two consciences can be found which exactly agree. A man's conscience, we must presume, according to the influences under which he has acted, will be more or less excited and developed, and more or less enlightened and educated. Still we hold it to be undeniable that every man has a conscience *to be* excited

and developed, enlightened and educated; that in this sense conscience has its root and foundation in the soul, and that man, herein, differs essentially from the most sagacious of the inferior animals, and, unlike them, was originally constituted *susceptible* of religion.

And so, too, of the sentiment of veneration or devotion, considered as an original and fundamental propensity of the human mind, I care not, so far as my present purpose is concerned, under what forms it has manifested itself, or to what excesses or abuses it has led. These very excesses and abuses only serve to demonstrate the existence and strength of the principle itself, as they evince such a craving of our nature for religion, that it will accept of any, even the crudest and most debasing, rather than have none. Could this be, if we were not made to be religious? No matter what may be the immediate or ostensible object of this sentiment,—a log, a stone, or a star, the god of the hills, or the god of the plains, "Jehovah, Jove, or Lord,"—still it is veneration, still it is devotion. Neither can the principle itself, by any show of evidence or just analysis, be resolved into a mere figment of the brain, or a mere creature of circumstances, for, in some form or other, it has manifested itself under all circumstances, and in every stage of the mind's growth, as having its root and foundation in the soul. The sentiment may be, and often has been, misdirected and perverted; but there is the sentiment still, with nothing to hinder its being excited, developed, and directed aright, and the result is religion. There is the sentiment disposing man to look upward to a higher power, and inducing faith in the invisible; a quality in which the most sagacious of the inferior animals do not share in the smallest degree, and which proves, if final causes prove any thing, that man was made for worship and adoration.

One word more respecting our capacity to form an idea of the Absolute and the Perfect. The shallow and flippant jeer, that it is the finite vainly thinking to comprehend the infinite, comes from substituting the literal sense of the term *comprehend*, as applied to bodies, for its figurative sense as applied to minds; making the comprehension of an idea to resemble the grasping or embracing of a globe with the hands or the arms. Besides, we need not say that man can,

strictly speaking, *comprehend* the Absolute and the Perfect, but only that he can *apprehend* them, as really existing; and there is this difference between the literal import of apprehension and a full comprehension, that one can lay hold of what he would not think to be able at once to clasp. However this may be, it is certain that the idea of the Infinite grows up in the human mind, as it is cultivated and expanded, and becomes an essential condition of thought. As a proof of this, let any one try, and see if he can separate the idea of infinity from his idea of space and duration; or, in other words, whether he can possibly conceive of mere space, or mere duration as otherwise than infinitely extended. Moreover, the very idea of imperfection, as such, involves at least some faint glimmering of an idea of the Perfect, with which it is compared, and without which imperfection would be to us as perfection. In other words, if we had no idea of perfection, we could have no idea of its absence, which is what we mean by imperfection. So likewise in contemplating things accidental and dependent, the idea of the Absolute grows up in the mind;—the idea of something that is *not* accidental and dependent, and on which every thing that is accidental and dependent leans and is sustained. In short, the mind of man is so constituted, that, in the full developement of its intellectual powers, it can find no real satisfaction, no resolution of its doubts and difficulties, but in the idea of the Absolute and the Perfect. Take away this idea, and existence itself becomes an enigma, a meaningless and objectless phantasm. Give us back this idea, and it again becomes a consistent, intelligible, and magnificent whole. Man, unlike the most sagacious of the inferior animals, is so constituted, that this reaching after the Absolute and the Perfect enters into and forms an essential element of his moral and spiritual nature, giving him not only a capacity but a predisposition for that faith which is "the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen."

Therefore do we say, and say confidently, that a foundation for religion is laid in the soul of man, the existence whereof is attested and put beyond controversy by the revelations of consciousness. This is my first proposition, and I have only to add in respect to it two brief suggestions. If, as we have seen, a foundation for religion is laid in the

soul of man, can we bring ourselves to believe for one moment, that it is laid there for nothing? And again, if, as we have seen, a foundation for a higher life than that of the senses is laid in the soul of man, must it not be accounted a sort of insanity in us, to say nothing of its sinfulness, to refuse or neglect to build upon it?

II. Here my second proposition comes in, which asserts that *religion in the soul*, consisting as it does of a manifestation and developement of our spiritual faculties and capacities, is as much *a reality in itself, and enters as essentially into the idea of a perfect man*, as the corresponding manifestation and developement of the reasoning powers, a sense of justice, or the affections of sympathy and benevolence.

Modern philosophy has revived an important distinction, much insisted on by the old writers, between what is *subjectively* true and real, that is to say, true and real so far as the mind itself is concerned, and what is *objectively* true and real, that is to say, true and real independently of the mind. Thus we affirm of things, the existence of which is reported by the senses, that they really exist both subjectively and objectively; that is to say, that the mind is really affected as if they existed, and that, independently of this affection of the mind, the things themselves exist. In other words, we have an idea of the thing really existing *in* the mind, and this is subjective truth and reality; and there is also an object answering to that idea really existing *out of* the mind, and this is objective truth and reality. One sense, therefore, there certainly is, in which the most inveterate skeptic must allow that religion has a real and true existence to the really and truly devout. Subjectively it is real and true, whether objectively it is real and true, or not. All must admit that it is true and real so far as the mind itself is concerned, even though it cannot be shown to have existence independently of the mind. It is a habit or disposition of soul, and, in any view of the matter, the habit or disposition truly and really exists. It is a developement of our nature, a developement of character, and, as such, is as true and real as any other developement of nature and character. Even if it feeds on illusions, it is not itself an illusion. Even if, in its springing up, it depends on nothing better than a fancy, a dream,— its growth in the

soul, and the fruits of that growth, are realities, — all-important, all-sustaining realities.

I dwell on this distinction, because it is one which the sensualists, from policy or perversity, would fain wink out of sight, making the question at issue to be, Whether religion is, or is not, a mere illusion. This is not the question. Take any view of the matter, take the sensualist's view of the matter, and still it is undeniable that religion itself, as it exists in the soul of the devout, is a reality, as much so as any other habit or disposition of soul, as much so as taste, or conscience, or parental or filial affection; and its effects are as real.

Nor is this all. Religion in the soul enters essentially into our idea of a *perfect man.* Suppose a man perfect in his limbs, features, and bodily proportions, but entirely destitute of understanding; — would he answer to any body's idea of a perfect man? No. Give him, then, a perfect understanding, but still let him be entirely destitute of moral sensibility, — as dead to sentiment as before he was to thought, — would he answer to any body's idea of a perfect man? No. And why not? Because we mean by a perfect man, one in whom the whole nature of man is developed, in its proper order, and just relations and proportions. Now, as has been demonstrated, a foundation for *religion* is laid in the human soul. In other words, we have spiritual faculties and capacities, as well as intellectual and moral faculties and capacities; and the former constitute a part of our nature as truly as the latter; and this part of our nature must be developed. Otherwise the entire man is not put forth. Part of his nature, and of his higher nature too, it may be said, is yet to be born; and thus it is, that a deep and true philosophy reässerts and confirms the Christian doctrine of regeneration. We are born, at first, into the visible or sensible world; when we become alive to the invisible or spiritual world, we may be said to be born again; and it is not till after this second birth that we become all which, as men, we are capable of becoming. It is not, I repeat it, until after this second birth, consisting, as I have said, in a developement of our spiritual faculties and capacities, that the entire man is revealed, or our idea of a perfect man realized or approached.

Every well constituted mind must be painfully conscious of this truth, though often without being aware of the cause of its uneasiness, in reading the lives, or contemplating the fame, of men of eminence, and sometimes perhaps of integrity and philanthropy, but destitute of religion. Doubtless a man may have some of the forms of greatness and goodness, without having all; and nothing can be further from my purpose or disposition than to derogate from any form of either, wherever found and however connected. Still when we behold a manifestation of the lower forms of greatness and goodness without the higher, an impression is left on the mind similar to what is universally felt on seeing a foundation laid for a noble structure, and that structure carried up far enough with the richest materials to indicate the grand and comprehensive plan of the architect, which plan however from some cause has been interrupted and broken off midway.

Thus far have I reasoned, as you will perceive, from what consciousness attests and puts beyond controversy respecting the moral and spiritual nature of man. Waiving the question whether any thing exists *out of* the mind corresponding to our idea of religion *in* the mind, — waiving the question whether the objects of our faith have a true and real existence independently of the mind itself, still the conclusion, as we have seen, is unavoidable, that this faith has its foundation in human nature, that its developement is a true and real developement of our nature, and that it is absolutely essential to our nature's entire and perfect developement. Whether religion exists independently of the mind or not, we know that to those who have it, it has a true and real existence *in the mind;* that it is a source of true and real strength, solace, and hope; and that men, as men, can truly and really do, bear, and enjoy with it, what they could not do, bear, or enjoy without it. Even, therefore, if the discussion were to stop here, it would follow incontestably, that to disown or neglect religion because of this or that real or supposed logical difficulty, would be to do violence at the same time to both those instinctive desires, from one or the other of which, it is said, a rational being, as such, must always act, — a desire of happiness and a desire of perfection.

III. But the discussion does not stop here. I maintain, and this is my third and last proposition, that from the acknowledged existence and reality of spiritual impressions or perceptions we may and do assume *the existence and reality of the spiritual world*; just as, from the acknowledged existence and reality of sensible impressions or perceptions, we may and do assume the existence and reality of the sensible world.

Most of you, I presume, are apprized of the extravagances of skepticism into which men have been betrayed by insisting on a *kind* of evidence of which the nature of the case does not admit. Some have denied the existence of the spiritual world; others have denied the existence of the sensible world; and others again have denied the existence of both worlds, contending for that of impressions or perceptions alone. These last, if we are to believe in nothing but the facts of sensation, and what can be *logically* deduced from these facts, are unquestionably the only consistent reasoners. For what logical connexion is there between a fact of sensation, between an impression or perception, and the real existence of its object, or of the mind that is conscious of it? None whatever. I do not mean that a consistent reasoner will hesitate to admit the real existence of the objects of sensation. Practically speaking he cannot help admitting their real existence, if he would. Every man, woman, and child believes in his or her own existence, and in that of the outward universe or sensible world; but not because the existence of either is susceptible of proof by a process of reasoning. Not the semblance, not the shadow of a sound logical argument can be adduced in proof of our own existence, or that of the outward universe. We believe in the existence of both, it is true; but it is only because we are so-constituted as to make it a matter of intuition. Let it be distinctly understood, therefore, that our conviction of the existence of the sensible world does not rest on a logical deduction from the facts of sensation, or of sensation and consciousness. It rests on the constitution of our nature. It is resolvable into a fundamental law of belief. It is held, not as a logical inference, but as a first principle. With the faculties we possess, and in the circumstances in which we are placed, the idea grows up in the mind, and we cannot expel it if we would.

Now the question arises, On what evidence does a devout man's conviction of the existence and reality of the *spiritual world* depend? I answer; — On the very same. He is conscious of spiritual impressions or perceptions, as he also is of sensible impressions or perceptions; but he does not think to demonstrate the existence and reality of the objects of either by a process of reasoning. He does not take the facts of his inward experience, and hold to the existence and reality of the spiritual world as a logical deduction from these facts, but as an intuitive suggestion grounded on these facts. He believes in the existence and reality of the spiritual world, just as he believes in his own existence and reality, and just as he believes in the existence and reality of the outward universe, — simply and solely because he is so constituted that with his impressions or perceptions he cannot help it. If he could, it would be to begin by assuming it to be possible that his faculties, though in a sound state and rightly circumstanced, may play him false; and if he could begin by assuming this as barely possible, there would be an end to all certainty. Demonstration itself, ocular or mathematical, would no longer be ground of certainty. It is said that sophistical reasoning has sometimes been resorted to in proof of the existence and reality of the spiritual world; and this perhaps is true; but the error has consisted in supposing that any reasoning is necessary. It is not necessary that a devout man's conviction of the existence and reality of the spiritual world should rest on more or on better evidence, than his conviction of the existence and reality of the sensible world; — it is enough that it rests on as much, and on the very same. It is enough that both are resolvable, as I have shown, into the same fundamental law of belief; and that, in philosophy as well as in fact, this law ought to exclude all doubt in the former case, as well as in the latter.

But how, it may be asked, according to the views here presented, can we account for the fact of such different and conflicting spiritual impressions or perceptions? If a spiritual world really exists, why do not all men apprehend it alike? Because, I hardly need reply, it is contemplated under such widely different aspects, and by persons whose spiritual faculties and capacities are variously developed, and, above all, because in spiritual things the best people are

so prone to mix up and confound their inferences with their simple perceptions. There is nothing, therefore, in the real or apparent diversity of our spiritual impressions or perceptions, which should shake our confidence in the principle that, to a rightly constituted and fully developed soul, moral and spiritual truth will be revealed with a degree of intuitive clearness and certainty, equal at least to that of the objects of sense. Besides, a like diversity in our views and theories prevails in respect to the material world; but nobody thinks, merely on the strength of this, seriously to raise a doubt whether the material world exists at all. And if it is further urged, that the most spiritual men may sometimes be tempted to say of their religious experience, "Perhaps it may turn out to be an illusion;" it should be recollected, that this is no more than what they may also, in moments of inquietude and despondency, be tempted to say of *all* their experience. They may say of all their experience, "Perhaps it may turn out to be an illusion." At this very moment, when I seem to myself to be delivering a discourse on the Christian evidences, before this crowded audience, how do I know but that really I am in my bed at home dreaming about it? We may talk in this way, I know, about dreams, illusions, visions; but it is certain that, to a well constituted and well ordered mind, it never has occasioned any real doubt or difficulty, nor ever can, in regard to ordinary life; and for the same reason neither ought it to do so in regard to the life of the soul.

Once more. What, according to the doctrine advocated in this discourse, shall we reply to those who may affirm that they never had any of our alleged spiritual impressions or perceptions? Precisely what we should to those who might say that they never had any of our alleged moral impressions or perceptions, any sense of justice, or honor, or disinterested benevolence, or natural affection. We should reply,— that we are very sorry for it. If, however, along with their skepticism they evince any love of the truth, any desire or willingness to have their doubts dispelled, any tenderness of conscience or of soul, we may reason with them, and not without some prospect of convincing them, that their want of faith is to be ascribed to one or both of the two following causes;— either to a

vicious or defective developement of their nature, or to their insisting on a kind of evidence of which the subject, from its very nature, is not susceptible. Either, from some defect or vice of their peculiar moral constitution or training, they are not prepared to appreciate the only appropriate or possible evidence in the case; or, from ignorance of true philosophy, they require the sort of evidence for truths addressed to one faculty, which is available only in regard to truths addressed to another. By insisting on these topics, it is not improbable, that many apparent Atheists may be reclaimed. "In days of crisis and agitation," says an eminent French philosopher, "together with reflection, doubt and skepticism enter into the minds of many excellent men, who sigh over and are affrighted at their own incredulity. I would undertake their defence against themselves; I would prove to them that they always place faith in something. . . . . When the scholar has denied the existence of God, hear the man; ask *him*, take him at unawares, and you will see that all his words imply the idea of God; and that faith in God is, without his knowledge, at the bottom of his heart."*

As for the rest, — the propagandists of atheism, the men who *love* atheism from eccentricity, or misanthropy, or deadness of soul, — I say it with submission, but I say it with the utmost possible confidence in the wisdom of the course, *Let them alone.* Conversion by the ordinary modes of instruction and argument is precluded. Gratify them not with a few short days of that notoriety which they so much covet. Leave them to the natural influences of their system; leave them to the silent disgust which their excesses must awaken in a community not absolutely savage; leave them to the cant and priestcraft of a few ignorant and interested leaders: and it is not perhaps entirely past all hope that, in this way, some of them may be so far reclaimed as to become ashamed of their cause, ashamed of one another, and ashamed of themselves.

Meanwhile, let us hope that a better philosophy than the degrading sensualism, out of which most forms of modern infidelity have grown, will prevail; and that the minds of the rising generation will be thoroughly imbued with it. Let it be a philosophy which recognises the higher nature

* Cousin's *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, pp. 179, 180.

of man, and aims in a chastened and reverential spirit to unfold the mysteries of his higher life. Let it be a philosophy which comprehends the soul, — a soul susceptible of religion, of the sublime principle of faith, of a faith which "entereth into that within the veil." Let it be a philosophy which continually reminds us of our intimate relationship to the spiritual world, which opens to us new sources of strength in temptation, new sources of consolation in trouble, and new sources of life in death, — nay, which teaches us that what we call *death* is but the dying of all that is mortal, that nothing but life may remain. Let it be a philosophy which prepares us to expect extraordinary manifestations of our heavenly Father's love and care, and which harmonizes perfectly with the sublime moral purpose and meaning of the Gospel, "casting down imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ."

ART. II. — *Christian Morality. Sermons on the Principles of Morality inculcated in the Holy Scriptures, in their Application to the present Condition of Society.* By W. J. Fox. From the London Edition. Boston. Leonard C. Bowles. 1833. 12mo. pp. viii. and 291.

THESE Sermons may be called *eloquent*, without any misapplication or abuse of that often and much abused word. They who were privileged to hear them, and who had "ears to hear," must have been almost roused from their seats by many of those fine passages, which, in the reading merely, warm our hearts and fill our eyes. How different are these outpourings of the full mind and fervid and benevolent affections of the advocate and preacher of a faith which is stigmatized as cold, from the dull and icy productions which are issued in such unreasonable quantities from the pulpits which claim for themselves a monopoly of the vital heat of religion. Not that we deny to these latter many productions of true sacred eloquence; but we must refuse the praise of godly warmth to orthodoxy by

itself considered, and affirm that a discourse may be exceedingly cold, though it be filled to overflowing with all the doctrines of Calvinism. The fact is, that many preachers, who are really deficient in warmth of spirit, are happy to thunder forth a series of doctrinal propositions, which pass for warmth with the mass of their hearers. The deception will not stand the test of time. Nothing is colder than an irrational dogma. With all its pretension, it soon ceases to affect the heart; and even they who think that they ought to be affected by it, feel that they are not so. The only warmth which is not factitious, and cannot be quenched, is the glowing and generous illustration and enforcement of practical truth.

And no preacher with whose works we are acquainted, is more faithful in the exhibition of practical truth, or illustrates and enforces it more glowingly and generously than Mr. Fox. We presume that it would be impossible for him to produce a dull sermon, even if he should attempt it. He always calls on his heart to speak, or rather his heart always insists on speaking, and therefore other hearts must hear; and when the heart hears, the understanding is in a fair way to be enlightened, and the conduct to be improved.

Who is there in Great Britain that preaches like Mr. Fox? We know not one. If there be one, his sermons are yet to come to us. We have no desire to disparage the correctness, good sense, and piety of several of the divines of the establishment; but correctness, good sense, and piety, do not of themselves make an eloquent preacher. — Irving has genius or once had it, but he never had judgment, his style was always extravagantly affected, adulation made him vain, vanity made him crazy, or nearly so; and who reads his sermons now? — We cannot doubt the power, any more than the popularity of Chalmers, as a speaker; but an apparently incurable want of taste spoils the best of his sermons, and the best are not remarkable for those qualities which constitute permanent eloquence, — that eloquence which resounds beyond the walls of a kirk, or the limits of a contemporary generation. But we will mention no more names. Our intention is not to deprive any one of a justly earned reputation, or to deny the very great usefulness of very many of the English sermonizers, but

merely to express our sense of the superior merits of Mr. Fox;—and we would not do this for the bare purpose of exalting a favorite, but only that we may contribute our small share in bringing the public acquainted with a collection of sermons, which they will find pleasure as well as profit in reading,—sermons, which, so far from being a task and a heaviness, as many sermons are, only excite the mind of the reader and compel him to read on, and which are full of solid nourishment, too, for the intellectual, spiritual, and practical life.

Let us open this volume any where,—at the sermon, for instance, on "Human Brotherhood," founded on that part of Paul's address to the Athenians, in which he declares that God "hath made of one blood all nations of men." In an introduction, appropriately beautiful, the preacher carries us back to the scene and the time. With language as rich and glowing as ever poet used, he draws Athens in its classic but idolatrous glory, and Paul in his strong simplicity, preparing and not fearing to speak to its wise men and its fastidious multitude. The whole of this we should be pleased to quote, but we must force ourselves to be sparing. After describing the feelings which were probably in the bosom of the Apostle, as he thought of his own peculiar situation, the preacher thus proceeds:

"Animated by such feelings, we may now regard Paul, in what must have been one of the most interesting moments of even his eventful life, preparing himself on the hill of Mars to address an auditory of Athenians on behalf of Christianity. He would feel the imposing associations of the spot on which he stood, where justice had been administered in its most awful form, by characters the most venerable, in the darkness of night, under the canopy of heaven, with the solemnities of religion, and with an authority, which legal institution and public opinion had assimilated rather with the decrees of conscience and of the gods, than with the ordinary power of human tribunals. He would look around on many an immortal trophy of architect and sculptor, where genius had triumphed, but triumphed only in the cause of that idolatry to which they were dedicated, and for which they existed. And beyond the city, clinging round its temples, like its inhabitants to their enshrined idols, would open on his view that lovely country, and the sublime ocean, and the serene heavens bending over them, and bearing that testimony to the universal Creator,

which man and man's works withheld. And with all would Grecian glory be connected, the brightness of a day that was closing, and of a sun that had already set, where recollections of grandeur faded into sensations of melancholy. And he would gaze on a thronging auditory, the representatives to his fancy of all that had been, and of all that was, and think of the intellects with which he had to grapple, and of the hearts in whose very core he aimed to plant the barbed arrows of conviction." — p. 90.

Then a few rapid sketches place the audience of the Apostle in full view before us. There stands the priest, and there the Stoic, and there the Epicurean, and there the sophist, each in his distinctive character; and "there the slave, timidly crouching at a distance, to catch what stray sounds the winds might waft to him, after they had reached his master's ears, of that doctrine, so strange and blessed, of man's fraternity." The contemplation of this doctrine increases the glow of the preacher, and he pours out his soul, as if he were incapable of stopping, in one long tide of enthusiastic sentences, which follow and fall over each other like waves.

"How magnificently does it level distinctions, whether of color, rank, nation, or religion! It rebukes the boastings of pride, the bitterness of hostility, the sternness of bigotry, the coldness of selfishness. It declares to each, that the object of disregard, hatred, or contempt, is a man, and man a brother. It knows nothing, it will hear nothing of the thousand pretensions set up for the gratification of vanity, and the indulgence of malignity. What prejudices have been already beaten down by it, and how many prejudices yet exist to which it is opposed, and which it shall yet beat down! That there are in the world different classes of men, heaven-born and earth-born; the blood of some a celestial ichor, to which that circulating in the veins of others is but as base puddle; that there are different races, with such disparity that it is for some to be luxurious lords of creation, and others their saleable, fettered, tasked, beaten, and branded beasts of burden; that a man's clan or country has exclusive title to his affections, exertions, duties, concentrating every thing within that narrow circle except a pitiless hostility to all of humankind beyond its narrow boundary; that there are natural antipathies, — hereditary national antipathies, which should make mighty and enlightened countries each other's foes from generation to generation,

and from age to age, desolating one another and all the world around them, each dreaming that the evil of its neighbour was its own good; as if the poverty of millions in one country could make a neighbouring country rich; as if the slavery of one country could make another country free; as if the misery of millions in one country could raise another to the summit of felicity: and that there are in the sight of God, man's Maker and Father, eternal differences and distinctions; some walking the earth in the pride and glory of his inalienable blessing, others born, living, dying under the influence of his wrath and curse; — differences sometimes evaporating in spiritual pride or busy zeal; at others, shaping themselves into the more noxious forms of alienation, persecution, denial of the courtesies of life, and infliction of the bitterest injuries. These were, and these are, under the various modifications produced by ancient and present modes of thinking, evils which the Gospel was given to mitigate and to annihilate; with which its spirit maintains everlasting warfare; against which it appeals to our piety, our benevolence, our justice, our consciousness; confronting which, in their strength, it rears its banner with the inscription which, in the day of their destruction, it will place upon their tomb, that 'God hath made of one blood all nations of men.'" — pp. 93 – 95.

The preacher next considers the doctrine of his text as involving four distinct assertions; first, man's common origin; second, his common nature; third, his common subjection to divine government; and fourth, his common destiny. Hear a part of what he says under the second of these heads.

"2nd. *Man's common nature. One blood* is one essential mode of existence, — one physical and moral constitution. Man is one, for men are of like 'parts and passions.' The principles of thought and feeling obtain alike with the operations of the brain and the pulsations of the heart. Hence it is that we can reason universally on man; and know that oppression will degrade, injuries exasperate, kindness conciliate, and unchecked power corrupt. 'His blood is like ours!' shouted a Marseillois peasant, as that of Louis XVI. spouted from his headless trunk upon the guillotine. It was, — and therefore it should not have been shed. It was, — and therefore the expression should have been one, not of vengeance, but of mercy. It was, — and therefore that should have been, not an exulting shout, but a whispered caution, — an admonition of the peril of weak humanity in power. Well were it

if the master felt this before his slave had wrested emancipation from him, to check his tyranny; and if the freed slave felt it after, to check his retribution." — pp. 96, 97.

And what an indignant appeal is this, addressed to those who despise, oppress, persecute, or in any way, by thought or deed, wrong their brethren.

"Oppressor, what are you crushing? Bigot, what are you cursing? Man-destroyer, legally or illegally, by your own hands or others, in the field or on the scaffold, by royal edict or assassin's dagger, what are you mangling? The image of your God, in your brother's person; and every drop of that stream you are spilling on the dust like water, is of your own blood. God made you and him of it, — of the same, of *one* blood; that you might dwell on the earth in unity and peace, in good will and charity, and mutual affection. Think, proud ones of the earth, as you trample in scorn upon the necks of multitudes, that it is your own nature and blood that you debase in their debasement. And if you felt, as it is shame and crime for man not to feel, you would writhe like the noblest spirit of chivalry under the blow of cowardice or the brand of the galley slave, at every insult which you now wantonly offer to humanity. Tyrants and oppressors! what are you doing, with your exactions and extortions, your proscriptions, banishments, and executions? You are laying waste human homes and hearts. You are violating that law of brotherhood which alone gives you a place in the rank of rational creatures; and selling your best birthright for passion's or flattery's mess of poisoned pottage. In your momentary success, you are but subjecting *yourselves* to guilt, *others* to misery, and in both fearfully triumphing over your own nature, and making it a suffering, a loathsome, and a hellish thing. You are flying in the Almighty face of God, who to all nations of men bears the relation of their common Father." — pp. 102, 103.

In a calmer, but hardly less eloquent style, is the sermon on gathering up the fragments, from John vi. 12. In this, the duties of domestic economy, of the improvement of time, of the preservation of all the records, however minute, of heavenly and earthly wisdom, and of attention to all the means of virtue and happiness, are enforced with the preacher's usual felicity; and the close is as follows: —

"Let us learn, then, never, in affecting the great, to despise the minute; nor to think of enlarging the whole while neglecting the parts; nor of doing much in years while insensible to

the waste of hours; nor of having the happiness of any portion of time while we aim not at that of eternity. Sound philosophy is the combination of accumulation and accuracy in particulars, with comprehensive generalization. Moral excellence is analogous; and so is the spirit of religion. Christianity has its prayer for the child, and redemption for the world; and the prayer would not be so good were not the redemption so stupendous. That not a single sensation of pleasure, nor the most trifling impulse of benevolence, should be despised or crushed, is the lesson which commends itself most to him who most enters into the plan of infinite wisdom and the prospect of universal happiness. The Omnipotence of the universal Creator ordains that of the merest fragments of his works nothing should be lost. And nothing shall. The withered hope, the broken spirit, the imperfect character, the moral fragments of the present state, shall be gathered for nobler forms and combinations, as out of dissolving elements shall arise the new heavens and earth wherein righteousness and blessedness will ever dwell." — p. 147.

There is a fine sermon in this collection on "mental hospitality," from Hebrews xiii. 2: "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers; for thereby some have entertained angels unawares." The applications which are made of this exhortation, to the various opportunities which solicit the mind's hospitality, and repay it in unexpected ways and under heavenly forms, are both true and striking, and show how generously all the occasions of our life may and ought to be estimated. Take the few following examples from the many which are stated.

"When illness has caused a cessation from active pursuits, or when the heavy pressure of calamity has benumbed and crushed the mind, and recourse has been had to some new intellectual occupation, dallying with a history, a science, a language, a theory; merely, perhaps, for the purpose of disengaging the thoughts a brief while from depressing topics; how often has not only the first purpose been answered, but the individual been led on unawares, and found unexpected sources of activity, of enjoyment, of usefulness, blessings tenfold to himself, and to others through his instrumentality! Partly, at least, we are indebted to the mental and bodily sufferings of Cowper for his poetry; and to the deafness of Dr. Lardner, for the 'Credibility of the Gospel History.' How often has the proper conduct of a child towards his parents, his filial respect and affection, his attention to their feel-

ings, wants, wishes, and situation, his unwearied and lovely ministering to them in their infirmities, perhaps even their fretfulness, not only had its natural, and common, and sufficient recompense, but attracted notice in its unobtrusiveness, and, by the character it created in the minds of others, paved the way, even after the lapse of years, for his success in life, and raised him to a station which he might never else have attained! Sometimes an individual, accustomed to be thought for and acted for, is suddenly thrown into a lonely and difficult situation, requiring clearness of mind, promptness of decision, energy of conduct; and all the needful attributes spring up, and the new duties are strenuously discharged; and not only is the actual object gained, but by the attention, the admiration, the interest excited, some of earth's best social blessings flow in, like an unlooked for spring-shower upon fields and gardens, making the heart's wilderness to blossom as the rose. Oh! there are stray gifts of God's goodness scattered over all earth's paths of duty; and what seem weeds, give forth balm and fragrance to those who tread them with wounded feet and fainting senses. While immortal fruits grow on the tree of life, its shade is the sweetest shelter; birds of Paradise sing among the branches, and 'its leaves are for the healing of the nations.'" — pp. 169, 170.

We need say no more. Such as the above extracts are, is the whole volume. They who are pleased with these, will be pleased with that. To ourselves, the views offered in these sermons appear so benevolent and noble, so elevated and elevating, and the language is such a worthy vehicle of the thought, that we feel strongly desirous that others should apply to the sources from which we have received so much pure delight. They will charm the tasteful, and satisfy the thoughtful reader. They will assist him who is prejudiced to get rid of his prejudices, and they will help him who is of a truly liberal mind to persist and glory in his liberality. They will strengthen the weak, and increase the strength of the strong.

ART. III. — 1. *Report of the Arguments of the Attorney of the Commonwealth at the Trial of* ABNER KNEELAND, *for Blasphemy, in the Municipal and Supreme Courts, in Boston, January and May,* 1834. (Collected and published at the request of some Christians of various denominations.) Beals, Homer, and Co. 1834. 8vo. pp. 93.

2. *A Speech delivered before the Municipal Court of the City of Boston, in Defence of* ABNER KNEELAND, *on an Indictment for Blasphemy in January Term,* 1834. By ANDREW DUNLAP. Boston. Printed for the Publishers. 1834. 8vo. pp. 132.

WE do not feel called upon at this time to express an opinion upon the expediency of this trial, still less upon the constitutionality of that law upon which conviction would depend; these are matters of private judgment and of legal inquiry. Yet we must say that for ourselves we would willingly bear any present ill that may result from a proceeding looked upon by some among us with disapprobation, for the sake of the attention which it has excited in regard to a subject on which we have long thought a dangerous apathy prevailed. We would recommend the arguments in behalf of the Commonwealth to the attentive perusal of all who, from an ignorance of the present state of infidelity among us, seem inclined to pay no regard whatever to the necessity of checking its progress. As showing the ultimate effects of that system which is now so boldly advocated among us, that pamphlet is entitled to particular consideration.

If there be a doubt in the minds of many concerning the ultimate effects of the recent judicial proceedings, and a great difference of opinion about the most prudent course which the friends of religion and morality should take in the present condition of things, all must agree that ignorance and indifference are here entirely out of place. Infidelity has now assumed a very lofty tone. It no longer conceals itself under the garb of hypocrisy, nor is satisfied by appearing indifferent to religious obligations and hopes, but it avows openly its presence and influence. It is not

in philosophical treatises and historical compilations, that doubts concerning the divine origin and sanctions of the gospel are covertly introduced; infidelity now has its treatises, tracts, and newspapers. It does not, as formerly, content itself with working in secret, but has its advocates in most of the cities of the Union, and its active agents in the principal towns of many of the States. Buildings are erected for the convenience of its friends, festivals are kept in honor of its advocates, societies are formed for the purposes of united exertion, and the same vessels which have carried the missionaries of Christianity into heathen lands, have been freighted with books, "indecent and abominable in their character, and wilfully wicked in their designs." Meanwhile those who are under its influence have left all that appertains to Christianity far behind them. They have grappled with the great truths of natural religion, have denied the existence of an intelligent First Cause, and cut up the roots of those spiritual truths on which the soul may feed, by denying the very existence of a soul. Their abominable doctrines, equally destructive to man's present happiness as to his future hopes, are polluting the very fountains of our moral and social institutions, by being held up to the young, the ignorant, and the vicious, as the lessons of sound philosophy, and the only guides to pleasure, to knowledge, and to virtue.

We know it is an unpleasant and a thankless task to hold up to the Christian, the character and conduct of those who mock his holiest tenets, and strive to insult and destroy the religion which he reverences as divine. Still, however disagreeable, it must be done; for it is only by acquainting ourselves with the origin of the evil, that we can discover its nature, and resist its influence. We would, therefore, inquire into the sources and character of infidelity, as it now exists among us.

Perhaps we cannot trace the origin and progress of infidelity in any better way, than by marking its influence, and the means by which it attains its ascendency, over an individual mind. The various minor causes which are usually thought to originate and support infidel sentiments seem to us insufficient to produce their blasting effects upon a moderately cultivated mind. The unworthiness of Christian professors, false views of the nature and sanctions of

religion, and the angry contentions of sects and parties, may do much to weaken the faith of the timid, the narrow-minded, and the vicious; but they are not sufficient to free the mind from all religious impressions, and allow the deluded victim of passion and prejudice to resign himself without many a struggle to the dreary depths of infidelity. We dare not say how much of infidelity is sin, and how much is infirmity. We believe that there are some men who are *predisposed* to doubt upon subjects connected with religion. And why should not this be the case? We see men around us of all possible differences of mental constitution; those who are guided entirely by a cool exercise of judgment; and those who make no more use of that faculty than if it did not exist; there are those who will receive statements of a very questionable character, with very little evidence, and those who seem to glory in being inaccessible by any amount of argument. This latter is a constitution which will be found to have entered very largely into the thoughts of many who have rejected revelation. They do not seem to have had a clear idea of what kind of evidence was necessary and possible in establishing the great truths of religion. They have looked for something out of the world,—for evidence distinct from, and superior to, what may come within the capacities of sense and reason. Let the number and the weight of favorable arguments, which have from time to time been recognised and received into the mind, be what they may, they make no firm stand when confronted with specious doubts. They do not even try to avoid contact with these dangerous enemies of their faith, as we should suppose a knowledge of their own infirmity would induce them to do, but, with a trembling and hurried movement, possess themselves of every pretence to an opposing argument which is put in their way, and afford such a ridiculous spectacle of foolish pusillanimity as would excite laughter, if the subject were not of so serious a nature. Such a mental constitution is besides very strangely united often with the coolest self-sufficiency. We can readily imagine what a pliable material is here offered, upon which a confirmed, proselyting infidel may exercise his skill. One whose intellectual structure answers to this description, whether it be from natural constitution or adventitious biasses, is indeed to be pitied; but he may so yield to his

infirmities, and neglect to use the means of cure which are ever ready at his hands, as to become an object of a less friendly affection.

We can all imagine the process by which infidelity obtains its hold on the mind. If religion (by which, we mean a belief in the divine origin of Christianity, and a sense of responsibility imposed by its teaching,) has at no period of life been an object of paramount importance, there is then some probability that a man can so bewilder his mind, and reverse every principle of reason and judgment, as to divest himself, at once, of the restraints and privileges, the hopes and fears of the gospel. But though experience proves to us that such a state of mind as is necessary to constitute an infidel, is a possible thing, and though we can imagine and state the process of corruption, we know that it must be a very difficult task. Indeed, it may very fairly be doubted whether any one who has been brought up under the influences of Christianity, and bound by some of its thousand associations, can, by all the force of self-delusion, sophistry, and affected indifference, so completely darken his mind, that rays of light will not at times return into it, even against his will.

But we are told that in every deliberate act whether it be mental or bodily, man must have a motive, and that there can be no possible motive why he should willingly and thinkingly involve himself in error, and sacrifice the hopes, at the same time that he does the fears, of religion. This is an argument which is often advanced in self-defence by unbelievers. They think they take an unassailable ground, when they intrench themselves behind this piece of sophistry. They say, with a show of reason, that the hopes of Christianity have as flattering an aspect to their view, as to that of believers, and that, if they willingly forego these hopes which are held out to them, they must be considered as at least sincere. This is entitled to some consideration; — the more so, because we think that this is the union point between those whose infidelity is sin, and those whose unbelief, to a certain degree, is infirmity. At this point both of these classes arrive, but beyond it they separate, and take very different roads, though both may eventually conduct them to the same gloomy regions.

Here, then, is the point to which all, who are preparing

to reject the belief of Christianity as a religion sent from heaven, must first come. We do not mean to say that all arrive at it by the same way; on the contrary the modes of their arriving at this point are as different as those in which they depart from it, either to go on, or to retrace their steps. The want of an early religious education, or what is perhaps as bad, subjection to harsh and gloomy views of religion, may have been the primary cause of placing one man in the situation where he is to choose between belief and unbelief; while a neglect of early and happy opportunities, coupled with the temptations of vice in after life, may have placed another in the same situation. It must be altogether unnecessary to describe the course which one of the latter class will take to fortify himself in his unbelief. His prepossessions, at least, are unfavorable to religion. The ideas which he would form of it would be, that it was a gloomy absurdity, and an enemy to human happiness, because he thinks that happiness consists in the course of life which he for the time is leading, and that, he knows, is any thing but a religious life. The pleasures of sin, though enduring but for a moment, are to him nevertheless pleasures; and he is glad to be told, and struggles to satisfy himself in the belief, that, since some have rejected revelation, it may not after all be a matter really of life and death. It depends altogether upon the force of such influences, and the presence or absence of opposing ones, what shall be the strength with which unbelief operates upon his mind, and affects his conduct. But let this be as it will, if his unbelief be but the consequence of his love of sinful pleasures, and a distaste for the requisitions of a religious belief, it is nothing less than a gross and deadly sin, a sin for which no one is responsible but himself.

The causes here intimated as the probable grounds of infidelity may be mixed in all proportions, and connected with others of a less tangible nature. But when the matter comes to the test of discussion, appearances are somewhat different. Whatever may have been the means which a man may have used in convincing himself that a revelation is an impossible thing, and that all who believe they possess one, are deceived, when he is desirous of spreading his views, he finds it necessary to go through a course of self-discipline, to fortify himself against himself, as well as

against others. It is probable that many men, when they have placed themselves in this situation, are brought back to their senses, by a few moments of quiet thought. They may well stop and consider whether they are correct in supposing themselves so much wiser than the multitude. And it is here too that early religious impressions will return. The voice within will make many a struggle to be heard. It is certain there were moments in the life of Vóltaire and Hume, (we say nothing of Paine, for it is said that he never thought at all except when under the influence of strong drink, and it would be an insult to religious feeling to suppose it could come in at such a time,) as well as of most other infidels, when the thought pressed heavily upon them, that there must be something to satisfy those earnest cravings of the soul, which all but religious faith does but mock. So many are the ties by which the Creator has bound us, that reason at times resigns herself implicitly to faith, feeling that there must be a dread something in the wide range of intelligence, which it cannot but recognise, though it will in vain hope to fathom. For below all the infirmities and biasses of the mind, in its very depths, lies the germ of religious feeling, — placed there by Him of whose essence it is a part. It is a spark which can never be extinguished, though it may be kindled into a bright flame, or dimmed by an inferior principle. How he may effectually smother this divine light must be the first attempt of the infidel. We have heard an infidel of the present day describe the manner in which he freed himself from the restraints of religion, but from some cause he made no mention of the process which we here suppose so difficult.

But, when this is as nearly completed as the nature of the case admits, what remains is comparatively easy. The prospect of encouragement and support will outweigh the fears of public exposure; and the ambition to "reign," though it be "in hell," will balance every deficiency. There will always be found some, likewise, who will suffer themselves to be misled by those deceitful smiles, which life may at times present, when the restraints of religion are removed. But even if an unwillingness to submit themselves to the influences of religion forms no part of their infidelity, the novelty of the doctrines, and a certain ill-defined distrust in things which they consider, if not absolutely beyond the

reach of their faculties, yet at best shadowy and mysterious, will entice many into the snare. Perhaps they may hope to learn the causes why man is still so ignorant, notwithstanding the boasted advancement of knowledge. This question at least is one which the infidel promises to answer for him by the sweeping decision, that superstition is at the root of the matter. It is to Christianity that he attaches the blame of cramping man's intellectual nature, impeding his progress, and placing an insuperable barrier to the attainment of the highest point which his capacities would enable him to reach. It is Christianity which creates those offensive distinctions in rank and condition, and draws the deep line of division between common interests. Thus by accusing religion, whatever be its form or origin, of being a foolish and unnecessary restraint, and by predicting an imaginary state of society, where the goddess of reason will be the idol of general worship, the specious doctrines of infidelity and atheism become powerful weapons in the hands of the deluded and the vicious.

We said that infidelity among us, had assumed a very lofty tone. Though every pretence to argument on which it depends, is but a repetition of the stale and oft-refuted objections of infidels of former times, the infidelity of the present day is characterized by a greater freedom in expressing itself, a more open manifestation of its designs, and a wider operation of its effects. A glance at one of the now numerous publications advocating the doctrines of "Free Inquiry," will surprise any one who has not traced its progress. Not that either wit or learning contributes to its support. We speak of that which is inculcated openly among us. Infidelity has now descended from whatever high station it may at any time have occupied, and finds its champions and advocates among the ignorant and the vicious. It deals altogether in low and scurrilous ribaldry, or in rash assertions and foolish predictions. Matters of fact are disregarded or misrepresented. "The heroes of the Revolution," the leading political characters of our country, ever since its independence, are boldly claimed as open or secret enemies of Christianity. The most distinguished literary and scientific men of our country at the present times, a late infidel writer * confidently asserts, are scoffers

* Dr. Cooper, in a late number of the "Free Inquirer."

at the faith. The same person (who may or may not know something of geology) has said, that the friends of the Bible are trying to stifle the progress of geological science, because it interferes with the Mosaic cosmogony. This assertion will pass for what it is worth, especially when we happen to call to mind the fact, that Cuvier himself, one of the most distinguished geologists the world has produced, died while composing a lecture, the very purpose of which was to show the concordance of the Mosaic accounts with the results of his laborious inquiries and investigations.

Against Christianity itself, its origin and sanctions, little is advanced. We gather this from their publications, and what they are pleased to call their "Scientific Lectures." The corruptions of Christianity, the persecutions and wars which have taken place under its name, are their most frequent topics of discussion. We are at a loss to conceive where they would have found materials on which to exercise their skill, had it not been for the Crusades, (which they are very particular to designate as the *Holy* Wars), the horrors of the Inquisition, the burning of Michael Servetus, the banishment of Roger Williams, and the burning of the Quakers at Boston. With what they say on such subjects we perfectly agree. Every friend of Christianity has wept at such perversions of a religion of "peace and good will." Indeed it is a matter of much surprise to us, that when they wish to enlarge upon such topics, they should put themselves to the trouble of providing original materials for the task. Passages may be found in the writings of Christians, which place these matters in as forcible a light, as any modern writer, however free his assertions or his inquiries may be, can reasonably wish. The words of the Master, — "Put up thy sword into thy sheath," would form an appropriate text for all those, who, by holding up the perversions and corruptions of Christianity, would but set its original purity and native divinity in a stronger light. All that we ask, is, that the blame of such impious proceedings be laid where it belongs. If our love and respect for the Saviour and his instructions, were but the common feeling which man bears for his fellow, we should oppose the libellous attempt to charge him who said, "My kingdom is not of this world," with introducing a system, which has flooded empires with blood, and identified the cause of God with worldly aggrandizement and power.

The "Tyranny of Priestcraft," is another hobby upon which infidelity capers and vents its rage. Infidels love to represent the clergy as nothing better than a band of interested deceivers, connected together by a kind of Freemasonry, assisting each other to suppress the liberty of conscience and the exercise of reason, to oppose the progress of learning and the rights of the lower classes. Society, they say, is duped and imposed upon, merely to support a lazy body of men, who may live at their ease, and grow rich on the credulity of the ignorant; — an assertion most wonderfully contrasted with the testimony, which the feeble frame of many a young martyr to the cause of religion bears to the arduousness of his office.

There is one more ground of complaint urged by infidels, and that is, the enormous expense of supporting the institutions of Christianity. They state, with the strongest feelings which the bare mention of so much money may excite, that Christianity costs the country more than twenty millions of dollars annually; and in the suspicious words which we remember to have seen used before, suggest that "this money might be given to the poor," or spent in the education of children. One would be led to suppose, from the language which infidels use on this point, that "Temples of Science" (which, if we may credit their assertions, are in a few years to adorn the towns and cities of our country) could be erected without the least expense, and that the prices (by no means moderate), annexed to those scandalous publications, called "Liberal Tracts," were merely nominal. The circumstances of those on whom infidelity now principally acts, renders this argument very specious, especially when it is pressed upon them with all the envy and malignity, with which we have heard infidels express themselves.

It seems to be the opinion of many, that infidels depend much, for their arguments, on the discordant opinions of sectarians, the condemnation which one party passes upon the chief tenets of another, and the exertions which one sect makes for the express purpose of defeating the aims of those who in their turn are opposers. But this is not, to any great extent, the case. Though the weapons which Christians have used against each other, are, in some instances, turned against them all, this is merely the by-

play of infidelity. It is chiefly for the sake of variety that the active infidel resorts to those abusive attacks of Christians on one another, which human passions and infirmities, whatever the restraining principle may be, will always occasion. Instances of hypocrisy, of pretended conversion, and blind zeal are at times held up to raise a sneer from the deluded hearers. And so, too, no ridiculous story which malice can invent or slander propagate, is allowed to pass by untold; on the contrary, the utmost possible use is made of every thing of the kind which offers itself. But infidels stop not here. Some will sneer at every principle of religion, whether its effects be good or bad. As might be supposed, if they are willing to dispense with Christianity, they are ready to throw off all the beneficial influences which it has exerted and can exert in promoting the objects of moral reform and general benevolence. A Temperance Tract, is, in their opinion, as useless as the Bible. Strange as it may appear to us, it is confidently asserted, that Christianity has never been productive of a particle of good, and that, if the doctrines of the New Testament were implicitly obeyed, the effect, so far from being what we should expect, would only be, to make men superstitious, selfish, ignorant, unmanly, and passive recipients of injuries. It is even said, that the morality of the gospel is positively injurious and deficient. The spotless character of the Saviour, which till very modern times was respected, where it was not adored, is now calumniated. Yes, the blaspheming infidel has dared to do this; the lips which should sooner have withered than pronounced the words, have stigmatized the Son of God, who knew no sin, as not only a deluded impostor, but as a liar and a thief.

But we shall greatly mistake if we think such reasonings and views are the sum and substance of modern infidelity. True, it is by such views that infidelity now spreads its gloomy and blasting influence; — these are the doctrines which are now taught to young and old, and under this aggregation of sin and error many have gone to their account. Though we feel satisfied that such are the only weapons which the proselyting infidel can and does use, we know that unbelief may exist in the minds, and influence the conduct, of those who would spurn the idea of lending their voice or their attention to these vile purposes. It was for

this reason that we made the distinction between those who hold infidel sentiments, and those who are active in spreading them. We hinted before, that the unbeliever himself was ignorant of the true nature of his opinions, till he felt induced to express and spread them. He may be at heart a most thorough skeptic, — absolutely denying the existence of what is called a moral nature within him, and positively refusing to enter upon the investigation of the nature, purposes, and claims of Christianity. The infidelity which is now spreading over our country in sneers at religion, and contempt of all authority whether human or divine is one thing, and that which is locked up within the hearts of many is another. The former is satisfied with being the enemy of the Christian faith, — the latter claims to be the friend of man's best interests.

That, in the rapid advancement of science and the discovery of truth, the imaginations and wishes of many should run away with their wisdom, is but what we ought to expect. It is a principle claimed as indisputably true by some of this class, that, since man's position is continually changing, and since the objects of his inquiry and attention are, and ever must be, on the advance, he will, in process of time, look back upon his present situation, and discover that he was entirely under the influence of error. Now to anticipate the time when this prospective state of perfection will be attained, and to pronounce the present state of things absolutely and totally wrong, is a very easy thing. Here is the origin of those views, which, under the name of infidelity, are now destroying, rather than perverting the hopes and interests of man. A scheme founded upon this principle is that which has lately found some advocates in our country and in Great Britain. Such, in particular, is the system of Miss Frances Wright. We have heard it forcibly remarked by one thoroughly acquainted with the matter, that no two people could be more different than Miss Wright, as she is understood and represented, and Miss Wright, as she really is. Many who condemn her sentiments, and picture the startling features of infidelity, as they fancy, from her teachings, we are sure would change the tone, if not the substance of their arguments, did they know what her abstract principles really are. Instead of giving vent to their horror and amazement at the fancied

immorality of her system, they would be much more inclined to deride it as visionary and nonsensical.

This philanthropic lady, who, in her own opinion, is undoubtedly sincere in her labors for the best good of mankind, has, by some means or other, possessed herself with a few bright ideas of the perfectibility of man, without paying as much attention as might have been wished, to the necessity of employing certain indispensable means for attaining that desirable point. By a bold flight of her imagination the time has already come. Man no longer looks to another scene of existence for the fulfilment of the purposes of his being. Nothing but an absolute refusal to coöperate with nature in obedience to her laws, has checked the universal prevalence of order and happiness. Man never had a right to expect to know any thing, as long as he recognised the existence of a limit where his endeavours to know more must yield. Religion teaches us the existence of such a limit, and, more than all, fixes it very near to us; consequently religion is all nonsense. Laws are made only for rogues; but the universal prevalence of a sound philosophy will lend its sanction to one at least of the maxims of the old morality, which says, "Honesty is the best policy"; laws then may be dispensed with altogether. All artificial restraint and interference in matrimonial matters, and others of a similar nature, is only rendered necessary because reason does not exercise her proper influence, but reason is to become the idol of universal worship;—rational principles only will unite the husband and wife, rational principles only will separate them; and it is rational they should.

Here we have the shallow compound of assumptions and inferences which constitutes that hideous spectre, "Modern Philosophy." Those who receive the whole scheme, and will not enforce one of its principles without the whole, are a very harmless set of wretches, and should be candid enough to ascribe the privileges which they possess in the security of their lives, property, and means of enjoyment, to one of the few redeeming excellences of the present system of things. But the difficulty lies here. There are but very few whose mental powers are competent to the task of realizing the predicted glorious state of things, without dwelling for an instant on the means by which it is to be

brought about. The novelty of the doctrine attracts hearers, some of whom, it will certainly be no disparagement to them to say, are more attentive than reflecting. It is wonderful to see how they will drink in the sage predictions uttered with all the gravity of oracular secrecy. All at once the truth flashes upon their minds, that, during the tedious revolutions of six thousand years, the world has not come into possession of a single truth; that the systems of education, law, philosophy, and religion, which now prevail, are defective at the very core, and that, even if no others are as yet decided upon, it is best to give them up entirely. As we before remarked, if the whole system of "Modern Philosophy" be kept together, its very folly will render it harmless. But neither its friends, nor its enemies, receive it in this manner.

There will always be found some restless spirits, who are inflamed to acts of the most inconsiderate rashness, merely by a love of something new, or a feeling that they have come into the possession of a great truth, which it is of the utmost importance the world should know. Calm reflection is, in such a case, entirely dispensed with. We have in our view a man who was once a minister of the Gospel, but is now an active infidel, and one of the main pillars of the cause in this section of the country. He professes to have discovered that men were under a great delusion, at least so many of them as acknowledge the divine origin of Christianity, and to have been prompted by a sense of duty to make known his discovery. Whether he pretends to any originality, we know not; but we should be inclined to suppose that he did not, from the air of antiquity which pervades the arguments by which he hopes to prove that Christianity is a delusion, and that religion and superstition are synonymous terms. But the subject is of too serious a nature, to be spoken of in other than a serious manner. The same discovery is made by others, and is nothing less than that man does not need the influences of religion, nor morality the sanction of a revelation. We have spoken of the kind of arguments which the infidel uses to establish these points. They are necessarily directed against the divine origin of Christianity, and the moral nature of man, and, though not openly grappling with these truths, strive by covert attacks and implied motives to effect their object.

These arguments are such as we should expect to see made use of, when we consider the characters and conditions of those who frequent the halls of modern infidelity. It may be considered a rash assertion, but it is one which observation and inquiry have convinced us is true, that there is not a man in this country, whose mental and moral attainments are above the common standard, who is willing openly to advocate the doctrines of modern infidelity. We say mental and moral attainments. We know there are some men who seem willing to rank themselves among "Free Inquirers," who maintain a respectable standing in society, and earn an honest subsistence as mechanics or traders; but the arguments and the reasoning which satisfy them of the correctness of their views, put the strength of their intellectual powers in rather a questionable light. But, though there may be some whose moral character is irreproachable, and whose errors are to be laid entirely to a neglect or perversion of intellect, by far the larger number of professed infidels consists of those who are followers of Paine in freedom of action, as well as of thought, and care as little for the laws of man, as for those of God.

The bloated countenances of the victims of intemperance and crime, which crowd the halls of Free Inquiry, give us an index not likely to deceive us, of the kind of instruction to which they listen. The ignorant and those who have been disappointed in their schemes or prospects, will give their presence, where they may hope to be on a level with the rest, and perhaps acquire the possession of unearned happiness. There also is the wretch who lives only for the gratification of his appetites, and thinks the lowest principles of his nature worthy of his sole attention. There will be found the drunkard, the gambler, the libertine, herded together in a fellowship of iniquity, and uniting their various tastes in the same unhallowed objects. The excitements of music and of dancing are added to complete the thoughtlessness of the scene, and thus, by artfully mingling enjoyment with the doctrines of infidelity, the deluded mortals would hope to convince themselves that pleasure belongs peculiarly and exclusively to their freedom from all religious influences. It is enough to excite the indignation as well as the pity of the most charitable observer, who has risked his person in the tainted atmosphere of the infidel lecture-

room, when he sees around him a crowd of vagabonds, collected from every sink of corruption which a populous city contains, listening to the words of a deluded man, while he strives to undermine the foundations upon which the social campact is sustained, and classes the noblest truths to which the human understanding can attain along with the prejudices of infancy. He will hold up to them the doctrines of infidelity, as the result of all the wisdom which man has acquired in the long course of ages. So far from admitting, what is nevertheless an indisputable truth, that Christianity has been the principal agent in enlarging the circle of human knowledge, and of opening the highest sources of inquiry at the same time that it stimulates the mind to action, he would ignorantly think to prove, that, had the Christian religion never been known, man would now be all that his most enthusiastic dreams have ever fancied. Still the only point in which infidelity appears consistent with itself, is, in claiming for the mind to which it assigns so low an origin, no nobler objects of inquiry, than its supposed cause may present. Man's motives, duties, and hopes are confined entirely to a few short years on this unstable mass of matter. Every aspiration after higher pursuits, every tendency to an enlarged exercise of the mental powers, is checked as the offspring of a superstitious and deceitful fancy.

Infidelity, nevertheless, quotes its great names. We are referred to some few, but eminent philosophers, who, after having looked deep into the mysteries of mind and matter, were content to stop at secondary causes, desiring to look no higher. That there have been some, who, in a civilized state of society, have maintained the ground that religion was absolutely unnecessary in the individual and social concerns of life, is thought to be sufficient proof, that religion, with all its forms and observances, is at best a cumbrous and unnecessary appendage. That some have lived respected and esteemed, though unbelievers, is brought to prove that morality is independent for a sanction as well as a code upon religion. That some have supported themselves in adversity, and quietly passed out of life without the consolations of a religious faith, is considered satisfactory proof that happiness is independent of such a principle. No distinction is made between what have been the effects

of infidelity upon single individuals, and what would be the consequences, were it a general thing. The manner in which the few who have professed it, have been influenced by those who opposed it, is not considered in the discussion.

The advocates of infidelity well know that no man willingly resigns the hope of another life, if he can see any reason for sustaining that hope. It is on this point that they make use of all the sophistry which the infidelity of former times has brought together to disprove the immortality of the soul. Materialism, with all its bold decisions upon points far beyond the reach of man's intellectual capacities, is advocated, to prove that the mind is dependent upon the body, and that consciousness must cease with death. Still, as might be expected, they find it to be a hard matter to convince their hearers, that men may live a good and happy life, and die a happy death, without the influence or support of a religious faith. A book has lately been published and circulated among infidels, which professes to give an account of the last moments of celebrated "Liberal Writers." We have not been able to obtain the book, and can judge of it only by the remarks of those who seem willing to receive it as true. The last moments of infidel writers have indeed been often appealed to as proofs, that the soul can sustain itself in the dark hour without the consolations of religion; but it is all a deceitful mockery. The death-bed of those who have lived without God in the world, who have sneered at every principle of religion, and, by the help of an abused philosophy, have striven to undermine the foundations of Christianity, — the groans of conscience there felt, the gloomy prospect of annihilation, and the unconquerable dread of punishment, increasing tenfold the agony of the moment which separates soul and body, — will read a mournful lesson to the unbeliever. We have the testimony of physicians who attended their wretched exit, and it cannot be disputed. We know the pertinacity with which Voltaire persisted in sending for a priest, in spite of all the remonstrances of his friends, when his *philosophic* mind was terrified at the prospect of dissolution. The pusillanimity which he displayed was such as to excite his own ridicule, when for an interval he recovered. But with the return of danger, fear again subdued him. Total annihilation seemed to him desirable, for he feared some-

thing far worse, and, in the humility of his agony, he implored his physician to procure him a treatise, written *against the eternity of future punishment.* It was Gibbon who said, that "the immortality of the soul is at some times a comfortable doctrine." There probably never lived a man who felt more the value of existence than he did, and nothing can surpass the despondency of the words, in his letter on the death of Mrs. Posen, where he says, "All is now lost, finally, irrecoverably lost!" It was Hume who said, "I am affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude, in which I am placed by my philosophy. When I look abroad I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, and distraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return. I am confounded with these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness." * When the French philosopher, Diderot, felt that his end was approaching, he sent for a priest, and determined to confess and renounce his errors. But his friends, not being pleased at the idea of his renouncing atheism, surreptitiously hurried him into the country, where he died.

But it would be a waste of words, to prove that the most philosophic apathy, cannot fortify the bed of death against the fear of an hereafter. Atheistical philosophers may have enjoyed some moments of happy unconcern, and prided themselves on their elevation above what they call the superstitious fears of those who recognise the existence of an immortal soul in this frail tenement; but an age of such an existence would not afford an equivalent for an hour of that happy joy which the Christian feels, though it were the last of a short and unhappy life, and passed in the darkness of midnight on the bed of death.

It would not be possible, even if it were desirable, to give the statistics of infidelity among us. Unless we could look into the hearts of men, and form a correct opinion of the precise state of their religious impressions, we must be unable to say whether they are believers or infidels. We can

* Treatise on Human Nature, Vol. I. p. 458.

have no idea of the influence which may have been exerted on the mind of an individual unless he chooses to manifest it; and we should be likely to err greatly if we supposed that they only were unbelievers in the divine origin of Christianity, who favored the operations of infidels. We cannot doubt, however gratifying it might be to us, but that there are some who attend upon the ordinances of religion, and outwardly conform to its requisitions, and yet are far from being convinced of its truth in their own minds. Every Christian congregation will furnish all possible degrees of belief and unbelief, beginning with those most firm in the faith, and descending through those whose faith, sometimes clear and sometimes dim, is always wavering, down to one who knows nothing from experience of what are the hopes and blessings of the Gospel. Of such circumstances we must be ignorant.

Nor is it much easier to discover what part of those who openly declare themselves infidels, by their conduct and company, are absolutely and totally dead to all religious principle. Their ranks are continually changing. This is equally observable in small as well as in large communities. As we have recently seen, where an infidel lecturer makes his appearance in a country town, some few will collect around him from various motives, — from simple curiosity, the love of something new, discontent at certain religious movements by which they have been affected, or an aversion to all religion, originating in a prejudiced or vicious inclination. Where this has been the case, it is easy for the chief mover in such operations, to select an inhabitant of more or less influence in the place, and make him the "agent" in receiving and distributing the means of corruption. If great exertions are used, much temporary evil will undoubtedly follow. But where mild and judicious measures are exercised, no permanent evil consequences are likely to ensue. Even where these have not been used at all, very slight causes have sometimes entirely removed the evil, at least for a time. It was remarked a short time since, that, in one of our large manufacturing towns, where many were under the influence of infidelity, the panic caused by the expected approach of the Cholera put a most salutary check upon their labors. Revivals in religion, and the agitation of questions of great general interest, have often produced the same effects.

Still there are some who continue to labor in the spread of infidelity. They are well furnished with means, such as they are, and often show an earnestness and zeal which would be honorable to a holier cause. The sentiments which are advocated in their publications, are of such an accommodating nature, as to suit those who are at enmity with some other of our institutions besides the Christian religion. Temperance, tract, missionary, and Bible societies, are all spoken of in an abusive manner, while political matters are by no means left out of view.

The difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of giving infidelity an influence over the respectable and enlightened portions of our community, has suggested the practicability of spreading it in the less cultivated and newly settled parts of the country. The West is the field of exertion for the infidel, as well as for the enterprising farmer, the man of genius, and the Christian minister. The accounts which are given of the state of religion there, if they be not exaggerated, are such as to arouse the energies of the most indolent and unconcerned among us, who care at all for the present happiness and future welfare of our country. If we wish that our religion should plant its institutions there, in order that it may prevail in the growing prosperity of that large portion of our country, we cannot but feel that we are called upon to labor, even though the enemies of our faith were inactive. That their unhallowed zeal makes our duty more urgent, is plain to every one.

We would not picture forth in all their startling colors the legitimate and inevitable consequences which would ensue, were infidel sentiments to gain supreme ascendency in our land. He who attempts to do this in proper colors, will be shocked at the productions of his own imagination, before he has half completed the work. We would recommend to those who are as yet unaware of the consequences which must assuredly follow the general diffusion of the principles of modern infidelity, to peruse the Arguments of the Commonwealth's Attorney,* where they are strongly and accurately delineated. "Blasphemy," says Mr. Parker, "is but one part of the system. It is but one step, a fatal one indeed, still but one step in the road to ruin." The

* Especially from page 81st to the end.

disorganizing and deadly scenes, which were for a short period acted upon the comparatively narrow soil of France, will scatter ruin and despair over our whole continent, if the germs of that poisonous weed are allowed to grow and ripen. Though the work of desolation would be gradual, it would be none the less certain. The first step taken, to go on would be easier than to recede. Once let the wholesome restraints of Christianity be removed by a denial of all the truths of revelation, and the Creator himself will next be blotted out from his creation. Atheism will reverse every principle of morality and justice, — passion will reign supreme, and man's intellectual part will be content to grovel among the perishing objects which it acknowledges as its equals. The consequences of sin will be thought to be confined to this life; and, if they can be avoided here, vice will possess all the rewards and honors of virtue. The principles upon which society depends for its proper order, and even for its existence, will be destroyed. Children are no longer to be dependent upon their parents for education and support. The rights of private property will be at an end. Marriage is no longer to be binding, even as a civil contract. The physiological laws which the Creator has established for the reproduction and continuance of the human species, are to be perverted from their end, and made to minister only to the most licentious gratification of sensual appetites. Murder in one of its foulest and most atrocious forms, — infanticide before birth, is even now acknowledged as a privilege, a right, and in some instances an obligation. The most villanous treatise that ever secured a continued existence by being committed to print, has been written by a criminal in one of our prisons, for the express purpose of teaching the easiest method by which this horrid result may be attained, and is now in the hands of many of the young of both sexes in this city.

Such are the acknowledged ends which the deluded victims of infidelity have in view.

We have no room to enlarge upon this point, nor to suggest preventives or remedies, even if we felt qualified to do so. Though we have endeavoured to give the characteristics of infidelity, as it exists among us, we would not be understood as inferring, that, as such, they should excite alarm, as if Christianity was now attacked with a bolder hand, than

it has triumphantly withstood from the hour of its first propagation. Fear forms no part of the feelings which our subject should excite. Christianity has not passed through the storm and siege of nineteen centuries, in which power and wit and learning have been unsuccessfully arrayed against it, to be now overthrown by ridicule and bold impiety.

> "Its sacred fane
> Has stood the shock of ages, and shall tower sublime
> Above the waves and winds of time."

We repeat, that the religion of the Gospel contains within itself abundant means of resistance against every attack which may be aimed at it, as a Revelation from God, and a perfect moral code, adapted to man's weakness and his wants. But when its rejection by unbelievers is united with principles and practices destructive to morality and order, and utterly subversive of the peace, and even the existence of society, then the friends of the Gospel must come forth, as the friends of the law, and must enforce its obligations, in spite of the foolish cry of persecution, and the cowardly imputation of "priestcraft and hypocrisy."

[For the Christian Examiner.]

Art. IV. — *Review of the Essentials of Christianity.*

"It is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners." The reformation and salvation of sinners were the great objects of his mission and his ministry, and of the religion which he instituted and enjoined. As Christianity is a revelation from God, to teach men what they must do to be saved, it is reasonable to suppose that some things are essential, as conditions of pardon and eternal life. It seems also reasonable to suppose that those things which are essential or indispensable, are so represented by the faithful and true witness. To his teaching and his revelations, therefore, it behooves us to look for the essentials of Christianity.

By the essentials of Christianity we would be understood to mean, those things, without which we cannot be the obedient disciples of Christ, nor obtain the salvation which he came to effect. In regard to the question, What are the essentials of religion? a great diversity of opinion has existed among the contending sects of Christians. But if we can obtain Christ's testimony on this subject, we shall have the truth from unerring lips. We may not expect to find him saying, of any one doctrine or duty, *This is an essential of Christianity.* But we may perhaps find that he has used language clearly denoting what is essential. Any thing which he represents as essential to discipleship, to the pardon of our sins, or to entering the kingdom of heaven, may be safely regarded as an essential of the Christian religion. So, if he has mentioned any thing by which his disciples may be known or distinguished, this may be esteemed an essential. On these principles we shall enumerate some of the essentials of Christianity. But to prevent misapprehensions a few things may be premised.

First. The ministry of Christ was among a people, to whom had been committed the oracles of God, so far as these are contained in the Old Testament. From childhood they had been educated in the belief of one living and true God, who had revealed himself to them as "the Holy One of Israel." These facts may be regarded as the reason why the Messiah did not mention a belief in the existence of God, as one of the essentials of Christianity.

Second. As the salvation of sinners was the object of the Messiah's mission, in his preaching he addressed men as beings who needed to be saved from their sins. Of course, his teaching was adapted to the reformation of mankind, and to correct false opinions relating to moral right and wrong.

Third. As Jesus came as God's ambassador to introduce the Gospel dispensation, and to make further revelations of God's forgiving love, both to Jews and Gentiles, it was of great importance that men should believe in him and rely upon him, as one commissioned and sent by the Father of all, to make known his purposes of love and mercy. Hence, we find that Christ was particularly careful to have it understood that he was not an impostor, that he came

not in his own name, or to do his own will, but as one sent of God to do the will of him that sent him. As proof of these facts, he referred not merely to the testimony of John the Baptist, and to the voice from heaven at the time of his baptism, but to the numerous miracles which he had performed in the Father's name. Until men were convinced that he was commissioned by God, they could not receive his instructions and precepts as of divine authority. This we may regard as a good reason for his making faith in himself an essential of Christianity. Hence, too, we find John saying, near the close of his narrative, "These things are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing, ye might have life through his name." John xx. 31.

We may now exhibit a list of articles, which have the Messiah's stamp as essentials of Christianity.

1. "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." John iii. 16.
2. "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life." John iii. 36.
3. "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." Luke xiii. 3.
4. "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven." Matt. v. 20.
5. "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." John iii. 3.
6. "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Matt. xviii. 3.
7. "Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart; and ye shall find rest to your souls:" "And whosoever doth not bear his cross, and come after me, cannot be my disciple." Matt. xi. 29, and Luke xiv. 27.
8. "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." John xiii. 35.
9. "If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed." John viii. 31.

10. "If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will forgive you; but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses." Matt. vi. 14, 15.

11. "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doth the will of my Father who is in heaven." Matt. vii. 21.

12. "Therefore, whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him to a wise man who built his house upon a rock;" — "and every one who heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened to a foolish man who built his house on the sand." Matt. vii. 24, 26.

13. "For every one who exalteth himself, shall be abased; and he who humbleth himself, shall be exalted." Luke xviii. 14.

In the first of these articles the love of God is spoken of as the source of all that Christ has done for the salvation of men; and the Messiah is brought to view as the medium through which God displays his forgiving love.

The second article mentions believing on Christ as an indispensable condition of that life which the Gospel offers through him; and as evidence that this life has commenced in the soul. This may account for John's saying, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God," or *begotten* of God. 1 John v. 1. So much is not said of believing any other doctrine of the gospel. Yet how very seldom at the present day is this doctrine so much as *named* among the essentials of Christianity!

The last of the enumerated articles exhibits the principles of divine retribution. This is of such importance that it was stated by Christ on three different occasions. It shows what temper of mind we must possess to be exalted in the kingdom of God.

All the articles between the second and the last, illustrate either the nature of saving faith in Christ, or that humility of heart which is an indispensable condition of divine approbation. Other passages might have been quoted to illustrate the essentials of Christianity; but they are perhaps all implied in what we have already quoted; and several of these mutually imply each other.

The great purpose of all the articles which Christ rep-

resented as essential, is to save men from their sins, and to bring them into a state of moral or spiritual conformity to the Captain of their salvation. He that complies with these indispensable conditions will possess that love which is the fulfilling of the law, and that meek and quiet spirit which is, in the sight of God, of great price. To be of such a temper of mind is essential to gospel obedience, and to the enjoyment of that felicity which is prepared for the people of God.

The twelfth article embraces an important principle or idea, which should be understood in all the others. By the words, "Whosoever *heareth* these sayings of mine and doeth them, — or doeth them not," we are taught that what things soever the gospel saith, it saith to them who are under the gospel, or who are favored with gospel instructions. The requirements and threatenings of the gospel extend only to those who have opportunity to hear them. God does not hold the heathen as responsible for gospel privileges until these privileges are extended to them. In regard to those who are denied these privileges, God will know how to judge them in a manner which shall display both his righteousness and his mercy. In his hands we may safely leave them. The Judge of all the earth will do right.

It is worthy of serious notice how very different are the essentials of Christianity, as stated by the Messiah, from those doctrines which have been taught as essentials by uninspired men. How often have we seen lists of essential doctrines, so called, which did not embrace a single article which was ever uttered by Christ, or which was ever represented as an essential article by him, or by his Apostles! In modern catalogues of essential articles, it would almost seem, that the writers or compilers had studiously avoided every article which Christ mentioned as essential.

Where shall we look for a passage in which Christ said, — 'Except ye believe that God is three distinct persons of equal dignity, ye shall in no case enter the kingdom of God?'

Or, 'He that believeth on the Son, as the second person in the Trinity and equal with the Father, shall have everlasting life; but he that believeth not on the Son as the Father's equal, shall not see life.'

Or, 'Except ye believe that God shows his displeasure

against the first sin of Adam, by bringing all his posterity into the world with a nature wholly sinful, and under his wrath and curse, ye cannot see the kingdom of God.'

Or, 'Except ye believe that God forgives the penitent only on the ground of a vicarious punishment, which he inflicted on his innocent Son, of equal dignity with himself, ye cannot be my disciples.'

Or, 'Except ye believe that the repentance of a sinner is impossible, without the supernatural influences of the Holy Spirit, ye cannot be saved.'

Or where shall we find a form of speech, denoting what is essential, applied by Christ or his Apostles to any one of the doctrines which are at this day contended for as essential, or as a test of Christian character? We have examined the Scriptures not a little, and, as yet, we have been unable to find the least evidence, that any one of the modern, supposed essential doctrines, was so regarded by any inspired teacher or writer.

We may then ask, by what authority can any Christian, or sect of Christians, form and establish as a test of character, or essential article of faith, any thing which was not so represented or taught by Christ or his Apostles? We believe it to be impossible to show whence such authority could be derived, or to show that such acts are not of the nature of injustice or usurpation.

By careful examination it will be found that whatever Christ taught as essential, was adapted to produce humble and kind affections, — the very reverse of those which have too commonly been evinced in supporting such essentials as have been fabricated by uninspired men. Christ proposed no mysterious or unintelligible propositions, as essential articles of faith, — nothing more unintelligible, than that he was "the Messiah, the Son of the living God." Indeed he taught nothing as essential, which may not be included in the wisdom that is from above, that is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy.

The consequences of overlooking or disregarding what Christ taught as essential, and substituting the products of man's wisdom, deserve the most serious consideration. For to this policy may be ascribed by far the greater part of the contentions and persecutions which have occurred among

Christians. Indeed, something analogous to this occasioned the persecution which was suffered by the Messiah himself. The scribes and Pharisees had their system of essentials, on the ground of which they reviled, impeached, and persecuted the Prince of Peace. As in his opinion it was lawful to do good on the Sabbath, he healed on that day. On this ground they were not afraid to say, "We know that this man is a sinner." As he, in answer to questions, acknowledged before the Sanhedrim, that he was the Son of God, they accused him of blasphemy, and adjudged him as deserving of death. Hence, we may see that purity of character is no certain security against being defamed and persecuted, by men who dare to establish such essentials in religion, as are not authorized by God; and the fact that the pure character of the Messiah was thus calumniated, should make fallible men careful in regard to judging the hearts of those who happen to dissent from their self-invented essential doctrines.

It was not many years after the resurrection of Christ, before difficulties arose among his disciples, in regard to the essentials of religion. Some of the Jews, who avowed their belief in him as the Messiah, seem not to have been satisfied with what he taught as essentials. To these they wished to add circumcision; and thus they taught others who believed in Christ, — "Except ye be circumcised after the manner of Moses, ye cannot be saved." Thus they would have made circumcision, one of their own traditions, essential to the salvation of Gentiles. The advocates for this doctrine occasioned much trouble in the churches, and did much to excite strong prejudices against Paul. At subsequent periods other doctrines were taught as essential, and tests of character. It would perhaps be impossible now to collect and exhibit the multitude of doctrines which have been contended for as essential, since the days of the Apostles, by one sect or another; doctrines, too, which were never thought of as essential by Christ, or any inspired writer. Each creed-making sect has had its essential doctrines; and what has been deemed essential by one sect, has been censured as heresy by another. By such means, the professed friends of Christ have been, from age to age, divided into sects hostile to each other.

It is a remarkable fact, that the doctrine which has been

placed at the head of essentials in New England, was never heard of among Christians for more than three centuries after the birth of the Messiah. The creed of the posterity of Abraham was this, — "Jehovah is our God; Jehovah is one." This was the creed of Moses and the Prophets. They regarded God as "the Holy One of Israel;" and to him, as one person, they offered their prayers and praises. To the same God, as to one person, and "the only true God," the Messiah addressed his prayers and praises. To the same God, and the same person, under the endearing title of Father, Jesus taught his disciples to pray. All the preaching, and all the prayers which are recorded in the Bible, are as strictly Unitarian, as to the personality of God, as any thing we ever wrote, uttered, or even thought. But in the fourth century, the doctrine of the Trinity was gradually formed. According to Mosheim, it did not receive "its finishing touch" till the time of the Council of Constantinople, in the latter part of the fourth century. This council, it seems, established the opinion that the Spirit of God is a distinct person. Until this was done, there was no such thing as the doctrine of the Trinity, or a "Three-One God," known to Jews or Christians. As the doctrine was formed in a most contentious state of the council, so it has been an unceasing cause of strife from that day to the present. In the quarrels and wars occasioned by this doctrine, much blood was shed, and many thousands of lives were sacrificed. Such have been some of the melancholy effects, which have resulted from the conduct of uninspired men, in assuming a right to form essential articles of faith, in addition to those which were represented to be such by the Head of the Church.

After much inquiry and deliberate examination, we can say with truth, that we believe that not so much as one of the doctrines which have been contended for in New England, as essential, within the last fifty years, was ever spoken of as essential by any inspired teacher. But, that these doctrines were not spoken of as essential by inspired teachers, is not our only objection. Several of them appear to us directly the reverse of what was taught by Christ, and really reproachful to our heavenly Father. That some of them are contrary to the teaching of Christ, we shall attempt briefly to show by way of contrast.

1. As a contrast to the doctrine, that God is *three* distinct persons, the Messiah said, — "The chief of all the commandments, is, Hearken, Israel, the Lord is our God; the Lord is ONE," or, "Jehovah is our God, Jehovah is ONE;" "and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." Mark xii. 29.*

2. As a contrast to the doctrine, that Christ is a second person in the Godhead, equal with the Father in power and glory, he taught thus: — "The Father is greater than I;" "I can of mine own self do nothing;" "The Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works."

3. As a contrast to the doctrine, that God shows his displeasure against Adam's sin, by bringing all little children into the world "under his wrath and curse," with a nature wholly sinful; Jesus said of little children, — "Of such is the kingdom of heaven." He regarded men as sinners, and called them to repentance; but, during his whole ministry, he omitted to say a word respecting the apostasy of Adam. We have no evidence, that he ever spoke of Adam, or his fall.

4. As a contrast to the doctrine, that God inflicted on his Son, a person equal with himself, "the punishment due to us all," Christ taught, that, as a good shepherd, he should give his life for his sheep, and "suffer many things," — not from the displeasure of God against him, as our substitute, — but "from the elders, and the chief priests, and scribes." So, when the time approached, he said to his disciples, — "Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of Man shall be betrayed unto the chief priests, and unto the scribes, and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him to the Gentiles, to mock, and to scourge, and to crucify; and the third day he shall rise again."

5. As a contrast to the doctrine, that it is impossible for any sinner to repent without the *special*, or *supernatural*, aid of the Holy Spirit, Jesus said, "Except a man be born of water and the spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of

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* See Campbell's translation, and his note on the text. The commandment was quoted from Deuteronomy vi. 4. Both Moses and the Messiah have given, "Hearken, Israel, Jehovah is our God; Jehovah is one," as a part of the first and great commandment. That God is one, not three, is a truth to which we are required to attend by "the first commandment of all."

God." Our objection here is, to the *addition* of the idea of *special*, or *supernatural*, to what was taught by Christ; and to this we object, because we think it implies, that the common aids of the spirit are insufficient, and of course, that God does not usually grant a capacity commensurate with the duties he requires. For, while such aid is withheld, as is essential to obedience, the capacity for obedience must be incomplete.

The "Five Points" of Calvinism, which long agitated the Protestant churches, were, in some respects, different from the articles held most essential at this day. One of them seems to be discarded, and others have lost that importance, which our ancestors attached to them. The articles of faith, which one sect affirms as essential, and another denies, are not expressed in the language of the Bible. They are the "words of man's wisdom," or man's folly. The accusation, therefore, so often heard, that this man, or this sect, rejects the great doctrines of the Gospel, is generally as unfounded as it is unkind. It is but the interpretation of fallible men that is denied. Let any doctrine of the Gospel be honestly stated in the language of Scripture, and where is the Christian, or the sect, that will deny its truth? And shall a Christian be so unjust, as to accuse a brother of denying a doctrine of the Gospel, while he only denies the correctness of a fallible interpretation?

The reason why *we* dissent from some doctrines which others regard as true and important, is this; we verily believe, that the doctrines are not the doctrines of revelation. Such we suppose to be the reason why good men of other sects reject some doctrines which we regard as very important. Candor and justice require, that, on each side, we should forbear accusations, which would imply, that the interpretation of a fallible man is of equal authority with the word of God. If it be so to the man who believes it to be the meaning of Scripture, it surely cannot be so to him, who believes that the doctrine is founded in misapprehension of what is said by the inspired writer or teacher.

It is remarkable, to what extent Christians have been divided and subdivided into sects, by the unauthorized practice of setting up other articles of faith, as essential, besides those, which are designated as such, by the Head of the Church. To make a change, as to essential articles in a

religion which was confessedly of divine origin, seems to us a perilous undertaking; and the consequences of assuming such a right have been deplorable.

Much has been said of the "soul-humbling" tendency of those doctrines which pass for essential in New England; and it has been imputed to nothing less criminal than pride of heart, that any dissent from these doctrines. Far be it from us to reproach our brethren of any sect, or to render evil for evil; but since it is publicly known that individuals of one sect assume the name of Orthodox and Evangelical Christians, and even reproach all dissenters from their creed as unworthy of the name of Christians, it seems to be a duty to make some inquiry in regard to these assumptions and accusations. But let it be understood, that we do not believe that *all* the Christians, nor *all* the clergy of the sect alluded to, concur in the assumptions and accusations to which we have referred. In reference to those who are in the habit of such assumptions and reproaches, we would address some queries and remarks; and in what follows of this article, our language will have the form of an address to an individual minister of the gospel.

In the first place, we ask you, dear Sir, the following serious question. Does a fallible, uninspired man, evince an humble mind, by forming or adopting, as a test of character, such articles or propositions as were never spoken of as essential by the Lord Jesus or any of his Apostles? Considering how very liable we all are, to err in our interpretations of Scripture, and how incompetent men are to look into each other's hearts, does not such conduct have more of the appearance of pride and self-sufficiency, than of Christian humility, meekness, and love? How does such conduct appear to you in a Catholic, when he denounces you and all Protestants as heretics, on account of their dissent from his great and essential doctrine, that the consecrated bread and wine in the Lord's Supper are the real body and blood of Christ? He may tell you, that this is a very "soul-humbling" doctrine; because, like the doctrine of the Trinity, it asserts what is above reason, and seems to be contrary to it. He may also say, and say truly, that his doctrine has far more of the appearance of having been stated by Christ as essential, than either of the doctrines which you deem essential. For, not only does

Christ say of the bread, "This is my body," and of the wine, "This is my blood;" but he says, "My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed;" — and what is still more, he says, "Except ye eat the flesh, and drink the blood of the Son of man, ye have no life in you." May not, then, the good Catholic accuse you of great pride of heart, in so exalting your own reason as to reject the literal sense of Christ's words, assigning to them a figurative or symbolical meaning? He indeed makes out a strong case; but does he satisfy you, that the pride is not on his own part, while he ventures to judge and censure the hearts of millions perhaps as honest as himself?

Or, suppose that *we* should set up our great doctrine as a test of character, "that God is ONE" and not *three*, and on this ground should reproach you and millions of others, as unworthy of the name of Christians, because they dissent from our interpretation of the Scriptures. Would this evince humility in us? If not, how does it appear, that your doctrines have had a "soul-humbling" influence on your own mind?

We would next inquire, — Is it an evidence of humility in you, as an individual, to assume it as a fact, that you are really more humble, pure, and upright, than any one of the myriads of people who dissent from your creed? Does such conduct evince the temper required by Christ, when he directed his disciples to "take the lowest room?" Is it what Paul means in his exhortation, — Let each esteem others better than himself? Does it not better accord with the spirit of the Pharisee, who thanked God that he was not as other men? What must be the impression on the minds of candid people, who hear you denouncing, as unworthy of the name of Christians, such men as Newton and Locke, — including in the same wholesale condemnation, Abraham, Moses, and the prophets, who unquestionably believed in God as ONE, and not as *three?* If it be the nature of your supposed "soul-humbling" doctrines to produce such censorious accusations, we must think such fruits to be evidence that the trees are not "very good," — that they have not the stamp of a divine origin. Indeed, we cannot doubt, that when you see such fruits in any sect, except your own, you ascribe them to something of a nature different from Christian humility. Humility pertains to that

charity or love, which "vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, thinketh no evil, hopeth all things." Is such the nature of your assumptions and accusations?

You may doubtless say, that you have verily thought you ought to do and say many things against the dissenters from your creed; and that you have no satisfactory evidence, that any of them are good people. So Paul verily thought he ought to do many things against Jesus of Nazareth, which things he did, by persecuting Christians with unrelenting cruelty. He might say, that he saw no satisfactory evidence, that any of them were good people. So the Jewish Sanhedrim might probably have said, that they saw no satisfactory evidence that Jesus was any thing better than an impostor. But why this blindness in the Sanhedrim, and in Saul of Tarsus? They looked at Christ and his disciples through the medium of prejudice, and judged of them by false traditionary tests, neglecting the proper and prudent means of forming a correct opinion. If they heard Christ preach, it was not that they might form correct opinions of him and his doctrine, but that they might catch something from his lips, on which they could ground an accusation. If they saw him perform the most beneficent miracles, such were their prejudices, that they ascribed these good deeds to the aid of the devil. While under the influence of such prejudices, what *could* be evidence to their minds of the goodness of the Messiah?

We well recollect, that there was a time, when many of your denomination seemed verily to think, that they ought to do many things against the Baptists; and about forty years ago, we heard an eminent minister of your denomination, express serious doubts, whether any of the Baptists were really good people. He was reminded that Dr. Stillman was a man of good reputation. But your good brother still had his doubts, though he hesitated to say that Dr. Stillman was not a good man. Yet, Sir, you are aware that the Baptists are at this time a numerous and respectable denomination. Few, we believe, at this day, think it to be either impossible or improbable, that a Baptist may be a good man. Since, then, it is so evident, that men have been very liable to misjudge the characters of those who dissent from their creed, it would seem, that there has been a good opportunity for reflecting and observing men to learn

wisdom; and to be cautious, lest haply they should be found to fight against God, by calumniating and abusing his friends. But it is a deplorable fact, that Christians have been slow to believe the things which concern the true interest and peace of the church. They see that one sect after another is formed, and abused,—and that the very means which are employed to prevent their increase, have the contrary effect. Yet the same or similar means are still pursued in successive ages and generations.

One of your accusations and reproaches against us, is this, that we exalt reason above revelation;—and what, Sir, are the grounds of this reproach? When by reflection, we have found in some of the opinions which we derived from tradition and education, or in the popular opinions of others, that which seems to us to be repugnant to reason or reproachful to the character of God, we have employed our reason to ascertain, whether such opinions were not founded in misinterpretations of the oracles of God. In various instances we have found satisfactory evidence that such was the fact; and the consequent change of our own opinions, and the reasons for such change, we have frankly avowed, and have published them for the consideration of our brethren at the hazard of reputation and worldly prospects. But this we do not regard as preferring our reason to revelation, but as employing reason to obtain a right understanding of what the mercy of a heavenly Father has revealed for our benefit. Permit us, Sir, here to ask, have you never employed your reason for such worthy purposes? Have you not, by such an employment of reason, found occasion to alter your opinion in regard to the meaning of some ambiguous portions of Scripture? If you have, we ask further, did you regard this as preferring reason to revelation? and would you not have deemed it injurious in others, to accuse you of this on such ground? If you have not employed reason in this way, such neglect may account, perhaps, for your continuing to regard as essential doctrines, the fabrications of fallible men.

We, or some who have agreed with us, that God is one, may have, on some occasions, been imprudent in what has been said of the office or value of reason in regard to revelation; and, perhaps, it has been so with yourself. But be assured, Sir, that we employ our reason from regard to

revelation, and not in contempt of that gift. We may also observe, that we esteem revelation and reason, as equally gifts from the Father of lights; and to speak contemptuously of reason, as some have done, seems to us little less than speaking disrespectfully of the goodness of God, by which the gift was bestowed. Reason is fallible, and revelation infallible; yet, were it not that we possess the faculty of reason, revelation would be of as little value to us, as it is to reptiles and insects.

In regard, however, to the charge of preferring reason to revelation, we deem the charge as misplaced. For, believing as we do, that our reason is fallible, and that we are very liable to err in our interpretations of the oracles of God, we have not dared to set up any of our inferences from what we deem Scripture premises, as essential articles of faith, or as tests of Christian character. We deem it more safe for us, and more respectful to others, to acquiesce in what Christ established as essential, than to exalt our reason so far, as to assume the right of forming other tests or essential doctrines. Can you, Sir, honestly make a similar declaration? As we have seen already, not so much as one of the articles which you have declared essential, was ever so represented by Him, who came from God to teach us what we must do to be saved. The articles, therefore, must have been fabricated by your reason, or the reason of others, fallible like yourself. Yet, is it not undeniable that you prefer these fruits of reason to the revelations of God, considered as essential articles of faith? If they are not preferred, why are they substituted for those which have the explicit sanction of the Head of the Church? Are you not, then, liable to the very charge which you have attempted in vain to fix on others? Show that we have, in like manner, or in any manner equally glaring, preferred our reason to revelation, and we will at once plead guilty, and supplicate the forgiveness of God and our fellow Christians.

That we have imperfections, both natural and moral, we cannot deny; and that there are some of the dissenters from your creed who are irreligious men, we do not doubt. But are you, Sir, free from moral imperfections? And are there no irreligious men who adopt your "soul-humbling doctrines"? If you can truly answer these queries in the

negative, you may have reason to suppose that your creed is more efficacious and salutary, than ours. Still, you should remember, that your creed has subjected you to great disadvantages in respect to judging impartially of the characters or the conduct of your dissenting brethren. For your creed implies the belief, that it is impossible there should be any thing morally good in those who dissent from your test of character. Prior to giving them a hearing, you have pronounced them undeserving of the name of Christians. What confidence, then, can be placed in your judgment, or your declarations, respecting them? The same that might have been placed in the judgment and declaration of him, who said of the "holy one of God," — "We *know* that this man is a sinner." We verily believe that some articles of your creed are in contradiction to the revelations of God. Should we connect with this, a belief that no good man can dissent from our creed, or that all who dissent are unworthy to be called Christians, would you not have reason to say, that we are in no situation to judge impartially of your characters or of your conduct? Judges of courts have sometimes declined acting, being conscious of prepossessions against one of the parties. When a prisoner is to be tried for his life, the jurors are severally questioned, whether they have formed an opinion on the cause to be tried. If any one acknowledges that he has, he is set aside, and another man is called in his room. Or, should it be made to appear, that one or more of the jurors had expressed an opinion against the prisoner, prior to the trial, and manifested strong prejudices against him, he, or they, would be set aside as disqualified. Admitting the principle to be good, on which such measures are adopted, what reliance could reasonably be placed on your judgment of any minister who dissents from your doctrine, that God is three. Have you not adopted a test on the ground of which you have denounced indiscriminately all such dissenters? And have you not been more or less employed in efforts to destroy their reputation as Christians, and to render them odious in the estimation of their parishes, and of the whole community? With what propriety, then, could you sit in a council, when one of them is to be tried? Or, of what value can be your judgment against him?

In view of the legal or common-sense principle, on which

prejudice is regarded as disqualifying a man for acting as a judge or juror, you may perhaps learn why your accusations and reproaches have not occasioned the dismission of every Unitarian minister in the United States. If what you and some of your brethren have said against them had been generally believed to be true, their reputation would have been ruined, and they would all have been dismissed, if not hooted from their parishes and driven into exile. But notwithstanding you have so often reproached them as infidels, or as bad as infidels, as enemies to God and Christ, and unworthy of the name of Christians, yet, many of them at least, are held in esteem by men as worthy perhaps as yourself, and much better acquainted with their real characters, than yourself. We cannot account for the fact that your accusations have not been more extensively ruinous to them, except on the ground, that you and others are regarded as so far under the dominion of prejudice, that, in this case, your opinion and your reproaches are entitled to little respect. We do not esteem it a light thing to be thus reproached and denounced by our brethren of another sect; but we have consoling evidence to our own minds, that God's thoughts of us are not as your thoughts; and we recollect, that as bad things were said of the Messiah, whose disciples we are, as have been said of us, — and that he forewarned his disciples that they would have to endure such trials and reproaches. Besides, we have verily believed, that in your attempts to ruin the Christian character of your brethren, you were so bewildered by prejudice and party passions, that what Christ said on one occasion to James and John, he might with equal truth say to you, — "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of." Seeing that Christ still treated men as his disciples who sometimes erred, not only in opinion, but in temper and practice, it is our aim to follow his example. We, therefore, still regard you as a Christian, while we disapprove of that in your conduct, which seems to us antichristian. We wish ever to be able to pray, "Father, forgive us, as we forgive those who trespass against us."

You will probably say, that there have also been reproachful things said by Unitarians, which tended to injure the character of the clergy of your denomination. This we shall not deny, — and we lament, that there has ever been ground of complaints of this kind against any who dissent

from you, or agree with us. Still, if we mistake not, there are some facts which afford ground for a distinction in the two cases. Though, on our part, there are things which we have often sincerely deplored, there are things which we have *not* done. We have *not* been in the habit of indiscriminate censure or denunciation of all who agree with you in opinion, — not even of the clergy of your sect as a body. While we have censured the acts of individuals, we have distinguished between them and others; and, even in regard to those whose conduct we have disapproved, we have often expressed a hope of their general piety. We have never set up our peculiar or distinguishing doctrines, as a test of moral character, — censuring as infidels, or unworthy of the Christian name, all who dissent from our opinions. Nor have we formed any combination, or systematic plan of operation, for the purpose of destroying in public estimation the character of Trinitarians. If such things have ever been done by any who bear the name of Unitarians, the facts are positively unknown to us, and are such as we should most cordially disapprove. How it has been on your part, in regard to such conduct, we have no occasion to declare. On this point you are doubtless better informed than we are. We, therefore, leave the subject to your own reflections.

Whoever may have been the more in fault, as to the present state of things between the different sects, we hope that none will be found to deny, that it is deplorable. We cannot wonder at the success of infidelity, while there is such a manifest want of that love, by which the disciples of Christ were to be known and distinguished from unbelievers. If men might safely judge of the nature and value of Christianity, from the bitter fruits which have resulted from the adoption of party creeds and tests, we might reasonably wonder, that avowed infidels are not more numerous at the present time.

We know of but one remedy for the existing evils. If all sects would adopt, as essential doctrines and tests of discipleship, those things which Christ and his Apostles taught as such; and discard, or remove from the list of essentials, such things as they never taught, or never represented as essential, the people of different sects might then enjoy the happiness, which results from love, forbearance,

and peace. All intelligent Christians, who duly reflect on the subject, must be aware, that the articles which Christ taught as essential, are truly of a "soul-humbling" nature, — not because they are mysterious, unintelligible, or above the reach of reason; but because they are plain, and easy to be understood, requiring us to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with God. As the first of all the commandments requires each man to love God with all his own understanding, we have no reason to expect true rest and peace among Christians, so long as the people of one sect make their measure of understanding and light the standard for others. When we duly consider the great diversity in the mental faculties of mankind, — in the advantages they enjoy for acquiring knowledge, and in their modes of education, — a vast diversity of opinion seems inevitable. Yet, with all this diversity of opinion, honest people may agree in this, that each should love God with all his own understanding, and this is all our righteous God requires. If you have more understanding, than we have, God does not require us to love him with all your understanding, but with all our own; and if we should be disposed to conform to the second commandment, and each love his neighbour as himself, we shall severally forbear to usurp dominion over each other's faith, and love one another with a pure heart fervently. In this way, there may be rest to each soul, and peace one with another. The unavoidable diversity of honest opinions among men, gives opportunity for the trial of our tempers, and for the display of Christian meekness, forbearance, and pure, undissembled love, — such opportunity, too, as we should not have had, were there no diversity of opinion.

By due conformity to what Christ taught as essential, Christians would so learn of him, as to find rest to their souls. An end would occur to all bitterness, wrath, strife, and censorious judging; and Christians of different opinions, would know, how good and how pleasant it is, for brethren to dwell together in unity. Then they would be in the right way to make rapid advances in the knowledge of the Scriptures, and the things which belong to their peace, — and to correct a multitude of errors. Whatever new discovery of truth might be made by one, would be freely communicated to others, then candidly examined by the

law and the testimony, and, if found correct, it would soon become a part of the common stock of useful knowledge, and be applied to useful purposes. In such a state, among Christians, there would be something that might be called the kingdom of heaven, — consisting, "not in meat and drink, but in righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." Then, too, Christians of different opinions, might know by experience, what the Saviour meant, when he said, — "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation, for behold, the Kingdom of God is WITHIN YOU." Luke xvii. 20, 21.

Dr. Wayland has said,* "Candor may be made to take the place of prejudice, and envy may be exchanged for a generous love of truth." For such an event, Christians of every sect should pray and labor by day and by night. Happy will be the day, when such a change of feeling shall become general among the professed disciples of Christ. But, in our opinion, this happiness will not be generally enjoyed, until the doctrines, which the Messiah taught as essential, shall be preferred to those, which have been forged by fallible men in the fires of antichristian strife; nor so long as the clergy of a numerous sect shall continue to reproach as infidels, men who verily believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God, and who make it their study and delight to obey his precepts. From the manner, in which a belief in this doctrine is treated by many, at the present day, who would suspect, that the following passages are to be found in the Bible? "Whosoever believeth, that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God." "Whosoever shall confess, that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God."

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* Discourse on Education.

ART. V. — 1. *De la Religion, considérée dans sa Source, ses Formes et ses Developpements.* Par M. BENJAMIN CONSTANT. 5 Tomes. 8vo. Paris. 1824, 1827, 1831.

2. *Du Polythéisme Romain, considéré dans ses Rapports avec la Philosophie Grecque et la Religion Chrétienne,* Ouvrage posthume de BENJAMIN CONSTANT, précédé d'une Introduction de M. J. MATTER. 2 Tomes. 8vo. Paris. 1833.

WHY is man affected by religious considerations? Why has he, wherever found, some kind of religious worship? Why does he, by turns, embrace and abandon that vast variety of religious forms, which range from the loathsome fetichism of the savage, to the simple and sublime monotheism of the Christian? Is it by accident, or in accordance with certain invariable and indestructible laws? If in accordance with certain laws, what are these laws? Such were the questions which passed through the mind of Benjamin Constant, and produced the works placed at the head of this article; — works, which, if they are not so perfect as to leave us nothing to desire on the topics they treat, open a new route to the philosopher, and let in light upon many a dark passage in the history of religions.

In these works, Benjamin Constant attempts to reduce our religious history to a science, and to verify its laws. He brings forward a striking and important theory, develops and sustains it with much felicity of style, with great beauty of language, power of argument, and extensive erudition. He may not, indeed, always convince the understanding, but he never fails to enlighten the mind, to warm the heart, and invigorate the religious sentiment. In going through his volumes, he compels us to run over the errors and the follies, the vices and the crimes, of a hundred ages; but he spreads over them such a warm sun-light, from a benevolent heart, that they lead to no discouragement, excite no misanthropic emotions, but increase our love for mankind, and inspire us with new zeal and confidence in the noble work of setting the human race forward in the march towards perfection.

He begins his work with the position, that all beings,

created or uncreate, animate or inanimate, rational or irrational, have their laws. These laws constitute the nature of each species, and are the general and permanent cause of each one's mode of existence. We do not know, we cannot know, the origin of these laws. All we know, or need know, is, that they exist, and in all our attempts to explain any partial phenomena, we must assume their existence, as our point of departure.

Man has his laws,—laws which constitute him what he is, that is to say, man. By one of these laws, he is led to seek some object to venerate, to adore, between whom, and himself, he may establish mutual relations. That this is by a law of his nature, is inferred from its being peculiar to man, and common to nearly all men, in all ages, and in all positions, being always reproduced with the new generation. It follows from this, that man is not religious by accident, —has not religion because he is weak or timid, or through the influence of wily statesmen, as some have asserted, nor because he has reasoned himself into the belief of its truth and utility; but because he is man, and must be religious or divest himself of a part of his nature. It is no longer a question, then, whether we ought to preserve or destroy religion. That matter is settled. Religion man has, and will have. He is determined to it by an interior sentiment, by a fundamental law of his being, a law invariable, eternal, indestructible.

But if man is determined to religion by a fundamental law of his being, how comes it that men, even wise and virtuous men, at various epochs, are either indifferent or opposed to it? To solve this problem, we must distinguish between the religious sentiment, and religious institutions. The sentiment results from that craving, which we have, to place ourselves in communication with invisible powers; the institutions, the form, from that craving which we also have, to render the means of that communication, we think to have discovered, regular and permanent. The consecration, regularity, and permanence, of these means, are things, with which we cannot well dispense. We would count upon our faith. We would find it to-day what it was yesterday, and not have it seem ready at each moment to vanish and escape from us like a vapor. We demand the suffrage of those, with whom we have relations of interest, of habit, or of

affection ; for we take pleasure in our own sentiments only when they are attached to the universal sentiment. We do not love to nourish an opinion which no one shares with us. We aspire, for our thoughts as well as for our conduct, to the approbation of others ; and we ask an external sanction to complete our internal satisfaction. Hence the nenessity of religious institutions, the reason why the sentiment is always clothed with some form.

But every positive form, however satisfactory it may be for the present, contains a germ of opposition to future progress. It contracts, by the very effect of its duration, a stationary character, that refuses to follow the intellect in its discoveries, and the soul in its emotions, which each day renders more pure and delicate. Forced to borrow images more and more material, in order to make the greater impression upon its adherents, the religious form soon comes to present man, wearied with this world, only another very little different. The ideas it suggests are daily narrowed down to the terrestrial ideas, of which they are only a copy, and the epoch arrives when it presents to the mind only assertions which it cannot admit, and to the soul only practices which can no longer satisfy it. The sentiment now breaks away from that form, which, if one may so speak, has become petrified; it asks another form, one which will not wound it, and it ceases not its exertions till it obtains it. Here is the history of religion ; but without the distinction between the sentiment and the form, it would be for ever unintelligible. The sentiment is lodged in the bottom of the soul, always the same, unalterable, and eternal ; the form is variable and transitory.

But if the form be variable and transitory, it is not by accident that the sentiment combines now with this form, and now breaks from it to combine with another. That which we worship is always the highest worth of which we can form any conception. We always embody in our religious institutions, all our ideas of the true, the beautiful, and the good. Consequently, the object of our worship, and the religious institutions we adopt, or the form with which we clothe the religious sentiment, will always be exactly proportioned to our mental developement and moral progress. At every epoch, there is cherished and defended, as pure a form of religion, as the general civilization of that

epoch will admit. The lowest, the grossest form of religion is fetichism. But, low and gross as this form of religion is, it is the purest and the most elevated, which the minds and the hearts of the tribes who adopt it can grasp, and nothing better, more spiritual, can be received, till there be an advance in civilization. Yet this form, miserable as it may seem at more advanced stages of mental and moral progress, is good and useful when adopted. It then responds to the wants of the soul, is in harmony with the lights of the understanding, and has a binding tie upon the conscience. It is at that epoch desirable, — has an important mission to accomplish.

But the correspondence between this form and the wants of the mind and the heart, is soon broken. Man is a progressive being. The institutions which he adopts to-day help him onward; but as they do not advance with him, he has soon outgrown them, and begun the work of exchanging them for others. The religious sentiment itself is the very spirit of progress. It labors unceasingly to purify the form with which it is combined. It is for ever struggling to enlarge the sphere of its activity. It demands a broader horizon; it shoots off into the unknown, rises to the infinite, and seizes upon the perfect. Left to the workings of this interior sentiment, man would march onward with an uninterrupted progress, and every day become able to conceive a nobler object of worship, and to embody more of excellence in his form of religion. The unyielding nature of every religious form, combined with the influence of the sacerdotal corporations, which always have an interest in perpetuating the existing order, whatever it may be, interrupts, however, this regular progress, and keeps him wedded to the low and the worthless form, from which he should long since have been divorced. But, if interrupted, suspended, progress cannot be wholly prevented. Fetichism ceases to be in harmony with civilization. Its mission ends, and a new religious form is demanded. Polytheism is elaborated, improved, perfected, but in its turn it must yield to theism, to the theism of Christianity.

Each religious form has three epochs. At first, man seizes upon a religion, — that is, following his instinct, directed by the lights of his understanding, he seeks to discover the relations which exist between him and invisible

powers. When he believes he has discovered these relations, he gives them a regular and determinate form. Having provided for this first craving of his nature, he developes and perfects his other faculties. But his very successes render the form, which he had given to his religious ideas, disproportioned to his developed and perfected faculties. Now begins the second epoch. From this moment the destruction of that form is inevitable. The polytheism of the Iliad no longer comporting with the age of Pericles, Euripides, in his tragedies, becomes the organ of a nascent irreligion.

If the old creed be prolonged by institutions, sacerdotal corporations, or other means, the human race, during this factitious prolongation, is furnished only with an existence purely mechanical, in which there is nothing of life. Faith and enthusiasm desert religion, and there are left only formulas, observances, and priests. But this forced state has its limits. A conflict commences, not only between the established religion and the understanding which it insults, but between it and the religious sentiment, which it has ceased to satisfy. This conflict brings about the third epoch, — the annihilation of the form, which stirred up rebellion; and hence the crises of complete unbelief, — crises, disorderly, sometimes terrible, but inevitable, when man wants to be delivered from what has become, and hereafter can be, only a bar to improvement. These crises are always followed by a form of religious ideas better suited to the faculties of the human mind, and religion comes forth from its ashes, with a new youth, purer, and more beautiful.

This distinction between the religious sentiment, and the religious form, is very necessary to be made. It explains many of the phenomena, which occur in the history of religion. This explains wherefore it is, that men of virtuous lives, of ardent enthusiasm, of generous devotion to liberty, and to the welfare of their fellow beings, have, at times, opposed themselves to religion. They are men who have outgrown the established form. It no longer responds to the wants of their souls, no longer comports with their understanding, nor comes up to their ideas of the perfect. They rebel against it, and the religious sentiment itself in them is found combating a religious form, which galls it, and restrains its free and healthy action. This explains the

existence, and the great influence of certain infidel writers. Writers are the organs of their age. They collect and bring out the ideas of their times. Had Lucian been placed in the age of Homer, or merely in that of Pindar, — had Voltaire been born under Louis IX., or Louis XI., Lucian and Voltaire had not even attempted to shake the belief of their contemporaries, or would have attempted it in vain. They were less indebted to their own merit for the applauses which they obtained from their own times, and for the eulogiums which encouraged them, than to the conformity of their doctrines, to those which began to be accredited. They said plainly and unreservedly what every body thought. Each, recognising himself in them, admired himself in his interpreter. Men must begin to doubt, before one can have much success in shaking their belief, and certainly before one can gain celebrity by attempting it. This explains why it is impossible at some epochs to disseminate doubt, and equally impossible, at others, to establish conviction. This is not accidental. It is not by mere caprice, that people are devout or irreligious. When the religious form is in harmony with the religious sentiment, and with the faculties of the mind, doubt is impossible; when that harmony no longer exists, belief is equally impossible. A believing epoch marks institutions which respond to the wants of the soul, and of the understanding; an unbelieving epoch marks a growth, an advance, which has left those institutions behind, — a search after new institutions, which will answer to the new wants that have been developed, and with which the faculties of the human mind may unite, and gather strength to take another step onward in its endless career of perfectibility.

From Benjamin Constant's theory, slightly and imperfectly as we have now presented even its most prominent traits, we may derive much to soften our indignation at the past, and to inspire us with hope for the future. All the great institutions of former times have been good in their day, and in their places, and have had missions essential to the progress of humanity to accomplish. The Catholic institution, Catholicism, which still excites the wrath and indignation of many a religionist, as well as of many an unbeliever, was a noble institution in its time. It was a mighty advance upon the paganism which preceded it.

It was suited to the wants of the age in which it flourished, and we are indebted to it for the very light which has enabled us to discover its defects. Its vices, — and they need not be disguised, — appertain to the fact, that it has lingered beyond its hour. It has now, and long has had, only a factitious existence. Its work was long since done, its purpose accomplished, and it now only occupies the space, that should be filled with another institution, — one which will combine all our discoveries and improvements, and be in harmony with the present state of mental and moral progress.

Protestantism cannot be said to supply the place of Catholicism. Protestantism is not a religion, is not a religious institution, contains in itself no germ of organization. Its purpose was negative, one of destruction. It was born in the conflict raised up by the progress of mind against Catholicism, which had become superannuated. Its mission was legitimate, was necessary, was inevitable; but may we not ask, if it be not accomplished? Catholicism is destroyed, or at least, is ready to disappear entirely, as soon as a new principle of social and religious organization, capable of engaging all minds and hearts in its service, shall present itself. And this new principle will present itself. Men will not always live in a religious anarchy. The confusion of the transition-state in which we now are, must end, and a new religious form be disclosed, which all will love and obey.

But we need not go out of Christianity to find this new principle. Christianity contains the germs of many new principles, which wait only the proper hour to develope themselves. We have, as yet, seen but little of Christianity, suspected but little of what it is, and what it contains. Christianity is unalterable, eternal, indestructible as to its foundation; but it is exceedingly flexible, as to its forms. In one stage of spiritual improvement, it unites enthusiastically with Catholicism, and, in another, it unites no less enthusiastically with Protestantism, and urges it on in its career of destruction. A great excellence of Christianity, and one of the most striking proofs of its divine origin, is the fact, that it is wedded to no form, but can unite with all forms, and exist in all stages of civilization. Indeed, in the last analysis, it is little else than the religious sentiment

itself, detached from all forms, exhibiting itself in its divine purity and simplicity.

We think the time has come for us to clothe the religious sentiment with a new form, and to fix upon some religious institution, which will at once supply our craving for something positive in religion, and not offend the spirituality which Christianity loves, and towards which the human race hastens with an increasing celerity. We think, we see indications, that this presents itself to many hearts as desirable. And we think we see this especially among our own friends. Every religious denomination must run through two phases, the one destructive, the other organic. Unitarianism could commence only by being destructive. It must demolish the old temple, clear away the rubbish, to have a place whereon to erect a new one. But that work is done; that negative character which it was obliged to assume then, may now be abandoned. The time has now come to rear the new temple, — for a positive work, and, if we are not mistaken, we already see the workmen coming forth with joy to their task. We already see the germ of re-organization, the nucleus, round which already gravitate the atoms of a new moral and religious world. The work of elaboration is well nigh ended, the positive institutions, so long sought, will soon be obtained, and the soul, which has so long been tossed upon a sea of dispute, or of skepticism, will soon find that repose, after which it so deeply sighs and yearns.

Here, perhaps, we ought to close; but we cannot let the occasion pass without offering some remarks upon a point very distinctly recognised in the interesting Preface to the first volume of the first of the works we have named. The point to which we allude is, that religion and morality rest not on the understanding, not on logical deductions, but on an interior sentiment. Here is an important recognition, — a recognition of two distinct orders of human faculties. This recognition is not always made by metaphysicians, but it never escapes popular language. It is found in the distinction between the head and the heart, the mind and the soul, the understanding and the affections, which obtains in all languages. And this is not strange. One cannot have made the least progress in psychological

observation, without being struck with internal phenomena, which can by no means be classed with the operations of the understanding. There belong to human nature, passions, emotions, sentiments, affections, of which, the understanding, properly so called, can take no account, which pay no deference to its ratiocinations, and even bid defiance to its laws. The feeling which we have, when contemplating a vast and tranquil sea, distant mountains with harmonious outlines, or, when marking an act of heroism, of disinterestedness, or of generous self-sacrifice for others' welfare, rises without any dependence on the understanding. We feel what we then feel, not because we have convinced ourselves by logical deductions that we ought so to feel. Reasoning may come afterwards and justify the feeling; but it did not precede it, and, if it had, it could not have produced it. The understanding cannot feel; it cannot love, hate, be pleased, be angry, nor be exalted or depressed. It is void of emotion. It is calm, cold, calculating. Had we no faculty but those it includes, we should be strangers to pity, to sympathy, to benevolence, to love, and, — what is worse, — to enthusiasm. Bring the whole of man's nature within the laws of the understanding, and you reduce religion, morality, philosophy, to a mere system of logic; you would, in the end, pronounce every thing which does not square with dry and barren dialectics, chimerical, and every thing which interest cannot appropriate, mischievous.

But we not only contend for the distinction of the mental phenomena into two different orders, but we contend, that the sentiments are as worthy of reliance, as the understanding; that, to speak in popular language, the testimony of the heart is as legitimate, as that of the head. We are aware, that the philosophy of sensation will condemn this position. Be it so. The philosophy of sensation reigned during the last half of the last century, and it is, as far as we have any philosophy, still the philosophy of our own country; but it is no great favorite of ours. It undoubtedly has its truth; but, taken exclusively, freed from its inconsequences, and pushed to its last results, it would deprive man of all but a merely mechanical life, divest the heart of all emotion, wither the affections, dry up the sentiments, and sink the human race into a frigid skepticism. The

testimony of the senses requires an internal sanction, and, in the last analysis, that of the understanding is not credited till it is corroborated by that of consciousness. Neither our senses, nor our understanding, can prove to us, that we exist, and yet it is impossible for us, in a healthy state of mind to doubt our existence; neither our senses nor our understanding can prove to us the existence of an external world, nor the objective reality of any thing, yet we should justly regard him as insane, who should not believe in the existence of an external world, and there is no one, who, listening to the sweet strains of music, will not believe they come to his heart from some objective reality. It is a law of our nature, of which reasoning cannot divest us, that in these, and in a vast variety of cases, we must believe on the simple testimony of consciousness, or, in other words, we believe so, because our nature, — the very laws of our being, — compel us to believe so. But the moment we recur to the testimony of consciousness, to the laws of our nature, we desert the understanding, we leave the power of ratiocination, and have recourse to an entirely different order of testimony.

We may be told, that to admit, that the feelings, the sentiments, are worthy of reliance, is to go off into the mysterious, to stop we know not where. We know many are very coy of mystery. We know there are many who say, "Where mystery begins, there religion ends;" and we know, also, that in saying it, if they mean what is inexplicable to the understanding, properly so called, they pronounce a general sentence of condemnation upon all that is elevated, generous, and touching in human nature. We can explain to the understanding, none of the workings of the sentiments of the heart, none of the emotions, the affections of the soul. Indeed, we do not wish to explain them. We are not afraid of the mysterious. It is one of the glories of our nature, and one of the strongest pledges of its immortal destiny, that it delights in the mysterious; that it has cravings which go beyond what is known; that it dares rush off into the darkness, trusting to its own instincts for guidance; and that it has powers, which can out-travel the understanding, and which can seize and shadow forth to its own eye a perfection, which reason cannot comprehend, of which it does not even dream. To condemn the mys-

terious, were to bring the soul down from the beautiful and the holy, to the merely useful, — were to kill poetry, to wither the fine arts, to discard all the graces, for all these have something of the mysterious, are enveloped in mystic folds, offensive it may be to the understanding, but enchanting to the soul. We say, again, we are not afraid of the mysterious. We love it. We love those mysterious emotions, which we feel, when we survey the magnificent works of nature, or the creations of genius; when we hear the wind sigh over ruins; or when we walk among the dead, and think of those who were and are not, of the hearts which once beat, but which are now still, of the sweet voices which once spoke, but which are silent now. We love those emotions, which start within us when we think of God, of the human soul, of its immortality, of heaven, and of eternity. Reasoning is then still, and the soul, asserting her supremacy, half escaping from the body which imprisons her, catches some glorious visions of her native land, her everlasting home, and of those sublime occupations to which she feels herself equal. It is to us, then, no objection to say, our doctrine leads off into the mysterious. All to us, human beings, is mysterious, except the little that we know, and it is only that interior craving of our nature which keeps us for ever hovering beyond the horizon of what we know, that enables us, by conquests from the dominions of mystery, to enlarge the boundaries of our knowledge.

But we would not merely rely on this order of our faculties, which we call the sentiments. We would have them appealed to, as the most essential part of our nature. We do not mean to depreciate the understanding; we would not underrate the power of ratiocination, nor, in any case, dispense with sound logic. We value man's whole nature; man's whole nature is essential. We should think clearly, reason closely, powerfully; but we should also feel justly and energetically. We should retain and develope all our faculties, each in its place, so as to preserve unbroken harmony through the whole man. But if we do this, we shall find, that the sentiments, the feelings, are entitled to a much higher rank than it has been customary to assign them for the last century. To us the sentiments seem to be peculiarly the human faculties. They give to man his

distinctive character. They supply him with energy to act, and prompt him to the performance of grand and noble deeds. We fear that their power is seldom suspected, that little attention is paid to the mission which is given them to accomplish. We have schools for the intellect. We take great pains to educate the reasoning faculty, but we almost, at least so far as our schools are concerned, entirely neglect the sentiments. We cannot but regret this; for knowledge when not coupled with just feelings, strong reasoning powers when not under the guidance of pure and holy sentiments, only so much the better fit one for a career destructive to the best interests of humanity. And, let it be understood, men are not reasoned into good feelings, for the feelings do not depend on the intellect. Just sentiments are not the result of just knowledge. A man may know the truth, be able to defend it in language and with arguments that fix attention, and flash instantaneous conviction, and yet have no just, honorable, or benevolent feelings. It is an old saying, that men know better than they do;

> "Video meliora, proboque;
> Deteriora sequor."

It will be so, as long as we trust to merely intellectual education to give right feelings. We would, therefore, without in the least neglecting the intellect, turn attention to the sentiments, appeal to them on all occasions, and make it the leading object of all education to develope them, to fit them for strong and beneficent action.

We would appeal constantly to the sentiments, for all that we have of the disinterested and self-denying pertains to them. Destroy the sentiments and we should never support any cause, however just, dear, or essential to humanity, when the nicer calculations of interest assure us that we have nothing to gain for our individual selves. Destroy the sentiments, and we could never identify ourselves with humanity, and at times come forth in its behalf with the reformer's zeal, and with the martyr's firmness. There is nothing great or good ever won without sacrifice. No man will devote himself to the defence of liberty, of justice, of his country, of religion, or of the welfare of his fellow beings in any shape, unless he has within him the power of self-denial, and is prepared to make almost any sacrifice. Had

the Apostles not had this power of self-denial and of self-sacrifice, they never would, they never could, have established Christianity. Had it not been for this, the Reformers of Germany would hardly have succeeded, the Puritans would not have withstood the Prelates, left their homes, and all the fond recollections of childhood and youth, to brave the dangers of the deep and of a new and hostile world, to maintain liberty of conscience; nor would our fathers have staked life, property, and honor, to gain a country for their children, and liberty for the world. But this power, or rather spirit of self-denial and self-sacrifice, which Christianity was sent into the world to cherish and clothe with omnipotence, pertains solely to the sentiments. The understanding knows nothing of it. That, at best, knows only the self-denial of calculation, of temporary pleasure to obtain a lasting good, which is nothing more than selfishness would every day command.

We are not willing to dismiss the topic of self-denial without a farther remark. We speak not now of its necessity. We have already shown that. But we would refer to man's love of self-denial, of sacrifice, and to the power of that principle on which it depends. It is, — perhaps always was, — extremely fashionable to speak of interest as man's strongest, man's governing principle of action. If there is a good thing to be done, a religious institution to be patronized, a moral or political reform to be accomplished, appeal is almost invariably made to interest, to selfishness. But in this we do not show our deep knowledge of human nature. Paradoxical as it may seem, men will do more from a disinterested, than from an interested motive. It has been asked, how could Christianity, a self-denying religion, as it was, be established without a continual miracle? Had it not been a self-denying religion, its establishment would have required a miracle indeed. Once awaken the sense of duty in a man, and it is infinitely stronger than his sense of interest. Men will see every thing dear to them die, see their children drop into the grave, have their own flesh torn off by inches, sooner than they will abandon duty, — we mean those in whom the sense of duty is not dormant. But has interest ever shown itself equally strong? And what is the sense of duty, but another name for the spirit of self-denial, of self-sacrifice?

There is a standing proof of the weakness of men's sense of interest, obvious to every eye, in the indifference shown to religion. Who is not convinced, that it is for his highest interest, even in this world, to be religious? And does every one follow this conviction? Far from it. You may go into the pulpit and speak with the tongue of an angel, — you may prove, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that it is for the highest good, the greatest possible interest of every one of your hearers, for time and for eternity, to be religious, and induce no one to forsake a single sin, no one to cleave to a single virtue. Your success would be immeasurably greater, would you insist on self-denial, and show clearly, that heaven is not to be won without a struggle, without a costly and painful sacrifice. The successes of different religious sects, clearly evince this. With all the drawback of a most irrational creed, those sects among us who insist most upon self-denial and sacrifice, spread much faster than those sects, albeit they have a much more rational creed, who attempt to show, that religion demands no sacrifice, no self-denial.

We do not, in this, shut our eyes upon the fact, that a large proportion of mankind are selfish, governed by a sense of their own interest. We admit the fact, and we can account for it. Our own good has its place. The faculties which lead us to seek it, are on the surface of our nature, and are almost the only ones to which appeal is ever made; consequently, the only ones much developed, and the only ones suspected by those who never penetrate beneath the surface. But let us go deeper into human nature, let us go down into the depths of the soul, and stir up, from its bottom, the sense of duty, of the good, the beautiful, the true, and the holy, the spirit of disinterestedness, of self-denial, and of sacrifice, and we shall find a power infinitely stronger than our sense of interest.

To be sure, it costs us an effort to awaken this sense, an effort to obey it. But so much the better. The sentiments all demand an effort, a self-denial, a sacrifice; it is their very nature to carry us away from ourselves, to seek a good which does not centre in ourselves. But this is their praise. It costs us an effort to obey them, we own, and we are glad that it is so. Men love to make an effort. There is that in man, which delights in the struggle, which disdains

repose, and pants for strong, varied, and continued action. The sailor on land feels its workings, and longs to be on his loved ocean, to be again amid the fury and excitement of the storm. The old soldier proves it; though he have lost a leg, an eye, or an arm, in battle, still, as his ears catch the strains of martial music, he is ready to rush into the conflict. Why? Because there is excitement there, because there is danger there, because there is a struggle, an effort, there. Take away the excitement, the danger, the struggle, and men would lose their passion for war. This shows us there is something within us, that loves the conflict, that delights to war with danger, to grapple with the enemy, even to the death-struggle. This at bottom is a noble principle. It is one which belongs to all men. We were made for war, to brave danger, and to face the enemy with a dauntless courage. But it was for a spiritual war, a war of the spirit against the flesh, a conflict with sin and satan, not with our fellow beings. Now this principle which delights in the struggle, pants to put itself forth in strong and continued effort, is very nearly allied to the spirit of which we have been speaking, if indeed it be not the same. This, then, explains wherefore it is that self-denial is so powerful, and wherefore it is, that the cause which demands it will always have adherents.

Let us not, then, overlook the sentiments; let us rely on their testimony in their own sphere of action; let us appeal to them, educate them, and depend on them to support us in all that is elevated, generous, or good. Let us venture to trust them for the support of religion. We may rest its cause securely on the disinterested and self-sacrificing affections. We shall not be disappointed. They will avail us immeasurably more than appeals to interest, for all experience will prove, that it is infinitely safer to league with the good than with the bad in human nature.

ART. VI. — *Spirit of the Hebrew Scriptures.* — No. III. *Public Worship: Social Crime, and its Retribution.*

MOSES does not confine himself, in the exordium of his history, to lessons, even so general as the origin of sin in the soul, and its retribution by the laws of nature, physical and moral. He goes on with some other traditions, not connected enough to form a history; and indeed so disconnected, as to have started historical doubts; but admirably arranged to convey the great lessons, which were evidently his object. By this remark, it is not intended, however, to start any doubts, as to their historical order. The events, as they arise, are so evidently natural, that they carry their own evidence.

Nothing more is said of Adam and Eve, directly. It seems, however, that they were not reprobates. Though driven from Paradise, they still worshipped God. Not in vain was the revelation of punishment, though the revelation of creation had been neglected. They, who, in the days of their passiveness, had not been able to restrain their hands from what was consecrated to remind them of God, even though they had the luxuries of paradise around them, — when, in "the sweat of their face," they were earning their bread, had the power and the will to institute, as a symbol of their worship, the sacrifice of the best of their hard earnings. What a difference between the active and passive man!

And the worship itself, — how beautiful it was, in that age, when the intellectual life was not known, — and the relations of social life hardly existed! How does the human heart, in all ages of the world, respond to it; for how spontaneous has it been, in all ages of the world, for love to annihilate something in the presence of its object! It seems as if the heart had felt that man could *do* nothing, which would not mock him, when done, by its finiteness, and so it desired to destroy something, — or itself, — as a symbol of the immeasurableness of the impulse from within. And, whether sacrifices were something more than the spontaneous expression of a blind feeling, — not as yet taught by reason in Christ, that the offering acceptable to the Creator, and alone satisfactory to the soul that makes it,

is the perfection of the nature which has been given to us, — or, whether they were the contrivance of reflection for the purpose of instructing the young, and keeping up the attention of all ages to religion, which is the *rationale* of all public worship, — how beautiful was this form! All that has been said heretofore, of the forbidden fruit, as to its adaptation to the purpose of developing the mind, can be applied to this. The mode of its operation was also analogous. By means of it, the active and grateful mind would improve, and the passive mind learn its fallen state.

Moses states these two cases, as actually having occurred. Cain and Abel both brought their first-fruits, as an offering to the Lord, — but in how different a spirit is evident; "And the Lord had respect unto Abel and his offering; but unto Cain and his offering, he had not respect. And Cain was very wroth, and his countenance fell. And the Lord said unto Cain, 'Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, a sin-offering lieth at the door, and unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him.'" This has been so stupidly interpreted by prosaic minds, and so allegorized by subtile ones, that simple and picturesque as it is, it requires some reflection to get back to the original meaning. The reader must recur to what has already been said upon the habits of mind which grew out of the poetical genius of the language. Moses had not outgrown these habits; still less had his auditors or readers outgrown them. Simple as the words are, they make a picture to the imagination, of what was in a great degree mental. And those whom he taught, could learn from a picture only; for they would not think out the meaning and force of artificial signs. With this key, let us review the story that is given above.

Supposing Moses wished to impress on his readers the fact, that outward worship was not always acceptable; how could he do it in a better way than to present a picture of two individuals doing precisely the same thing outwardly, the moral effect being different? And this difference of effect, — how could it be more impressively expressed to the Hebrews, than by the words, "And THE LORD had respect unto Abel and his offering; but unto Cain and his

offering he had not respect"? Will it be said, that these words convey something arbitrary? They may, perhaps, to our metaphysical minds; but they could not to minds like those of Moses' auditors, minds such as also exist in the bosom of the most philosophical societies, in all ages of the world; they do not to children, unless they are made metaphysical by education. The obvious impression is, merely, that the sacrifice of the one was of good spiritual effect, and that of the other had no spiritual effect; and the inference of any mind of moderate reasoning powers would be precisely that which Moses has again put into the mouth of THE LORD, "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?" &c., the interpretation of which is, that good faith, or want of good faith, in the sacrificer, was the source of the difference between the acceptance and the non-acceptance of the offering.

But, then, lest the self-condemned worshipper should be discouraged, because convicted of sacrificing in a wrong spirit, he is reminded that the future is still in his power; — that he may even sacrifice as an expression of his repentance; — "a sin-offering * lieth at the door." If he desired to sacrifice, he could take advantage of this circumstance, and all should be as if he had not done wrong. What an inimitable story is this! It is too much to believe, as some have done, that Moses' genius invented it. It is, indeed, much more reasonable to suppose that it was, as it purports to be, a fact, handed down by tradition; the republication and sanctioning of a fact, as revelation to the Hebrews, which, in its day, had been also a revelation to the primitive people. The plain prose of it is, that Cain sacrificed without the spirit of love. Instead of being blessed, he only felt his loss of the material substance. But this pain made him reflect; and he reflected, not without gaining mental light, it seems. He learnt that there was a moral cause for his want of blessing, — *wrong-doing*. He learnt, also, that it was not remediless, for right-doing could even atone for the past; the future was his own. *We* may understand all this better in prose. But Moses' auditors could have taken no idea from these prosaic words, or, at least would have received no impression from them.

* This is the literal meaning of the Hebrew.

We cannot too often recur to this fact; for unless we keep it in mind, we shall be led into all the absurdities of allegorical interpretation, of exoteric and esoteric meanings. Moses had no double meanings, unless we consider all poetry as having double meanings, it all being addressed to the whole nature, and so holding true, whether received by the reason or sensibility.

It will be observed, that Moses does not warn his readers here of any dangers that may arise from external worship, except the danger of the heart's not being fully in it. We have learnt that many other abuses are possible. But it is not to be expected that Moses should have known them; and, even if he had, it would have been absurd for him to have warned his readers of them, at that stage of their progress. Other abuses were to be guarded against by other prophets, when they should arise. The great point, however, that the outward sacrifice is not enough, was deemed worthy of the second place in his revelation. We should also follow Moses in this. It should be one of the first principles of all religious education, to have the external worship grow naturally out of the circumstances around the individual, — and to be the sign of devotion, — not a substitution for it.

We now come to crime and its retribution, which naturally enough follows what we have last considered.

The story of the murder of Abel is distinct from the story of the sacrifices; and there is no reason to suppose that the quarrel between the brothers arose out of the sacrifices. But it is worthy of all consideration, that Moses has linked these two stories together, and probably that Providence linked them in fact, as well as in tradition. This seems to imply, that one was a moral consequence of the other. The second story proves that Cain, though he might have been startled, was not subdued, by his own just reflections on his unaccepted sacrifice. The Lord had then spoken in vain! From a mind thus perseveringly impious, arose a crime, which was, as yet, new in the world, — a crime against the social principle, whose operations are intimately, if not inseparably, connected with the operations of the religious principle. "And Cain *talked* with Abel his brother; and it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against his brother, and slew him."

Not a circumstance is recorded in connexion with this dark deed. No intimation is given of the occasion of it. The terrible tradition had come down to posterity, in its nakedness. What an evidence is this of its truth! The first death, if it was indeed also a murder, must have been an undying tradition among men. The shock which it communicated must also have been felt in succeeding generations. Nothing is more surely transmitted than an event which was a shock. Cain undoubtedly rose up against his brother wilfully. Ungoverned by the love of his Maker, reckless of his will, the powerful nature within him was liable to be wrought into passion by any thing that jarred his personal feelings. Some trifle, perhaps, excited the outbreaking, and, regardless of consequences, a blow was struck! — Death! — which he could not have premeditated, for it was inconceivable before it had occurred, — *Death* revealed to him in thunders, that, in dealing with a human being, he was dealing with the Infinite. — When the mighty hiatus between sense and spirit yawned beneath him, how must he have recoiled and shuddered! But Moses expresses it in language which rhetoric in vain would essay to imitate; "And THE LORD said unto Cain, 'Where is Abel, thy brother?' And he said, 'I know not; am I my brother's keeper?' And HE said, 'What hast thou done? The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground. And now art thou cursed from the earth, which has opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand,'" &c. To us, these words do not convey what they did even to the auditors of Moses, to whom death was as much of a mystery as ever; for *we* know where the dead are; and to *us*, the truth, that we are each our brother's keeper, is too much familiarized, in words at least, to awaken the earthquake, that such reflections must have awakened in Cain; or to produce the impression which that recorded curse, interpreted on the same principle as the curse in the preceding chapter, must have produced on the mind of the Hebrew. When we connect these subduing words, put as usual into the very mouth of the Lord, with what follows, nature almost faints at the thought; but it cannot doubt the picture, for it is too true to what we know of ourselves. Alas for Cain! A mark was truly set upon him; the introducer of Death! No wonder the earth yielded no more to his

labor. The earth had refused to give spontaneously any longer, to the passive Adam; and this had been called a curse. But even when Cain tilled, it did not bring forth! What a curse was this! but was it arbitrary?

If we look back at the original event, and the consequences upon the mind of Cain, which were so evidently visible, as a revelation to him and his brethren, on the eve of their forming a frame-work of society, we shall be struck by the wisdom of Providence therein displayed. In the ungoverned buoyancy of new-found power, man needed, as subseqüent experience has proved, that the laws of social morality should be sanctioned by terrors. Or, if we look at it as first presented as a revelation by the records of Moses, we shall find it in beautiful adaptation to his purpose. The Hebrews were about being formed into a nation, and needed such lessons on the social principle. It is in strict harmony with Moses' whole plan. The record of human experience, in his Revelation, is, indeed, but one long series of events, displaying successively, over and over again, what Jesus seemed to feel so deeply on the cross, — that man, when he omits to do right, and especially, when he sins against a brother, *knows not what he does!*

Some persons, in reading these ancient records, have said, that the punishment of Adam and of Cain was out of proportion to their crime, because it was impossible for them to look forward to what had never been experienced. Such persons, of course, consider virtue as a choice arising from the consideration of consequent external happiness or unhappiness, to be derived to the individual choosing. To them it will be difficult to defend Moses, or rather the Providence he describes. But to those who admit that virtue is felt to be virtue, because it is in harmony with, and builds up, all that is peculiar in man, and all that raises him above the influence of transitory circumstances, and makes him create good, — the equity of Providence is vindicated, and its wisdom and goodness made especially manifest, by these events. For deviation from the original principles of our nature, or from virtue, has outward evil effects; and human legislation and penalty should bear a proportion to these; but the inward evil of doing wrong is not measurable; unless, indeed, we measure man by the standard of the perfect man in Christ Jesus, and say, that by all that

it reduces a man below that, by all that it adds to the difficulty of attaining it, and by all the stumblingblocks it raises in the way of others' also attaining that perfect stature, and by all the hanging back of the progress of humanity which comes from the loss of the actual assistance the growing man might have given to his fellows, supposing he had cultivated his nature, — by all this, he is to be considered as having done injury to humanity. To measure in this manner, however, was impossible before Jesus' coming; it is even difficult to do it now, because the character of Jesus is so little understood, and his influence on society so much involved and interrupted, and it is so hard for the mass of mankind to separate it from the influence that false views of him have had. Thus still, as in the days of Moses, the secret of the mystery of sin is beyond the ken of human organs, and the only means of indicating the mighty importance of virtue, is for every deviation from it to be thus tremendously visited; for mere thoughtlessness to be thus awakened; for man to learn, in agony and blood, that *to be reckless is an immeasurable crime*, connected, as he is, by immortal ties, which are nothing less than human heart-strings, with he knows not how large a portion of his race.

In the days of the first revelation, and even in the days of Moses, there were no skeptics from philosophical speculation. The infidel of that day, was only one practically; overwhelmed by physical passions, or thoughtless of God through the multiplicity of momentary impressions. The sin to which he was first liable was the omission of thought, for this omission was the foundation of the power which temptation had over him. In Cain's case, omission of thought had been already rebuked in the non-acceptance of the sacrifice; but, still reckless, he had lifted his hand against his brother, and learnt only from the lifeless body to know what he had done, — to realize that man was, in a degree, his brother's *keeper*, and that the earth was a desert and wild waste to the murderer. This was instruction that was then wanted in the world. It is impossible for us now to estimate the good that these revelations did in their day; or even the good that they did among the Hebrews, as they stood in the books of Moses, and were taught to their children, with the history of their nation,

according to the commandment. But there is no doubt that they did great good. The record of the Old Testament history, like all other history, is indeed filled with crimes; but amidst them all, the country did go on much longer than other countries of equally ancient origin, and here and there, men did rise up so good and pure, that it is evident the seeds of culture were not sown in vain.

The providence of God is thus far sufficiently uncomplicated to teach all mankind. What a lesson of brotherhood is taught in the consequences of Abel's murder upon Cain's mind! What was that relation of society which he violated? Christ has taught us by acting it out! and, when we enter into his spirit, we shall know what we are doing, when we "talk with a brother." And if we consider the connexion of this want of brotherly conscience in Cain, with the previous account of his want of the spirit of worship, can we avoid being struck with the analogy of his character, in its successive stages, to that of the formalist in religion of all after ages; who has ever been found most liable to misunderstand and undervalue the relation of brotherhood, and to overlook the duties belonging to it; nay, sometimes directly and positively to violate them, even unto the commission of crimes against the lives and liberties of men!

But we have not quite done with the antediluvian traditions. Cain's crime and punishment, great as was the impression that they evidently made, preserved, as they were, in such a remarkable picturesque form of composition, did not effectually check the deterioration of the race. Some difficulties, however, occur to most readers, as they go on in the record. The want of natural philosophy, astronomy, and pure metaphysics, are not the only deficiencies which critics and cavillers have pointed out in the historical songs of the prophet-lawgiver. Even as historian, they say, he is not full and consistent. Where did Cain get his wife? And who could have been the inhabitants of the land of Nod? And for whom could Cain have built a city? And what is meant by *going out from the presence of the Lord*? And what is meant by the distinction between the *sons of God*, and *daughters of men*? &c. &c. &c.

It may be remarked, by way of a general answer to all such questions, that Moses did not undertake to write a regular detailed history of the world. He did not intend to

give a history of all the children of Adam. He mentioned the birth of Abel and Cain, because he had anecdotes to tell of them; and of Seth, because he was the ancestor of Noah. There is no knowing how many more children there may have been; or how much they may have wandered from their father's home and religion. Cain's *going out from the presence of the Lord* seems to imply, that there was already a distinction, and that the public worship of the true God was not kept up by the wanderers; and it is probable that the distinction of *sons of God*, and *daughters of men*, denotes a confirmed wandering from the true religion. A union of these two classes by marriage had evil consequences naturally; in the first place, the loss of this distinction, and, in the second, the final prevalence of evil. The next event, however, after the curse of Cain, sufficiently startling to have been preserved as revelation, seems to have been the deluge. That great event,—the tradition of which is preserved in all the Eastern nations, with more or less of the same circumstances, and the reality of which has been confirmed by the scientific researches and reasonings of modern naturalists,*—our poet introduces in his own peculiar and sublime style. "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And it repented the Lord, that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart. And the Lord said, 'I will destroy man whom I have created, from the face of the earth, both man and beast, and the creeping things, and the fowls of the air, for it repenteth me that I have made them.' But Noah found grace in the eyes of the Lord."

The Supreme Being is rather anthropomorphized in this magnificent passage, it is true. But that was of little consequence, in the day when his actual existence and moral government were the great points which it was the business of Revelation to make.

The narrative of the deluge, which follows, is so particular, so simple, so natural, that it carries its own evidence; and this is made manifest by nothing so much as by comparing it with the other traditions of the deluge preserved in

* See Cuvier's Theory of the Earth.

the East, or rather hidden under the artificial modes of Oriental expression. The moral of the deluge, however, is the strongest proof of its having been a link in the chain of the providence of God. It was a tremendous event, whose consequences must have been long obvious in the natural world. The circumstance of its being preserved in tradition till the times of Moses, and as an immediate act of a punishing Deity, is itself a proof how strong a moral impression it made. It is impossible to measure its moral consequences upon those who re-peopled the earth; and to them it was a revelation, rather than to the immediate sufferers, unless indeed, it is believed that men may profit in the next life from their experiences in this. It is for posterity especially that those calamities occur which affect nations. To the imagination they seem greater than a calamity which affects an individual only; and objections have even been made to the representation of the deluge as a punishment, on the ground of its extreme severity. Was it possible, it has been asked, that all the world, gifted and ungifted, old and young, should have deserved the same indiscriminate slaughter; and, if not, is it representing the equitable moral government of God to represent so indiscriminate a punishment? But it was, to the individuals who suffered it, not by any means so direful a calamity; it was but death, which each must have suffered in the end, at any rate, a death probably unlooked for, and which was less of a calamity than is ordinarily the case when there are survivors. It seems so tremendous to the imagination, because they all died together; and this was associated, probably, with great physical changes in external nature. It seemed, indeed, — to use the bold Oriental expression, — as if the immutable God had "repented" of forming the race! And this was all right; for, thus exciting the imagination, it served to impress on posterity a great truth, viz., that *when the moral causes at work for the deterioration of men come to predominate over the causes at work for their improvement, so that the new individuals born into society have not a fair chance for virtue, it is the part of Infinite Mercy and Justice to exterminate the race entirely;* a lesson which has been repeated by every national calamity which has occurred since to break up the foundations of the existing state of things. It will not be until the social system is founded only upon

the most general principles, that it will involve no principle of decay, but will "inherit the uttermost parts of the earth," and issue in the heavenly "communion of the just made perfect."

Here it might seem that we should naturally pause for the present. But there are two postdiluvian traditions, so much in the same spirit as the antediluvian, that they must be considered before the traditions of the Patriarchs. The ninth chapter of Genesis gives an account of the fall of Noah before the spirit of the vine (which seems to repeat the lesson of the tree of knowledge), together with the conduct of his sons on that occasion, by which a moral lesson was evidently intended. What is that lesson? Is it not that a veil is to be drawn by kindred over the weaknesses of their kindred; or at least by children over the degradation of their parents? It would seem by the heavy curse pronounced upon Ham, that some important principle had been violated by him. And might it not have been important to establish the above mentioned principle in society, at a period of the world's history when the tendency was so decidedly to sensuality and violence? The social principle is in great danger of being utterly neutralized when men are so very uncultivated; mutual forbearance is a refinement to which the rude reflections of barbarians do not immediately bring them, and might it not have been necessary, therefore, that the specific precept of religion should do its best to make sacred one relation, at least, of human society, by forbidding the withdrawal of the forms of respect by the child, even when the parent himself might seem to have forfeited them by his personal character or acts?

It is true that Christianity has no such direct precept; and the reproofs of Christ to the Jews, who, in his day, sacrificed every thing to a very narrow patriotism, and even to his disciples, who also interrupted him in the prosecution of his great work, to urge the claims of his ambitious relatives upon his attention, have been wrung to extract from them a principle diametrically opposite. But the whole effect of Christianity is such as to lead to as great a delicacy and tenderness towards all the great family, as Shem showed towards his erring parent. With the Christian, indeed, the weaknesses and crimes of his brethren, however removed in kindred, can never be the subject of heartless scoff, but are

ever covered with the mantle of charity, even when their discussion is necessary for the general good. Of this universal principle of reverence for human nature, and charity for the individuals who are unfaithful to it, is not this narrative of Moses a dawning? In what equally ancient record is there any story expressing such refinement of feeling? It was nearly two thousand years afterwards, that Plato wrote his Eutyphron.

But we must not pass over this passage without considering the curse. Curses abound in the writings of Moses. Literally taken, and with our ideas, nothing can be more diabolical than this committing of children by their parents to future woe, with all their posterity. But perhaps we understand them in too prosaic a manner. Let us consider this particular instance, and draw some general conclusion therefrom concerning all the curses recorded in the Old Testament.

In the times of Moses, the children of Shem, Ham, and Japheth were separated from each other, and there was a great distinction in the condition of these several tribes. Tradition had connected this difference of condition with the different characters of their respective ancestors, as displayed in the only anecdote which had survived them. The facts that constituted the prophetical curse of Noah, were therefore, with Moses' auditors, a matter of historical fact; and is it being too free in our interpretation to suppose that these facts may have been thus stated as prophecy, so as to make a more vivid impression on the minds of the people, and give a deeper sanction to parental authority? Although the different condition of the descendants of Noah might not have sprung immediately from the acts recorded in this tradition, yet they did undoubtedly spring from the different characteristics impressed on the several tribes by the different characters of their three progenitors, of which these acts were one expression; for the influence of the patriarch, who added the authority of king and priest to that of father, was undoubtedly very strong and enduring upon the family he governed with despotic sway. Thus the spirit of the prophecy was strict truth. Nor could harm arise from the idea of a *curse*, in an age when people did not, like us moderns, reason upon the abstract morality of such things, but acknowledged the right of a father to bless, or to curse, i. e.

prophesy evil, provided he did it according to the principles of just retribution. It was calculated, in their rude mode of viewing it, to help stem the torrent-like recklessness of youth, which is always especially prone to sins of omission, and needs the terrors of the Lord to arrest its heedlessness and inattention. The prerogative of cursing, moreover, which was given to parents, was one not liable to be carried to excess by them. The parental instinct is infinitely stronger than the filial, and would and did restrain all abuses. There is no other recorded curse of a father so severe as this of Noah's upon the son who forgot his personal duty to the immediate author of his earthly existence. The other patriarchs cursed conditionally, which is not so difficult to explain.

The other postdiluvian tradition, which is the last we shall at present consider, is the famous one of the building of Babel and the confusion of tongues. This has challenged the ingenuity of various commentators. Let us look at it in our own simple way, as a picture of some facts which are presented in this lively manner, in order to produce a moral lesson; and then inquire what that lesson is.

In the first place, as to matter of fact; — some years have elapsed since the deluge, and still there is but one nation with one language; "And the whole earth was of one language and one speech."

Secondly, there is an emigration from the East into the country between the Tigris and Euphrates; "And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the East, that they found a plain in the land of Shinar."

Thirdly, they had advanced somewhat in the arts of civilization; "And they said one to another; 'Go to, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly;' and they had brick for stone, and slime had they for mortar."

Fourthly, a national spirit seems to have arisen, with a wish to consolidate society; "Go to, let us build us a city, and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven:" is not this a graphic manner of representing the great and gradual work of founding social institutions, which should give to men a sense of power in the sight of the powers above: — a process that may have begun with the building of a city and citadel?

Lastly, do not the words that immediately follow, imply that these social institutions were founded on a wrong princi-

ple? "And let us make ourselves a name, lest we be scattered upon the face of the whole earth." Whether this be so or not, the fact is evident, that the project did not prosper. Might it not be that they were setting up a system which would eventuate in a false religion?

But there were some eternal principles of things which operated to confound their plan. Moses puts the expression of this idea into his usual form for general ideas.

He first indicates the presence of these eternal principles amidst their finite operations; "And THE LORD came down to see the city and the tower which the children of men builded." — He goes on to imply that they were doing something without reference to the will of God; "And THE LORD said, 'Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language, and this they begin to do; and now nothing will be restrained from them which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech.'" Does not all this mean, that when men act from any other principles, than the eternal ones, — which are simple, and hang together, and produce harmony, they necessarily differ, and understand one another no longer, the paths of error being individual, and therefore numberless? The consequence of difference in objects of desire and pursuit is separation into different communities, and the ultimate consequence of this separation is a difference of dialect. In Moses' arbitrary style, all this comes out thus: "'Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech.' So THE LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of the earth: and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel, &c."

Such are the facts, and what now is to be considered as the moral use of this picture to the Hebrews?

Let us recur to the design of Moses. He was on the eve of forming a new government and establishing new institutions. In the book in which he records these new institutions, it was especially natural that he should speak of the society from which the progenitor of his race was set apart, as founded on principles which involved decay as a necessity, and that he should account for the variety and hostility of the surrounding nations. It was perhaps particularly useful,

that he should hang about the origin of Babylon associations which would diminish the attractions its external prosperity and splendor might give to it in the eyes of the Hebrews. For this he had the materials in this tradition, which he has therefore made part of the poetical exordium to his history of a theocracy; and a better introduction can hardly be conceived, than just such a statement of the effect of going to work to form a society without reference to the moral ends of society as the will of God.*

* Herder, in his work on the Poetry of the Hebrews, to which I referred in the first part of the first of these Essays, as sanctioning by his learned authority the views of the language which I had derived from a different source than a study of the Hebrew, also coincides with me in this latter opinion. He shows that a parallelism of the theocracy with the government of Babylon, forms the predominant imagery of the Hebrew poetry from the tradition of Babel, recorded by Moses, even to the Revelation of St. John in Patmos. The reader is strongly recommended to the perusal of Herder's work, lately translated by one of our distinguished scholars. I will take this opportunity, however, to remark, that these Essays were written before I had any knowledge of Herder. When preparing them for the press, there happened to fall into my hands a manuscript translation of the first chapter of Herder's work, and I therefore took the advantage of his name as giving authority to the speculations with which the first Essay began. But the Essays, with the exception of that one passage, retain the form into which they were put when they were first written, several years since. I am happy to have the advantage of coincidences with Herder, when I can feel that there could not have been any plagiarism, voluntary or involuntary; and therefore I received peculiar delight from reading this contribution of President Marsh to our sacred literature.

ART. VII. — *The Claims of Harvard College upon its Sons. A Sermon, preached in the Chapel of that Institution on Lord's Day Afternoon, July* 13, 1834. By JOHN G. PALFREY, A. M., Professor of Biblical Literature. Cambridge. James Munroe & Co. pp. 20.

THERE is good meaning, we apprehend, in the title of this sermon. Of course, whoever thinks that the diffusion of knowledge has something to do with social welfare, and that intellectual accomplishments make an element in the efficiency of public men, regards a place of education in the higher departments, which has tolerably well done its office, as having established a substantial claim on a whole community's good will. But to those who have enjoyed its discipline, such an institution makes an appeal, resting on other grounds. They stand directly indebted to it for personal services of the most important nature. It has put them in possession of valuable powers of action, and sources of enjoyment. It has introduced them to places, where, promoting on a large scale the well-being of others, they find themselves most effectually securing their own; or it has helped them to a selfish satisfaction in intellectual pleasures, which are well worth having, when there is no taste for what is better; or, at all events, it has given them added capacities for pushing their way in the world. And the sentiment of gratitude, so natural and well grounded, will scarcely fail of being excited to greater strength, by the force of associations in the mind, unavoidably attaching themselves to the scene of one's intellectual experience during the most impressible and imaginative years of life.

If any one imagines that Harvard College has not deserved well on an extensive scale, there is nothing better to do in his behalf, than to commend him to the study of the history of English North America. For more than fifty years from its establishment, that is, for nearly twenty years after the safety of the northern colonies was secured by the issue of Philip's war, it was the only seat of higher instruction on this side the water; and the only two other institutions of the same class during the first century of the settlements, date from a period so nearly approaching to its close, that all the educated men, who had arrived at the most prominent sta-

tions within that eventful time, had either studied abroad, or were formed under the tuition of this college. How good that tuition was, might be inferred from the fact that youth were often sent from the parent country to enjoy it, if it were not better shown by the well ascertained competency of those, whom it had reared, to all duties expected of the wise and learned. So, with a like exception for the youth of Virginia and Carolina, who were sent to foreign schools, the educated men, of an age to take any considerable part in the revolutionary contest of argument or arms, were necessarily furnished by Harvard College, or by some one of two smaller institutions of the same character in New England, and four in the southern states; and, in fact, the former school was the mother of far the greater portion of this race, of which Otis, Warren, Quincy, and the Adamses, were only most distinguished specimens.

If any one thinks that, individually, he has carried nothing away from this college which he has occasion to think of with pleasure and gratitude, he will naturally wish to keep the opinion to himself, and will save us the pain of agreeing, and the trouble of disputing, with him. And those of us, who are sensible or vain enough to be of another mind, find much, of an accessory sort, to heighten the interest, which could not fail to attach in our thoughts to the scene of early study. If the English taste of our fathers for *locating* the great houses of religion and learning in a plain by a river's side, or if, otherwise, (which is a pretty old theory on the subject) the desire of securing for their learned youth "the orthodox and soul-flourishing ministery of Mr. Thomas Shepheard" determined them to a spot which we might not have selected from the whole beautiful vicinity, yet it is one by no means destitute of natural attractions, and time and art have built up around it one of the most agreeable villages which the country has to show. "The scituation of this colledg is very pleasant," writes old Johnson in 1651, "at the end of a spacious plain, more like a bowling-green than a wilderness, neer a fair navigable river, environed with many neighbouring towns of note, the building thought by some to be too gorgeous for a wilderness, and yet too mean in others' apprehensions for a colledg." The "fair navigable river" still "wanders along its silver-winding way," worth a dozen, as nature made it, of either Seine or Tiber,

to say nothing of such lesser matters as the Isis or the Cam. The "spacious plain" is covered, in great part, with ornamental edifices and cultivated pleasure-grounds, enclosing a central area, which reveals them to each other's view, and is itself marked from a distance, by the towers of two churches, each, in its way, of uncommon symmetry and tastefulness. From its surrounding eminences (crowned with their old and stately growth of the native oak and elm), of which Mount Auburn is only the most lovely, you may look down, among other "neighbouring towns of note," on Brighton, Watertown, and Medford, each feasting the eye with its own delicious landscape; on the metropolis, close by, which those, who know no better, call, in one way of compliment, the cradle of American liberty, and, in another, the American Athens; on Lexington, where the first stand was made in the battle yet waging for human rights; on Charlestown, where in the bloody ashes of a sore defeat was read by penetrating eyes the auspicious presage of final victory. When we go among the solid structures, which time has brought into the place of that, "thought by some," in its day, "too gorgeous for a wilderness," we move everywhere in the midst of sublime phantoms of the past. Our college is older than Oxford, with its millenium of fame; for its history goes back to the earliest infancy of the society, of which it has been head and heart. There stands old Massachusetts Hall, that "fine and goodly house of brick," the gift of the Province in its first century of generous poverty; there is Holden, bearing on its pediment, in the broadest relief of painted plaster, the heraldic blazonry of its virgin givers, cotemporaries of Anne; Hollis, not quite so fresh, though for aught one can see, as firm, as when James Otis and his coadjutors reported to the General Court that they had "turned the key" upon the consummate work, and "the Governor and Council, with the lower House, met together in Holden Chapel," (how sadly inadequate such a space for such a convocation now!) to give the "very fair building, beautiful and commodious," its greatly honorable name; and Harvard, another gift, or rather payment of the good commonwealth, when its legislature, convened in the ancient library-room, sat by fires which doomed it to sudden ruin, with almost all its precious stores. Over the way is the enclosure which the dust of Dunster hallows, and the fresh inscription over

what was mortal of his successor, one of the great English scholars in the days when "there were giants," the friend of the blessed Usher, and exiled victim of the egregious Laud. A little further, in another direction, is the site of the humble meeting-house, where the ecclesiastical fathers of New England were convened to establish their Platform of Church Discipline; and, in another, are yet traced remains of the primitive fortification, which secured the hamlet, then intended for a metropolis, against surrounding savages. To come down to later times, if, from the spot lately occupied by a church, within which sat the convention that framed the constitution of 1780, we wend our way by an avenue, which the commissioners for laying out a western road reported that they had carried as far as Watertown, and "that was as far as ever would be needed," we shall presently pass the magnificent tree beneath which Washington issued his first order to an American army, and the mansion where his head-quarters were kept, while he was worrying out our British visitors from beneath the shelter of those three sister-eminences,

> "Whose ridgy backs heave to the sky,
> Piled deep and massy, close and high,
> Our own romantic town."

But we are not upon the composition of a guide-book; and it is possible there may be readers of ours with the heart to say, that such things have nothing to do with the point in hand. At all events, we shall be speaking to it, when we urge, that, at no previous time, has Harvard College, in respect to advantages which it holds out, deserved to be regarded by its sons with more pride and pleasure. The requisitions for admission having been constantly, though gradually, increased in passed years, the student brings preparation for a rapid proficiency during his term of residence. The studies in Livy, Horace, Cicero's philosophical works, and Juvenal, in Latin, and Xenophon, Homer, and some of the orators and tragedians, in Greek, with the exercises in the writing of these languages, and in antiquities, constitute, for our country, an extensive course of elementary classical discipline. Hebrew, among ancient languages, is added, to such extent as students may desire. Mathematical studies are pursued, before the end of the second year, to the extent of some good acquaintance with the differential and integral calculus;

and the three volumes of the Cambridge Natural Philosophy, the text-books which are next taken up, present what may be called a full outline of the branches in that department. Of modern languages, — for the College is any thing but bigotedly scholastic, — the French is taught to all, and permanent provision is made for the acquisition of four others by as many as wish to learn them, — a privilege which is largely sought, — besides the very attractive lectures of the Professor of Modern Literature. To a brief course in History and Grammar, succeeds one in Logic and Rhetoric, the text-books being the recent admirable treatises of the Archbishop of Dublin; works, especially the former, which subject the mind to a severe and salutary training. In Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, Locke's Essay, which we rejoice to see lately restored in the place of Brown, Stewart's Elements, and Paley's Principles, are the manuals; in Theology, Butler's Analogy and Paley's Evidences; in Political Economy, Say's Treatise, which in a degree, like Paley on Morals, we apprehend must be allowed to be a work excellent for its clear statement of questions, however some of its principles and conclusions may be disowned; and in Constitutional Law, Judge Story's Abridgment of his Commentaries. In Natural History there are recitations from Dr. Ware's revised edition of Smellie's Philosophy, and in Chemistry from Dr. Webster's Manual. Exercises in English composition in different forms are continued from the beginning of the second year to the end of the course; and lectures in different branches are given to the Senior class, illustrated, in Natural Philosophy and Anatomy, by the rich apparatus in the halls of those departments, and the chemical laboratory; and, in Natural History, by the valuable collections in the mineralogical cabinet and the botanic garden.

Having no personal reasons whatever for either modesty or arrogance in this matter, we mean to make free to express our strong conviction, that the advantages for education offered at Cambridge are such, that whoever, having enjoyed them, does not go away a better scholar than any other American institution would have made him, has only his own incapacity to lament, or indolence to blame; in saying which, we are not at all implying any offensive comparison between the teachers there and at other similar institutions,

disparaging to the latter. Indeed, considering the obviously superior advantages of Cambridge in other respects, we could not say a word less than we do, without positively instituting a comparison to the prejudice of those who conduct its instruction. Further; with some opportunities for making observations to justify such a remark, we avow our persuasion, that the average scholarship created there year by year, is decidedly higher, — we speak with caution, — than that furnished from any other American college. We do not watch the methods of operation, but we look at the results. We are sometimes present at an examination in one or another department, and we commonly, on such occasions, go away with a high satisfaction in having made such use of our time. And, at the yearly exhibitions at the end of the course, — while we take care not to be so unreasonable as to expect young men to reason like old ones, — we witness, on the whole, a grasp and precision of thought, and a purity and force in composition, such as testify to a universal good training of the mind. We do not, to find what their colleges have done for them, compare men together when, a score of years after they have left these nurseries, they have come to make a figure in public stations. Various other influences have been operating on them then, to reverse the conditions of their early life. But we compare them in the years when the comparison may yet be made, and we submit, that, actually, the professional students, and the young professional men, from Harvard college, are found, on the whole, to think and write better, and to know more, than those on whom rests, in this respect, the reputation of any other of our great schools. We have not finished yet; for, rather than the fact should remain unasserted, we are willing to undertake the ungracious task of its assertion. To the best of our knowledge and belief, there is not in Europe, any more than in America, an institution which, year by year, sends forth a band of youth of like age, so well, or better fitted, in discipline and accomplishments, to do the intellectual work of the community to which it belongs. And this is the highest praise which could be bestowed. It is nothing to say that there are schools abroad, which teach more of Greek, or of mathematics, or of something else worth knowing. The sensible question is, Is there any one which can be shown to make better provision than does our own, for the intellectual wants of the society

which they are respectively to influence? If there be, it is one of which we have not heard.

But if this, or any considerable part of it, is true, how comes it that the number of students at Cambridge is exceeded any where else in the country, as it was exceeded last year in three other colleges? This is a problem, which, on our premises, we may be fairly called on to solve.

One solution is to be found in the very fact of the greater thoroughness of the course. The requisitions for admission being higher than elsewhere, more time and money are required to prepare for it. And this being so, that large proportion of young persons, who care not so much to have the best education, as to have a tolerably good one, which will introduce them speedily into a profession, are to be expected rather to turn their steps in some other direction. This impediment to the multiplication of students we hope never to see removed. We would not have abrupt and exorbitant advances made in the terms of admission. But we hope to see Cambridge always as much in advance of its sister seminaries, as we believe it now to be, in respect to opportunities of proficiency for such as desire to have the best. One distinguishing advantage which it possesses in its affluent endowments is, that it can better afford than they to dispense with the income, to be collected from a large number of students. And one obligation to the literature of the country, thus devolved on it, is, that it should make itself a kind of model institution, constantly raising the standard of scholarship, and leading the way in improvements, which other institutions, with the benefit of such countenance, will then be justified and excited in their own due time to adopt.

Another important point in this connexion is, the situation of Harvard College. Amherst is in the centre of New England, the most studious portion of the country, and especially in the centre of that district of New England, densely inhabited by its substantial yeomanry, which furnishes the largest proportion of the raw material for educated men. Union College is at the centre, — not geographical, but of population, — of the empire state, and within a two hours' ride of its seat of government. Yale College is in a town, which, besides being the capital of a state which is, for schoolmasters, the "officina gentium," is, by force of steam-boat

power, (well nigh accomplishing the modest request in the play, "Ye gods, annihilate both time and space,") made actually a suburb of New York, the great thoroughfare of America. Cambridge is out of the way, except to Maine and Rhode Island, which have their own respectable institutions, and to the sea-board of Massachusetts Bay. And how much this circumstance of vicinity is a recommendation to the large class, who wish to get into the professions on the easiest reputable terms, an inspection of any college catalogue will show. This is a circumstance which of course cannot be altered. And, for ourselves, being particularly concerned for this section of our country, we are perfectly well satisfied that it cannot. We are pleased with our good fortune in having, near our own doors, the advantages for education of our children, which, if elsewhere situated, we would still seek for them at any reasonable sacrifice.

Religious prejudices, no doubt, have had, and have their operation, in diminishing the number of students; though, unless we greatly err, these have been exaggerated in their supposed effect, and are sensibly subsiding. There are Unitarians in the administration of this college, as, with few exceptions, there are not in the administration of any other. And those who mean, that, if they can help it, there shall be no freedom of thought among the educated young, who will tolerate no college that will not be the engine of their sect, we are aware have left, and will leave, no method untried, to argue the minds of fathers, and distress those of mothers, into a resolution against this disposition of their sons. But we believe that such champions have done their worst. If falsehood, as Fisher Ames said, "will travel from Maine to Georgia, while truth is putting on his boots," truth, once well booted, makes firm and terrific strides after him. A slander generally gains, to some extent, immediate credence; but, after a certain time, sensible people take to asking about its evidence, and then its heavy retribution comes. Whoever is at the pains to scrutinize this,—and in good time those also, who will not be at much pains,—will have occasion to know, that the real difference between Harvard College and some other institutions is, that at the former, the student is left actually and absolutely unmolested in the enjoyment and profession of his religious opinions, whatever they may be;

in the latter, he is constantly subjected, — here more, there less, — to remonstrance, vexation, and contempt, if they are of an unpopular stamp. There are churches of the Episcopalian, Baptist, Methodist, and Orthodox Congregational denominations near the college, where all may worship, who, being of age, desire it, or, not of age, whose parents or guardians desire it for them. Roman Catholics have been freely allowed (and always will be, till sectarism gains triumphs there, which we do not anticipate,) to worship, not only on Sundays, but on other holy days of their communion, at their Boston Church. A Sandemanian has, with like deference to his conscientious views, been dispensed from all attendance on public services of the Sabbath, and allowed to pass the day with his friends, according to his and their views of edification. And a Jew, besides being held excused from presence at worship on the first day of the week, has had the seventh day equally at his disposal for his own religious uses. Nor is there any pretence that the full privilege of the legal provisions is restricted by intolerant practice of any other kind, on the part either of the governors or of the young men themselves. While apparent religious principle commands the respect of the latter, there is no such thing known among them, as any distinctive form of it being a ground of favoritism or of dislike. And when we say, that not the smallest reference is had to religious opinions, in adjudging college honors or benefactions, we shall provoke a smile from those who know any thing about it, so superfluous to them is the remark, and so notorious the fact; nay, so impossible do they see it to be, that it should be otherwise, in our state of society. We repeat our conviction, that too much importance has often been attached to this theological outcry, in reckoning the circumstances which have kept down the number of students at Cambridge. People who are able to choose the place where they may send their sons for an education, — as many of those are, who are at sufficient distance to be practised upon, — will, other things being equal, prefer, in the long run, to send them where they can get the best. If they respect their children's religious principles at all, or have been at pains to give them religious principles, — (and if not, they will have little solicitude on the question,) — they will have a confidence, that, at the age when young

men go to college, it is time they should be able to bear some exposure, even should that befall. And, in coming to so important a decision, they will be likely, if at all sagacious, to institute some inquiry, whether rumors which may have reached them are to be trusted; an inquiry, which, as we have said, can, under common advantages, only terminate in one way.

But, whether more or less importance be attached to this last consideration, and after all that we have admitted of the effect of the high requisitions for admittance, and of the remoteness of place, to prevent a rapid increase of the number of students, the great obstacle, we are persuaded, remains yet to be named. Besides that noble portion of its property, which is intended to "perish in the using," its buildings, library, and apparatus, Harvard College is, in lands and money, richer than any other in the Union. But it is also, we suppose, considerably the most expensive. The annual sum of seventy-five dollars must be contributed by each student towards its current charges. Eighty dollars more must be paid for board by those who use their option of living in the College commons, and fifteen by those who have a lodging within the College walls. And fuel is as dear as in Boston. So that, independently of personal expenses, which would be about the same in one place as another, a student lives in Cambridge at the cost of two hundred dollars a year. Here it is, that Harvard College labors. But for this barrier, the theological Cerberus would find himself turning so few passengers from its gate, that he would soon, himself, weary of his wearisome latrations. But for this, the ambitious youth of New England would be found disregarding, in greater numbers than now, the temptations of easier admission to other places of higher study, and of vicinity to their parents' homes. There is important fact in proof, if the reason of the case were not so evident. In the ten years following 1814, while the Commonwealth made its grants of two thousand five hundred dollars a year in favor of indigent students, the average number of the graduated classes was over sixty, while in the ten preceding years it was only forty-seven. And this too, under some very unfavorable circumstances of comparison. In the earlier period, other means of employment for youth were abridged by the political condition of the country, the sec-

tarian causes of alienation had scarcely begun to operate, and other colleges had not begun, to any great extent, to divide attention. The latter period, not to mention the great diminution of one class, under circumstances of internal discontent, was that when other colleges multiplied most rapidly, controversy was at the most unrebuked height of its savageness, and all the forms of reviving business were calling youth away from the Muse. Now, all which Harvard College does, to lighten to its students the regular charges, as we have stated them, is done with the gross annual amount of one thousand dollars, distributed in sums, of which the greatest is sixty dollars, and the least fifteen.

One thousand dollars in a year the sum total of appropriations to beneficiaries, who, as to the rest, are subject to all charges of the institution! Meanwhile the Education Society paid last year to eight other New England colleges, for the instruction of two hundred and ninety of its protégés, the sum of seventeen thousand seven hundred and sixteen dollars; giving to the two which show a longer roll than Harvard, four thousand seven hundred and fourteen dollars for seventy-six pupils, and three thousand five hundred and forty-six dollars for fifty-eight pupils respectively, the latter of these two seminaries, unless well-accredited report has misled us, numbering at the same time some scores of students, supported by a well known munificent individual among its friends. We greatly respect that institution. In all fit places, we are in the habit of cordially speaking its praise. But is not one most apparent cause of the difference between the size of its annual catalogue, and that of Harvard College, to be read in their respective legers?

Nor is Harvard College an expensive host, because an exorbitant one. To indigent students it gives all that it has to give; all, that either formally, or else (in its deliberate estimation) equitably and reasonably, is subject to such appropriation. Reasonably, we say; for, while much the greater portion of the property held by it, is held on terms, that is, on a contract, of some specific use, from which it cannot, either honestly or lawfully, be diverted, there is no doubt a balance, liable to be appropriated, from year to year, according to the best judgment of its governors. They may use this, if they see cause, to increase the advantages

of the institution, to hire more or better teachers, or buy more books, or more apparatus; or they may apply it to a universal reduction of the tax for the enjoyment of advantages already possessed; or they may give it to indigent students; or they may do something of all three. But certainly they will not, for the support of a poor man's son, lay a tax on the son of a man in middling circumstances, — no, nor on a rich man's son, without any equivalent of benefit to him. And they will be most scrupulously cautious about doing, what virtually amounts to the same thing, providing for the third object we have just named, at the expense of the second.

The cause of the expensiveness of Harvard College is two-fold. It is eminently expensive, because of the eminent advantages which it furnishes, and because of what some might think the disadvantages, and we reckon the precious advantages, of the situation, where it furnishes them.

Of the ninety dollars which each student must annually pay, (that is, unless he chooses to have a deduction made of fifteen dollars for rent, and hire his room out of the walls,) twenty-seven are paid towards charges which we suppose cannot be materially lower any where; though, if they are, they will come under the category, to which we are presently to proceed. Three dollars of them go to the Librarian's salary, and the remaining twenty-four to the support of the Steward's office, and the cleansing, heating, and repairing of the public rooms, to which every student, living in or out of college, is alike equitably bound to contribute. Fifteen dollars go to the rent and care of a lodging-room and study, which, however, he need not take nor pay for; but if he hire a room elsewhere in Cambridge, it will cost him much dearer; and if he can be lodged more cheaply, while he studies somewhere else than in Cambridge, he has certainly found a very economical place. The remaining forty-eight dollars go to defray the charge of instruction.

The instruction is dear, partly on account of the place, where it is given; and this again directs us to a view, at which we have not yet arrived. Because the place, where the instructers are to live and teach, is an expensive one to live in, the salaries they live upon must be high. Actually high, in a comparative estimate, they are. No doubt the incumbents of the same offices might be supported at less

cost elsewhere. But proportionably high, we are equally sure that they are not. So far from it, that we are satisfied that the support afforded must before long become more liberal, or the offices will have to fall into less able hands than will be consistent with the best honor of the College, or the best satisfaction of its friends. The expense of a domestic establishment in Cambridge, even (as to tenements near the College) in the article of rent, which might be supposed to make an exception, is in all respects as great as in the neighbouring city; while scarcely a salary approaches, within a quarter, to those afforded by the richer denominations, in the city, to their ministers. But, passing this, the instruction is dear, chiefly because there is a great deal of it; and it is a very familiar principle and practice, that the more a man buys, the more he pays for. We hope that there will never be a fraction less; and considering how much there is, it is very far from costly. We observe that an accomplished young friend of ours has just issued proposals for a school for boys in this city, at the charge, not of forty-eight dollars a year for each pupil, but of fifty dollars a quarter. And he will have that school; and he will succeed in it; and we rejoice that he will do so. The parents will receive every farthing of their money's worth; and it is matter of mutual congratulation for our College and its Boston neighbours, that the former is able to give a learning to its sons, which the latter have the sense and spirit thus liberally to compensate them for the use of. And much as its students may be thought to pay towards the accumulation of such a stock in trade, they by no means pay for all that they receive. The instruction which they buy of the College for forty-eight dollars a year, costs the College one hundred and fifty dollars, the difference being provided for from its funds, the trust with it of public and private benefactors.

We said that we would not, for the greater cheapness' sake, have the existing advantages of instruction abridged. But, if any one should think differently, he is to be told, that a material abridgment, of this kind, is not within the option of the College. On the contrary, just in the proportion that it has grown richer of late years, it has actually been compelled to levy a heavier tax. This will be obvious, as soon as a single fact is considered. The benefactors of the College have been in the habit of giving a particular

direction to their bounty. Generally this has been, to found a Professorship in some department, which in the terms of the endowment they have required to have kept filled. In no case of a Professorship yet in operation,* has there been given for this purpose a larger sum than twenty thousand dollars, while almost always it has been very much less. The annual income of this principal amounts to between one thousand and twelve hundred dollars. And, as no resident professor, on a foundation, receives a less salary than fifteen hundred dollars, the College is reduced to the alternative of either rejecting such gifts, or else, as an essential condition of their acceptance, assessing an additional tax of between three and five hundred dollars, at least, on its students, for the advantage of each new professorship which it secures. Could it, with any show of faithfulness to its trust, choose the former side of this alternative?

We said, again, that the College is expensive, because of its situation. Whether this be thought a subject of felicitation or complaint, it is a thing not now to be helped. To say nothing of the impossibility, or the inconvenience, of moving so much stone, and brick, and furniture, and the inexpediency, if it could be, of forfeiting, as an instrument of influence on the young mind, the benefit of associations which generations of glory attach to a place, — the College is, by constitution and law, a college in Cambridge. Ceasing to be in Cambridge, it ceases to be at all; and Cambridge, a place three miles distant from one of the most expensive capitals in the world, unavoidably partakes in its expensiveness. But, though this is enough for the justification of the College, we are not going to stop here; nor is the practical question, for those who are selecting a place of study, yet reached. We admit, most fully, that the vicinity to Boston is expensive. It increases the charge of living to the instructers, whom the student must help to maintain; and it increases his personal charges for diet and other things needful while he studies. And here we briefly remark, by the way, that the College interferes for him, to keep the charge from being nearly so onerous, as, on the principles of sale and purchase, it would naturally be. Besides paying from its

* We make this qualification with reference to the late large endowment in Natural History, by the venerable Dr. Fisher, of Beverly.

own treasury, two thirds of his tuition-fees, as has been explained, — if he chooses to board at its refectory, he pays the College but one dollar and ninety cents in a week, for what costs the College, all things included, two dollars and twenty-five cents;* and if he prefer to fare more delicately, still, the College, by this under-bidding, keeps down the price, which will be demanded of him at a private house; and the same is the operation of the low rate, at which it rents its apartments, charging but twelve dollars a year for accommodations worth from twenty to forty. But, leaving this, we affirm, that while the vicinity to Boston is expensive to the student, it is worth to him all, and very much more than all, it costs him.

This worth is to be analysed into the influence exerted from the circumstance in question, on his moral habits, and the influence exerted on all the habits of his mind.

We have heard that, when the first bridge between Cambridge and Boston was projected, materially facilitating communication, and some friends of the College urged it to oppose the scheme, as hazardous to its objects, Judge Parsons, then a Fellow, assumed the opposite ground. If it was so, we venture the conjecture that it was for reasons such as we are about to present.

We say, that this vicinity to a city like Boston is worth what the student pays for it, partly because it is a circumstance so auspicious to his moral habits. If the general experience of our country does not deceive us, the vices take their most odious, ruinous, debasing, hopeless form in village dissipation. If all the experience of the world does not betray, remote academical villages, containing two castes in society, the one withdrawn from all domestic influences, overlooked by no public opinion which it regards, making a point of honor for itself, looking on the other but as furnishing instruments for its wickedness, are well-nigh the most painful objects to which a good mind can turn its view. What keeps Cambridge from being such an academical village? We answer, — after doing all justice to the good dispositions of its youth, and the good management of its governors, — that in great part what prevents this, is its

* Many of these statements are but repetitions of facts presented in Mr. Gray's Letter to Governor Lincoln, in 1831.

vicinity to Boston. Place the College, with all the money which it disburses, at thirty miles' distance from a great town, and directly, — unless all influences, observed commonly to operate in such institutions, were to cease to act, or unless opposite influences were applied with a hitherto unheard of power, unless youth should become immaculate, or tutors omniscient, — there would be collected about its walls all facilities and appliances of vice. Nothing short of martial discipline would keep them away; and with that even, as at West Point, they would not fail to wage a pertinacious war. Now, all means of vicious pleasure already existing at three miles' distance, as every great city provides them, no motive exists for bringing them nearer. To bring them nearer, would, under such competition, cost the purveyors more than it would come to. This seems a very simple speculation; and it is justified, as every body knows, who knows Cambridge, by the fact.

But, it will be objected, "The argument is, that means of vice being already near enough to be conveniently accessible, all motive for bringing them nearer is withdrawn. If, then, near enough already to be accessible, how is the naturally resulting evil checked?" We answer, it is checked mightily, in two or three ways. If, on an expedition to one's harm, instead of being absent from one's proper place long enough to find some neighbouring lane, it be necessary to be gone two or three hours, to travel an open, frequented road, and cross a bridge, the danger of detection is indefinitely increased, and with it the securities for good order, as far as this may demand to be maintained by vigilance and coercion. But, much further and better than this, students at Cambridge, — unless their dulness hinder the perception, — see themselves to be more or less under the oversight, and to be companions of others who are most strictly under the oversight, of a very enlightened, discerning, and moral neighbouring community, of a consequence and power which forbids them to be indifferent to its regard or censure. They see themselves the sons, or associates of sons, of those, who are near enough to turn a very watchful eye to the place of their studies; the objects of attention to men, whose esteem is well worth having, and who yield it on no easier terms than those of estimable conduct; the neighbours of a band of youth, who, in the coveted circles of society, take care to main-

tain, in their various walks, a high standard of character, and mean that whoever is ambitious to be their companion, shall respect that standard. They live in a good moral atmosphere. They must breathe it, or they must go away to find another.

These are some of the features of the moral condition of students at Cambridge; and we bear them emphatic witness that we see happy fruits of their position. We do not pursue the train of thought. We have said enough to make ourselves understood; and we ask attention to it. We proceed to a like hint on the literary influences of the same position; and here again, having undertaken to present some grave points, we do not mean that they shall suffer injustice, through any bashfulness of ours in the statement.

When we look at the scholarship which Harvard College actually forms, after giving all credit to the good judgment with which its course of study is laid out, the talent and faithfulness of those who conduct it, and the various obvious advantages under which it is pursued, we are fain after all to acknowledge, that the machinery is inadequate to the product. We look for some further element of power, in bringing about the consummation witnessed. And we do not hesitate to say, that we find it in the circumstance of situation, of which we have been speaking. Those who do not know Boston, may need to be told, that a decidedly literary tone pervades its good society. We do not say, whether it contains great or little men, sciolists or scholars. Let that take care of itself; we do not carry "this foolishness of boasting" any further than suits our purpose. But there is a love of learning. That its citizens love to read, either what is superficial, or else what is not so, or both, may be inferred from the large amount of its publications compared with those of any other American city, or from the single fact, that, exclusive of newspapers and of religious magazines, the amount of its periodical literature has been reckoned to be as great as that of all the rest of the country. At all events, there is a love of the fame of learning. Mothers, like Mather's mother, are ambitious to see a son "a good scholar," as well as a "good Christian." Fathers and sisters have an especial pride in the youth who has won that name. The stranger, who has won it at Cambridge, under the eye of this community, sees himself received, on that ground, on an honorable footing, in society

where he may well desire to move. He finds himself, wherever he may be introduced, to be, on that ground, the object of a flattering consideration. The youth, who comes here with his fortune to make, sees, — we do not scruple to say it, — that, that reputation won, his fortune will be made; at least, that he will have brought it effectually within the reach of his own further good conduct; for he will have been attracting the kindled eye of not a few, who stand emulously ready to advance him, by such honorable and effective aid as the risen may render to the rising. Is there not found stimulus in all this? And even for those, on whom, from their individual circumstances, some parts of it do not directly act, does not the raising of the standard of attainment, through such means, indirectly produce the same effect? And is there no permanent, inevitable impulse and discipline for the mind, in the literary cast of all surrounding social intercourse? And does not the presence of individual examples of literary success and note, — such as colleges and villages do not show in any numbers, — such as a city must show, or nothing, — does not this have its vast effect? We ask to have this view of the facts well weighed, by those by whom the facts are recognised; and we will be in the judgment of any discerning parent, whether the expensiveness of the place of study in question is not incident to advantages which it is no bad thrift to pay largely for, if they may not otherwise be had.

But, while we so highly appreciate these advantages, and cannot think the money ill spent that secures them, we earnestly wish that they were otherwise to be had, and most earnestly do we hope, before long, to see some resolute measures taken to this end. This end is what the College wants accomplished, to become what its living friends, and its patrons, if they may look down to see the progress of their blessed work, desire to see it, — an overflowing fountain of refreshing waters to our beloved native land. This it wants, to enable it to dispense its learned wealth with an unstinted bounty. This it wants, to help it to inscribe its name broadly and brightly as it should, on the history of the American mind. Give it this, and it will confidently leave, to those whom it invites, the question of further endeavours, which will remain for themselves to make, to accept its invitation. Give it this, and it will not defy,

but by the beauty of its usefulness, it will win and silence, the jealousies of sectarian bigotry. Who shall give it? Singly, some of its sons have done their part; and others, who owed it nothing, except what good men owe to good objects, have all along been bountifully doing theirs. Who shall make this provision for the College? Its own sons collectively, some have thought; and so proposes the author of the discourse before us.

"If God blesses us with wealth, I know not, among the public distributions we may have grace to devise, what more grateful object we can propose to ourselves, than to turn back to pour a filial tribute into our mother's lap, to be dispensed to her younger hopes, in ampler bounty than she could command the means to afford to us. And here I will even ask, in passing, since the subject leads to the inquiry, whether, while separately many of her children have 'done virtuously' in this way, it is not time that some more extended and united action of them together, should 'excel them all.' An eminent jurist of the last century called his liberal testamentary endowment, 'a poor thank-offering to God from his unworthy servant, for his many and great mercies to him in his education at that college'; * and the words, 'once a pupil, always a patron,' making part of the inscription, in which her gratitude recorded the merits of another distinguished magistrate, on the edifice, by the gift of which he had evinced his filial regard, have a truth and an interest for the many bosoms, in which the same sentiment is doubtless devoutly cherished.' — p. 15, 16.

A subscription for Burlington College, among its sons and perhaps others, had, previously to the beginning of last July, raised for it twenty-six thousand dollars. Amherst College lately obtained, in the same way, between thirty and fifty thousand dollars; and Hanover, not long ago, about as much. Williamstown College has had its contribution of the same kind, and the Alumni of Yale have testified their love to their Alma Mater by the becoming gift of nearly one hundred thousand dollars. Berkshire and Hampshire counties are not richer than the sea-board. Vermont and New Hampshire can hardly spare more money than Massa-

* Chief Justice Dudley. "He honored and loved that his mother, and was wont to say of her, that he knew no better place to begin the forming of a good and worthy man." — Colman's *Sermon on the Death of the Hon. Joseph Dudley.*

chusetts. The sons of Yale College do not owe more, than those of Harvard, to the mother of their minds; nor should we of Harvard be willing to have it proved, nor can it be yet proved, that they love her better. A very generous example has been set. Is there any reason to question, that, at the fit time, it is destined to be as generously followed? We submit, whether a hint, in a note to the passage just quoted, respecting that fit time, is not well entitled to attention.

"'The Court agreed to give £400 towards a schoale or Colledge, whearoff £200 to bee paid the next yeare, and £200 when the worke is finished, and the next Court to appoint wheare and w^t^ building.'

"Such is part of the record of the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, convened Sept. 25th (Oct. 6th, N. S.), 1636, and continued thence from day to day by adjournment. In little more than two years, then, the second century from the foundation of the College will be completed.

"Is it fit, or not, that her nineteen hundred living sons should be thinking of doing honor to that event, by some joint expression of their gratitude?

"Their aggregate means are ample. The wants of the College, in two respects, those of accommodation for its invaluable library, and provision for indigent students, are great. To keep the anniversary by a liberal united effort to advance the object, to which it owes its interest, would make a sensible and memorable novelty among forms of commemoration."—p. 16.

Truly, what an anniversary here would be! The gathered gifts to a common mother of nineteen hundred sons, remitted from "all the borders of the country, and all the corners of the world," — the north giving up, and the south not keeping back, — and consecrated at the goal of the second century of her history, in testimony of reverence for her services, of the gratitude of the givers, and of confiding hope that the coming ages would be terms of equal, and more, usefulness and honor. Whoever should see that day, would have some feelings to experience, worth the knowing. He would witness something which he could not forget, nor the world either.

As to the year 1636, here adopted as that of the foundation, we apprehend that it ought to be so regarded; though the common reckoning we believe has fixed it in 1638, the

year when the College went into operation, the first class being graduated in 1642. The date of the legal act, establishing it, appears to us properly to fix the point of time; and it is so recognised in the preamble to the fifth chapter of the State Constitution, which recites, that, "Whereas our wise and pious ancestors, so early as the year *one thousand six hundred and thirty-six*, laid the *foundation* of Harvard College, in which University, many persons of great eminence, have, by the blessing of God, been initiated into those arts and sciences, which qualified them for public employments, both in church and state; and whereas the encouragement of arts and sciences, and all good literature, tends to the honor of God, the advantage of the Christian religion, and the great benefit of this, and the other United States of America: it is declared," &c.

As to a contribution of the kind referred to, the nineteen hundred living graduates, — though there are some seventy or eighty earlier, and, among them, names of our eminently affluent and liberal citizens, — may be regarded as distributed through fifty classes, beginning with 1780, the more recent classes being still young. Of the earlier of these classes the surviving members are few, and those of the later have not fully entered upon life. To make up, from fifty classes, a like contribution for Harvard College, to what has been lately made for Yale, an average sum of two thousand dollars from each, would be requisite. There are others, who can better tell than we, whether the hope of obtaining such a sum would be extravagant.

Should a contribution, greater or less, ever come to be made, and should it be applied to the object of which we have been speaking, the lessening, to youth of limited means, of pecuniary discouragements from studying at Cambridge, such application would naturally take one, or the other, or both, of two forms. It might either go to diminish the charge for instruction for all the students indiscriminately, or, leaving this as it is, it might be directed, in larger single distributions, towards the maintenance of the more indigent of their number; or it might do a portion of both these kinds of good.

In the first case, it would probably have the immediate effect of bringing back that perhaps most desirable class of students, the sons of families in the middling rank in respect

to property, in town and country, who, we fear, were driven away in great numbers, by the change in the amount of tuition fees in or about 1807. They mean to pay, to the full extent, that others around them do, for whatever they have. This is what they have been used to doing. It is their habit; perhaps it is their point of honor; — no matter which. But they are obliged strictly to consult economy. And the difference of an annual expense of twenty or thirty dollars, which their fathers will have to spare from the profits of a farm or a shop, and pinch themselves to furnish, is, and ought to be, with such, a very serious consideration. It is, in fact, a consideration, decisive year by year, of the destination of numbers of youth, to whom the country owes, for its own sake, the best advantages of education it can afford; — of those, who, in moral and intellectual structure, are the bone and sinew of the commonwealth, and on all accounts, personal and public, entitled to its best training.

There is one obvious qualification of the advantage of this use of funds. Along with those to whom it is of the first importance, it would benefit others, who are in no need of it whatever; — the sons of the rich, who, instead of caring to pay less than they now do, would feel a considerable increase of their liabilities to be no burden. But, on the other hand, this equality of expenditure between the rich and those who are not rich, is indispensable; else the object of the latter, who intend, wherever they go, to pay all that their associates do, is defeated. And again; as it is to be supposed for a general rule, that the richer givers to such a fund would be also the most bountiful, it would not be reasonable to expect them to repeat their contribution, in the payment of larger charges on their children's term-bills.

To an appropriation of funds, of the second description named above, we have occasionally heard objections made, to which we do not think it liable. We cannot say how common the sentiment is, but we know that it exists, that the more indigent class of students at college have not generally, by the merit and services of later life, shown themselves particularly well entitled to the aid afforded them in acquiring an education. We are not of that opinion. It is impossible to arrive at exact results in the weighing of that question. It covers too much ground, and it is too delicate. But, from such rough estimate, as

we are able to make, of what has fallen under our own notice, we are inclined to think, that that class of students, — not to speak of the individual instances of its furnishing leading lights, — has, on the whole, done its fair share of service to the great interests of society. And, if it were otherwise, we should by no means hold the question of the fitness of such patronage to be settled. The experience of a few years or decades cannot settle it; and certainly there is nothing in the reason of the case, to prove that the supposed actual result is to be looked for. Nor, if the result were both probable and realized, would we allow that the assumed practical inference follows. Independently of all such considerations, we should still desire, — and that on grounds, we think, of patriotism and good sense, — to have the poorest man feel, that his son, if disposed to use them, had the best advantages of education within his reach, and, with those advantages, the privilege of the most favorable experiment to lift himself to the highest places in society. We should still earnestly desire to have the poorest men know and feel, that opportunities for obtaining the best learning were no aristocratic possession, and that they had none but themselves to reckon with, if the best learning should become characteristically an aristocratic accomplishment.

We know, again, that there is in some minds, an indisposition to this form of bounty, on account of an impression, that there is something humbling in becoming its object. They think, that to receive it, argues, or forms, something of an abject spirit, or does both. We cannot but hold, that this view is taken in utter blindness to the conditions, under which Providence has made us men to live on earth. He who demands to be independent, must go seek quarters in some other planet. Providence meant that all men should find their own happiness in communicating it to others; and, if all are to confer favors, it can hardly be that all will not have to receive them. It meant that there should be such a happy sentiment as gratitude; and, as none were to be excluded from its enjoyment, so none were allowed to be above being served. Every human being is a debtor to men before and about him; — a stipendiary to the past and to the present. When so much of what we most value, and are every moment enjoying, — the protection of good laws, the spirit of society, the guidance of transmitted wisdom, —

is necessarily the free gift to us of the fruit of costly labors, which cannot be estimated in money, — and, if they could, which we have no money to pay for, — it clearly appears to us more nice than wise, to be lofty about receiving the smaller balance of kindnesses, which it still remains optional with us to reject. And while a man is making his superlative distinctions between what he can, and what he cannot, help receiving gratuitously from others, he will only be experiencing the multiform mortifications of that most mortifying passion, pride, till he is taught sense enough to be willing to have his impracticable principle break down under the distraction. He who is difficult about being a "charity scholar," if such is the phrase, at Cambridge, — if he will carry out his doctrine, must be disturbed and shame-faced, when he goes thence, and comes to deposit his vote, or vent his voice, in that eleemosynary establishment, Faneuil Hall. For he is there a charity voter, and a charity orator. If Faneuil had not given the Hall, the town would now have to build it, and the citizen and speaker would be taxed to pay the bill. At all events, Harvard College admits none but charity scholars. Some rich men's sons are studying there ; but not one of them all pays his scot and lot. As truly as any of their associates, they are objects of the College's bounty. It is simply a question between them of more and less. We take it that not a word of the statement to this effect, on the fifth page of the sermon before us, can be called in question ; and, if so, he who is a beneficiary to the annual amount of one hundred and fifty dollars, while at his right or left hand sits another who gets but one hundred dollars, may be made by fifty per cent. a more abject-spirited man than his neighbour, may be depressed half as much again in his own esteem, but a most humiliating process for all the ingenuous youth, without exception, must doubtless be our college life.

Both of these methods, then, of relieving the expensiveness of an education at Cambridge, seem to have their recommendations; and it is not improbable that, on a full view of the subject, it might be thought wise to direct endeavours towards a partial attainment of both, rather than an exclusive one of either. In the case of any thing considerable of the kind being done, it may be supposed that the government of the College would feel more at liberty to direct any

funds, come or coming into their hands, and subject to their direction, to the provision of safe and proper accommodation for its library. That is a thing which it is high time were done, to whomsoever it may belong to do it. The destruction of that library would be an intolerable stigma on the name of the government, or the alumni, or the neighbourhood, or the State, or the country, or whomsoever else the stern justice of posterity might select to bear the blame. We state familiar facts, when we repeat, that being considerably the richest in the western hemisphere, it consists of forty thousand volumes, many of which are rare, important, and costly; that it contains a collection, — undoubtedly the most precious in the world in the department of American History, — of six or seven thousand volumes, and thirteen thousand maps and charts, bought, partly, against the competition of a king, by one of those "merchants" of ours, who are "princes," and partly furnished by the munificence of a son of another of those "traffickers," who are "the honorable of the earth"; that it is necessarily disposed in rooms, whose narrow dimensions absolutely forbid its further extension, a measure for which other liberal citizens are understood to be standing ready, so justly popular is the object; — and that it is within six feet of a building, where in the winter are constantly kept thirty fires under the care of youth, whose engagements, besides, cause them to be absent three times every day, for an hour together. The risk is appalling. We cannot sleep on a windy night when we think of it. The burning of the comparatively small, and on all accounts incomparably meaner collection, seventy years ago, threw the province into a sort of universal mourning. A "ruinous loss" the papers of the time well called it. The governor, on the second following morning, sent a message to the Representatives to "heartily condole with" them "on the unfortunate accident"; and America and Britain were moved to repair the mischief. May this generation not be doomed to see on that spot such another heap of priceless ruins! But if the horror do not befall, it is not wishing, that will have averted it.

The President says, in his "Considerations," submitted to the Legislature the winter before last; "Let the Legislature of Massachusetts only grant sufficient means for such a building as the case requires, and it is not too much to

say, nor to pledge, that this library, instead of containing forty thousand volumes, shall, within ten years, contain sixty thousand volumes. Dispositions to that effect have been intimated by men capable of carrying them into execution." He says, again; "It has been ascertained that the books now actually constituting the library, would require thirty alcoves of the same height and extent (viz. with the twenty, which now occupy the whole space,) properly and safely to preserve them." We wish to suggest, in addition to this object of safe preservation, the importance of that of convenient use. Great libraries are not more, perhaps not so much, depositaries of books to be borrowed from them, as of books to be consulted within them. But to consult books in Harvard College library, is now all but out of the question. There is hardly so much as room to pass conveniently between the book shelves and other indispensable furniture. Every book should be brought, by means of galleries, within convenient reach. A moderate temperature should be kept up throughout the room; and the alcoves, furnished with tables and with stationery, should present accommodations and a degree of retirement, for reading and writing. We have occasion, from time to time, to visit that library, but we certainly do not go thither one time in ten times, that we should, if the apartments were more tenantable. For ourselves, we use no exaggeration in saying, that the day that arrangements were made for Harvard College library, only similar to those existing for that of the Boston Athenæum, that day it would rise tenfold in value to us. And that which is the case with us, may not improbably be, more or less, the case with others.

It is not for us to predict what the Commonwealth will do in the premises; though we think we can guess what its enlightened people would do, if left to themselves. They make it no sectarian question; and the petitions of the several faculties of the Episcopal, Baptist, and Orthodox Congregational schools of theology, were cordially presented to second the application of the College. And we think we can conjecture what their intelligent representatives, following the generous lead of the upper house, would do, if released from side-way influences, and unbiassed by regard to considerations of supposed practical connexion of this subject with others, which, in their own nature, are as remote from it as possible. Were we legislators, we should plead for this provision for the Col-

lege, not on the ground of the College's wants, nor of its deserts, but on the ground of what the Commonwealth owes to its own dignity, and growth, and greatness. We would say, whatever influence you are to have in the councils and over the destiny of this nation, you are to owe, not to the extent of your territory, nor to your numbers, nor to your money, but to the mastery of your minds. Look to the fair intellectual fame of Massachusetts. See to it, that there be always clear, and well trained, and well stored understandings, to discern her rights, and interests, and honor, and, seeing, to maintain and to advance them. Take care to make her, in the way to which plain indications of Providence invite, "a name and a praise" in the wide earth. Take good heed, that, through your slowness, *the republic receive no detriment.* The sons of the College are able to take care of your interest within her walls, and they will do it, when they shall know that you have abandoned it. But you have only to speak the word, and the work is done. And if, while you are hesitating, the brightest jewel in her crown is reft, look to your reckoning with posterity, when it shall bitterly say, how untrue it has found you to its claims and interests, while the past had never been wanting to yours.*

We have only further, before leaving this point, to turn the tables upon a former remark, and say, that if, in a despair, — which certainly we could not undertake to justify, — of provision from the public chest for this pressing want of a library building, the sons of the College were to resolve them-

* "Think not, that the commonwealth of learning may languish, and yet our civil and ecclesiastical state be maintained in good plight and condition. The wisdom and foresight, and care for future times, of our first leaders, was in nothing more conspicuous and admirable, than in the planting of that nursery, and New England is enjoying the sweet fruit of it. It becomes all our faithful and worthy patriots that tread in their steps, to water what they have planted." — *President Oakes's Election Sermon*, 1678.

"Behold an American University, which hath been to these plantations, as Livy saith of Greece, for the good literature there cultivated, *Sal Gentium;* an University, which may make her boast unto the circumjacent regions, like that of the orator on the behalf of the English Cambridge; 'Fecimus (absit verbo invidia, cui abest falsitas) ne in demagoriis lapis sederet super lapidem, ne deessent in templis theologi, in foris jurisperiti, in oppidis medici; rempublicam, ecclesiam, senatum, exercitum, viris doctis replevimus, eòque melius bono publico inservire comparatis, quò magis eruditi fuerint.'"—*Magnalia*, IV. p. 125.

selves to make that provision, it would seem reasonable to expect that the government, being just so far relieved from occasion for the use of unappropriated funds, would be able to devote them, to the same, or to some extent, to a reduction of the charge for teaching.

We suppose we should not be excused, if, having in another aspect brought the College thus largely to the view of our readers, we should shrink from adverting to notorious circumstances of its recent position before the public. We would gladly be excused from this reference, if we might. In the existing posture of things, we have perhaps a different view of its expediency, in the abstract, from those irresponsible and uninformed persons, who have not scrupled to discuss very delicate questions touching the feelings of parents, the prospects of sons, and the honor of a most venerable and meritorious institution.* We shall not follow them in that discussion. The case of the government is not yet before the public. Very probably it will be, before long, by means of a report to the Overseers, or otherwise; and then, if occasion be, we, perchance, shall be found as ready as others to enter into its merits. What we care to say here, and what is here to our purpose to say, is, that we have no belief that any thing has occurred, which ought, or will, withdraw pub-

* The wantonness of the periodical press has perhaps rarely been more strikingly manifested, than in the course of this business. We have taken no pains to remember the instances, but one happens to be before us. One of the Boston prints, late in June, or early in July, had announced that "all the Senior class of Harvard College, who acknowledged having approved of the circular, had been dismissed, and that there would be no Commencement." Not a word of this was true. The Faculty were holding meetings; but, as was fit under such circumstances, they kept their own counsel, to that degree that their own neighbours could not form so much as a probable conjecture, how things were going on. When their decision, some two or three weeks after, became known, it proved to be a dismission, not of the whole class, but of a small portion of it. And that there will be no Commencement, is an assertion which could not be safely made, as late as the time when we are writing, towards the middle of August.

Now fair men very often make mistakes; and they have a very simple way of procedure, when they discover that they have done so. They say that they had been misinformed, adding, or not adding, an expression of their regret for any mischief which may have been so occasioned. But what said this editor, when better information speedily reached him? Referring to his previous insertion, he said, "We were rightly informed *in part only.* Up to this morning, sentence had not been pronounced, *but it was expected momentarily.*"

lic confidence from the institution. A pretty strong proof to the contrary is already furnished, by the fact, that, at the end of the last term, in which the discontents occurred, so great a number of students was offered for admission into the Freshman class, that, if a like proportion as in past years should be kept up at the examination in Commencement week, — and we know no reason why this should not be expected, — a larger class will be formed than has ever entered.

We are not, then, going to discuss the character of the police laws of the College, or of their administration in any instance. They who conduct the latter are known, and the former are on record, and are always on the trial of experience. Both are subject to a control, — by a large foreign body, that of the Board of Overseers, — which the wisdom of the Commonwealth has judged to be sufficient; and when the College authority, in the several departments, has entertained an important question, the public does not commonly have to wait long, to be acquainted, in detail, with facts and reasons. But it is to our point, to express the confident opinion, that any possible disadvantage, greater or less, to which the College may seem exposed, by occurrences like those of recent date, is not to be often or long incurred through their repetition. We believe it impossible that the evil, whatever it be, of such combined resistance to authority, should be permanent, because of our persuasion that it stands upon bases altogether insufficient to sustain it. We are satisfied, that its grounds only need to be looked at with that careful attention, which interesting consequences like those lately witnessed will secure for them, to melt away beneath the view. And, apart from this, we know the young gentlemen to be such good reasoners, that the strength or frailty of principles, on which they may have acted, will not eventually remain concealed from their perception.

One of the grounds, on which combined resistance to authority in such an institution appears to proceed, is a vague idea, that, in the relation implied in its laws, the governors constitute one party, and the students for the time being, the other; so that, if there be supposed fault to find in such laws or their execution, the latter, being the sole party in interest, are the party to find it, and to insist, if need be, on a remedy. Now the students for the time being are not the other

party in that relation, but a very small portion of it; a portion so small, as to be, numerically, — almost insignificant, we would say, if the word did not seem to imply disrespect, a thing which, above all others, we mean to be careful to avoid. No doubt they are so situated, in some respects, as to have advantages, other things being equal, for an exact acquaintance with the operation of the laws, and peculiarly to feel the present pressure, if the laws work ill. But they do not make up the party, for whose improvement and satisfaction the laws are ordained and administered; no, nor are they so much as the legal, nor so much as the rightful, nor so much as the apparent representatives of that party. The laws are made for the benefit of all the *educable* youth of the country, alike of those who may come, as of those who have come under them, — a number, of which that of the resident students at any given time is but a fraction; and they are made for the good and use of others yet, of the friends of those youth, and of the literary community at large, and of the body politic. It is not then for A, B, and C, whose names this year are on the College catalogue, to understand a supposed mal-administration as a summons to themselves to put lance in rest. They "take too much upon them," those "sons of Levi." Before they can modestly assume that championship, they must get authority from the youth of the country, with names beginning with all the letters of the alphabet; and this done, they must get authority from the many others, who have a stake in the issue as well as they, and who, when they should be consulted, might, or might not, be found to hold different views, and decline their interposition.

What then is a person, so situated, to do, when he feels himself aggrieved, and they, with whom lies the discretion, will not right him? Is he to submit to be oppressed? There is not a question easier to be answered. He is not to submit to oppression. He is to go away, out of oppression's reach. He has his own discretion in this matter, and one amply sufficient for his own protection. The College does not want to keep him to oppress, after a difference of opinion unhappily arises, if he is not inclined to stay. Unless he be chargeable with one of the higher offences, excluding him, by academic courtesy, from reception elsewhere, — a case which stands on its own grounds, and is very different from what we are now supposing, — the arm of College authority

cannot touch him, an hour after he wills that it shall cease to do so. There is his remedy. If there be mal-administration, it follows not at all that the coercive correction is for him. He is concerned for it, true, and so are very many others. He, like others, under the obligations and with the advantages of the place which he fills, may use his influence and information to have it corrected in a legal way. But that correction is no more entrusted, either in law or in common sense, to him and his two hundred and fifty associates, than to any other two hundred and fifty citizens of the Commonwealth, between the ages of sixteen and twenty. When effected, it is to be through the action of a body, which the constitution and laws recognise as the true representatives of the whole party actually concerned, the representatives of the interest of students in Cambridge and out of it, and of their friends, and of the friends of the College, of learning, and of good order.

Another impression, which seems to be implied in recent college movements, is, that the relation of classmate, or college-mate, imposes an obligation to make common cause; so that a man is concerned in honor to bring himself into trouble, by illegal measures, when legal do not avail, either to obtain redress for his associate who has in his judgment suffered wrong, or, failing of this, to express his indignation at the injustice. We speak under correction, when we say, that we suppose this to be, at Cambridge, a modern refinement. In old times, as far as we remember, general movements were occasioned by some sense of general grievance. So it was in the great commotion of 1768. So it was in that of 1807. Nor can we, — though it may, we grant, be through defect of memory or knowledge, — recall an instance, earlier than within a score of years, in which resentment of supposed individual hardship led to a considerable combination in illegal acts. But, new or old, this principle of action, we have no idea is going to stand for ever, inasmuch as it stands on no tolerable grounds. If I take my seat in a stage-coach with a stranger, I presently perceive that we have one point of sympathy together, in the journey on which both are bound. If I have common benevolence, I intend that his journey shall be a pleasant one, as far as depends on me; and little civilities begin forthwith to pass between us. If he prove to be an intelligent and well-disposed person, I am of course

pleased with the opportunity of such a familiar and unceremonious enjoyment of his society. And after we have parted, should we ever meet again, I shall be gratified in recalling with him the agreeable circumstances of our accidental interview, and renewing the satisfactory communications which had occurred. If I have had such a companion in a long voyage, all relations of this description will have been multiplied, and all interest heightened that grows out of them. But, certainly, I cannot think of giving to every person with whom I may have chanced to whirl in an omnibus, or to pace a quarter-deck, such a control over my agency and standing, that his honor is to be my honor; his quarrel, my quarrel; his discredit or loss, a thing that he must be relieved from, or else share it with me. If he gets into trouble, I shall wish him, and do what I can to bring him, out of it. So much is due to charity. If I think he suffers wrong, I shall remonstrate and otherwise interest myself with the wrong-doer for his indemnification, in such manner as my relation to the latter may make fit. So much is due to justice. If the case seems to me flagrant, I shall be willing to put myself to much expense and inconvenience to have him righted. But it can hardly be so flagrant, that I shall find it my duty to acknowledge claims (on the ground of any accidental fellowship, independent of the claims of humanity,) which shall involve disappointment and distress to other friends, to whom I am attached in obligations of the earliest date and of the closest intimacy; and it absolutely cannot be so flagrant, that I shall be willing to disregard such obligations as the latter, when the disregard of them can be attended with no benefit to him whom I would serve. Certainly I shall not, because a man is my fellow-traveller, allow that he has a right to expect me to take counsel in his behalf, on all occasions, of my feelings, which may be hasty, and of my first judgment, which may be dull. If he looks to me for good offices on the common grounds of justice and generosity, as they bear on the relations between man and man, these I understand, and there is no danger of their creating interference with any of my duties; but if on the ground of a particular relation, then there are other relations, which I ought to consider much more; relations, which will righteously call upon me, as soon as there is conflict, or danger of conflict, to give them practical precedence.

Now a college, as far as the question before us is concerned, is a public conveyance, carrying its burden four years forward from childhood into life. Nor is it only, nor mainly, the length of the opportunity afforded by it, to those whom it conveys, to mature a mutual interest, which causes it to give a peculiar relish to the feeling thus inspired. The intercourse, for which it affords occasion, is connected with common occupation in engaging studies, and with the rapid, and happy, and intense experience of youth. The college journey, in a word, is a journey towards fairy-land, over a region attractive enough to deserve to lie in such a line of way; a journey made by a party in high spirits, of quick perceptions, full of wit, of unoccupied hearts, of like age, and with many other points of sympathy. And no wonder, that the travellers should find it pleasant, and from the very beginning feel very kindly towards one another. But after all that can be said on that side, still we cannot get so far as to say on the other, that a man is to feel himself bound, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, for well-behaved or roguish, to whosoever, unseen by him till then, has happened to vault or blunder into college on the same Midsummer day with himself. We cannot find so much as a goodly seeming pedestal of moon-shine to uphold the fancy, that an obligation created by that accident, — an accident, it may well be, and often is, which neither of the parties particularly rejoices in, — is to supersede obligations which devoted years of a mother's love have been establishing, and anxious years of a father's sturdy toil. We submit, that that notion will not stand the looking at. It trembles and sways under a beam of light, like a balanced needle in an exhausted receiver. It is soon going to be in the limbo of "things lost on earth." At all events, it will not do for our "climate and manners." It is quite too sublimated; too exquisite; too German, we would say, but that national reflections are illiberal; at least, too German after the manner of Professor Pottingen's daughter in Canning's play in the Antijacobin, who accosts another fair traveller, whom she encounters in the common room of an inn, with the proposal; "A sudden thought strikes me; let us swear eternal friendship." — And then to go on, and in this summary offensive and defensive alliance, do battle, as soon as the uncertain trumpet sounds, at the hazard of much that is interesting to one's hopes, and important in

the view of one's good sense, — why, this does seem to us a most incoherent centaur-composition of excessive amenity and exaggerated manliness. It is Captain Mac Turk grouped with Damon and Pythias. Rather, it is the bravery of that worthy, engrafted on the devotion of Araminta Vavasour, and her gentle boarding-school friend;

> "We walked hand in hand to the road, love,
> We looked arm in arm to the sky;
> And I said, when a foreign postillion
> Shall hurry me off to the Po,
> Don't forget your Medora Trevilian," &c.

We do not mean to leave any body at liberty here to misapprehend us. We are not of those, if any such there be, who think lightly of the interest of the relation of class-mate at college. Perchance we know about its interest, as well as younger men. Perchance we have had, in our day, as much of the good of that relation as others, and have as much reason as others to know the worth of permanent friendships, there formed and nurtured. But we hope we never saw the time, when we looked upon it as the great dispensing relation of life; if we ever did, that time is so distant, though we are not octogenarians, as to have quite faded from our memory. And in these few words we have not designedly said one, to wound the feelings of any, who have been implicated in recent transactions. Quite a different sentiment from any which would dictate this, is excited in every observer of tolerable rectitude of mind and heart. Those youth are our sons, or sons of our kindred, neighbours, and friends. They are bone of the community's best bone, and flesh of its dearest flesh. We love every man and boy of them. We could not spare so much as one from the good public service, which we hope they are destined to render. We would trust them to-morrow with any thing, in which uprightness of mind and heart was alone concerned; and with many things which called for clear judgment, provided the case was one, in which that college idiopathy, we have been commenting on, was out of the way. There is sense and excellence among them, which ensures that their errors, if they err, shall be viewed much more "in sorrow than in anger." We do not expect Alcibiades to have Socrates' grey hairs, though as often as he harms him-

self, he makes us wish that he had, for his protection, more of the philosophy he is studying. Indeed, they must be much more than commonly wise men, if, at twice their present age, they never make great mistakes. And they must be very much more than commonly good ones, if their mistakes have never a worse source, than an ill-defined and exaggerated feeling of honor. And they must be very much more than commonly fortunate ones, if they are always told of their mistakes as good-naturedly, as we have desired to comment on what we account such now.

For our glorious Alma Mater, we admit not a thought of apprehension. It is not by so light a touch, that her age-gathered honors are to be brushed away. Hers is a proud and solemn mien, ready to frown, — but that it is too calm and Jove-like, — on any thing like fear; — a radiant presence, that shines away every shade of gloom. We have no doubt how her destiny is written. We wait in cheerful trust till it be fully read. It is, in Milton's words, to "lead and draw" her sons "in willing obedience, inflamed with the study of learning, and the admiration of virtue; stirred up with high hopes of living to be brave men and worthy patriots, dear to God, and famous to all ages."

NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

Review of Hengstenberg. — The review of Hengstenburg, in the last number of this journal, has been misapprehended for several reasons. One is, the brevity which the writer studied, and the consequently imperfect manner in which some parts of the subject were illustrated. His references to a former volume of the Christian Examiner, and some other references, which he regards as very important, do not appear to have been examined by some who have spoken of his labors with considerable freedom and confidence.

But the principal cause of misapprehension is, we think, a want of acquaintance with the true state of the subject, and with what has been written upon it in foreign countries. The article was designed to meet the wants of the community in reference to the increasing use of the works of the German theo-

logians in our country. While the Reviewer admitted the conclusions to which the learned of that country have almost universally arrived in regard to the representations given by the Hebrew prophets of the character and offices of their expected Messiah, conclusions which are admitted to be correct to a considerable extent by the advocates of a double sense, and by those who adopt the theory of Hengstenberg, provided the true meaning is that single sense, which we have reason to suppose the prophets assigned to their own language, he sought to reconcile these conclusions with the divine authority of Christ. In other words, it was his aim to reconcile with the truth of Christianity what appear to be facts, and what, on common principles of interpretation which are applied to all other books, have been admitted to be *facts* by the learned of different persuasions, countries, and ages, in regard to the meaning of the language of the Old Testament. It was to remove an obstacle to the universal reception of the Christian religion, which has had great influence for the last hundred years. It was because he believed that some such view as that which he has given was highly important to the defence of Christian truth, that he prepared the article, foreseeing its present unpopularity, as the editors of the Examiner can testify. He has no confidence in his speculations any farther than they are entirely consistent with the divine authority of our Saviour, which will stand, though we should find no mode of explaining the difficulties of prophecy. He admits that he has labored in vain, unless he has contributed to remove an obstacle to the universal acknowledgment of this authority. But he cannot admit that they are competent judges of the value of his labors, who have not gone far enough into the subject to feel its difficulties. He can appeal to God for the sincerity of his endeavours to advance the cause of Christian truth, and he cheerfully leaves it to time to show, whether he has in fact done a service or an injury to that cause.

Indeed the author would not have consented to the publication of the article, unless he had believed that the cause of truth would have been advanced by it, whether his sentiments be right or wrong. Let his views be regarded in the light of a statement of difficulties which occur to a lover of truth in the investigation of the subject. Such a statement shows to the friends of truth, to those who think they have better views, to what point they should direct their labors. We trust that those, who are confident that they can give a better exposition of the subject, will lose no time in doing it. To none will it be more welcome than to the Reviewer. If it can be done in the com-

pass of a small tract, so much the better for the reader and the more honorable for the writer.*

It may be asked, Where is the necessity of innovation? Why is a new exposition of the subject needed? I answer, On account of the progress of the art of interpretation in modern times, particularly on account of the rejection of the theory of a double sense, the former method by which difficulties in relation to the subject were solved. I repeat it; the prevailing and ultimate design of the Reviewer was to establish the divine authority of Christ, — to reconcile with it what have the appearance of being facts. If he has not succeeded, the work remains to be done by some happier inquirer after truth.

A distinguishing characteristic of the review is, that it aims to reconcile the representations of the Hebrew prophets, not only with the divine authority, but with the infallibility of our Saviour in his instructions. This design appears from the drift of the argument, as well as from the explanation of the language of Jesus in a former number of the Examiner, to which reference is expressly made. In this respect, the review differs from a work which is announced as about to be translated and published in Scotland, apparently under Orthodox patronage. I allude to the work mentioned on the last page of the last number of the Christian Examiner, "The Hermeneutics of the Authors of the New Testament," by Döpke. This writer maintains† that Jesus, as well as the Apostles, adopted and used the allegorical mode of interpretation, which prevailed at that time, and that it is only in an allegorical sense that they apply passages of the Old Testament to persons and events mentioned in the New. At the same time he holds, in common with almost all enlightened interpreters of modern times, that the allegorical sense is imaginary.

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* "Within a short time," says Prof. Pusey, of Oxford, in his work on the theology of Germany, "after Bretschneider's collection of objections or difficulties relating to the genuineness of St. John's Gospel appeared, no less than fourteen answers were published; and the point is now established to the satisfaction of Bretschneider himself, in common with the rest of Germany; it would, however, be very unjustifiable to ascribe to Bretschneider any other motive than that which he assigns in his original work, the wish to bring the question to an issue; where doubts have acquired a general prevalence, it is an unquestionable service to collect those doubts as strongly as they are capable of being put; the only result of the desultory answers with which, till this is done, vindicators often content themselves, is to produce an unjustified and unconvinced conviction."

† See pp. 52, 53, and 125.

I have mentioned for what class of readers the article was designed. It was for those who have doubts and difficulties in relation to the subject. If there are any, whose faith is nourished by the common views of the subject, the writer has no wish to disturb them. His only wish is to remove every obstacle in the way of the universal reception of the religion of Jesus. He hopes, too, that the friends of Christianity will be careful how they rest its defence on arguments, which will not stand the scrutiny of the most rigid logic. For the extent and variety of the evidences of our religion, founded in its own nature and in historical truth, are absolutely overwhelming.

Introduction to Sacred Philology and Interpretation: by Dr. G. J. Planck: translated from the original German, and enlarged with Notes, by Samuel H. Turner, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Interpretation of Scripture in the Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and of the Hebrew Language and Literature in Columbia College, New York. New York: Leavitt, Lord, & Co. 1834. 12mo. pp. 306. — This is but an indifferent version, we are bound to say, of the chapters on sacred philology and interpretation in Dr. Planck's Introduction to Theological Literature in general. We regret that Professor Turner should have thought it worth his while to translate so dry and meagre a treatise, out of date even in Germany, and particularly worthless in this country, because most of the little value it possesses consists in its literary notices of German works, that can be of no imaginable service to the mere English reader. Dr. Planck is reckoned among the Orthodox; and yet some passages in his work bear a character so neological, that the translator has felt himself bound to omit them altogether, and others which he has retained are sufficiently bold. Take, for example, the following:

"It cannot, by any construction but the most unnatural, be concealed, that our sacred writers, and even Christ himself and his Apostles, did occasionally direct their instructions in reference to imperfect views current in their age, and even to views not strictly correct; and as little can it be concealed, that the latter, the Apostles, sometimes brought forward these views as their own, which most probably they held in common with their age." — p. 144.

Professor Turner has appended almost a hundred pages of notes, nearly a third of the volume, to supply the defects of the Introduction, especially as regards English and recent German theological literature; yet he has succeeded but very imperfectly, and the whole is little better than a confused medley. The translator himself, with half the time and labor bestowed on an original work of the same general purpose and charac-

ter, would have produced one, we doubt not, every way more valuable, and of higher authority. The indifference formerly manifested by English and American scholars for German books, seems rapidly giving place to the opposite extreme of a weak and indiscriminate preference, still less creditable, and for which no one good reason can be assigned.

The late Outrage at Charlestown. — No public event can be adapted to produce deeper humiliation or more serious thought in an inhabitant of this country, than the exhibition of depravity which has lately broke forth among us. A depth of evil has been laid open to view, which none perhaps previously knew to exist. We are not the people whom we thought ourselves to be. The expressions of indignation and abhorrence with which the perpetrators of that crime must feel themselves blasted, if they are capable of being touched by such things, cannot do away the fact, that they, and wretches like them, exist in the bosom of our community. The aspect of society around us has been changed, as would be the aspect of nature, should a tropical whirlwind carry its ravages through our northern fields. The first excitement caused by the event, strong as it has been, will not equal the deep sorrow and apprehension which a calmer consideration of it must produce in every one capable of reflection.

The moral depravity of the outrage committed, the causeless and wanton defiance of all human laws as well as the laws of God, the reckless disregard of all the purposes for which government is instituted among men, and the tendency of such acts to reduce us to a state of ferocious barbarism, in which we must band together for mutual defence, each little tribe at war with its neighbour, are characteristics of the transaction which strike every one at first sight. If such events are to occur among us, our boasted institutions will be the scorn of the world. Only the remembrance of them will hereafter remain, as a warning to men against forms of government falsely called free; but which will have brought us to utter wretchedness, and covered our land with hordes of ruffians. The worst tyranny of a Russian despot would be preferable to the restless and capricious tyranny of the vilest class of society, banding together, and waking us from sleep by the yell of their barbarities. It may be thought, that this is too strong language. We do not think so. It is more the language of reflection than of transient feeling, much more that of anticipation than of present apprehension. Dark as may be the prospect around us, our institutions, we doubt not, will last for the little time that we may need their protection. But unless such atrocities are to be put down

by the strong arm of power, exerted fearlessly and effectually, by a severity of punishment which shall terrify those who can be acted upon only by fear, and, far more than all else, by the indignant expression of public feeling; unless this can be done, there is small hope for our children. What we have thought, and justly thought, the blessing of God upon our country in our free institutions, will, through our own faithlessness to our trust, be turned into such a curse as never fell upon a nation before.

There have been mobs in all countries, and barbarous and bloody crimes have been committed by them. But they have usually been the result of a highly exasperated state of feeling, in which those who were ready to take the lives of others were equally ready to hazard their own. It is the very absence of violent passions in those guilty of the late enormities, which renders the transaction fearfully ominous. No crime could be less excused by provocation, real or supposed. There was not probably an individual engaged in it, who could complain that he had suffered any personal injury from the unhappy women, whom he was driving out at midnight from the shelter of their home, that they might see at a distance the blaze which consumed that, and all it contained which they valued or venerated, except indeed some articles portable enough to be stolen, and which were stolen. Those females, we understand, had been distinguished for their charities to the Protestant population of the town in which they resided; and their characters were of such established respectability, that Protestant parents entrusted to them, without fear, the charge of their daughters. But their dwelling has been burnt down, under circumstances of brutal outrage; not through any strong excitement of passion, but in a sort of diabolical frolic, as if such an atrocity were nothing more than the kindling of a great bonfire. The feeling which it is evident the perpetrators of this act must have entertained of the impotence of all government among us to restrain or punish their enormities, is an alarming indication of the present state of our society. But there is power enough to repress such disorders; not the power only of truly moral and enlightened men, but the power of all who prefer civilization to barbarism, and who have any thing to lose by exchanging the authority of law for anarchy. And this power must be exerted. It must be understood that those who commit violent outrages upon property do, by the very act, declare war upon civil society, which exists for the protection of property as one of its chief ends, and that they are entitled to as little forbearance as a foreign enemy who should ravage the country. If government fail in that end, it is needless to say that it must fail in every other. When it cannot protect men's dwellings, it can

protect nothing. It should be well understood, that where an armed force can be legally brought into action, the destruction of property by a mob is never to be perpetrated by them but at the hazard with which one engages in a battle.

We have this moment, while writing the last paragraph, received the Boston Advertiser (of the 18th of August), which contains a narrative of a riot in Philadelphia also. These narratives seem to be becoming as common in our newspapers as those of suicides and murders; and in the last case, if the accounts received be correct, murder, and crimes more brutal, if not more atrocious than common murder, were committed. We have no reason to doubt these accounts; but whether they are true or not, is a question of little importance. If a new spirit be not infused into our community, and more vigor into our governments, such accounts, if not true this year, will be true the next. We have only to wait for the third or fourth new history of a mob, and we shall have them often, and no outrage, however lawless or brutal or cruel, will strike us as any thing strange or unexpected.

We doubt not that religious fanaticism, in its lowest and most brutalizing form, had some influence in producing the wickedness which has been perpetrated at Charlestown. It was excited in part by gross calumnies, which had been proved to be unfounded before the deed was committed, and in part perhaps by the writings and preaching of some one or more of those pests of our community, who seem to have little other notion of religion, than that it is a subject about which men's passions may be inflamed, and they may be made to hate each other. We fear, too, that among some individuals of more respectable character, unfounded reports and a feeling of bigotry have tended to weaken the indignation which they would otherwise have felt. Such men we would most seriously and earnestly urge to consider, that it is in the highest degree desirable, that the Catholics who land upon our shores should feel the full influence of their faith. How desirable it is, recent events have fully manifested. The Catholics have a right to demand that their religion should be equally respected as that of any other sect. The apprehensions which have been expressed of danger from the prevalence of the Catholic faith, if we can suppose them to have been expressed in good faith, are among the wildest dreams of fanaticism. But suppose the Catholic teachers are making proselytes by their zeal, ability, and learning, and they have no other means at command, how are they to be met? Surely but in one way; by the zeal, ability, and learning of Protestant teachers. Our faith is not worth defending, if it cannot be so defended; and it will be guilt and infamy, if

we use or tolerate, or do not strongly discountenance, any other mode of defending it. Shall we persecute? God forbid. Wise men have thought that the barbarous ages of religious persecution had long past. But if you are bent upon persecuting, let us at least have our tribunals to decide what is and what is not the true faith; and to apportion the degree of punishment which one merits as a member of the oldest church in the world, or as deviating on the other hand too far from some more recently established standard of belief. Let us, at least, not trust the administration of this fancied justice to the outcasts of society. If we do, they will soon take the whole administration of justice into their hands.

By their fruits ye shall know them. We cannot be suspected of any attachment to the peculiar doctrines of the Catholic church, and our feelings must be regarded as wholly unbiassed, when we say that under the outrage which has been perpetrated, the Catholics among us have displayed upon Christian principles, a degree of forbearance that does them the highest honor. All praise is due to their Bishop and his clergy for their efforts to preserve the peace of the community, and the whole body of Catholics share in the commendation that those efforts have not been ineffectual. The religion of those who have suffered, and the fanaticism, so far as this was operative, of the guilty, stand out in striking contrast with each other. Which sort of spirit is it desirable should prevail?

Painful as is this whole subject, there is one view, to which we are almost unwilling to advert, that to our minds is peculiarly humiliating. There is something in acts of violence, which require courage in their execution, that may redeem them from utter loathing. But in the present case the act was committed by dastards, disgracing the name of manhood, against women and children; terrifying their victims, insulting them with indecent songs, profaning what was most venerable in their eyes, and what the associations of our common religion should have protected, violating the sanctuary of the tomb, and engaged at the same time in petty pilfering. To one who has been, and who fain would be, proud of his country, it is bitterness to think that all this was done by individuals entitled by birth to the name of New-Englanders, in the very sight of the battle-field of our ancestors' glory.

And what is to be done to prevent the repetition of such scenes; and to save our country from sinking into the ruin that must follow? This is a question not to be answered at once nor in a few words. It brings into view many topics of consideration, many subjects for change and reform. The evil to be cured is deep-seated. It will require not one nor

a few efforts for its remedy, but the steady watchfulness and exertion of all who have sufficient reflection to comprehend the subject, and who care for their country, their children, or themselves. The strong indignaton now felt, and the energy and readiness to repress such violations of the law, which doubtless will now exist for a time, must not be mistaken for a permanently better state of things. There is but one end to be kept fixedly in view. The true patriot, the wise politician, the enlightened philanthropist, and he who has a mere selfish regard to his own interest and safety, must all feel that there is one thing to be done; — it is, to strengthen lawful authority. Liberty, by which, in the widest sense of the term, is meant nothing more than the full enjoyment of all our rights, cannot exist unless there be power enough in the state effectually to protect those rights. Power in the government is necessary to the enjoyment of liberty by the individual. There are false notions maintained by some among us, respecting the nature and ends of government, and the relations of men to each other in civil society, the tendency of which is to license, disorder, and that worst form of tyranny, that is controlled by no laws and no restraints of opinion. There are those who would confound that equality of civil rights, which our institutions are intended to secure, with an equality in all things, which God has made impossible. When they recognise any one superior in the gifts of nature, or in the advantages to be secured by good conduct and industry; or more fortunate in the lottery of life, which with us is equally open to all, they have a feeling as if their rights were invaded. Hence there is a struggle against the necessary order of society, that order which may be disturbed by violence, but as soon as the violence is removed must immediately restore itself. Sounder doctrines respecting the civil relations of men to each other must be popularly and forcibly taught; and whoever, for any temporary purpose, in order to excite the passions or flatter the prejudices of some party in the community, countenances those principles which lead to the overthrow of all lawful authority, must be marked as a scoundrel, as a dangerous disturber of the public peace. There is no want of power to preserve order and law among us; — by no means; that is not the deficiency; but there is, we fear, a want of civil and moral courage, of activity, and of a sense of individual responsibility. The times in which we live are not times for complaint and melancholy foreboding, and a selfish withdrawal of individuals from the concerns of the community, as if its interests were to be despaired of; they are times which require thought and energy in all who are capable of acting beneficially upon their

fellow-men. But that they may so act, they must be unfettered by any selfish purpose. Ambition for office is with us a low sort of ambition; and when it possesses a man, it renders him unfit to be trusted; reducing him to a watchful dependent upon the party and personal feelings of those whose favor he solicits. The men to be trusted are such as may indeed take office, if the public good require it, but who do not seek it; men who, without any personal end, are ready to exert all the influence, which an honorable character and useful talents may enable them to exercise; men who, in addressing others, rely upon truth, and appeal to high motives. We debase those whom we would persuade, when we draw motives from their passions and prejudices, and false views, and selfish interests, even if some temporary good may be so effected. There are few who cannot be acted upon by better considerations; and there is no reason to fear that motives founded upon duty, honor, and truth, will not, among us, find their way to men's hearts, and rouse into action the real strength of the community.

There are other great topics which we can barely touch upon. All interested in the welfare of the country must look with concern upon the state of religion among us, our miserable division into sects, the bigotry about matters of indifference by which this has been produced, the consequent insufficient support of most of our clergy; and hence the discouraging prospect of poverty and sorrow, which is constantly diminishing the number of young men of talents disposed to become clergymen. Least of all governments can a republic exist in a prosperous state without religion; and there is much to be done, by means on which we cannot now dwell, to strengthen the influences of religion among us. Our clergy especially should have a distinct apprehension of the new and peculiar character of the times in which they live, and of their new duties and relations arising out of it.

General education is certainly not neglected among us. But it may be doubted whether our higher modes of education are the best adapted to form young men in this country for the stations and duties which actually await them. If there be any reason for this doubt, it concerns a matter of the most serious importance. The character of the well educated usually determines the character of the community.

But we must stop. Every topic we have touched upon requires a dissertation where we have written a sentence. Our purpose has been attained, if we have done any thing to awaken attention to the state of society around us, and to the means by which its evils may be corrected.

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ART. I. — *The Christian Advocate for November*, 1833, *and January*, 1834. — *Review of Letters to Presbyterians, by Samuel Miller*, D. D. Philadelphia.

MOST of our readers are acquainted, we presume, with the nature and organization of the Presbyterian Church of the United States. They are aware that it professes to unite the whole sect in one homogeneous mass, by the adoption of a common creed, and a distribution of the whole body into local Presbyteries, the combination of these into Synods, and the subjection of all to the General Assembly; which is composed of representatives from these inferior bodies, and thus constitutes a kind of appellate court or supreme judicature over the whole. The meetings of this latter are annual, and holden at Philadelphia; where all causes from the inferior bodies are heard on appeal, and all affairs relating to the general welfare are discussed. This organized body has now been in existence nearly a hundred and thirty years; and like all things human it has seen its vicissitudes of prosperity and trouble. It has had its periods of great activity and zeal, as for instance about the time of the regular establishment of Episcopacy in America; and then again it has relapsed into a comparative quiet and inaction. One thing amid all mutations they have preserved the same — their creed. That was settled for them by the Divines at Westminster. To this, all who are admitted into their body must subscribe, and agree to interpret the Scriptures as they were interpreted by the great lights of the Reformation. How far subscription to a creed has had the effect of producing

uniformity of belief, we shall be better able to judge by the developements of this review.

That the Presbyterian Church should have been unaffected by the religious *mouvement* of the last fifteen years, was not to be expected. Rumors have been abroad, indeed it has been a matter of general notoriety, that the Church has been disturbed by what some are pleased to style *a new Theology*. New doctrines, it is said, have been introduced into it, in the opinion of many, entirely subversive of their ancient faith. The matter has been going on from bad to worse till it has alarmed the watchful, and aroused them to make a stand against such profane innovations. Not only has there been a great declension in doctrine, but likewise a sad falling off in discipline. The decrees of Presbyteries and Synods have become a mere *brutum fulmen*, alarming only to the weakest nerves. In saying this, however, we only anticipate the disclosures of the review before us.

It has been supposed that the onward progress of religious opinions was confined in a great measure to New England. This we believe was the general impression. It was ours; and it was not until we took up by chance the review under consideration, that we became aware that it had pervaded the whole extent of the Union. We could not still have believed it, had it come from any other source. But Dr. Green we consider the very best authority. He is one of the eldest members of the church to which he belongs. Near a half-century ago he was settled over a church in Philadelphia, to which he ministered for some years. Afterwards he was chosen President of Princeton College. This situation he likewise retained many years, but finally retiring from office, he is passing the evening of his days in Philadelphia as the editor of the Christian Advocate. No man has had a better opportunity to know, or knows, more of the affairs of his denomination than Dr. Green. He can look back to the time when the Assembly's Catechism swayed an undisputed sceptre over the realms of Presbyterianism. So supremely dear and precious were the doctrinal standards of his church to him, that, on resigning the pastoral care of the church to which he had ministered, he exhorts his former hearers in the following terms. "Nothing will contribute more to your being at peace among yourselves, both when vacant and at other times, than keeping strictly to the principles

and forms of the Presbyterian Church. By these standards try carefully all doctrines, and conduct scrupulously all your proceedings. Esteem it no hardship or oppression, — esteem it as an unspeakable privilege and advantage that these standards are given you for your direction and control." In a note it is added, "I would recommend that every family make it a point of Christian duty to keep a copy of our Confession of Faith." Little did he think when he wrote this, that he should so soon be called to sing the requiem of the creed he so unceremoniously puts in the place of the Bible.

But times have strangely changed between the youth and age of one man. Not only have men's opinions changed, but the very forms of the Church are fading away. Presbyterianism, to use his own language, has been *Congregationalized*. Its organization is retained, but its spirit and power are fled.

The occasion, on which this great declension became manifest, was this. Mr. Albert Barnes, of their connexion and lately settled in Philadelphia, had indulged himself in some speculations on human depravity and freedom, which were thought by some to have an awful leaning towards liberality. Complaint was entered against him, and carried before the General Assembly. Greatly to the astonishment of the Old School party, it was found that it was very doubtful whether a majority of the Assembly could be brought to convict the accused of heresy; thus making it evident that the leprosy had spread much farther than was supposed. The venerable champions of Orthodoxy were taken wholly by surprise. They could neither advance with success, nor retreat with honor. Dr. Miller, who seems to have been endowed with one Apostolic gift at least, — the wisdom of the serpent, proposed that the case should be discussed *in thesi*, that is, abstractly, or *supposing such a case might have happened*. The two parties seem to have agreed to consider it a drawn battle, and the matter was hushed up by being referred to a committee *judiciously chosen*, and thus the evil day was for a while put off.

This event opened the eyes of the sagacious to the perilous condition of the whole church. Dr. Miller, whose patriarchal care of his own denomination is well known, followed up his attempt in the Assembly to keep the peace, by pub-

lishing a series of *Letters to Presbyterians on the Present Crisis of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.* In these letters he attempts to show, that "nineteen twentieths of the whole number of our ministers are sufficiently near to the Scriptures, and to each other, in respect to all the essentials of truth, to be comfortably united in Christian fellowship and coöperation." Dr. Green undertakes to review those Letters, and to dissent from this proposition altogether. The differences according to him are radical, fundamental, and altogether irreconcilable. Before, however, we produce his reasons for this opinion, we shall quote a few passages of his exposition of the causes which have led to the prostration of the discipline of the church. These were the gradual admixture of Congregational elements in the great mass, and the organization and efforts of Missionary and Education Societies.

"In the mean time, the necessities of the church, especially on the frontiers of the country, and the comparative facility of obtaining Congregational ministers from New England, contrasted with the difficulty of obtaining them in the Presbyterian church, brought in a large number of pastors, of Congregational education and partialities; some of whom were permitted to be enrolled in presbyteries without even a formal adoption of the Standards of the church. The criminal desire of having a *large* church, rather than a *pure* and harmonious one, seemed to obtain a general prevalence; so that an offered addition of members and territory was too readily accepted, without examining into the fitness of the proposed auxiliaries, or associates, to be admitted to the privileges and immunities which were conceded to them. * * *

"Missionary and educational associations, moreover, had much influence, in giving the present Congregational complexion and character to the Presbyterian church.

"The result of the combined influence of the causes which we have now indicated, and of others of less magnitude to which we might advert, has been, to leave our church but little more of its Presbyterian character than its name and its forms. We now regard it as *practically* a Presbyterio-Congregationalist church; — from the General Assembly, down to the church session, we are *Congregationalized.* Strict Presbyterianism is considered and represented as bigotry and narrow-mindedness, and as indicative of the want of charitable feelings, as well as of a liberal mind.

"That we might show in the most unexceptionable manner,

the ill effects which have always resulted from the admixture of the heterogeneous elements of Congregationalism and Presbyterianism, and the comparatively peaceful, happy, and prosperous state of our church, when it has kept strictly to its true and avowed principles, we have examined its records from its origin to the present time. This has been our scope through the whole; although, from a belief that it would gratify at least a portion of our readers, we have interwoven a larger portion of our ecclesiastical history than was always necessary to our main purpose, and far more than we at first intended.

"It is now very nearly a hundred and thirty years, since the first organization of the Presbyterian church in our country. The thirty years which elapsed, from the union of the Synods of New York and Philadelphia till the formation of the General Assembly, were the halcyon days of our church; and the manifest reason was, because its forms, doctrine, and discipline, during this period, were most exactly maintained and regarded: And it has been with a kind of mournful pleasure that we have observed, while attentively reading the ancient records, the blessed effects, — the unanimity, the peace, the purity, and the prosperity, — which resulted from keeping closely and conscientiously, during this period, to the prescriptions and forms of our acknowledged standards, — a pleasure rendered mournful, by comparing this felicitous state with the discontents, divisions, relaxation of discipline, and loss of confidence in church judicatures, which the same records show have so often occurred from the collision of Presbyterianism and Congregationalism, during the remaining *century* of our ecclesiastical existence; and which at no former period have been half as great as they are at present.

"Much has been lately said, beside what is said in the letters under review, of preserving the unity, and healing the existing divisions, of the Presbyterian church. Let it be remembered that wounds can never be truly and permanently healed, while a portion of that which was their cause remains at the bottom of them, unextracted. A grievous departure from the standards of our church, in doctrine, government, and discipline, — it is our solemn conviction, — is the main cause of all the evils that afflict us. If our government and discipline were restored, false doctrine might be banished; — till this restoration takes place, nothing effectual can be done. But government and discipline will never be restored, while Congregationalism retains its present influence and predominancy among us. This is the *radical* evil, and till it be removed it is as vain to attempt the restoration of the Presbyterian church to peace, purity, and order, as it is to expect to

make a tree fruitful and flourishing, by pruning and training its branches, while a worm is constantly corroding its root. * * *

"The evils, it should be remembered, which have now risen to such a formidable height, came in, for a considerable time, by gradual advances; so that it is not easy to fix the precise period when the existing danger ought to have produced alarm, and a determined effort to arrest its progress, and to expel it from the ground it had already gained. But for ten years past, at least, the danger has been such, that it seems to us that those who have not seen it, are justly chargeable with wilful blindness, or criminal inattention. Within that period, we have not a doubt, that many individuals have not only seen it, but have knowingly, and with design, endeavoured to promote it, — not, we would hope, recognising it as *an evil;* but thinking rather that it was *a good thing*, — a good thing to break down those fences, which the bigotry and narrow-mindedness of a gone-by age, of comparative ignorance, had erected to stop the march of mind, impede the progress of improvement, and prevent men of liberal minds and noble enterprise from doing and saying whatever they might please, in projecting and promoting grand schemes of reformation, calculated eventually to revolutionize the world. Now, we are willing to leave it to others to decide the point of casuistry, — which of two classes is the more criminal; that which is composed of those who *actively* do wrong, or that formed of those who *stand by and permit it*, when they might and ought to prevent its being done. In our estimation, both are inexcusably blamable, notwithstanding they may plead that they mean 'to do God service.' The Congregationalists, and *quasi* Presbyterians, have been to blame for prostrating the barriers, and disregarding the constitutional prescriptions, of the Presbyterian church; and the real Presbyterians, who truly love the constitution and all its provisions, have been to blame, for not resisting and preventing, as once they certainly might, the inroads and devastations of the Congregational invaders. * * *

"So far as our observation has extended, our Congregations are much disposed to trench on the prerogatives of their Sessions; disposed, in certain cases, to assume to themselves the powers which they have delegated to their elders; and to order their affairs much as is done in Congregational churches; and the Sessions are often, we believe through timidity, inefficient in sustaining the order and purity of the church. They are afraid of becoming unpopular, and are willing to adopt the common notion, that it is best to let irregularities alone, or only to say they disapprove of them, and hope they will be amended: and that to do more than this will be regarded as

carrying things with a high hand. Presbyteries often act on much the same plan. They attend to their stated business; but as to taking care that discipline is maintained in the churches under their care, or exercising discipline on their own members for preaching unsound doctrines, or for almost any thing short of gross immorality, it is seldom attempted; and when attempted, it is in great danger of being rendered abortive, by those who dislike the attempt. The difficulty of carrying through a disciplinary proceeding, discourages and enfeebles those who would readily take part in it, but for the opposition they know they will have to encounter; and the probability that, even if they are successful in the courts below, what they do will be undone by a higher judicatory. In the mean time, the lawful prescriptions of the higher judicatories are often set at nought. It is not long since we heard it gravely maintained in a Presbytery, that a plain, and positive, and strictly constitutional act of the General Assembly, directing what was to be done in a specified case, was to be considered only in the light of a *recommendation*, which might be regarded or disregarded, as the parties concerned might choose. This was pure Congregationalism. As to Synods, who does not know that a sermon was not long since preached at the opening of a Synod, and afterwards published, in which one of the most important articles in our Confession of Faith and Catechisms was directly and violently impugned, and yet no notice was taken of it by the Synod, or by any other judicature. The time was, when the preacher of such a sermon would have been arraigned, within half a day after he was out of the pulpit. That the General Assembly of 1831 was completely Congregationalized, in disposing of the case of Mr. Barnes, has been shown by Mr. Bacon, in his letter to us, in a statement as true as it is taunting. And ever since that period, the supreme judicatory of our church, instead of a straight-forward proceeding, agreeably to the principles and forms of the constitution of the Presbyterian church, has tried to settle difficulties and controversies in the Congregational way of compromise; in which something like concession is awarded to both parties, and, under color of promoting peace, materials for prolonged, and perhaps incurable alienations, are furnished. In a word, the forms of the Presbyterian church are now sometimes used to take vengeance on an obnoxious individual, and at others to protect a favorite; and when neither of these objects is in view, or something may be promoted by the suspending of all discipline, discipline is permitted to sleep. We do not say that this is invariably or generally done; but we do say that there are instances of this kind, and that the evil has reached so far as to impair confidence in

church judicatories; and to fill reflecting minds with a painful uncertainty of what is to be the destiny of our church, in a short time to come. It is a fact too notorious to be denied, that doctrines vitally affecting the whole evangelical system, and directly contradictory to those laid down in our Confession of Faith and Catechisms, are both preached and published without fear, or cause of fear, that their advocates and propagators will be visited with the discipline of the church. Now, we hold it to be a moral evil of a flagrant and reproachful kind, for a church, as well as for an individual, to violate or disregard a public profession. The Standards of our church are her solemn Confession and Profession, before the world; and it is a species of dishonesty, offensive to God, and to all men of upright minds and honorable principles, to profess one thing and practise another, — or *not* to practise agreeably to what we profess. The course we are pursuing is exactly that which has been run by the Calvinistic and Lutheran churches of Switzerland and Germany. In those countries, the Formularies adopted at, or shortly after, the Protestant reformation, remain to this day unchanged, — unchanged, as the ostensible creed and symbols of ecclesiastical order, of Unitarians and Neologists. We are rapidly tending to the same goal, and if, in the mercy of God, we are not arrested, we shall as surely reach it, as that like causes produce like effects." — *Christian Advocate for Nov.* 1833, pp. 500 - 507.

As to the tendency of the Presbyterian body to Unitarianism, we are as little disposed to deny as to lament it. Believing as we do that this is the point at which all honest inquiry must end, we do not consider the progress toward it as an evidence of great corruption in the church, but rather as an indication of growing candor and industry, — a deeper reverence for truth above the commandments of men.

As to causes of the decline of ecclesiastical power, which the Doctor pathetically bewails, we are inclined to adopt a different explanation. What he would consider the disease, we should regard as only a symptom. The strong undercurrent which is setting against Presbyterianism, and bearing away its landmarks, is not Congregationalism, or Missionary, or Education Societies. It is the stern republicanism of our institutions, and the free spirit of personal and independent inquiry which distinguishes this age. Here all power resides in the people. All our institutions must therefore be democratic, we mean of course in the good sense of the term. Any thing of a contrary character,

whatever imposing names or forms it may assume, whether of Presbytery or Bishop, is the mere shadow without the substance. The power of the Presbyterian Church *was* formidable — till it was attempted to be exercised, — then it became ridiculous. It might have existed a while longer, had it not been incautiously used. They tried it in Baltimore. But there they ruined their machinery by attempting to break down too hard a substance. They undertook to discipline Mr. Duncan for preaching against creeds. They tried to excommunicate him, and turn him out of his church. But so far were they from succeeding, that he fairly turned the tables upon them, and (as one of them afterwards facetiously confessed) *excommunicated them.* His congregation went with him, and instead of gaining a victory, they lost a church. Since then, in the words of Dr. Green, "discipline has been permitted to sleep."

We now come to notice the deplorable apostasy in doctrines of which the Doctor complains.

"In chapter vi. sec. iii. and iv. of our Confession of Faith, it is said, speaking of the fall of our first parents, and of their sin, — 'They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.' In chapter vii. sec. ii. it is stated, — 'The first covenant made with man was a covenant of works, wherein life was promised to Adam, and in him to his posterity, upon condition of perfect and personal obedience.' In questions 12, 16, 18, of our Shorter Catechism (to save space we omit the fuller statement of the Larger Catechism) we read as follows, — 'When God had created man, he entered into a covenant of life with him, upon condition of perfect obedience. The covenant being made with Adam, not only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression. The sinfulness of that estate, whereinto man fell, consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original sin.' The eighty-second question and answer of this Catechism are as follows: — '*Q.* Is any man able perfectly to keep the commandments of God? *A.* No mere man since the fall, is able, in this life perfectly to keep

the commandments of God, but daily doth break them, in thought, word, and deed.'

"Let our readers mark well how many direct contradictions of the above extracts from the public authoritative Standards of our church, are at present publicly avowed, orally and in print, by ministers in the Presbyterian church, who have solemnly adopted those Standards at their licensure or ordination. (1.) It is explicitly and repeatedly stated, in the foregoing extracts, — 'That the first covenant made with man, was a covenant of works,' — that it was 'made with Adam, not only for himself, but for his posterity.' But it is now denied that there ever was a covenant of works made with Adam, either for himself or his posterity. All the errors under this general head unavoidably involve this denial, — whether made in explicit terms or not. The federal headship of Adam is discarded as an antiquated notion. (2.) It is explicitly declared, in speaking of the sin of our first parents, that — 'They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was *imputed.*' At present, in the Presbyterian church, the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity, is absolutely scorned. We will not say that 'nineteen-twentieths' of our clergy reject it, but we do seriously fear that at least a moiety of them disbelieve it. (3.) It is unequivocally declared in the Confession and Catechism, that 'the same death in sin and corrupted nature [of our first parents was] conveyed to all their posterity,' — that 'the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original sin.' These positions of our Standards are denied as openly and positively, although we hope not quite so generally, as that of the immediately preceding item. In regard to the quotation from the Catechism, we heard a clergyman in the Synod to which we belong, on being asked, before the Synod, if he believed it, answer categorically, 'I do not.' (4.) It is stated in the above questions from our Standards, that — 'From this original corruption [derived from our first parents] we are utterly indisposed, *disabled*, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil,' — and that 'this corruption of his [man's] whole nature is commonly called original sin.' This fundamental point in Christian theology, for which all the Reformers contended (and none so earnestly and ably as Calvin), which is called in some Formularies, 'Birth sin,' and in ours, as we have just seen, 'Original sin,' is now violently impugned and totally set aside, by not a few religious teachers, in both the Presbyterian and Congregational churches. Taking ground on some dogmas of their 'philoso-

phy, falsely so called,' they maintain that 'all sin consists in voluntary action, — in man's *own act of* CHOICE;' and consequently that infants, before they are capable of discerning good and evil as the objects of *choice*, are perfectly free from sin; as destitute of any moral taint as Adam was at his first creation, — from whom, it is maintained, they inherit no corruption whatever, and to whom they sustain no other relation, than that which every infant now bears to his father. This is Pelagianism of the highest kind; and it is rampant, and spreading like a leprosy, in many portions of the Presbyterian church. (5.) Our quotation from the Confession of Faith affirms, that by man's 'original corruption' he is utterly '*disabled* to all good,' as well as 'made opposite' to it, and 'inclined to all evil:' And the Catechism teaches, that 'no mere man since the fall is *able*, in this life, perfectly to keep the commandments of God.' Now it has even become fashionable to deny this outright, — to maintain that man has natural ability to keep all the commandments of God, and to keep them perfectly. We have not long since seen it stated in print, by a Presbyterian minister, that Satan never invented a more successful artifice to ruin souls, than the preaching of the very doctrine of our Standards, — the natural inability of unsanctified men to obey the commandments of God.

"II. As our Confession of Faith and Catechisms teach the entire corruption, depravity, and impotence of man in his natural state, so they hold forth with equal clearness and explicitness, that his recovery to holiness and the divine favor, is wholly from the power and free grace of God. It is said, Confession of Faith, chap. vi. sec. iii., that 'Man by his fall, having made himself incapable of life by that covenant, the Lord was pleased to make a second, commonly called the Covenant of Grace, — promising to give unto all those that are ordained unto life his Holy Spirit, to make them willing and *able* to believe.' And in the Larger Catechism, in answer to the sixty-seventh question, it is affirmed that 'Effectual calling is the work of God's almighty power and grace, whereby — he doth in his accepted time, invite and draw them [the elect] to Jesus Christ, by his word and Spirit; savingly enlightening their minds, renewing and powerfully determining their wills, so as they (although in themselves dead in sin) are hereby made willing and *able*, freely to answer his call, and to accept and embrace the grace offered and conveyed therein.' We omit the answer to the question on effectual calling in the Shorter Catechism, which is of the same import as that here recited.

"The foregoing doctrine of our Confession of Faith and

Catechisms notwithstanding, we have heard a sermon from a Presbyterian minister, the avowed purport of which was to show, *what* God had done for the salvation of man, and that he had done *all* that was necessary and proper to be done; and yet the gift and work of the Holy Spirit was not mentioned, or alluded to, from the beginning to the end of the discourse. It was not intimated in all that was said, that in the great concern of renovation, and the acceptance of Christ as he is freely offered in the gospel, man needed the quickening influence and the special aid of the Spirit of all grace, — nor indeed any assistance whatever, beyond the proper exercise of his own powers. That man is essentially active in *regeneration*, — in regeneration strictly considered, and as distinguished from *conversion*, — is both proclaimed and printed; although our Standards explicitly declare that he is 'dead in sin.' In fact, the *effective*, and often, we believe, the *intended* impression, made on the minds of their hearers, by the preachers to whom we refer, is, that men are fully able to convert themselves, without any other divine aid than what every man, under the light of the gospel, already possesses. — They are told that they can and ought to *will* it; and if they do, they will go away renewed in the temper of their minds. We have been credibly and recently informed, that a Presbyterian minister said, — we understood, *publicly* said, — that we ought not to pray that God would convert sinners, but that he would convince them, that they can convert themselves. And indeed this is only putting into words, the system which is substantially taught and inculcated, by the whole class of preachers and writers to whom we here refer.

"III. In the chapter on justification, in the Confession of Faith (chap. xi. sec. i.) it is said, — 'Those whom God effectually calleth, he also freely justifieth, — by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto them, they receiving and resting on him and his righteousness by faith; which faith they have not of themselves, it is the gift of God.' Again; in the iii. sec. of this chapter we are taught that 'Christ, by his obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice in their behalf.' In both the Catechisms the same doctrine is clearly laid down. — We quote only the Larger Catechism: '*Question* 70. What is justification? *A.* Justification is an act of God's free grace unto sinners, in which he pardoneth all their sins and accounteth their persons righteous in his sight; not for any thing wrought in them or done by them, but only for the perfect obedience and full satisfaction of Christ, by God imputed to them, and received by faith alone.'

"Now, there are preachers and writers in the Presbyterian church, who, if they had distinctly intended to gainsay almost every idea contained in the essential article of our Creed, as stated above, could scarcely have done it more effectually and explicitly, than they have studiously attempted to do. According to them, the *atonement* (a word not found in the *doctrinal* part of the Standards of our church) did not consist in 'Christ, by his obedience and death, fully discharging the debt of all those that are justified; and by making a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice in their behalf.' All this is most unequivocally denied. It is explicitly asserted that Christ did not endure the penalty of the violated law of God, in behalf of his people; and of course did not discharge their debt, — that the atonement is merely an exhibition of the displeasure or wrath of God against sin, and was made for all mankind alike and equally; was an offering made for the race; did not by itself secure the salvation of any one; and consequently did not make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to the justice of God in behalf of all those that are saved; for these men profess to reject the doctrine of universal salvation. In a word, all ideas of *substitution*, or that Christ took the sinner's place, and obeyed and suffered in the room and stead of his people, are completely, and by some indignantly, rejected. And as to his righteousness, — consisting of his active obedience to the law of God, and passive endurance of the penalty, — being *imputed* to his people, as the meritorious cause of their justification, it is regarded and treated as an absurdity, and even as an impossibility. The old orthodox terms, of *atonement*, *justification*, and the *righteousness of Christ*, are retained; for what purpose we know not, if it is not to blind the populace, and leave them impressed with the belief that there is no real difference between the sentiments of these men and their orthodox brethren." — *Christian Advocate for Jan.* 1834, pp. 30 – 33.

Here we have the old and ominous charge of concealment and deception, so rife a few years ago against the Unitarians of New England. And if we had not seen the title of the book we should be almost persuaded that we were reading a Number of the Panoplist for 1815 or 1816. And if, as our reviewer says, "like causes produce like effects," the whole Presbyterian Church are within fifteen or twenty years of downright Unitarianism. He goes on to show that there is not only an apparent, but a real, radical difference between the two parties.

"We wish to be understood, that a principal part of our

purpose, in making the exhibit that we are now closing, is, to let our readers see what is the *doctrinal* difference between the parties that now divide and distract the Presbyterian church. Let them look at it and consider it well: And when they have done so, we ask

"1. Is there not only a *real*, but a *wide* difference? To us it does seem, after the most serious and impartial view that we have been able to take of the whole matter, that here are *two systems*, — two systems which, in their characteristic features, are directly opposed to each other. If we understand the doctrinal system of our Confessions of Faith and Catechisms, the principle of IMPUTATION is fundamental, and essential to the whole. Deny the imputation of Adam's covenant-breaking sin, with its consequences, (as specified in our Standards) to all his posterity; deny the imputation of the sins of believers to their Surety Saviour, and the full satisfaction which, when imputed, he made for their sins, to divine law and justice; and deny the imputation of the finished righteousness of Christ to his people, for their justification before God, and their title to eternal life, — and you deny a very large part of the very essence of the doctrinal standards of our church. But the party contemplated do unequivocally deny all this; as well as the other fundamental principle of regeneration, as being *exclusively* the work of the Holy Spirit. The most frank and candid among them will tell you so expressly. Question them on each of the points to which imputation applies, as stated above, and they will tell you, that they do not hold this, that, or the other. Yet they will preach, after all, in such a manner, as to lead the people to believe, and many of their ministerial brethren to believe, that they cannot be far wrong, — that the most of the difference between them and their brethren, is only a difference in language, — a dispute about words, — that in reality they all think alike, — or as Professor M. has it 'are sufficiently near to the Scriptures and to each other, in respect to all the essentials of truth, to be comfortably united in Christian fellowship and coöperation.' Great was the delight which this declaration gave to the whole party. It was the very thing which they wished, and which they still wish and labor to have believed. It gained an admission of the letter which contained it, and a few of the succeeding ones, into their periodicals. But they found, after a while, that they must treat the Professor pretty much as a Quaker preacher treated Whitfield, when he had spoken a short time in one of their meetings, — 'Friend George,' said the Quaker interrupting him, 'I think thee has said *about enough*,' — and so no more of the Professor's letters, so far as we have seen or heard, have appeared in any of their papers.

"2. Is it credible that 'nineteen-twentieths of the ministers of the Presbyterian church, are sufficiently agreed in all the essentials of truth, to be comfortably united in Christian fellowship and coöperation?' We take it for granted, not only from what we personally know of Professor M., but from what he says in immediate connexion with the quoted passage, that those who materially disagree, in relation to the points which we have exhibited from the Constitution of our church, cannot be comfortably united in Christian fellowship and coöperation. It follows, necessarily, that his estimate is, that not more than one in twenty of our ministers, hold the obnoxious system which we have endeavoured to expose. Now, without stating any calculation of our own, we shall offer a few reasons briefly, why we think the Professor's estimate must be exceedingly erroneous. We first mention the free and fearless manner in which the advocates of unsound doctrine preach and publish their opinions. Would they do this, if they were not well assured, that far more than one in twenty are prepared to stand by them? Or if they would still state, preach, and print as they do, *could* they do it, without suffering discipline? No, assuredly. — They well know that there is *a large party*, — in the General Assembly of the church, probably *a majority*, — who, either through fellowship with their errors, or reluctance to offend those who are in such fellowship, will see them safe and sound through any jeopardy into which the orthodox may endeavour to bring them. Again. Look at the Theological Seminaries in our land, that send forth their pupils to become, and who actually and immediately become, ministers in the Presbyterian church. Are nineteen-twentieths of these, substantially sound in the faith? Have the professors of the Seminary in which Dr. M. sustains his office, been able to prevent many of their pupils from maintaining and advocating, through their whole course, several of the obnoxious sentiments to which we have adverted; and from preaching and publishing them, after they have left the institution? We know they have not. But let us not be misunderstood. We believe the professors in that Seminary have honestly and faithfully labored to embue the minds of their pupils with sound doctrine; and that they sincerely lament that they have too often labored in vain. We firmly believe the evil arises from the minds of some of the youth being so preoccupied with wrong views before they enter the Seminary, and from knowing that popular opinion is much in their favor, that they can neither be convinced of their errors from all the lectures they hear, nor restrained from defending, and even endeavouring to propagate them, in the institution: And others, who leave the

Seminary, apparently and avowedly sound in the faith, find so many clergymen opposed to their sentiments, and the popular current in the places where they are located so strongly set against them, that at length they yield and swim with the tide. Could this take place, to half the extent to which it has taken place, if nineteen-twentieths of our ministers were substantially orthodox? We are confident it could not. Once more, and finally. — Whether it is known to Professor M. or not, it is known to us, that on one side there are strong hopes, and on the other side strong fears, that in the event of the death of any one of the present professors of the Princeton Seminary, a man of the same, or similar theological tenets with the defunct, could not be chosen in his place. 'Nineteen-twentieths' of our clergy substantially sound in the faith, when this is the case! Impossible. — We fear that even a majority will not be found so, or not found so with sufficient firmness and decision, whenever another professor is to be elected in that Seminary. We are ready to weep over the prospect; although it is probable we shall not live to see the event. Our duty, we think, consists in making known the danger, that measures may, if possible, be taken to prevent its being realized." — pp. 33–35.

Dr. Green's worst anticipations appear to have been realized. We learn that the question between the New and Old Schools was brought up this year, and decided *against* their creed by a vote of about ninety to eighty. Thus we have the spectacle of one of the largest sects in Christendom, condemning their own Standards of Faith.

Such then is the present state of the Presbyterian church in the United States. The reflections, which this condition of things suggests are highly curious, and most deeply interesting. It demonstrates for the hundredth time the utter worthlessness of creeds, either for the purpose of securing uniformity of faith, or of maintaining peace. It clearly shows that they are all that their worst enemies have declared them to be, snares to the conscience, instruments of oppression, and chains and fetters to the advancement of the human mind. Almost every sect has resorted to them, for the delusive purpose of binding what is necessarily free, human opinion. The Catholics tried them, to stop the thousand voices of heresy and schism. But the hoarse murmur grew deeper, and louder, and fiercer. The Protestants tried them after the Reformation, and almost every year has produced a new sect. The Episcopalians have tried them, and

straightway a dispute arose, which has never been settled, whether their Articles are Arminian or Calvinistic. The Presbyterians have tried them, and now their creed remains as a landmark to show them where they *were*.

The present state of things is deeply interesting as an augury of the future. What are we coming to? This is a question easier asked than answered. One thing however is evident, that the whole Christian religion is to meet a crisis in these United States, such as it has never met before. The restraint of authority is gone. That of superstition is fast wearing away. The human mind, having conquered and explored every other province, is marching boldly on to that of religion, determined to leave no corner unsearched, even its most sacred recesses. The next twenty years are destined to witness a discussion of all topics connected with religion and the Bible, which has occurred in no country except Germany, and perhaps not even there. Every point will be tried, and stated, and defended, from the absurdest Orthodoxy, to the boldest Atheism. Wild speculation, fierce controversy, temporary skepticism, and in some instances, we hope not many, total shipwreck of faith, are inevitable. The heavens are blackening, the clouds rolling together, the winds are collecting their strength, and every thing shows that a tempest is nigh. But through the storm we think we can see a vista of light. We believe, that, while the mind boldly "tries all things," it obeys a law of its nature when it "holds fast that which is good." We believe that all this dispute is merely about externals, about the *envelope* of Christianity. It is about things "which perish with the using," which are demolished by the very act of submitting them to a rigid analysis. These things being disposed of, Christianity will be revealed in all its beautiful simplicity. It will come forth "as the sun shining in his strength." And men will wonder that they ever sought for it in metaphysical subtilties, or verbal criticism. John's Gospel will be read, not for the purpose of gathering sharp weapons for polemic warfare, but to unfold the deep realities of the inward, spiritual man. Paul will be studied, not to see how a learned Jew would illustrate and defend the Gospel; but how the most exalted intellect may be renewed, and sanctified, by "Christ and the resurrection."

For the Gospel we have no fears, for "it is founded on a rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

For Unitarianism we have no fears, for we have almost past through the trial, and, notwithstanding the predictions of our foes, embrace religious faith with a firmer grasp than ever. We are riding safe at anchor, while we see every other sect still tossing on the waves.

For ourselves, we think we see that one great benefit, which is to spring from the freedom of the religious discussion and action of this age, is the discovery of what is essential to Christianity, and its separation from what is merely adventitious. How much of cold and barren metaphysics, how much of dry system and technicality has been preached as the Gospel of Christ, till men's brains have reeled and their hearts frozen under their influence. And this because religion has been made to lean on other supports than its own spiritual power. Now that those supports are falling away, such preaching must run out. It has no vitality. It must die. Mere sentimentalism and natural religion, too, must be abandoned. Much less is life to be found in the earthly mould of Ultra-Universalism, in which almost every quickening ray of heaven seems to be extinguished. What then will be preached? The pure simple doctrine of Jesus, or nothing. Christianity must stand, if it stand at all, on its *Moral Power.* This after all is its great evidence. This is its standing miracle, as much so as the glory which rested upon the tabernacle in the desert. The moral power of the Gospel we consider at this day to be truly supernatural. Look at it. Here is the Christian ministry, a body of weak and fallible men, compassed like their brethren with ignorance and infirmity. And yet by their weekly ministrations they exert an amount of moral influence beyond all estimate. This influence differs in *kind* as well as degree from every other which mankind has ever witnessed or felt. A spiritual regeneration is effected, a character is formed of purity and elevation by it, which no other discipline that man has ever known, could impart. Whence then this moral power? Take away their Bibles and you will see. Send them into their pulpits with any other book, with the wisdom and truth and eloquence of all other books concentrated, and they become utterly impotent. The foul spirits which they before cast out, would get the mastery of them at once, and make

them feel that there is but one name which they obey, the name of Jesus of Nazareth. This moral power, as we before said, we esteem to be truly supernatural, and the great standing miracle and evidence of Christianity. And this power, as it distinguishes the religion of Jesus from all false religions, so will it distinguish the true Gospel from the inventions of man. The experiment is making with every form of doctrine. The false will be abandoned because they are useless. The true only can build up the kingdom of the Redeemer. Men are destined, we believe, to arrive at religious truth through their moral nature. Naked metaphysics we fear have done little, either in settling, or in recommending truth. "He that will do his will, shall know of the doctrine." So it is on the great scale. Men learn little as they ought, till "they receive the Gospel as a little child." Then it is that the mounds and walls of sects and parties begin to disappear, and the soul embraces with joy whatever of truth and goodness it perceives scattered among the different tribes of men. Such we hope and believe will be the order of things, when the present chaos of the religious elements assumes the form of a new creation. In the mean time the great warfare which is ever waging between "the flesh and the spirit," will still be going on. While the freedom of the will remains, "though one should rise from the dead," men will still continue to range themselves on the one side and the other, as the race move on to assume other stations in other spheres of being, some in "the resurrection of life," and some in "shame and everlasting contempt."

ART. II. — *An Argument to prove the Truth of the Christian Revelation*, by the EARL OF ROSSE. London. 1834. 8vo. pp. 443.

A WORK like this on the Evidences of Christianity by a nobleman, though not without honored precedents, must still be numbered with the rarest productions of the press. Lord Chancellor King's "Enquiry into the Constitution and Worship of the Primitive Church" and his "History of the Apostles' Creed"; Lord Barrington's "*Miscellanea Sacra*," with other considerable productions by the same learned

writer;* and Lord Lyttelton's well known popular work on the "Conversion of St. Paul," are among the few theological productions, that may claim nobility for their authorship. Of the writer of the book before us we know nothing but that his title designates him as an Irish nobleman, and the dedication of his work to the memory of a lamented son shows his family name to be Parsons. Whatever may be the merits of the author, recent or ancient as may be the honors of his house,† we see from this dedication that he has at least the heart of a father; and we find ourselves favorably disposed to the book by the touching mention of the domestic sorrow, that called it forth.

"To the memory of my late dear Son
The honorable John Clere Parsons
I dedicate the following Pages
in humble recollection of his unblemished virtues
and great acquirements
his filial piety, his gentle and polished manners
and his laudable ambition
to render himself
an ornament to his family and a benefactor
to his country.
He died on the 10th of August 1828
when it was fondly hoped
that he was just about to gather the fruits
of his honorable labors.

During the long period of deep affliction
for so great a loss
I studied the subject of this argument.
Rosse."

From the circumstances suggesting the work, it might perhaps be expected, that the author would have taken only

* Lord Barrington is the author of a considerable work on "Natural and Revealed Religion," and of another on "The Dispensations of God to Man."

† The family of the Earl of Rosse, as appears from Brett's Peerage, is one of no inconsiderable antiquity and honor in Ireland. The author of this work, now in his seventy-fifth year, besides other publications of an earlier period, has distinguished himself among the political writers of the day, and still holds at his advanced age an honorable post in the government of Ireland.

the most practical views of his subject; or have been disposed to exhibit for others, as he needed for himself, the grounds of those hopes of immortality, which are the Christian's solace in adversity. But whatever of consolation he may have derived from these, — and they are the peculiar treasure of the bereaved and sorrowful, — he has wisely sought the relief that never fails from continued intellectual employment, and has produced a work of no ordinary scheme and enterprise.

To establish the truth of the Christian religion, he goes back to the very beginning of things. He first refutes the Aristotelian hypothesis of the eternity of the world. The truth of the Mosaic account of the creation, of the formation of the sun and the other heavenly bodies, he establishes from its accordance with the modern discoveries of science, those especially of La Place, Cuvier, Humboldt, and the latest philosophers. The date of the creation he considers as established by geological and astronomical facts, some of which have been recently ascertained; and as they could not have been known in the time of Moses, he considers their agreement with the Mosaic account as an evidence that the Jewish Lawgiver must have derived them from revelation.

The miraculous history of the Jewish people, as selected of God to preserve the knowledge of his name and the purity of his worship, is the subject of several introductory chapters. Neither our limits nor inclination allow us to refer to them, except as they are parts of a comprehensive plan, and as auxiliary to the direct testimony the author afterwards adduces in support of the Christian dispensation. And of the various evidence, by which this is sustained, his remarks are chiefly confined to that of miracles and of prophecy. These two subjects, including under the former the resurrection of Jesus as the "great miracle," without which preaching were vain, and faith also vain, occupy the larger half of this volume.

The history of the miracles, somewhat more than twenty of which are considered, is judiciously given. The objections, that have been urged against a part of them, are candidly met; the incidental circumstances showing their reality, or enhancing the direct testimony, are skilfully exhibited; and on the whole, whether as a narrative of extraordinary events, or illustrative of the character of Christ, or establishing

the claims of his religion to the faith of mankind,—this part of his Lordship's work will be read, we are persuaded, with edification and pleasure.

The following are his reflections on the miracle of restoring to sight the blind man of Bethsaida, who upon our Lord's first putting his hands upon him, said, "I see men as trees walking." In most other instances of the gospel miracles, their publicity and investigation on the spot by disinterested or jealous witnesses are proofs of their reality. In this, the privacy of the transaction, and the obscurity of the individual who was the subject of it, are justly adduced as evidence that there was no temptation to imposture from vanity or any more selfish consideration.

"No miracle, perhaps, could be more clear than this from the suspicion of imposture. For what was to be accomplished by it, that would compensate for the difficulties and risk of a fabrication? It was not performed in public, in the presence of a multitude, but on the contrary, from the account we have of it, we have no reason for supposing, that any one was present at it but the disciples. Therefore, there was nothing ostentatious in it; nothing to be obtained in the way of character and reputation. Jesus carefully avoided all display upon the occasion. He led the man out of the town in order to do it privately, and forbad him to enter the town, or to tell any person in the town. It cannot therefore, be supposed, that any one, in the character in which Jesus appeared, would. for the purpose of pretending to work such a private miracle, venture to engage in a confederacy with a man who was to counterfeit blindness. For it is obvious, that it is only by a person counterfeiting blindness, and then pretending to be cured, that a fictitious miracle of this kind would be attempted. Observe then the risk, that would be run. The person, personating blindness, might whenever he thought fit, discover the imposture, and thus bring Jesus into derision and contempt with his own followers. This would be no small risk. A wise man would scarcely incur it for the chance of any advantage so perilous, even if he were unprincipled enough to work by such means. But that any one should do so, only for a private exhibition, which could add nothing to public fame, is altogether incredible.

"Besides, what means had Jesus to compensate such a coadjutor? How was he to pay him? He had no money; he had no patronage. He had nothing that wealth and power could bestow; no, not even in the lowest degree. Is it then

credible, that a man should personate such an irksome and dismal defect for no advantage whatsoever? And that he should act the falsifier and impostor, and pretend to be cured, without a prospect of obtaining the slightest remuneration or reward thereby? Whether, therefore, the improbability be considered, of Jesus running the risk of the man betraying him; or whether the improbability of the man's acting such a part be considered, when he had no chance of recompense, it appears alike incredible, that this was a fabricated case of blindness. And when, in addition to all this, it is considered how difficult, if Jesus had been an impostor, it would have been for him, without the knowledge of his disciples to form such a plot, they being constantly with him; how difficult again it would have been for him, even if he had so formed it, to have deceived them by pretending to cure a man who only counterfeited blindness, when they had ample time and opportunity for observing whether the disease was real or assumed; and, finally, when it is considered how absurd it would have been that all this should have been thus planned, merely for the purpose of exhibiting it in private to these disciples, and of imposing on them, — nothing can well be conceived more improbable, than that this was a case of imposture. And if it was not, it must be admitted to have been a real miracle, performed by a more than human power, and that consequently his mission was divine." — pp. 266 – 269.

The evidence from Prophecy is another of the prominent topics of this work, and is discussed, though less fully, with adequate learning and judgment. Of the prophetic writings in general, the noble author remarks, that they present us with the most exalted ideas of the Deity, the justest notions of piety and virtue, and the most awful denunciations against wickedness in every form, public or private. "But it is," he adds, "their peculiar use and value to us, that in them are foretold the most remarkable circumstances of the birth, life, ministry, miracles, doctrines, sufferings, and death of Jesus of Nazareth; and that, too, in so minute and exact a manner, that it might almost be thought, that they were describing those things after they had happened, if it were not known, that these prophecies were written many hundred years before his birth, and were all that time in possession of the Jews, who were the mortal enemies of Christianity, and who, therefore, would not have forged, or suffered to be forged, or altered any passage in them to adapt it to the founder of that religion, to which they were so hostile."

To this general statement of the value and genuineness of the testimony from Prophecy, there lies, as we apprehend, no availing objection. To some minds, this evidence from Prophecy is of the most convincing nature. Implying, as the term denotes, the prediction of future events, it includes with it, of necessity, the inspiration of God, since, as "no one can work miracles," so none can foretell future events "except God be with him." And when it can be shown, that the prediction points to the event, and the event corresponds with the prediction, we know of nothing in the whole range of scripture evidence more conclusive or satisfactory. As has been well remarked concerning it, "it is a species of evidence, which no previous conjecture nor accidental coincidence," nor, we may add, any fanciful theories of accommodation, "are sufficient to counteract or invalidate."

Yet from the nature of the subject, — prediction and not history, — and not seldom too from the manner in which it has been treated, it is undeniably attended with difficulties. In the application, moreover, or interpretation of particular prophecies, there might be expected, as is found, a wide diversity of opinion. That with a blind zeal for finding Christ in every thing, in the ark, and in the tabernacle, in the sacrifices of the temple, and in every word that proceeded from the priests, — some have applied to him personally, or to his religion or kingdom, passages which bear no such application, — which were either not uttered as predictions at all, or had their fulfilment in events near at hand; that others, led away by that delusive and mischievous theory of a double sense of prophecy, a primary and a secondary, have introduced mysticism and perplexity, — is not less true. We willingly, and of choice, reject from this testimony what is doubtful or cannot be proved to belong to it. Just interpretation demands here, as in all other parts of Scripture, a strict adherence to the "unity of sense;"* that is, when it is ascertained, that

* "In all other authors besides the Scriptures," says Dr. Benson, in his admirable "Essay on the Unity of Sense," "before we sit down to read and study them, we expect to find in them one, single, determinate sense and meaning of the words; from which we may be satisfied, that we have attained to their meaning and understand what they intended to say."

a text or passage means one thing, it cannot also mean another. If a prediction refer to one person or event, it cannot at the same time include another person or event; nor may we suppose, that while it has a primary reference to a prior individual or history, it looks forward also to another subsequent or remote. "For if the Scriptures are not to be interpreted, like the best ancient authors, in their one true and genuine meaning, common readers," says the writer already cited, "will be led to doubt, whether or no the Scriptures have any certain meaning at all. They will be for ever at a loss what to believe and what to practise; on what to ground their comfort here, and their hope of everlasting happiness hereafter." On this obvious, and only safe rule of interpretation, many passages in the Psalms and in the Prophets, which ignorance, inadvertence, or a misguided zeal would refer to Christ, should be referred, where they belong, to David, or to David's son, to the kings or kingdoms of Israel or of Judah, to the condition, prosperous or adverse, to the sins and impending calamities of the neighbouring idolatrous nations. For the objects of the Old testament predictions were almost as various as the predictions themselves. Some of them announced events just ready to be accomplished, and were designed for the immediate instruction of those to whom they were addressed. Others looked forward to more distant periods. Of this class were the denunciations, so frequent in the prophetic books, of the fate of various kingdoms, of Egypt, and of Babylon, of Nineveh and Tyre. These were "the burdens," with which the souls of the Prophets were oppressed; the heavy doom, which they were commanded to utter. Yet who will contend that these had any relation to Christ or his religion? Surely none, except that they are found in the same Scriptures, which do in truth speak of him. We do not want for the evidence of our faith this cumbrous help.

There is another class of predictions, which with far better reason have been applied to Jesus Christ or to his religion; and which, even by intelligent critics, have been understood as susceptible of a double sense. Of such are the second and the sixteenth Psalms. "But if," as says Benson, whose authority on this point is inferior to none, "they can be shown throughout to agree to David, then let them be interpreted exclusively of him." So, also, if in the seventy-second

Psalm the prophet intended the son of David, King Solomon, then he intended him alone; and the whole Psalm is to be interpreted of the peace and prosperity of Solomon's reign; and we only diminish the worth and value of the Christian evidence by pretending that at the same time he looked forward to the kingdom of Christ.

But notwithstanding this, and yet more that sound interpretation would reject, the Christian evidence from predictions, fulfilled and fulfilling, is abundant and complete. In addition to all the miraculous attestation, by which it was established, we have also, in the language of the Apostle, the sure word of prophecy, unto which we do well if we take heed. And when Isaiah at a distance of more than seven hundred years, declares, "There shall spring forth a shoot from the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; and the spirit of Jehovah shall rest upon him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding; the spirit of the knowledge and of the fear of Jehovah;" * when, announcing, as we interpret it, the place of Messiah's birth, the Prophet Micah declares, (ch. v. 2,) "But thou, Bethlehem, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall come a governor, who shall rule my people Israel, whose goings forth have been of old;" — when, designating the place of his parents' abode, it is said, (Isaiah ix. 2,) "In the land of Zebulon and of Nepthali, by the way of the sea, beyond Jordan in Galilee, the people, that sat in darkness saw a great light, and they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined:" when, yet again, the same prophet declares, "Unto us a son is born, unto us a child is given," (Isaiah ix. 6,) and afterwards describing in his own person the blessed influences of his mission, "The spirit of the Lord Jehovah is upon me; for Jehovah hath anointed me: He hath sent me to publish good tidings to the distressed, to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim the year of mercy from Jehovah;" † and this prediction, too, applied by our Lord to himself, when rising in the synagogue, and reading the passage, he said, "This day is the Scripture fulfilled in your ears;" when Jeremiah predicts, (ch. xxiii. 5, 6,) "Behold the days come, saith Jeho-

* Isaiah xi. 1, 2, *et seq.* See Noyes's Translation.
† Isaiah lxi. 1, 2, in the same Translation.

vah, that I will raise up unto David a righteous branch, and a king shall execute judgment, and this is his name, whereby he shall be called, THE LORD, OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS;" when Daniel saw in prophetic vision one like the son of man, coming in the clouds of heaven, to whom was given dominion and glory, a dominion that should not pass away, and a kingdom, that should not be destroyed; when, passing from the solemnity and magnificence of a general description, he specifies the very time "determined upon the people and upon the city to finish the transgression and seal up the prophecy, and to anoint the Most Holy;" nay, the exact period, at the end of which, Messiah should be cut off, though not for himself, (Dan. vii. 13, and ix. 24 – 26;) and finally, when at the close of all, Malachi predicts, (ch. iii. 1 – 3,) "The Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, in whom ye delight:" — for ourselves, we read in these the same sure word of prophecy of which the Apostle speaks; we see not merely a vague and indefinite anticipation, — a looking forward to one knows not what, — nor yet terms of general import, to be applied only in accommodation, or for rhetorical ornament, as we quote from orators and poets, — but clear, distinct predictions of the kingdom and coming of Jesus Christ.

Of these, were it necessary, we might select for more particular illustration that memorable prediction, which commences with the close of the fifty-second and is continued through the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, in which the prophet describes the humiliaton, sufferings, and reward of the Messiah. The language of this prediction is scarcely less remarkable than the character and events it foretells. In the number, minuteness, and peculiarity of the circumstances it details, it would seem to be rather a record of what had been, than a prophecy of what was to come. "Here," says Paley, who in his admirable view of the "Evidences of Christianity" selects this from the whole range of ancient prophecies, as the clearest and strongest of them all, — "here is no double sense, no figurative language, but what is sufficiently intelligible to every reader of every country. And what adds to the force of the quotation is, that it is taken from a writing, *declaredly prophetic*, professing to describe such future transactions and changes in the world, as were connected with the fate and interests of the Jewish nation."

The ancient Jews, as Chandler has fully shown, interpreted it of the Messiah. And the modern Jews, too well aware of the weight of the argument, have exhausted all their ingenuity to evade the application of a prediction, the authenticity of which they could by no methods disprove. They have referred it to the distressed condition of their own nation; to the persecutions and sufferings of their own prophet Jeremiah; to one of their kings, and even, as their last resort, to one or more of their Rabbis. That it points to an individual and not to a nation, the whole scope and spirit of the prediction incontrovertibly proves, and no individual has ever appeared, to whose life, and condition, and character ingenuity itself could find a resemblance, but Jesus Christ. To him it perfectly accords. In him, with astonishing exactness, was it fulfilled. His humble yet miraculous birth, his spotless life, his meek patience, his bitter sufferings, "wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities;" the humiliation of his death, "his grave appointed with the wicked, yet with the rich man his tomb;"* and finally the glory of his reward, "because he poured out his soul unto death; because he bore the sin of many and made intercession for transgressors," — reasons applicable in no sense to any mortal beside, — all these are distinctly described. Had this prediction stood alone, it had been enough to show the connexion between the Jewish and the Christian dispensation; to establish the latter on the evidence of prophecy in the former. For this, its obvious interpretation, we have in addition the express authority of Philip, who, in answering to the enquiries of the Ethiopian convert, "Of whom speaketh the prophet this?" "began at this same scripture and preached unto him Jesus."†

But there are other predictions, which it were easy to adduce, in which with less distinctness, indeed, but in terms not to be mistaken, the names and offices of Messiah are enumerated, the nature and influences of his religion are described, and the triumphs of his faith are anticipated. Which shall we most admire, — the bold and glowing strains in which the Prophets foretold, or the calm historic

* Isaiah liii. 7 – 9. Noyes's Translation.
† Acts viii. 30 – 35.

simplicity with which the Evangelists describe, Jesus Christ? The language of their predictions is the consecrated language of Christian piety and faith. Like that of the songs of Zion and the hymns of early childhood, it is identified with the purest and highest feelings of devotion. Nor would we lightly disturb the association. In the minds of unlearned but sincere disciples, there may be, and doubtless are, mingled with their views of these predictions, some fancies, which a severe criticism or careful interpretation would reject. But much as we reverence good learning, we should be slow to remove the error at the hazard of the truth; and should hardly congratulate ourselves upon our success, if, in taking away the first, we had not with the great Reformer, established the second.

But another, and to our view, the most material argument upon this whole subject, is drawn from the application made of many of these predictions by our Lord to himself; and to the same person in repeated instances by his Evangelists, the historians of his life, and by his Apostles, the first preachers of his faith. This application is in some instances of the most direct and explicit kind; and furnishes an evidence to us at least abundant and convincing.

Many passages, we well know, are quoted from the Old Testament into the New, in simple accommodation; as is usual with one writer to quote from another for illustration or rhetorical ornament. No careful reader of the Gospels will fail to perceive, that many texts borrowed in this manner from the prophetical and other books, have a different meaning from that for which they are here employed; and that the terms "then was fulfilled" — or, "this was spoken that it might be fulfilled," are used by our Lord and his Evangelists not to intimate the connexion of a prediction with its completion, but simply as forms of quotation. This has been so satisfactorily shown by various writers,* and will be

* Any one, who may desire satisfaction upon this point, needs only consult Sykes's chapter, "The Meaning of the Phrase *That it might be fulfilled*," in his volume on Prophecy; Benson in the Essay already quoted; Everett's "Defence of Christianity," Chapter vi. And we have much pleasure in referring to an ingenious and highly satisfactory view of this subject in a dissertation, by Mr. W. G. Eliot, lately of the Theological School, Cambridge, and printed in the last number of "The Scriptural Interpreter."

so readily admitted by all who have given any attention to the subject, that it is scarcely necessary to say, it is not to passages of this class that we refer.

But our Lord repeatedly refers the Jews to their own books for evidence concerning himself; and when, meaning of necessity the Old Testament, he says, "Search the Scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they, which testify of me;" when, rebuking their unbelief, he adds, "If ye had believed Moses, ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me;" yet again, when entering into the synagogue, he opened the book of the prophet Esaias, and read the passage already quoted announcing the object of his mission, and declared concerning it, "This day is this scripture fulfilled in your ears;" when to the woman of Samaria, expressing her expectation of the coming of the Messiah as promised by the Prophets, he says, "I that speak unto thee am he;" and when, after he had risen from the dead, and met his distrusting disciples, he rebukes their slowness of heart to believe what the Prophets had spoken, and beginning with Moses, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself, — in these and in other passages, we find a clear, distinct application of the ancient prophecies by his own lips to himself. It is the Master's own interpretation of the prophecies, — and who will pretend that he did not understand them. Therefore we say, as did Philip to Nathanael, "We have found him, of whom Moses in the law and the Prophets did write, Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph."

And if from the Master we turn to his Apostles and first preachers, after they were instructed in the faith they were commissioned to teach, we find such passages as these. Peter, addressing the men of Israel, amidst their surprise at the miraculous cure of the lame man, says, "The God of Abraham hath glorified his son Jesus." — "For those things, which God before hath showed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled." — "Yea, and all the prophets from Samuel, and them that follow after, have foretold of these days." *

* It is in this connexion the reader will perceive that the Apostle adduces that remarkable prediction, taken from Deuteronomy, "For

The same Apostle, announcing the gracious purposes of God for the salvation of the Gentiles, as well as of the Jews, declares, that "to him," that is, to Jesus of Nazareth, "give all the prophets witness"; and Paul, in writing to the Romans, designates himself as called to be an apostle, separated unto the gospel of God, which "*he promised afore by his prophets in the holy scriptures.*"

Now though it should be conceded, that of these and of other predictions we may not ascertain the precise meaning, nor even, of any one of them, may be able to assert to what specifically the prophet points, still their use and value as predictions remain; and the object, moreover, for which they were uttered is accomplished. They were sufficiently clear to produce that expectation, which was entertained alike by the Jewish and the Gentile world; which not only led a few devout men to wait for redemption in Jerusalem, but was the hope and consolation of all Israel, to which, said Paul, "the twelve tribes hoped to come." The woman of Samaria spoke in the name of her whole people, when she said, "We know that Messiah cometh." And what but the report of these predictions could have awakened the fears of Herod, or have sent the wise men to inquire "where the Christ should be born"?

Let it be admitted, also, that the truth of the Christian revelation does not *depend* upon the literal fulfilment of any prophecies of the Old Testament by Jesus, as a person. Christianity, as has been well said,* is supported "by the intrinsic value of its doctrines and precepts, and their adaptation to the wants and weaknesses of man; by the facts recorded in the gospel history; by the life, death, and resur-

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Moses truly said unto the Fathers, a prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you of your brethren, like unto me. Him shall ye hear in all things." Whether this prediction, as would certainly appear from this citation by the Apostle and again by Stephen, Acts vii. 37, pointed personally and exclusively to Jesus Christ, or, as some critics of note have supposed, it should be interpreted of the long succession of Prophets, beginning at the time of Moses, it still includes the Messiah, who was one, and the most glorious of that succession.

See a candid and impartial view of this matter in the late Rev. Samuel Cary's "Review of a book entitled 'The Grounds of Christianity.'" Boston. 1813.

*See Christian Examiner for July, 1834, art. "Hengstenberg's Christology."

rection of our Saviour," and especially, we add, by *its own independent testimony from prophecy.* Christ himself was a prophet, — the greatest of all the prophets; and he uttered many predictions, which the world has seen fulfilled. He foretold his rejection by his own countrymen, their unbelief and ingratitude, the denial of Peter, the treachery of Judas, the desertion of all his disciples. He foretold his own death, his resurrection, and future glory; the sufferings which his disciples would endure as the first preachers of his faith; the opposition it would encounter, and yet its spread and triumph in the world. He foretold events more distant than these, — the rejection of his religion by the Jews, the consequent forfeiture of their national privileges, the destruction of their city and temple, and their final dispersion throughout the world. Of the exact fulfilment of all these predictions history affords abundant testimony, and there remain to this day sensible monuments.

The gospel, then, is sustained by the evidence of prophecy, independently of its connexion with the Jewish religion. Nay, take away from Christianity all the testimony it derives either from its own or the ancient Jewish predictions, and though indeed you deprive it of an evidence, which to some minds is irresistible, enough remains, and more than enough, in its internal and historical evidence, in the sublime character of its author, in its beautiful and glorious revelations of the immortal life, to command the faith and to sustain the hopes of all mankind.*

At the same time, the united predictions of the Old and New Testament constitute in our view a most interesting and important part of the evidences of our religion. They

* We repeat here, as the writer may have been misapprehended, the statement of this part of our subject, given in the Examiner for July 1834, in the notice of "Hengstenberg's Christology," already referred to.

"That Jesus was the Messiah in the sense in which he claimed to be so, we are far from questioning. But whether he can be shown to be the subject of supernatural prophecy or not, he was anointed by God with the holy spirit, and with power to sustain the office of Instructer and Reformer of the world; he was sanctified and sent into the world to accomplish purposes of God, and to introduce a dispensation, for which the whole Jewish economy had been a preparation, and by which the best hopes and most ardent desires of prophets and righteous men would be more than answered." — p. 327.

are among the various proofs, that "God hath glorified his son Jesus." We number it with the countless tokens of the manifold wisdom of God, that as in the dispensation of the truth itself, so in the evidences by which it is attended, it is graciously adapted to the diversities of men's minds, to their different habits of thought, or degrees of improvement. Thus, the kind of evidence that fails to convince one mind, may be decisive with another; and he, who may refuse his assent, or be slow to believe the word of prophecy, may yield a ready faith to the testimony of miracles. So also, in the nature of the truth, there is mingled doctrine with precept, warnings with invitations; there are promises, that the humblest may hope, and threatenings that the presumptuous may fear.

In the remarks we have offered, we have taken only a very cursory view of an important subject. Our readers will perceive, that we have not even glanced at many considerations, which a more extended survey should embrace. The "history of Prophecy" especially, might open a wide and fruitful field; which notwithstanding the learned labors of Grotius, Whiston, Le Clerc, Newton, and Sherlock, in his admirable treatise on "The Use and Intent of Prophecy," might be successfully improved. It is of such an history Lord Bacon says,* that "comparing every scripture prophecy with the event, it would serve for the better confirmation of the faith, and the better information of the church, with regard to the interpretation of prophecies not yet fulfilled. This is a work which I find deficient. But," adds he, "it should either be undertaken with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all."

ART. III. — *A Sermon preached before the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company, on their CXCVIth Anniversary, June 2d*, 1834. By the Rev. F. H. HEDGE. Boston. J. H. Eastburn. 1834. 8vo. pp. 30.

THE man, who is called upon to officiate upon any of our anniversary celebrations, whether religious or secular, is

* Bacon's Works, Vol. VI. "De Augmentis Scientiarum."

rather to be condoled with, than congratulated. The mere fact, that the orator is one in a series of men, each of whom has performed the same duty with more or less of ability, imposes a clog and restraint upon the mind, and fills a sensitive person with nervous apprehensions of the disadvantageous comparisons that may be drawn by those whose memories are painfully retentive. Every year, too, increases the intrinsic difficulty, since every year yields its pamphlet, in which the same subject is treated, and less room is left for him who comes after. Notwithstanding the boundless variety of the human mind, it is natural that persons of average capacity should be led into similar trains of thought by a consideration of the same themes under circumstances very nearly similar, and none, but a mind of decided originality, can escape falling into the worn and familiar track of discussion.

These inferences, we believe, are borne out by facts. Of the innumerable anniversary discourses which have been pronounced in New England, how few comparatively have marked superiority enough to rescue them from the teeth of Time, who, omnivorous as he is, takes a peculiar pleasure in consuming every thing of the pamphlet race. Most of these productions are not even fair specimens of the powers of their several authors. They are generally characterized by a tameness of thought and a well-bred propriety in expression, a formal annunciation of commonplace truths, a proper sprinkling of the current phrases of the day, and an indulgence in self-complacent reminiscences and glowing anticipations. We find in them the same thoughts in new garbs, the old sentiments paraphrased and often diluted, and recognise distinctly a strong family likeness. To these, as to all general remarks, there are, of course, exceptions, though not always favorable ones. There are but few symmetrical and well-balanced minds; and many men, in their desire to avoid being commonplace and formal, fall into startling extravagance, and show an indecorous disrespect for public opinion, common sense, and common taste. Anxious to escape the regular elliptical orbit, they rush into the eccentric vagaries of a comet, and, in their search after originality, forsake that dignity and propriety which are always becoming, and, to the pulpit, nothing less than essential. After making all these deductions, there remains still a small

minority of productions rich in every thing requisite to secure a permanent reputation, in vigorous and striking thoughts, eloquent expressions, purity of style, and manly independence of sentiment.

Among this minority we rank without hesitation the Artillery Election Sermon of Mr. Hedge. It is not one of those sermons which men read from a sense of duty. It has the stamp of originality on every page, and we can hardly turn over the leaves without feeling that we are communing with a mind which thinks for itself, and thinks wisely and well. His views are large, liberal, and comprehensive. He has the philosophic glance which sees objects in their just proportions, and which groups heterogeneous masses into a well-arranged whole. His sermon has the somewhat rare merits of unity and completeness. He does not seem to have begun it without knowing where or how it should end, and to have cast himself upon a current of thought without heeding where it might carry him, but to have drawn the plan of his work before he began to build. The several departments of the discourse succeed each other in a natural and harmonious order, and give to the whole the beauty of symmetry and proportion.

The style of this discourse, no less than its historical allusions, shows the trained and accomplished scholar. It is rich, vigorous, and flexible, — smooth without being insipid, and polished without being elaborate. It has, what we frequently miss in these days of rapid and careless composition, purity and precision. We look in vain for a slovenly sentence, or a slip-shod expression. Mr. Hedge does not treat his thoughts with so little respect as to send them into the world with a scanty or unbecoming garb. The following introductory paragraphs explain the objects and purposes of the discourse with much simplicity and beauty.

"The occasion which has now brought us together, has claims upon all who feel an interest in the early history of this Commonwealth. The anniversary, which we celebrate this day, is among the oldest that our annals record; it carries us back through two centuries of revolution and improvement to the first planting of New England, — that day of earnest expectation, when a new manifestation of the sons of God was believed to be at hand.

"Your institution, gentlemen of the Ancient and Honorable

Artillery Company, connects you with that period, which may, emphatically, be called the heroic age of our country; an age, when manhood and individual worth possessed an influence, which they can command only in the infancy of nations. Your charter has come to you from brave and godly men, who, in an age of depravity and misrule, were called to exhibit, in this far corner of the earth, the novel spectacle of a nation founded in truth and righteousness: — men, who, though they dreamed not of glory, are become exceeding glorious in our eyes, — who, though they toiled not for fame, have earned the brightest that earth affords.

"There are periods in the progress of society, when new prospects of social happiness unfold themselves to the philanthropist. The great hope of humanity, the hope of infinite progress, is never entirely extinct: now and then it breaks forth through some long eclipse of history, and becomes a guiding-star and a bright augury to coming centuries. It may be the discovery of some new principle in the natural or moral world, that awakens this hope; or it may be kindled by the ministry of some pious reformer, or by a whole generation of reformers, as at the founding of these colonies: whatever the cause, the effects are blessed; a new interest is felt in the destination of man, and a prophecy of better days is abroad in the earth. In the contemplation of such periods, the passage of Scripture, which I have selected for this occasion, will not be thought misplaced. 'For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God:' in other words, the world is eagerly awaiting that better state of things which the reformers sent by God are about to effect. At the time when these words were written, the most abandoned of tyrants was seated upon the throne of the world.* It was a period of deep corruption, of universal woe, — a season of despair to most men, and of fiery trial to the few in whom a better faith precluded despair. In the strong language of the Apostle whom I have quoted, 'the whole creation groaned and travailed together' in helpless anguish. In the midst of this darkness, there sprung up a race of men, such as the world had never seen before, — men, born of the spirit, and baptized with fire, — a band of reformers, who, in the midst of corruption, maintained a blameless conversation; in the midst of superstition, worshipped the true God; in the midst of a selfish and luxurious generation, devoted themselves to hardship and death. These were the sons of God sent to reprove and re-

"* The Epistle to the Romans was written while Nero was emperor."

deem the world; and soon the world was filled with the glory of their manifestation, and with the fruits of their ministry. Thus it hath ever happened, that the most corrupt ages of the world have witnessed the loftiest manifestations of faith and devotion; whenever the frame of society is most diseased, the remedy is near." — pp. 3–5

Mr. Hedge then passes to the consideration of another epoch when the "earnest expectation of the creature" was again awakened, the period when the Fathers of New England entered on their mission. There was much in the character of these men, and in the heroic nature of their enterprise, to justify these expectations, and the growth of their settlements did not disappoint the friends of humanity in the old world. Their peaceful and uninterrupted progress during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is happily and forcibly contrasted with the wars, disorders, and struggles which prevailed in the old world, during the same period. The present condition of our country is such as to satisfy all reasonable expectations, and the moral influence, which it has exerted and continues to exert upon the world at large, is great and valuable. Mr. Hedge justly remarks that "all the great moral movements of the day, the abolition of slavery, the instruction of the poor, the suppression of vice, the reformation of prison discipline, and the first systematic efforts to promote universal peace, have either originated or received their strongest impulse here; and the fact augurs well for the future prospects of our country."

These future prospects Mr. Hedge proceeds to consider in a strain of sober good sense, without extravagant confidence or equally extravagant despondency. He regards the efforts for the improvement of the family of man as the leading characteristics of the times. The means generally used to effect this consist in voluntary associations, whose utility and dangers Mr. Hedge discusses at considerable length. We will not do injustice to his eloquent and discriminating remarks by condensing them. They deserve the serious consideration of every patriot and philanthropist. The vast number and variety of our benevolent, literary, and religious associations, are beginning to be felt as an evil, and those who have been most efficient in promoting them may be ready to acknowledge the truth of the saying quoted by Lord Bacon, "Stay a little, that we may make an end the

sooner." The following extract shows the spirit and character of this portion of the discourse.

"A still further objection to the system of combination is, that it destroys individuality of character, endangers freedom and independence of thought, and thereby retards the progress of truth. Truth is not elicited by popular excitement, nor discovered in public discussions. It is to be found only in self-communion, in the private study of ourselves and of God. And it is not to be found there, unless the mind acts with perfect freedom and originality, unbiassed by party associations, unprejudiced by public opinion. This freedom is rarely to be met with in those who have leagued themselves with numerous associations. The habit of acting only in conjunction with large bodies tends to enfeeble and enslave the mind. It disqualifies us for independent thought and action; it disposes us to receive the opinions and principles of the body to which we belong, as our own opinions and principles; it induces us to coöperate with that body in measures, which our unbiassed judgment would not approve. There is a tacit pledge, an unconscious obligation to do so, which few have self-knowledge enough to perceive, or firmness enough to resist. Right views and a sound morality are attainable only by a nature, which knows itself, and which acts from principles itself has established, without regard to public opinion or public example. Such natures are as little prone to follow blindly in the steps of the multitude when they happen to be treading a right path, as when they are moving in a wrong direction: they seek their motives of action within themselves; they seek the right because it is right, never asking and never caring whether it is practised by others or not. It is only by such principles that a manly character, or indeed any character, can be formed. Habits of action into which we are led by the influence of example, however good, are not *moral*, — can never constitute a character. He who acts on principles derived from others, who sacrifices his individuality to the opinions and the will of a party, *has no character;* he is merely a reflection of the character of some leading mind." — pp. 13, 14.

Mr. Hedge next proceeds to the objects contemplated in the philanthropic movements of the day, and confines himself to the consideration of an appropriate and important one, — the abolition of war. He dwells upon the difficulty of the project of a universal peace, and the following paragraph is as true in sentiment, as it is brilliant in expression.

"In order to appreciate fully the difficulty of effecting a general and permanent peace, in order to understand what it is that we propose to accomplish, we must consider well, how strong and how universal the passion for war has been in all ages of the world. This passion is one of the most remarkable phenomena in human nature. So prevalent, so unremitting has it been, that an English philosopher of some repute was led to declare war to be the natural state of man. And truly, it would seem as if there were some foundation for this belief; at least it is not difficult to conceive how a philosopher, *reasoning from facts and not from principles*, should adopt such an opinion. It cannot be denied that war has ever been the most common employment and condition of nations. Seasons of peace are but brief interludes in the solemn tragedy of the world. As far back as we can trace the history of man we find him struggling with his fellow-man. The first use which he made of his godlike faculties was to forge implements of destruction. The sword was an earlier invention than the ploughshare, the bow and the spear have ever preceded the scythe and the spade; and the clods of the earth were removed to make room for the first fruits of slaughter ere ever a furrow was opened to receive the seed of the husbandman. But little has come down to us of the mighty men of old but the record of their splendid homicides. We see them at the head of immense armies, sweeping the earth like the breath of the pestilence, withering every green hope, and devouring the ungathered harvests. They toiled for glory, and glory was theirs, — the glory of the lightning, which shatters where it shines. The heroes of antiquity, the kings of Egypt, of Assyria, of Persia, and of Macedon, — what do we know of them, but how many thousands they led forth to battle and how few hundreds returned with the boast of victory. Victory! — well did the Roman annalist describe it; 'A scene where profound and universal silence reigns, funeral mounds on every side; distant and rare the smoke of human habitations; no one to greet the eye of the wanderer.' It might be supposed that so rude a pastime would have been relished only in a rude age and by an ignorant people; but polished Athens and stately Rome partook of its pleasures with as keen a gust as the nations whom they pronounced barbarous. It might have been supposed that Christianity would have set bounds to the tide of blood; but the progress of Christian civilization has thus far only added new importance, new skill, and new efficacy to the art of war. It is no longer the rude thing it was in the hands of Xerxes or Hamilcar; it has been exalted to a graver beauty and adorned with a terrible grace; dignified with the honors

of a science, and enriched with the choicest results of modern invention. The advancement of society, so far from diminishing, has increased the frequency of wars. The last two centuries have abounded more in this cruel custom than any two previous centuries of the world's history. And even now, Christian Europe, bowed with the weight of years, grown grey in old campaigns, and scarred with thousand battles, still clutches the sword with her veteran and palsied hands as eagerly as she grasped it in the days of her youth. History has been censured for speaking only of conquerors and of battles; but in truth, history has had little else to record. The arts of peace have always hid themselves in obscurity; the progress of human improvement has been always a secret stream revealing itself only by the superior fertility of the regions through which it passed: while all that appears on the surface, all that is obvious to the historian, the great current of human affairs has been red with war from its source until now." — pp. 16 – 19.

Mr. Hedge supports his position by a reference to history, and gives a most animated and picturesque sketch of the famous war of the Spanish succession, presenting, in a few glowing and magic words, all the waste of treasure and blood it occasioned, as well as the paltry nature of the objects struggled for. He dwells with fervor and earnestness upon the incalculable evils of war, and upon the duty of good men to direct their efforts to abolish it. This can only be effected by the operation of great and good minds upon public opinion, and by giving more and more extent to the "subduing and pity-moving influence" of the Christian Religion. For the whole of this portion of his discourse, Mr. Hedge deserves the warm thanks of the friends of peace. The sermon concludes with the usual address to the Company, which is conceived and expressed with great felicity.

We are sensible that we are doing great injustice to Mr. Hedge by our brief and imperfect analysis. A popular discourse bears such treatment less well than almost any other class of composition; but our readers will perceive from the specimens which we have quoted, that our commendations are amply merited. We have no hesitation in saying that it is, in its kind, one of the finest productions of the day. We are glad to bear our testimony to its merits, and to recommend it to our readers, many of whom, probably, seeing that it is an Artillery Election Sermon, have looked no further than the cover.

The reviewer's office is but half done, if he does not find some fault. Having spoken in such high terms of the sentiments, thoughts, and style of this sermon, it will not be expected that we should qualify our praises by any general censure. We have no such intention. We have merely noticed one inadvertence. Mr. Hedge speaks of "Sir Joseph Addison." We are not aware that Addison was ever knighted. We could have wished that another expression had been substituted (p. 28,) for that of "the infant God."

[For the Christian Examiner.]

ART. IV. — *The Validity of Congregational Ordination.* A Discourse delivered before the University in Cambridge, at the Dudleian Lecture, May 14, 1834. By ALVAN LAMSON, Pastor of the First Church in Dedham, Massachusetts.*

THE Episcopal controversy is no longer, as formerly, an exciting theme. It may be said, in fact, to belong to history. No intelligent person, certainly no one who has not some interest to serve, now thinks of attributing any special sanctity either to the crown or the mitre. If Episcopacy is to be defended at the present day, it is not on the ground of divine right, — that is an obsolete fiction, — but of its utility.

It is my duty at this time to "maintain and prove" the validity of Congregational ordination, "as the same hath

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* Large portions of this Discourse, including the whole historical argument on the Episcopal question, were omitted in the delivery, on account of its length, and two or three passages as not partaking of that character of abstract discussion, which the author was desirous to preserve, and which courtesy seemed to require, in a discourse addressed to the members of a University devoted to no sect or party. These passages, relating chiefly to the application and practical bearing of some of the principles which it was the object of the performance to defend, or of the opposite, are now retained. It is hardly necessary to add, that for the sentiments contained in the discourse, the author alone is responsible. He speaks as the organ of no sect, or class of Christians.

I may add, what, however, the attentive reader will all along perceive, that in my observations on religious societies and churches, I speak of them solely in their *ecclesiastical* character. With their legal character I have nothing to do. That has been settled by the proper tribunals.

been practised in New England from the first." "Not that I would," says the founder of the Lecture, "any ways invalidate Episcopal ordination, as it is commonly called, and practised in the Church of England; but I do esteem the method of ordination as practised in Scotland, at Geneva, and among the dissenters in England, and in the churches in this country, to be very safe, scriptural, and valid."

I am not then required, and I certainly feel no disposition to impugn the validity of Episcopal ordination, but only to combat the exclusive pretensions of its friends. As long as they are satisfied with claiming only what belongs to all classes of Christians, the right of each to judge for itself in all matters pertaining to faith and discipline, we have no wish to interfere with their opinions or ceremonies. We would leave them, as we would the thousand other sects into which Christians are divided, to the peaceable enjoyment of their doctrines and mode of worship. But when they proceed to say to us, and to all who do not adopt their peculiar views of church polity, — You are without an authorized ministry; your teachers, not being lawfully called and ordained, are mere intruders into the holy office; and the ordinances administered by them are not administered according to the mind of Christ, and have no validity; — they assume too much. Renouncing the Pope, in the language of Milton, they "still hug the Popedom."

I am no more disposed to contend for the divine institution of Presbyterianism, or of Congregationalism, than of Episcopacy. I do not imagine that any one of them is of positive divine institution. Of all forms of ecclesiastical polity with which I am acquainted, however, that of Diocesan Episcopacy, as understood to imply that Bishops and Priests constitute distinct orders, has the least claim to be regarded as the primitive one.

It is true the term Bishop occurs in ancient Christian writings, and in those of Paul himself. But in what sense? Evidently in its original sense of overseer, inspector, one who has any care or charge. The primitive Bishops were persons selected from among the first converts made in any place where Christianity was preached, to superintend the affairs of the little fraternity of believers in that place, to preserve them in purity of faith, and generally to further the objects of the new religion. They are called, indiscrimi-

nately, Bishops and Presbyters, the latter designation having a Jewish, and the former a Greek original. Thus St. Paul, as we are informed, sent from Miletus to request the "Elders" of the Church or body of believers at Ephesus, to come to him, and when present addressed them as the "Bishops" of the Ephesian Church.* In his Epistles, too, passages occur in which the terms are evidently interchanged. In giving directions concerning the office of Bishop or of Presbyter, the connexion of his language and his general argument show that he intends one and the same office, and not two. He speaks of Bishops and Deacons, and of Elders and Deacons, as of two orders, but never of Bishops, Elders, and Deacons, as of three.

It is unnecessary to go more into detail. It is admitted by the best writers in favor of Episcopacy, and I believe by all recent critics of any note, that the terms Bishop and Presbyter are sometimes, at least, used synonymously by the writers of the Acts and Epistles; and, as no instance has yet been produced in which they are unequivocally employed by them to designate two orders of the Christian ministry, and as it is not now pretended by the most strenuous advocates of Episcopacy, that Christ himself instituted any form of ecclesiastical polity, the controversy, so far as it relates to the names and descriptions of office occurring in the Apostolical writings, may, I believe, be considered as settled. No real friend of Episcopacy, certainly, if he knows what he is about, will now think of appealing to the use of the terms Bishop and Presbyter in the New Testament, as proving a distinction of order.

In regard to the assertion that the Apostles in their own persons transmitted the Episcopal character, it is sufficient to say, that their writings contain no intimation of this sort; and, further, that the office of Apostles as ordained to be the witnesses of Christ after his resurrection, and by the aid of miracles to spread abroad a knowledge of his religion, was from its nature temporary. They were extraordinary teachers, deriving their commission immediately from Jesus, and having no particular charge, diocese, or see, but were sent out to preach Christ to all the world, and with them their name and office died.

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*Acts xx. 17, 28.

A similar remark may be made with respect to Timothy and Titus, through whom the attempt has been made to derive the succession of Bishops. They belonged not to the class of ordinary teachers, and consequently had, and could have, no successors.

I do not pretend to have given even an outline of the evidence from the New Testament against the exclusive claim of Episcopacy to the possession of an authorized ministry. I have stated two or three facts or grounds of argument merely. More is not needed. The subject has been often enough treated at sufficient length; and even did it admit of being thoroughly discussed within the limits of a single discourse, without the exclusion of other topics, about which I cannot be wholly silent, I should shrink from taxing your patience by a long-drawn argument on so dry a point.

But though no evidence of the distinction contended for be found in the Scriptures, do we not meet with vestiges of it in the writings of the ancient Christians? have we not proof that it existed before the last witnesses of the resurrection had sunk to their rest? This ground has been taken by the advocates of the Apostolic origin of Diocesan Episcopacy; but it is equally untenable, I conceive, with the former. The opponents of Episcopacy are able to show from the old writers, that, for fifty years after the last of the Apostles had passed from the earth, the terms Bishop and Elder were used interchangeably as designating one order, and continued to be so used occasionally for a long time afterwards.

The earliest writings of Christian antiquity which have come down to us, those contained in the New Testament excepted, are those of Justin Martyr, the pieces attributed to the Apostolic Fathers being of doubtful antiquity, and in their present form certainly not genuine. Justin was a learned convert from Paganism to Christianity, and flourished a little before the middle of the second century. He is separated from the time of the Apostles by a dark gulph. But cross the chasm, what do we find? How far has the ancient simplicity been preserved? Have the primitive and lowly Pastors, the unassuming Presbyter-bishops of the first days, passed away? What evidence do we discover in the writings of Justin, that there existed in his time a class of officers in the Church, superior in order to the Elders? Not the least. The name of Bishop, if I mistake not, does

not occur in any of his productions now extant. Yet occasions in sufficient abundance offered, of mentioning the order, had it existed as distinct from the presiding elder or elders of each congregation. He has left us a description, somewhat minute, of the mode in which Sunday was observed, and baptism and the supper administered; but, in speaking of the person who conducted the service, and who appears to have been the highest officer then known in the Church, he calls him simply the "president of the brethren," language which savors much of the primitive simplicity.*

Originally there were several Presbyters or Bishops to each congregation, and Justin, it is true, mentions but one. Here then seems to have been a change, but such as is easily accounted for. Among the original Presbyters, one would, of course, preside, for the sake of order; and the office of president, if not originally perpetual, appears to have soon become such. To this office the term Bishop came afterwards to be restricted. But this was not yet the case. The presiding Presbyter might be, and no doubt was, even in Justin's day, sometimes called Bishop, or *the* Bishop of the congregation, by way of eminence, his office giving him a certain rank and dignity. But we have proof that he was not yet regarded as belonging to a distinct order.

I may be told that the evidence from Justin on this point is only of the negative kind. Admit it; I must be permitted to observe, that, all circumstances taken into the account, this evidence is, in the present case, of no small weight.

But we have other which is positive. Irenæus, who was bishop of Lyons in Gaul, and lived some years after Justin, speaks indiscriminately of the "succession of Presbyters," and "succession of Bishops," from the Apostolic times, a fact to be explained only on the supposition that both, in his view, belonged to one order, and were in this respect equal, though one of them being chosen, or succeeding by virtue of age, to the presidency, would acquire the title of chief or first Presbyter, called by Justin the president of the brethren, and frequently, as I have said, Bishop of the congregation. Distinct traces of the old doctrine of the identity of Bishops and Presbyters, as regards order, occur

* Apol. I. pp. 95–98. Ed. Thirlb.

also in the writings of Clemens of Alexandria, and Tertullian, in the early part of the third century, and even later.

The testimony of Jerome, who flourished late in the fourth century, and who was the most learned man and profoundest antiquary of his time, is very express. He speaks of the origin of Bishops as distinguished from Presbyters. He shows from the writings of the New Testament that they originally constituted one order, but afterwards, "*as a remedy to schism*," he says, "one was elected to preside over the rest." Though in his day Bishops alone were considered as having power to ordain, it was not so from the first; for in Alexandria, so late as the days of Heraclas, and Dionysius, they made and ordained their own Bishops, and had done so from the days of Mark the Evangelist, the reputed founder of the Alexandrian Church.* Those Bishops, as it appears from the illustrations employed by Jerome, one of which is the making of an Arch-Deacon by Deacons, were evidently viewed, not as belonging to a distinct order, but only as having a certain preëminence conferred by election. They were, in fact, little more than a sort of perpetual moderators.

And such, as late as the commencement of the twelfth century, were the Bishops of the Waldenses, a primitive and unlettered people, long concealed amid the secluded recesses of the Cottian Alps, to which they had retired during the persecutions under the early Emperors.†

Soon the dawn of the Reformation appeared, and the doctrine of the original equality of Bishops and Presbyters was among the first to be recovered. We find Wiclif, at whose "torch all succeeding reformers more effectually lighted their tapers," asserting it in the fourteenth century, and Cranmer and most of the founders of the Anglican Church early in the sixteenth trod in his steps. The doctrine then and some time afterwards, was, that ordination is the "ancient right" of Presbyters, and that there was originally no difference between them and Bishops. That the latter are *jure divino*, superior, constituting a distinct order, and having the exclusive right to ordain, and that they are indispensable to the existence of a true Church, was not, I believe, maintained in Protestant England, till some enthu-

* Epist. ad Evagr.

† Blair's History of the Waldenses. Edinburgh, 1833.

siasts among the Presbyterians or Independents contended that their own form of polity and no other could be extracted from the Bible. The Episcopalians then "found out that one claim of divine right was best met by another." * Hooker, some time their oracle, often, however, but ill understood, maintained that no form of ecclesiastical polity was found in the Bible, and, if found there, might be lawfully changed, expediency requiring it. Laud, while yet a member of the university, showing the spirit of the future man, undertook the defence of the divine right and necessity of Bishops, in his exercise for the degree of Bachelor of divinity, and, for his temerity, received — a college censure. The learned Selden, the best read in ecclesiastical antiquity of any man of his time, turned the doctrine of the divine right into a jest, and Usher was too great an antiquary to be ignorant that Presbyters formerly ordained.† But it is not my purpose to give a history of opinions.

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* Hallam's "Constitutional History of England," Vol. I. p. 922.

† The good sense and moderation of many of the old advocates of Episcopacy, some of them among the brightest ornaments of their church, should put some modern writers to the blush. If those who assert, that, from the time of the Apostles to the Reformation, "no other form of government but the Episcopal had ever been known to the Christian Church," mean, by the "Episcopal form of government," such as is at this day established in England, they must be prepared to hear either their learning or their honesty called in question. They must know, if they have ever dipped into the original writings of primitive antiquity, that a Bishop, for some time after the name came to be generally appropriated to the first or presiding Presbyter, had charge only of a single parish or congregation, and was in fact, no more than what may be called a congregational or parochial Bishop. They must know that no such thing as a Diocesan Bishop then existed. Ærius in the fourth century, instead of being "the first person who ever thought of confounding Bishops and Presbyters," as it is pretended (Le Bas' "Life of Wiclif," p. 300,) only asserted the old doctrine. St. Luke and St. Paul had certainly confounded them before him. The doctrine of their identity, however, had become in his day in a measure obsolete. He attempted to revive it, and, meeting the usual fate of reformers, was treated as an innovator.

There is something peculiarly disingenuous, to use no harsher epithet, in the mode of appeal to antiquity sometimes adopted by the friends of Episcopacy. Thus, because the term Bishop occurs in the early writers, as the name of a church officer, they give their readers to understand that Bishops, such as we now have them, then existed. They must know, as I have said, that it was not so. A sort of Episcopacy was early introduced, to be sure, but it was not Diocesan Episcopacy.

Thus far I have treated of the question of ordination in reference to the Episcopal controversy, which is the attitude in which it has been generally viewed. We infer the validity of Presbyterian ordination, strictly so called, in opposition to the Episcopal claim, from the fact, that the original Bishops, the only ones known to Scripture or antiquity, were simply Presbyters. Of this fact we think we have the clearest historical proofs. I have but hinted at the nature of these proofs. I have not attempted to spread them before you in full, nor shall I. I wish to take broader ground, and discuss the question of ordination, not simply with reference to the Episcopal controversy, but to its general merits; especially as I discover, as I think, in a portion of the community, great remaining misapprehensions on the subject of ecclesiastical power, usage, and polity, some of them affecting important rights.

I am to speak of the nature of ordination, to show what is its purport, and to whom the right or power to ordain belongs. In doing this, I must touch briefly on the spirit and end of Christianity, the character of the ministry, and the nature and primitive constitution of the church.

Jesus left no form of external polity, nor could he, consistently with the purpose he had in view, have ordained any as invariable and permanent. He came, not to introduce any partial, temporary, and local institution, but to give to the world, the whole world, and to all future ages, a religion suited to man's spiritual and progressive nature, — a religion which, recognising the soul's freedom, worth, and immmortality, labors to rescue it from the withering embrace of sin, to endow it with inward piety and strength, minister to its growth in godlike virtue and benevolence, and procure for it pardon, peace, and unfading joy in a final union with its Father. Its end is the sanctification, improvement, and progress of natures formed in the glorious image of the Divinity. It descends from heaven to bear the human soul up thither. It comes to speak of that better world where is the spirit's home; of that eternity, through which its thoughts even now wander, and for which it would fit and educate it.

The Bishops of primitive times were all equal, each being the Pastor of a single flock. "One altar, one Bishop," was the maxim. He was a mere Presbyter-bishop, "unbeneficed, unrevenued, and unlorded."

Such being the leading principle and end of Christianity, it is easy to see in what relation it stands to forms and outward polity. It is and must be essentially a spiritual religion, not a religion cramped, confined, and encumbered by forms and ceremony.

Forms, trappings, and a fixed polity, are almost necessarily local, and will hardly bear being transplanted. They have an affinity with the soil in which they spring up; they are associated with modes of thinking, usages, and feelings, which are perpetually varying with time, and which no two nations possess in common. In proportion as they are multiplied, the religion which prescribes them acquires a narrow and local character. It may be suited to a particular time and spot, or mode of political organization, but admits not of general extension, and perpetuity. Such was Judaism with its multitude of rites, its priesthood, and its temple-service. But how different Christianity, which teaches us that God's altar is the humble heart, that we may in any place lift up holy hands to him; that the universe is his temple, and the true worshipper, he who worships him in spirit and in truth, whether in edifices reared by human skill, or beneath the broad canopy of the overhanging heavens; that his kingdom is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy.

Forms are from their nature stern and unyielding. They have no expansive power corresponding with the capacity of growth in the human intellect. Had Christianity, then, clothed itself with them as a garment never to be put off, it would have been in a condition to have been left behind in the progress of society. And therefore it has avoided them. It has satisfied itself with introducing into the soul the germ of a new and better life, leaving it to the nurture which shall best promote its healthy growth, and vigorous and beautiful manifestations. The seed was sown in the field of the world, and all kindly influences are sent down from above, but no mode of culture is prescribed. That is left to be determined by human judgment, by the condition and wants of the age, by times and seasons.

A visible priesthood, assuming a fixed and unalterable character, partakes of the inconveniences of all forms; in the progress of the human mind it must be outgrown; it is opposed to the free spirit, the essential principles, and end

of Christianity; and revives a distinction, which, as we are taught to believe, was to perish with Judaism.

There can be no sacred *caste* among Christians. By the essential principle of the Gospel, all believers are consecrated. They are spoken of as a spiritual priesthood. Christianity recognises no other. So the Apostles labored to show. The old distinction, they tell us, was no longer to subsist. All were brought near to God; all, as we are assured, have immediate access to the one universal Father. No sacerdotal mediators, I mean, regarded as a distinct and sacred class, are needed. They belong to an infant and rude age, which readily cherishes the belief of a character of peculiar sanctity in its lawgivers and priests. But the religion of Jesus encourages no such elements of superstition. He came not to render the mind the slave of a debasing fear, not to strengthen, endow, and perpetuate a priesthood (I use the term in its technical sense), but to do it away for ever.

Who then, it may be asked, are Christian ministers, and what is the character of the ministry? Jesus has himself told us who they are, and what is the nature of their office, and expressly proposed himself as their pattern. "Even," says he, "as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister." The Christian ministry then is an office of help, a work, a benevolent labor. It has no character of sacredness except what duty, conscience, the religious obligation to do good gives to it. No other was attributed to it in the first ages, as a slight reference to its origin and history will abundantly show.

The early ministers were not priests, as the term is used to designate a separate *caste*, nor were viewed as such. The synagogue, and not the temple, furnished, I say not the exact model, but certainly the germ of the institution. Christianity, I may say, sprung up in the synagogues. They were appropriated to the teaching of religion among the Jews, the priests of the temple not being the ordinary instructers of the people. In the synagogues was Moses preached; in them the first heralds of the cross proclaimed Jesus as the Messiah; in them Paul, as we are told, taught every Sabbath day, preaching Christ to the people. They had their interpreters, their rulers, their elders and deacons,

their angel or messenger, and those who taught in them were called pastors or shepherds.

Several of these names and offices passed into the Christian Church, and nothing could be more natural than the transition. The early Christians were chiefly converts from Judaism, and for a time continued to form a part of the Jewish community, to observe Jewish rites, and especially to worship in the synagogue every seventh day. On being expelled from the religious assemblies of the Jews, and forced, in consequence, to adopt some form of worship, and some mode of regulating the affairs of their public meetings, they would as matter of convenience, as well as from attachment and habit, take along with them as many of the old institutions and usages as were suited to the genius of the new religion. Of course they would discard the priesthood, but retain the pastors and teachers. These were not regarded as possessing any character of peculiar sanctity; that belonged to the robed priests of the Temple, to an institution which stood in meats and drinks, and fleshly ordinances, making nothing perfect. They held not their office by divine right or appointment, as did the posterity of Aaron. They were not a distinct order. Nor were the early Christian ministers. They were elected by universal suffrage, for the infant communities of Christians were so many little democracies; they were Pastors or Bishops of the parish, strictly congregational Bishops, independent of all other Bishops, but accustomed to take no step in an affair of any moment without the concurrence of their people. They were to watch over and feed the flock, and for this were set apart by a ceremony called ordination.

And what was this? its nature, form, and purport? To ordain, according to the original signification of the term, is to appoint or choose to an office or trust. In its technical, or ecclesiastical sense, it is to put in possession of such office or trust. It is simply a ceremony of investiture, the installing or putting into an office previously bestowed.

There is nothing peculiar in the form of it, adopted by the early Christians, and still essentially retained by most sects. The same, or something similar, had been in use among the Jews on solemn occasions from patriarchal times. In praying over a person, they laid their hands on him. Jacob blessed the two sons of Joseph, laying his hands on

their heads. The prophets laid their hands on the sick, and besought Heaven to heal and to save. After Joshua had been appointed by divine command to succeed Moses, the latter "laid his hands on him and gave him a charge." * And Jesus, you recollect, observed the same ceremony, when little children were brought to him, laying his hands on them and blessing them.

That the early Christians, Jews as they were, should have retained so common and familiar a ceremony in setting apart the officers of their several assemblies, need not surprise us. Its meaning was perfectly well understood, and there was nothing exceptionable in it. It was highly appropriate and fit. It was not regarded in itself as conferring any authority or character. † It was the act of solemnly committing to a person, a charge or office which had been previously assigned him. Certainly it was fit that such an act, the office being a responsible one, should be rendered as impressive as possible. It was fit that prayer for a divine blessing should form part of it, and this according to a primitive and familiar usage was accompanied, as matter of course, with the laying on of hands.

Such and so simple is the origin, and such the primitive meaning, of the ecclesiastical rite of ordination. It is not of divine institution, and is to be defended only on the ground of its intrinsic propriety and a regard to Apostolical example. As a ceremony, undoubtedly a superstitious importance has been often attached to it. We speak of its validity. That word, I suppose, would never have been heard of in this connexion, had the primitive idea of ordination been retained. The appointment, or election, confers all the power and rights, whatever they are, pertaining to the ministry. Ordination confers none.

As it confers no power or right, neither can it be supposed in the judgment of reason, to confer any fitness or qualification for the office of the ministry, or produce any

* Numbers xxvii. 23.

† By the laying on of the hands of the Apostles, and by prayer, the Holy Ghost was given to believers generally, and not simply to the officers of their several fraternities. Besides, the effect was a miraculous one, and confined, as I suppose all sound theologians will now admit, to the Apostolic age. See among other passages, Acts viii. 15, 17, 18, and xix, 6.

effect other than is produced by all solemn acts into which devotion enters. The indelible character we must reject as a figment of the schools, and, even should we admit it, the case would not be altered. For, though a mysterious something, no one can tell what, is on this hypothesis imparted; no one, I suppose, can explain how, — the individual possesses all the intellectual and moral qualities, habits, affections, gifts, and acquisitions which he possessed before, and no more. He remains the same being; and, if he was unfit for the ministry before, he is so still. The ceremony through which he enters it, solemn though it be, and fitted to produce a deep impression of responsibleness, makes him neither more wise, eloquent, nor learned; neither assists him to think, nor to express his thoughts with justness, force, and pertinency.

If any peculiar qualification for the ministry, any endowment, moral or spiritual, any new faculty of acquiring, illustrating, and enforcing the truths of nature or of revelation, any Christian affection, virtue, or grace were to be conferred by the rite, when performed in a particular way, we might be anxious about the mode, and we might talk of its validity or invalidity. But, viewing it as a mere human ceremony, an initiatory act, by which the relation of Pastor and People, before virtually subsisting, is publicly recognised, with such forms as appear most impressive, and especially with prayer for the divine favor and all propitious influences, we feel that its whole efficacy as a religious rite, depends on the sincerity with which it is performed. Any mode of it is valid, which usage has sanctioned as such, or which the parties interested agree to adopt as a ceremony of investiture or initiation, and the mode in use among our New-England fathers as much so as any other. The laying on of hands cannot be regarded as absolutely essential, being, as I said, but an accidental accompaniment of prayer, founded on Jewish usage, and having only an emblematic signification, perhaps originally designed simply to designate the individual for whom prayer was made, and being no more necessary to its efficacy than the posture, whether of standing or kneeling, in which it is uttered.

But whence does the power or right to ordain emanate? Who are the possessors of it? The people. In strict propriety it belongs to them to ordain, either by themselves or

by such as they shall invite or delegate to the office. And by the people, I mean the congreg tion or Parish. The primitive meaning of the word Church *(ecclesia)* is *assembly* or *congregation.* This meaning it always bears in the New Testament and writings of the ancient Christians, except when used in an extended sense to designate the whole community of believers, who were sometimes called the church or congregation of Christ, that is, his people, just as the Jews were termed, in the Old Testament, the church or congregation of God, or people of God, which were equivalent expressions.* This is the only exception. The term, when not so used, was always employed in the New Testament, or by primitive antiquity, to signify the body of believers accustomed to meet for public worship in one place, under their own officers, that is, the whole Parish.†

When a vacancy occurred in the office of Bishop or Pastor, the whole Parish met to choose a successor, and he was elected by the suffrage of the whole people. Of this fact we have ample evidence in the old writers, and even in Cyprian himself, a strenuous asserter of the power and privileges of his order, and therefore an unexceptionable witness. That the right of election belongs to the people, is, I suppose, as agreeable to the principles of sound republicanism, and all rational principles of Christian liberty, as to the united voice of primitive antiquity. The right to elect, includes, as I conceive, the right to ordain, or this is deduced from it as a legitimate consequence. If the people do not possess this right, then they have not power to consummate their own act, and the right of election is reduced to a mere nullity.

And this is the doctrine of the Cambridge Platform itself, which says, expressly, "If the people may elect, which is the greater, and that wherein the substance of the office doth consist, they may much more ordain, which is the less, and but the accomplishment of the other." Those who appeal to that instrument, as of authority, and they are a numerous class, must in consistency, I should think, maintain that the religious society, or Parish, has not the right of choosing a

* So the "whole church," or "congregation" of Israel, and the "whole people of Israel" were expressions of the same import.

† Unless, perhaps, in one or two instances used to designate a sort of domestic assembly, or body of believers.

Pastor, or they must admit that it possesses the right to ordain. At the time the instrument in question was framed, the Church or body of communicants, as distinguished from the Parish, had by law the sole right to elect the minister of the Parish. When that law was repealed, and the right of choosing its own Pastor was restored to the Parish, or people, the right to ordain, or to issue letters missive, to call a council to perform the act, should, upon the principle of the Platform itself, also have been considered as belonging to the Parish. Yet, strange as it may seem, it is now strenuously contended by multitudes, professed admirers too of the Platform, that, although the Parish may elect, the Church, regarded as a distinct and independent body, only can ordain. That is, as it is explained, the Parish may elect a Teacher, but they cannot make a Pastor; that teacher will be a "mere civil officer," not a minister of the Gospel. I am not, as you might suspect, dealing in fiction. I am stating a doctrine which is seriously and soberly asserted and defended.

Let us look, for a moment, at the reasoning employed in support of this most extraordinary doctrine. The people, religious society, or Parish, not being, as we are gravely told, an ecclesiastical body, can perform no ecclesiastical act; it cannot ordain, nor call a council whose acts shall have any validity.

This argument rests on a false assumption. The truth is, a religious society, congregation, or Parish *is* an ecclesiastical body, and the only one known to Scripture or antiquity. As an association for a religious object, what is it, in its essence, spirit, and end, if not an ecclesiastical body? As such, it is authorized to perform all ecclesiastical acts, that of ordination included. It is absurd to call it a religious society, yet deny that it possesses such authority. From its very nature and constitution it possesses it; possesses it by the principles of the Gospel, reason, and ancient usage.

In opposition to my argument drawn from the state of the ancient Parishes, it will be said, I know, that all the members of those Parishes were communicants, and their successors, therefore, at the present day are our churches, and not our religious societies. This inference is unsound. All the members of the ancient societies may have been communicants; I suppose they were, for, if we except the catechumens, all Christian worshippers were so. But this fact is

fatal to the theory I am opposing, and on it I found one of my principal arguments against it. The early religious societies embraced all the converts in the place, that is, all Christians. Our modern churches do not, unless we are prepared to say that only communicants can be Christians. This principle, I believe, is sometimes assumed, but no argument is necessary to show that it is inadmissible. Whole sects, it is well known, reject the rite of the supper, believing it to have been a temporary institution, and not designed to be perpetuated in the Church. And in all our religious societies there are many, who, for the same or other reasons, neglect its observance, to whom however, we should not be justified in denying the name and character of Christian worshippers. As members of a religious society, united for Christian worship, they are, according to the primitive sense of the term, Christians, and as such, are entitled, upon the broad principles of Christian liberty, to act with the religious community of which they are members, on all questions touching the Pastoral relation and office.

Before it can be pretended that our present churches succeed to the ancient Parishes, it must be shown that they embrace all the Christians belonging to the religious societies or Parishes with which they are connected, as distinguished from unbelievers or heathen. This would be difficult. In many of our Parishes very sincere and pious Christians may be prevented from joining the church, as it is expressed, from an unwillingness to subscribe a creed which they believe to be repugnant alike to reason and Scripture. Grotius, in a short piece, full of good sense, in which he discusses the question, whether we are always under obligation to communicate by the symbols of bread and wine, states three cases in which he thinks a person would be justified in declining communion, — when the terms of communion require, either expressly or tacitly, an acknowledgment of doctrines, to the truth of which he cannot assent; — when communion, instead of serving, as originally intended, to testify our fellowship with all who manifest a spirit of Christian piety, is made equivalent to a declaration, that we acknowledge as Christians, only the members of the sect or sects with which we communicate; denying the name to others who exhibit just as much of Christianity in their lives; — and when, by abstaining from communion, we may

avoid identifying ourselves with a party, and so be enabled the better to discharge the duties of benevolence and charity towards the several sects or classes into which Christians are divided.* From these and other causes, perhaps from false diffidence, from erroneous notions of the nature of the ordinance, and conscientious scruples about a fitness for partaking it, many very devout persons of exemplary lives, and such as in all equitable judgment ought to be regarded as Christians, may abstain from communion, though they are far from denying that the rite was meant to be perpetual. Times have changed. Our churches now by no means embrace all the Christianity in the Parish. Until they do so, until it can be shown, as I have said, that the communicants alone are entitled to the name of Christian worshippers, and the rest are Heathen, Jews, "Turks, or Infidels," there is no pretence for denying to the members of a religious society generally, authority to act in all matters pertaining to the pastoral relation. In truth and propriety, the successors of the ancient Parishes are not our churches, but our religious societies or Parishes, as bodies of Christian worshippers, each individual of which is authorized, by the free principles of the Gospel, to decide for himself, whether or not he is under obligation, to partake of the memorial rite as administered, and what circumstances justify him in omission.

To return to the subject of ordination, I contend, as it will be seen, for no one mode of election or of ordination. I am an advocate for liberty. All I contend for is the power and right of each religious society to perform all acts necessary to constitute a Pastor, by itself, or by such persons as it shall select, and in such way, and by such ceremonies, as it shall deem fit, orderly, and scriptural. This right, as I have said, is denied; but I have never yet met with one solid argument against it, nor do I see how religious freedom can stand without it. My position is, that whatever mode of proceeding a religious society or parish may think fit to adopt, or to sanction by their silent acquiescence, is valid upon the primitive idea, that the Pastor or Bishop is the minister of the people, and made by and for them. The power to ordain, as well as to elect, their own pastors, is the right of all Christian congregations, and the mode of exercising this right is simply a question of expediency. In taking steps prelimi-

* An Semper Communicandum per Symbola.

nary to ordination, they may or may not request the church to unite with them, or act for them. It cannot act as an independent power, — but as the organ of the Parish, and in virtue of authority derived from it. Its action or its coöperation is not necessary to give validity to any act of the parish, and affects not in the least the power or right of the Pastor, as regards the administration of any Christian ordinance.

Should the Parish, the exigency of the case requiring it, proceed to perform the ceremony of ordination by their own immediate act, or by such of their number as they may see fit to designate, the person so ordained would undoubtedly possess all the powers, rights, and immunities of a Christian minister. Certainly, it cannot be proved from Scripture or antiquity, that his ordination is invalid, or that the rites, as administered by him, are not administered according to the intention of Christ, as strictly as in those cases in which the ordinary usage, in regard to ordination, has been complied with. That usage being only of human authority, and binding simply as matter of decency and order, is not to be superstitiously adhered to, to the great and manifest detriment of a religious society, perhaps to an abandonment of the rights of a majority of its members. No religious community or Parish can be required to forego the advantages of a stated ministry, such as is acceptable to the majority, because they do not choose, or are unable, forsooth, to procure ordination upon the model of the Cambridge Platform, or according to rules acknowledged at the Lambeth House. What authority had a little knot of New-England divines, assembled here some hundred and seventy-five years ago, to settle for all future time, what form of polity is, or is not, "set forth" in the Bible? As Protestants, we acknowledge no such authority in any man, or body of men. We like not a Protestant Pope or conclave, any better than a Catholic one.

Of the two simple and impressive rites of Christianity I would speak with all reverence; but it is a mistake, growing out of the former superstitious belief in regard to their nature, to suppose that the administration of them is among the most important duties of a minister; that it is of greater moment than teaching or consolation, for example, or that they require, for their valid observance, any character of peculiar sanctity, any qualification, in fact, in him who administers them, which is not also required to enable him to

lead the devotions of his flock acceptably in the solemn act of prayer. No other qualification seems to have been thought necessary in primitive times. All Christians, I believe, were supposed to have authority, as matter of right, to administer the supper. It was administered, of course, as order and decorum required, by the President, Bishop, or Pastor of the congregation, when there was one, but not in virtue of any superior sanctity imagined to be conferred by the ceremony of ordination. All believers, as before remarked, were regarded as consecrated. Every Christian was a priest, and, as such, was authorized, circumstances of time and place permitting, to perform all religious acts, and among the rest, if he chose, the administration of the memorial rite.

The ordinance appears to have been originally observed by Christians, when none of the order of Bishops or Priests was of the company, and this was a well-known usage in the time of Tertullian, who, in more than one instance, refers to it. "Where there is none of the ecclesiastical order," he says, "you administer the sacramental rite, and baptize, and are alone a priest to yourself." That is, according to the natural force of the expression, you are accustomed to administer it, to baptize and perform all sacerdotal acts. He evidently alludes to a familiar practice, which was conformable to his own sentiments and the common sentiments of the age. All Christians were authorized to administer the ordinance; whether or not they should do it, was a question, not of the right, but of the fit and expedient.*

* De Exhort. Cast. See also, De Baptismo, et de Coronâ Militis. The attempt has been made, but without success, to set aside the testimony of Tertullian on this point, on the ground that his meaning has been misunderstood. Rigault, in a corrected edition of some of the works of Tertullian, published by him in 1628, took notice of a passage from which, as he asserted, the right of the laity under certain circumstances, to administer the ordinances, might be inferred, and a long controversy ensued, which was finally carried to Rome. It was during this controversy that Grotius wrote his "Dissertatio de Cœnæ Administratione ubi Pastores non sunt." See also the short piece, already alluded to, accompanying the dissertation on the question, "An Semper Communicandum per Symbola." Opp. Theol. T. iii. pp. 507, 510, Amst. 1679. Dodwell, a violent partisan writer, collected and published the several pieces called forth by the controversy, and added a dissertation of his own. Some account of the controversy may be found in the *Biblioth. Univ. et Hist.* of Le Clerc, T. i. p. 133,

And this, undoubtedly, is the true doctrine. We hear little of it, however, after the time of the abovementioned Father. Already Christian ministers, impelled by pride and ambition, began to assume a rank and powers, wholly unknown to the simple Pastors of primitive times. No longer content with the humble titles and offices derived from the synagogue, they arrogated to themselves the name, dignity, and all the "pomp and circumstance" of the hierophants of the Temple. Nor did they disdain to borrow now and then a shred from Paganism. The leading principle of Christianity was forgotten, and soon a visible priesthood stepped forth in "palls and mitres," and "deformed and fantastic dresses, fetched," as one has said, "from Aaron's old wardrobe, or the flamen's vestry." Whatever they touched was hallowed. They were hallowed; and the rite of the supper being, as matter of propriety, usually administered by them, would soon acquire, in the view of the people, a corresponding character of sanctity. On the other hand, superstitious notions of the nature and importance of the rite would favor their projects of aggrandizement. When it came to be believed that a new quality was superadded to the elements, and at length that they were changed during the act of consecration into real flesh and blood, the priest would be naturally regarded as a being little inferior to the divine. He could do what no one, on whom the indelible character had not been impressed, could effect, and what it would be unlawful in him to attempt.

On no better foundation does the opinion, which denies authority to administer the Supper to all who have not received priestly consecration, rest. I place the rite precisely on the ground on which it stood so late as the time of Tertullian, two hundred years after the birth of Christ. The grace and ordinances of the gospel are committed to all Christians, that of the supper included; and the right to administer it belongs to all, belongs to private Christians as Christians, and the direct exercise of this right, the necessity of the case demanding it, is lawful and fit. The Pastor of a religious society or parish is authorized as a Christian to ad-

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and T. iv. p. 94. See also Campbell's "Lectures on Ecclesiastical History," iv. and vii., and Neander's "History of the Christian Religion and Church," p. 199, who, however, quotes Tertullian very loosely.

minister the ordinance; and, being chosen to his office by an act of the people, he is authorized, by virtue of such office, to administer it to the communicants belonging to the parish. The authority publicly to administer it is not derived from any act of the Church, technically so called, formally recognising him as its Pastor. It pertains to his office as Pastor of the religious society or Parish.

The object of the New-England Fathers was to restore the polity of the primitive churches. Something of it they did restore, but not the whole, nor could they. Something they dropped, and something added. They proceeded on the principle that Christianity recognises no visible and distinct priesthood; that a Pastor or Teacher becomes such by the act of the people choosing him, and his own acceptance; that ordination is "but the putting a man into his place and office, to which he had a right before by election;" that it confers no power or character, being, as it is expressed, "like the installing of a magistrate in the commonwealth;" and that it may be rightfully conducted, the exigency of the case requiring it, by the lay brethren themselves. *

So far they adhered to the ancient doctrine. But they too "hugged the Popedom." They set up a pretence of "divine right," which they denied to the Bishops. They asserted that their form of polity was "exactly described in the word of God." They claimed for their churches power formally and expressly granted by Jesus Christ, in virtue of which their acts carried with them a divine sanction, in such sort that their Pastors or teachers were to be considered as "called of God, as was Aaron"; such is their language. The broad line of distinction they drew between Church and Parish, however natural in their situation, perhaps even salutary, involved, too, a departure from the original principle; for no such distinction, as before said, was in primitive times known. There is no pretence of antiquity in its favor.

Is the distinction then to be done away? I recommend no such thing. But I would have it distinctly understood that it is founded solely in expediency. If any members of the congregation are disposed to associate for the purpose of mutual counsel and improvement, and to perform such acts and duties, provision for the administration of the Supper

* Platform, ch. 9.

among the rest, as the body of worshippers shall voluntarily leave to them, and the laws of the land shall sanction, there is no objection. More than this, such associations are commendable. But then these individuals have no authority to rear a wall around the altar of communion by requiring of all who approach it subscription to a doctrinal creed, or a narration of what, in the language of sects, is technically called a conversion. History records no more palpable act of usurpation than this. To what does it amount? Why, a few individuals, half a dozen, it may be, undertake to say to the rest, You shall not partake of the memorial rite Christ has instituted for the use of all who are called by his name, unless you acknowledge *our* views of his person and instructions to be correct, nor unless you can prove that a work of grace, according to *our* notions of it, has been wrought in your hearts.

A few individuals undertake to say this to a community of Christian worshippers! Is this the boasted liberty of Protestantism? As well might they presume to say, You shall not enter the temple of Christian worship, which your own hands have reared; you shall not be permitted to listen to the voice of instruction, consolation, and hope from the lips of the teacher you nourish with your substance, except on conditions we see fit to impose. To administer the ordinances is as much the duty of that teacher as to preach, and to administer them to all who ask it, acknowledging, at the same time, their belief of the primitive article, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and living in consistency with their profession. And they have just cause of dissatisfaction, if, allowing himself to be fettered by the will and determination of a few individuals, not commissioned to act in behalf of the rest, he refuse so to administer them; and they are authorized, if they choose, expediency strongly urging it, to take the affair into their own hands, and insist on other and more liberal and more Scriptural terms of baptism and communion. *

* I say *authorized.* I do not suppose, however, that cases can often occur among the class of Christians to which we belong, rendering the exercise of this authority expedient. Perhaps the constitution of our religious societies, though not exactly conformable to the original model, is as well adapted to promote Christian piety and virtue, and secure the general welfare, as any which could be now devised. I am no advocate generally for violent and sudden changes; certainly

But is not the Church, it is asked, as a voluntary association authorized, like all other societies, to say on what terms a person shall become and continue a member? Decidedly not, if, by the terms adopted, any individual of the Parish with which such Church is connected, is debarred the use of any one Christian privilege, except on terms which Jesus, the sole lawgiver of his people, has not prescribed, and which are therefore not obligatory on Christians. And for this plain, and as I think, satisfactory reason, they are not authorized to do any thing which shall impair or destroy the rights of their fellow worshippers, or in any way prove to be an infringement of Christian liberty. The minister is minister of the Parish, the whole Parish, and as a Pastor or teacher is accountable to no other earthly power; and no other body, no mere fragment of the Parish, can rightfully step in to define his duties to the rest, or attempt to control him in the discharge of them, whether preaching, or the administration of the ordinances.

So long as the members of the church, technically so called, manage their affairs with becoming liberality, making voluntary provision for those observances and institutions of Christianity, of which the Parish, as a Parish, do not choose to take the charge, throwing no unreasonable obstacles in the way of a participation of them, they are, as before observed, to be honored for the service, and should be regarded with none but the most friendly feelings. But the moment they lay claim to power derived immediately from Christ, and wholly distinct from that possessed by the congregation as a society of free Christian worshippers, and of a nature to interfere with their rights, civil or religious, then their pretensions are to be resisted, as containing the germ of an antichristian usurpation.

The principle I have advocated, is, as I think, the true principle of Congregationalism, as the name implies. A Congregational society, by the principle of its constitution, acts, or should act, by its members, as a congregation. The attempt on the part of the communicants, comprising, as now generally, but a small proportion of the regular worshippers,

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not in this instance. I beg distinctly to state that I do not intend, in what I have said, to recommend any change in our present system of congregational order and polity. I am anxious only that the principle of religious liberty should be understood.

to control the will of the congregation, involves, as it seems to me, a violation of the essential principle of the order, as it certainly does of the principle of Christian liberty. The principle of Episcopacy is the power or rule of Bishops; of Presbyterianism, the power or rule of the Presbytery. So the principle of Congregationalism is the power or rule of the Congregation, — the people united for Christian worship. Doctrines, if I may be allowed the remark, are out of the question. The original Congregationalists never pretended that doctrines constituted the distinguishing mark of their sect. They asserted the contrary over and over again. The distinguishing character of the sect is polity, not doctrines. Those who contend that doctrines constitute its essential principle, betray either woful ignorance, or strange effrontery. It is difficult to believe them serious. There are Calvinistic and Arminian Episcopalians, and Calvinistic and Free-will Baptists. Shall the Calvinist turn to his Arminian, or his Free-will brother, and say, You are no Churchman, or no Baptist; you are gone out from us, and are not of us? A Congregationalist may be a Calvinist or an Arminian, a Trinitarian or a Unitarian. If a Calvinist, he may be of the old or the new school, but still a Congregationalist. The *doctrines* of the original Congregationalists are not now holden by any one class of their descendants in New England. If doctrines are the test, all have gone astray.

I am aware that the views I have advocated are regarded by a large portion of the religious community with a strong feeling of disapprobation, or even abhorrence. It is still contended, I know, that the church, regarded as a distinct and independent body, and embracing only communicants, exists by divine right, and possesses power derived immediately from Christ. This with many is a favorite doctrine, and one to which they attach peculiar importance. But I am constrained to say, that its truth, as it seems to me, is assumed without a shadow of proof. It is a doctrine, against which I see many formidable objections. It is at war with the great principle of Christian liberty, and amounts, as I view it, to a sort of Protestant Popery. No matter where the indelible character or power, supposed to be immediately communicated from heaven, resides, whether in Bishops, or in the brethren; it is equally dangerous in the one case, as

in the other, and just as likely to be turned into an instrument of oppression. Such an instrument it became in the hands of our New-England fathers, and may become such in the hands of their descendants.*

Let it not be said, that the principles I have defended, degrade the ministerial office. I contend for a ministry of usefulness, an earnest, enlightened, and effective ministry, a ministry of benevolence, and one which shall meet the intellectual and moral wants of the age. Such a ministry, I believe, must wield other instruments than those of superstition and terror. To secure a wholesome and enduring influence, and one which is every way desirable, it must not appeal chiefly to the coarser passions of human nature. Such appeals may produce a temporary effect, but an effect which is to be deprecated, as tending to injure the cause of true piety, and destroy or greatly impair the permanent usefulness of the ministry. The times demand something better. He who would now discharge faithfully his trust, as a minister of Christ, must not think to treat men as mere "children of a larger growth." He must show a respect for their understandings. He must not rely on the sanctity of his office, or on a principle of blind faith in his hearers. He must, under God, confide chiefly in the stirring power of Truth; confide in the weapons which she puts into his hands. From her armoury he must fill his quiver, and go forth in her strength. By truth, heavenly truth, truth

* If we look at the systematic operations by which, within a few years, the attempt has been made, and is still made, to crush the advocates of liberal sentiments, and chain down the human mind to the miserable and cheerless dogmas of the dark ages, we shall find that the power of the churches is the element chiefly relied on. Extraordinary efforts are made to swell the number of communicants by means of feverish excitements produced by the revival and other machinery. These constitute so many trained bands, which are taught to move forward in an unbroken mass, and through which the influence of an artful, exclusive, and sectarian clergy is brought to bear on society with a tremendous force. This influence is not the less because the power claimed in virtue of divine right is supposed to reside in the communicants generally, — in the brethren, and not in the clergy; for the latter, without giving occasion for the jealousy and odium which naturally attend a privileged order, are able effectually to appeal to the principle of superstition and fear, the tendency of which is to break down the courage, to overawe and enslave.

enlightening the understanding, quickening the conscience; truth, warning, urging, entreating, the Christian affections are excited and nourished, and the soul is raised to a divine life. Truth is its element; by that it is invigorated, and in it lives. By truth temptation is resisted, and the world overcome. By it religion triumphs, triumphs by her revelations of imperishable truth, and shall triumph. Empires fade and vanish, but the sceptre departs not from her hands; she sits, and shall sit, enthroned in the human spirit, that living temple, which she fills with her glory.

[For the Christian Examiner.]

Art. V. — *Remarks on Mystery.*

How wonderful to a simple, clear, and honest mind must it seem that *Mystery* could ever have been regarded as one of the characteristics of a *revelation*, — a revelation from God. What a bold paradox lies in the very statement! Besides, how untrue does it appear when we compare the religious man who has received that revelation with the infidel who has rejected it. How much less of mystery has the former to struggle with than the latter. Before the eye of the real Christian constantly the clouds are breaking and the darkness flying. Many an object to others dark has an intense illumination thrown over it by the sunlight of his religious faith. The Atheist, — the disbeliever, throws out darkness from his own mind upon what is plain even to the common and negligent understanding. He casts the dark mysteries of a dishonest heart over the fair face of creation and the course of God's providence. For without asserting that it is impossible for skepticism to be honest, we must express our conviction that the heart disbelieves far oftener than the intellect. There the corruption *commences*, which afterwards spreads through the whole mind.

From what has been said, it will be readily understood that we are opposed to the introduction of mystery into religion, and that we deny of course that the two are united in the Bible. We are so opposed, and we do thus

deny. And we express our sentiments on this subject now because we believe that a connexion, of which the Word of God says nothing, has been established between these essentially discordant principles by the doctrines and systems of men. But there is an objection which we may as well meet and dispose of at the threshold of our subject, — especially as its consideration will place more clearly before the mind the particular end we have in view. It may be said we are surrounded by mysteries, — and why, it may be asked, as they exist, should we not act with reference to them? They are the mysteries of God's power, — why should they not vitally affect the relation in which we stand to God? There are mysteries in creation and in Providence, why not also in Grace? And why, if God's dealings with our souls are mysterious, are we not concerned in mystery? The *existence* of mysteries we most fully admit. They exist in whatever we see or feel or hear. If we turn back upon ourselves and question our own souls as to their origin, and, passing our hands over the smooth flesh of our bodies, ask, Whence is this? — we shudder at our own existence, and tremble with the most mysterious sensations. There is indeed no lack of mysteries. This broad universe of worlds hung down from the throne above for our admiration, these souls of boundless capacities and boundless conceptions, these "thoughts that wander through eternity," existence in its million forms, with its miseries and joys, its progression and degradation, the whole creation compressing itself into the trembling imagination of a feeble man, — all these are in some sense mysteries. And it is the clearest thing in the world that they should be mysteries. For what must be the condition of that mind to which nothing should seem wonderful or strange? Must not all its attributes be infinities? Some things there are, which "the angels desire to look into." And should ignorant man be ashamed to say of many things, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me, — it is high, I cannot attain unto it." So long as our knowledge is finite, so long will there be things that are mysteries to our minds. All beings of limited powers are encompassed with mysteries. Mysteries encompass *us* and will never cease to encompass us, — but it is important to be observed they will be ever-changing mysteries. They will rise in orders one upon the other, in endless succession, and suited to the numberless

changing ranks and orders of an intelligent existence. One mystery will vanish and another appear. We shall not be for ever perplexed with the same fixed, unexplained, and unexplainable difficulties. Mysteries will then *ever* surround us, not to perplex and afflict our spirits, but to excite in us perpetual growth, to enlarge our souls with endless expansion, and enable us to pursue with increasing vigor and delight the course of God's own glory as it spreads through the universe. In this view of the subject, to say that mysteries do exist, and ever will exist, is to say that we have entered upon a progress of knowledge which is never to end, that we have a curiosity the means for whose gratification are exhaustless. But we are chained within no iron wall of mystery, — holden in no dark and vile bondage never to be broken. To be sure, it is sometimes said we can never understand the essential nature of any thing. This is no more than saying there will always be something in the objects of our study which we do not understand. But we shall constantly be knowing something about them which we did not know before. This *nature of things*, of which we are ignorant, is a certain something which we cannot define. It is a convenient phrase to veil our ignorance. So long as we are learning something new, something of which we had no idea before, we cannot without presumption attempt to fix on any precise thing as never to be learned.

But notwithstanding the objection we have stated, and the concession we have made, we still deny the propriety of introducing mystery into religion. The general reason for this is, that religion is a thing to be understood, felt, acted on, a thing which is to effect the same object in all minds, and to exist as the same sentiment in all hearts. Now it is no man's duty to act with reference to a principle of which he has no comprehension, any more than it is the duty of the navigator to shape his course by the guidance of an invisible star. We are to act, not according to some quality in God's nature of which we are ignorant, but according to those requirements of his will of which we are assured.

There is then a propriety in discussing this question, — Is it right that mysteries should be introduced into religion? We wish to treat the subject under several divisions, and to present particular reasonings in respect to them. And in this more particular treatment of the bad effects of mystery in religion, we would employ three courses of remark,

corresponding to three distinct views of the subject. We would speak of Mystery in reference to the three points of Belief, Experience, Practice. There are, in other words, certain doctrines preached in which Mystery appears, there are certain mysterious feelings required, and still further certain duties, having principal reference to the affections, which are often enjoined in a mysterious and incomprehensible mode of preaching. Hitherto Mystery has been opposed only as it appears in the formal statement of intellectual points of belief; but we think there is ample ground for treating the subject in the other views we have mentioned. There seems to be as it were a *spirit* of Mystery which has several modes of manifestation, and, as it is this spirit to which we are opposed, we must oppose it in all its forms.

First then we speak of mysterious doctrines. In Deuteronomy, ch. xxix. 29, we find these words, — "The secret things belong unto the Lord: — but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this law." All the precepts, then, which the Jews were to regard, were so plainly revealed that they could *do* them. With mysteries they had no acquaintance and no concern. But what constitutes the secrecy, and what the revelation, of a truth? A truth is revealed when, being plainly set forth, it is fully comprehended by the mind. Every thing not revealed is a mystery. We suppose of course in this statement that a revelation, in its strict meaning, concerns only those things which human reason cannot surely grasp. And still further, if any truth be not understood by some particular mind, — to that mind it is not a truth, — to that mind it has had no revelation, — to that mind it is still a secret, a mystery. But it is said that the Bible proposes to our acceptance certain doctrines which are mysteries as much after the revelation as before. It is declared to be of the utmost importance that these doctrines should be admitted into the living faith of our minds, and should direct the conduct of our lives. It is affirmed indeed that on our belief and practice of them depends all our hope of salvation. But what more can be made out of this than that there are certain things in a revelation which are themselves unrevealed? Perhaps truths might be *alluded to*, in a revelation, which were not intended to be made known; but how is it possible they should be parts of the

revelation itself? Let us examine one of these doctrines for a moment. It is said there is a Trinity or Triunity in the Godhead. The Father is God, — the Son is God, — the Holy Spirit is God, — and these three make one God. The almost instinctive reply of a rational mind to this statement is, — How can this be? Three, each of whom is the Infinite God, make one God! Impossible! But the theologian stands ready with his argument. He says to the objector, You say you cannot see how God can be at the same time both *three* and *one*. But because you cannot perceive the *how* and *wherefore* of a truth, are you therefore forced to disbelieve it? Suppose I tell you the sun shines, — will you contradict that proposition because you cannot see *how* it is true? Will you, at the very moment you are dazzled by the beams of the great luminary, say it does not shine, because you cannot see and know how it shines? I tell you there is a God. Will you disbelieve his existence because you do not know *how* he exists? The first sensation which this argument, which is one that has actually been used, produces, will be one of surprise that the real question at issue should be so entirely lost sight of, and another substituted in its place. The difference lies here. We do not, it is true, see how the sun shines. But we do not see any impossibility or contradiction in his shining. Now we not only do not see how three and one are the same, but we do not see how they *can be* the same. We deny not only that there are three persons in the Godhead, and but one God, but we deny entirely the possibility of such a thing. And in regard to the other illustration, the case is still stronger. For while we admit we are not able to conceive how God exists, — yet, so far from our having a feeling of impossibility or contradiction that he should exist, we feel his existence to be absolutely necessary. We have as strong a feeling of necessity in favor of the existence of a God, as of impossibility against the doctrine of the Trinity.

No accumulation and force of evidence could operate to secure rational belief in a doctrine of this kind. In such a case there is no point in the mind upon which argument and proof can act; of course the mind is immovable by any supposed strength of evidence. Miracles might in vain be showered like rain-drops to prove that $3 + 2$ make 6. We ought rather to say that nothing could possibly be re-

garded as a miracle which should prétend to go to the establishment of such a point. God surely cannot desire to make that appear to us a truth, which, in the very nature and the very centre of the minds he has given us, we know to be false. We admit then that a proposition may be true, and may be proved to be true, when we are unable to understand something relating to the *manner* in which it is true; but we contend that no proposition can be true against the mind's resolute and instinctive feeling of impossibility. We believe in the infinitude of space. Why do we maintain that space is boundless? Because it is revealed in all its boundlessness to our eye? By no means. We maintain it because it is established as a truth beyond question by evidence from our own minds. So far from there being a feeling of impossibility against the correctness of our assertion, there is a feeling of necessity in its favor. We feel that it is impossible it should not be true. Yet surely no man can contend that we do see *how* it is true, or that we could without minds as measureless as nature. The trouble in respect to this mystery of the Trinity lies, not in its being embodied in unintelligible language, but in the plain self-contradictoriness of the ideas which that language presents, In this language the ideas oppose and neutralize each other, so that nothing is left on which the belief of the mind can fasten. There is as much denied in it as there is asserted. Thought destroys thought, and the result, so far as belief is concerned, is a perfect nullity. But, it is asked, shall we never admit into our minds two articles of faith which we cannot reconcile with each other? The answer is, there is a vast difference between our being unable to reconcile two things and those things being absolutely irreconcilable. We may sometimes be convinced that two things are consistent whose consistency we cannot perceive; but in certain cases our minds have the power of discerning an essential inconsistency. Some have inconsiderately confounded these two things, and have most presumptuously asserted doctrines to be irreconcilable, upon whose reconcilableness or irreconcilableness they had not the least power of deciding. We do not confound these things in our argument against the Trinity. Sometimes we can see the best reason in the world why we should not be able to reconcile two doctrines; we see this reason in the nature and relations of the doctrines themselves. But the

Trinity is a single doctrine irreconcilable with itself. We would abate no jot or tittle from the importance of religious faith. For the interests of such faith we are contending. For its value depends upon ascertaining its proper objects and the right conditions of its exercise. The evil of believing wrongly is proportionate to the advantage of believing rightly. We do not know that any other mystery of doctrine stands on precisely the same ground with the mystery of the Trinity. Other doctrines are consistent with themselves. But what shall we say of doctrines which, though they may not be irreconcilable, cannot be perceived by us to be consistent with each other? We say it is still competent for us to make the inquiry, Why are these doctrines not seen to be consistent? Is there good reason they should not be seen to be consistent? Does the nature of the case preclude our power and right to pass on the question of their consistency?

If these questions be answered in the affirmative, we may have the most perfect *satisfaction* in being unable to reconcile them. But, if these questions are so answered as to increase the mystery of the doctrines, we are not able to receive them with the same undoubting faith. Yet, even under these circumstances, if we are fully assured that they come as a revelation from God, we cannot without great guilt reject them. We doubt however very much whether this last case ever happens. We cannot see that harmonious consistency between the doctrines of God's prescience and man's free-agency, which we at the same time feel *may* exist, and which we believe does exist. We may imagine that we can follow out trains of argument from these two doctrines till they lead us into discordant results. And our precise idea of prescience may not harmonize with our particular view of moral freedom. But the doctrine of God's prescience, we should remember, is one which we can comprehend only in its obvious character, and not in its whole extent, — and this thought should make us cautious and humble. Some persons seem desirous of making these two doctrines inconsistent by defining *prescience* as synonymous with *foreordination*. Now is foreordination inconsistent with free-agency? I may understand it in a sense in which it is absolutely inconsistent with my view, and the common view, of free-agency. The doctrines cannot then both be

true in these senses. Still, we believe, they are by some asserted to be true in these very senses. Here, then, we have a mystery almost equal to the Trinity. Surely men should not make so earnest search to find such a mystery in the Bible, or labor with the engine of metaphysical reasoning to extort it from the Holy Book.

But we hasten to the second division of our subject, in which we wish to speak of what, for the sake of distinction, we have denominated mysteries of experience. The having possessed certain mysterious feelings is insisted on as a necessary pre-requisite to salvation; — mysterious, I say, because we cannot anticipate for ourselves what they will be in our own minds, nor, after their experience, can we communicate to others what they have been. They are feelings which cannot possibly originate from any dispositions we have within us; and we can have no conception of any thing which is in the nature of mind, and at the same time differs from any and all of our own mental acts. Others cannot understand them, because no person can understand the feelings of another but by sympathy, which is here of course precluded. We complain then that this character of *mystery* is attached to the feelings. We would not for a moment doubt that God may make communications of his Spirit to the minds of men. But we maintain that the feelings communicated are like the feelings we may naturally have in our own minds, — they accord with the constitution of our nature, — they do no violence to our powers and affections. And we would most seriously ask whether the Bible does not justify, nay, *require* this view. Does not Holy Writ speak of the communications of Divine Grace as consisting of what is clear and definite and accordant with what is high and noble in ourselves, — with that delight which, in the language of Paul, we have "in the law of God after the inward man"? And does not the same authority justify us when we maintain that these communications are made to all who, though subjected to that fearful struggle in which "the law of the members wars against the law of the mind," still cry out with the Apostle, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

If a man affirms that he has certain feelings which have been supernaturally delivered to him, we dare not treat his declaration with levity. But we ask him solemnly whether

he can distinguish those feelings from the feelings of his own mind. Have they such a peculiarity, — such a mystery about them that he can place his finger on them and say to himself, These came from God? Do they stand apart in an awful sanctity in his internal emotions, and with a calm holiness view his mind as angelic spirits may gaze on the troubled scenes of this earth? To these questions we firmly believe he must reply in the negative.

We dare not limit the intercourse of spirits. Nay, we dare not affirm of our own mind, that certain thoughts and feelings existing in it did not come from a superior Power. But we deny that men can identify particular thoughts and sensations as coming from God. To be sure the Apostles could do so; and we presume not to declare it impossible that God should choose to inspire a person even at this day. Yet we need not speak of the entire improbability of such a thing. A pious man indeed would naturally attribute his pious thoughts and feelings to God; but he would do this in the same sense in which he attributes to Him "every good and perfect gift." The mind, the thinking being, comes from God, and of course all thought and feeling has its primary source in his nature. But to attribute a *certain* set of feelings to Him, as the special and direct effusion of his spirit, is more than all this. We are not justified in specially referring to God certain sentiments we may have in the course of our religious experience, because they have something of novelty and strangeness about them. When we are under strong religious excitement it is natural and consonant to the nature of our minds, that we should experience a depth of humiliation, repentance, adoration or love, to which, in other circumstances, we have been unaccustomed. Besides, we often experience feelings as novel and strange on being newly situated as to other relations which have little connexion with the relation of our religious character. And, if we should follow the rule against which we contend, how large a share of those emotions which have made up the life of our hearts, should we invest with the mystery of a celestial origin.

There may and there do result most deadly consequences from ascribing, at the mere suggestion of a superstitious fancy, certain mental experiences to the action of special grace. When a religious process goes on in the mind with

great strength and rapidity, there is often a wild rush and extravagance of feeling, a rousing of the stronger passions, a lashing of the great deep of the soul into fury, which brings a man under the action of most powerful incentives, and prepares him for the most decided courses of conduct. Whatever motive may for the time gain the ascendency, bears his mind before it like a feather on the breeze. Suppose, while in this condition, he fixes upon certain motives and feelings, and resolves upon it that they have come from God, — and this is doubtless often done, — what an unspeakable sanctity must be thrown over these feelings and motives! What a blind and adoring obedience would be rendered to them! How would they be followed to the ends of the earth and to the gates of Death! A most dreadful and unholy power may thus be sanctified as the "power of God unto salvation," may be permitted to hold a stern, unresisted sway over the mind, and to break forth to the desolation of the lives and hearts of others. We read in the history of the Abbot of St. Cyran, whom the Jansenists regarded almost as an oracle, that "he had no doubts but that he was an instrument by whom the divine Being operates and works! and that he held generally that a pious man should follow the impulses of his mind, suspending all exercise of his judgment. And the opinion," continues our author, "was most deeply fixed in the minds of all the Jansenists that God himself acts and operates on the mind, and reveals to it his pleasure when all movements of the understanding and the will are restrained and hushed. Hence whatever thoughts, opinions, or purposes, occur to them, in that state of quietude, they unhesitatingly regard as oracular manifestations and instructions from God."* How many there are living at this moment, who, in respect to themselves, go to the full length of the Jansenist creed on this point. One of our own intimate acquaintances a few years since had an experience which may be brought to justify this remark. He felt his mind very much excited and quickened in the action of its powers. It ran through long and complicated processes of thought, like the electric fluid on crooked wires, and could master some of the most difficult problems in a moment of time. He was strongly per-

* See Murdock's Mosheim, Vol. III. pp. 383, 384, note.

suaded that he was under the special influence of the Holy Spirit. But after his restoration from this mental illness, he had quite as strong a persuasion that his belief about the Holy Spirit was entirely without proper foundation. We account for the wild extravagance of his first belief by the erroneous character of his religious views, — especially the error of supposing that he could distinguish the operations of the Spirit from those of his own mind.

The Spirit of Mystery has another mode of manifestation which is the last we shall mention. Sometimes it pervades the general cast and air of a minister's preaching. This kind of mystery will be a marked quality of the instructions and exhortations of some pulpits, while its appearance in others is quite infrequent. Some seem to think it their duty to consider Religion, as a general subject, as much in the light of mystery, and to speak of it as mysteriously as possible. It is to them a vast temple darkened with solemn obscurity, where every object shows dimly and every sound is uncertain, and in which they are to exercise a veneration the more awful and sacred because some of the things they revere are but half revealed, and others are entirely unknown and must have a fancied greatness thrown about them by the imagination. Thus do men worship dark feelings, which from their own hearts cluster about their own ignorance. Thus the reverence that would rise to its nobler and its only worthy objects rests upon earth, pours itself out before gloomy imaginings, and adores "the creature more than the Creator." How distressing must it be to a person seeking spiritual guidance, to hear the preacher discourse on what would seem, from the strong interest he takes in the subject, to be a matter of vital concern, so as not to be understood. Such a preacher seems to have so great a distrust of human nature, as to be unwilling to address it at all. We are all in darkness and trouble to hear him most earnestly beseeching us to do — *what* he cannot tell us, labor earnestly as he may. He does not present us with mysterious expositions of intellectual points of belief, nor does he mysteriously exhibit the mode of spiritual operations, — but he describes in the spirit of mystery the *dispositions* we must cherish and the *duties* we must perform. The subjects, in the treatment of which this spirit especially appears, generally relate to what are called the "terrors of the Lord." We trust our

readers will perceive what we mean. It is impossible to give a very definite delineation of that quality in preaching of which we speak; but we doubt not very many have had an experience in relation to this matter which so well corresponds to the idea of our description as to leave them at no loss in regard to it. Now we ask, — Is it merciful, — is it right, to cry out to a man that he is in danger of being crushed under the wheel of some dreadful calamity, and, in telling him how to escape, fail to give him the slightest assistance?

Suppose, during some conflagration, a person should suddenly awake and find himself in the upper room of a house surrounded by blazing and crackling timbers. In trembling helplessness he shows himself, from some high projection yet untouched by the fire, to those assembled for the purpose of its extinction. A voice rises above the din of the crowd and the roaring of the flames, assuring him that there is one last forlorn hope of escape, one way of communication with the ground not yet cut off by the devouring element. This way is described, yet so as not to be understood. A thousand voices echo the word, — "Escape! Escape!" yet still he stands as if charmed by the serpents of fire about him into motionless despair. Gladly, — almost fiercely would he dart through any passage-way that would lead him to safety. But no such way reveals itself to his straining eyes. His ear and mind labor to catch the meaning of the direction given him, but grasp it not; all hope dies in his breast, and he already feels his flesh palpitate and wither under the tongues of flame that are darting towards him. Of what avail has been the vague cry of safety from below? What relief is afforded to his last moments of agony by his own groaning exclamation, "I might have been saved"? — This is imagination, it may be said; but we would ask, Has it not a strict application to fact in the subject of which we treat?

We tremble to think how deadly an influence the mode of preaching of which we speak, must have upon common minds. How must they be tortured and broken and enslaved by it! What a surrender must they make of their freedom and birthright! How must they content themselves with a mere passive obedience, and admit the "right divine" of spiritual kings to reign over their consciences and lives! How must it tend to give them mean, abject, and disgusting views of

themselves! And doubtless one great object of such preaching is, that the creature may be covered with the dust of humiliation before the exalted majesty of the Creator. It is forgotten that there is a sense to the word *humiliation* which removes it the farthest possible from the true meaning of *humility*. We are told that we must glorify the holiness of God by our own contrasted guilt and shame. Of course, holding such views as we do, the first thought that would come into our mind in answer to this would be to ask, Is there this boundless separation between man and his Maker? Has the child been torn away from the arms of its Parent and hurried a measureless distance from his mercy? and must miracles bear the passive object of their power through that distance into those arms? Look at the doctrine in its naked and open character, and then ask if men speak of what is real, when they speak of this contrast of Infinite Holiness and entire Depravity. But letting this pass, we must express our deep surprise that any mortal imagination could have fancied that such a contrast glorifies the perfection of God. Do angels and arch-angels thus illustrate his glory? Do sun, moon, and stars tell of the adorable splendor and purity of his character by blackness and darkness? Do they speak of the eternal principles of his nature and of his dominion, by rushing with mad disorder, and in lawless courses, through the heavens, because there is space for irregularity? What is the glory which archangels pay to God? They glorify him in developing their own glorious capacities for excellence, and thus coming to a nearer imitation of and resemblance to Him. How do the heavens show forth his praise? By reflecting as a stainless mirror the bright image of his perfection. Alas! that man, of all things else, should think of glorifying God in the way of contrast. But it is said we benefit ourself by this prostration, and humiliation, and self-reproach. This idea carried to the extreme to which it is carried, unqualified and unrestrained by other principles, is untrue in theory. The course it would justify, has no *tendency* to our benefit. But what is the practical result? If we are unfit for good conduct, absolutely unable to do any thing well, how natural that we should make no effort after virtue. We undertake nothing to which we are in our own convictions entirely inadequate. All action presupposes motive, and motive implies an internal feel-

ing or opinion of our ability to reach the object. Thus these abject ideas of our own minds injure ourselves by preventing us from virtuous and noble effort, and also make us act to a far different end than that of glorifying our Creator. Not only does the argument fail in both of its points, but the examination of it leads us to conclusions directly contrary to those it would establish.

But we return to insist more directly on the idea that this shrouding religion in mystery and uncertainty is a dreadful wrong to the human soul. How fearfully must the mysterious mode of preaching injure hearts which are piously disposed, which have that overflow of love to God and love to man which is the fulfilment of the whole law. A pious man struggles to comprehend his duty as it is announced from the oracles of God, but it slips from his grasp. Again and again he endeavours to seize it, but meets with repeated delusion and ill success. Gladly would he fold the truth in his embrace, but he is condemned to disappointment;

> ——— "frustra comprensa manus effugit imago,
> Par levibus ventis, volucrique simillima somno."

Christ came to bring life and immortality to *light*; — why will men cover his message with darkness and doubt? The condition to which we are brought by mysterious preaching is one of great suspense. Suspense is a source of misery in the most trivial affairs. This is a truth of which almost all who speak have spoken, and almost all who write have written. When there is a long balancing between good and evil fortune, the vexed mind is almost tempted to defy fortune to do her worst. Misery itself is preferable to a continual doubting whether misery or joy will be our portion. Now if this be the case in inferior matters, how much more strongly and decidedly will it be so in matters the most important. If the feelings are fretted when the scale hesitates between a moment's joy and a moment's sorrow, how shall we describe the state of the mind when the gloom of uncertainty is cast thickly over its whole condition and duty? If we should be more kind and compassionate than to torture a man with doubt about so small a thing as the arrival or departure of a friend, how can we have the heart to over-

whelm him with dark sayings and vague mysteries in announcing that message of duty, on his treatment of which hangs his everlasting happiness or woe? Yet dreadful as this course is, we fear it is sometimes pursued. We fear that the imagination of the preacher sometimes kindles the flames of hell about the trembling victim, and gives him but dubious directions how he may force his way through them. He describes the way of escape indeed, with great solemnity, and the appearance of strong personal conviction; yet it is a dark way, — clouds are at its entrance and over its whole extent, — it is rough with precipices and torrents, — the surest foot is sure to stumble, — miracles must bear up him who does not fall to be dashed in pieces. How different from this the calm and clear language of Jesus Christ, when, from the mountain, he spoke to the multitudes who had assembled, expecting to hear the voice of a temporal conqueror ring in their ears. Strangely, in this particular, has the whole religion of Christ been mistaken by the lovers of mystery. That religion requires the direction of certain affections to definite objects, and the performance of definite duties. Mystery is something we must place *upon* the mind without receiving it *into* the mind, — something which we must regard without understanding, and obey without applying. It is something which rises up gradually and gloomily from the plain ground of religious faith, — which we must gaze at from a distance with indefinable feelings of awe, — but into which it were impious for any curious eye to search too closely. Nor let it be said that we describe, under the names religion and mystery, two things which are both parts, though somewhat dissimilar parts, of the Christian system. The truth is, they are not only dissimilar, but opposite in nature. Light and darkness are not more opposed to each other than a clear and an incomprehensible doctrine. Neither do we insist too strongly on the character of determinateness as belonging to Christianity. The Bible continually implies, on this point, the principle which is acknowledged and verified by reason. The spirit of preciseness marks its inculcations of doctrine and duty throughout. This truth is a glorious thing for human nature and human character, and it is wonderful it has not been more clearly seen and thoroughly practised on, blazing as it does

like fire on every page of Holy Writ. And when we say that the Scriptures, in describing man's duty, speak in terms the plainest and most precise, we do not of course mean to say that they are continually marking out the external courses of a religious life. These, in order to express the same spirit, must be constantly changing with the changing state of society and of the human mind.

It is the *principles* of duty that stand out on the pure pages of the Holy Book clear, distinct, and bright as the stars in heaven. Let the eye be fixed upon them, and, with all the fearlessness of faith and hope and love, we may hold on safely and surely in that path we must make for ourselves over the troubled yet trackless waters of human life. We shall be surrounded with mysteries, yet the brilliant light that streams from Heaven will give us no dark decisions as to the direction that will lead us to the celestial region.

It must be seen, that what we have objected to in these remarks is not the acknowledgment of mysteries as existing in the world and in the soul. Such mysteries, through the necessity of the whole constitution of the universe, must exist. We rejoice that they do exist. We rejoice that the voice of God's providence in the world is continually speaking to us, as the voice of his grace has spoken to us in the Holy Word; — "Behold I *show* you a mystery." If the mind be faithful to its powers, if the *heart* be faithful to *its* powers, we shall in this life be continually changing mystery into knowledge; and, when this life shall end, we shall "rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory" in having revealed to us, and in revealing to ourselves, those mysteries which will be perpetually unfolded as we live on in that endless life of God in which we find the redemption and regeneration of our souls. — We have not objected to the conduct of those who teach the existence of mysteries, but to that of those who perplex and blind the simple honesty and clearness of the human will by mingling dark enigmas with the most important questions of duty, who create a warfare between faith and conscience, who refuse the most lawful claims of the understanding and withold the most solemn rights of the heart, and who press back the most holy principles in the soul when they are just struggling into religious life, by annexing to the enjoyment of that life unknown and perhaps undiscoverable and impossible conditions.

Our limits do not allow the insertion of some remarks we had intended to offer, designed to describe more distinctly the manner in which mysteries affect, first, the intellect, and, secondly, the heart. These remarks may or may not appear at some future time.

ART. VI. — *A Letter to the Executive Committee of the Benevolent Fraternity of Churches, respecting their Organization for the Support of the Ministry at Large in Boston;* by JOSEPH TUCKERMAN.

TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BENEVOLENT FRATERNITY OF CHURCHES.*

GENTLEMEN,

A fraternity of churches having been formed for the permanent establishment of a ministry at large in our city, and Messrs. Barnard and Gray, with myself, having been elected to this service, under the organization which has been committed to you; it has been thought proper by my colleagues and myself that we should present to you, and through you to the religious societies which you represent, an exposition of our views of this ministry, in its claims, and in the measures which have been taken to sustain it, and to make it more effectual. It is highly important that both you, and we, should have clear and just conceptions upon these subjects. There is a demand for this ministry, or there is not. And the plan adopted for its support is a wise and Christian one,

* An association, called "The Benevolent Fraternity of Churches," has been formed within the Unitarian Congregations in Boston, for the support of the ministry at large, which has for some years been in operation here. In organizing this association, the independence of our several churches has been scrupulously regarded. Five delegates from each of these congregations, or from each of the Benevolent Societies within these congregations, are the channel of communication between these congregations and the ministry at large. There is also an Executive Committee of five gentlemen, whose duty it is to devise, mature, and execute measures, by which the object of the Fraternity may be advanced. It is to this Committee that the following Letter is addressed.

or it is not. Each of the queries, thus implied, has indeed received from you a most unequivocal answer. An association has been formed within our religious societies for sustaining this ministry, because they believe the ministry is required by the moral wants of the community; and because they feel that those, "who, through the providence of God are possessors of blessings, to which others around them are strangers, have, in these blessings, a weighty responsibleness, and would discharge the trust." * Have you, then, or have we, fallen into any mistake upon either of these subjects? In resuming my service, after an absence of more than a year from it, and from our city, and after six years and a half passed in its active duties, I would bring home to my own mind the inquiries I have proposed, and, in as brief a space as I may, would answer them.

Is there, then, or is there not, a call for a ministry at large in our city? Allow me to recur to the circumstances, which led to the first proposition of this ministry.

I entered upon the duties of "the mission to the poor," as I called my service in my first Quarterly Report, on the 5th of November, 1826. There was, at that time, a young man in the field, in the employment of "The Boston Society for the Moral and Religious Instruction of the Poor." I had then but very little knowledge of this department of society in our city, and had to seek and obtain this knowledge as I could. My first object, however, was, to connect myself with such families, as I should find were not visited by any settled minister as a part of his flock; and to render them any, and every service, which could be looked for from a Christian pastor and friend. At the end of my first Quarter, on the 5th of February, 1827, I had fifty families in my pastoral charge. At the end of the next three months, I had ninety families; and at the close of the first year, I was the pastor of a hundred and seventy families. In that year I published four Quarterly Reports, in which, according to the light I had obtained, I brought before our public those interests of this ministry, with which I was at that time most strongly affected. My visits, during that year, had been frequent, — generally once a week, — at the House of Cor-

* Report on a Union of the Churches for Benevolent Purposes, p. 7.

rection, where I had been enabled to learn something of the causes and character of crime; and I had visited the families of a number of the inmates of that institution. I had also learned something of the number and character of the children, who should either have been in our schools, or in some useful employment; but who were misspending their time, and vitiating themselves in our streets, and lanes, and markets; on our wharves, and in the open spaces of the city. It early, therefore, became an object of my especial care, to aid parents in keeping their children at school; and, as far as I might, to rescue children from vagrancy and crime. And not only was I daily a preacher from house to house, to those to whom access could not otherwise have been obtained for Christian instruction; but, within five weeks of the time of my entrance upon this service, with the assistance of an association of young men, I obtained the upper chamber of the circular building at the bottom of Portland Street, for Sunday evening exercises, which were attended by considerable numbers of those whom I visited. My sentiments, however, were yet very vague upon many of the great interests which are to be regarded in view of the administration of Christianity in large and densely populated cities. I had learned, indeed, that there is much in the science of government, which is not to be reached by civil legislation, or to be looked for from civil authority; much, the obligation of which devolves upon the intelligent, the philanthropic, the religious, and moral part of the community; much evil to be prevented, and much good to be attained, on which Christian principles, brought wisely to bear, may exert an influence to be exerted by no other means. I felt, therefore, that Christian ministers, connected with society, and employed as I was, could do much in collecting facts, by which we might be most surely guided to the principles and modes of operation, by which cities may be most effectually secured against the moral evils to which they are most exposed. An extract from my first semi-annual Report of the second year, published in May, 1828, will give the views I then had of the demands of this ministry, and of the manner in which I then proposed that we should meet them.

"I have often been asked, what I suppose to be the number of families in the city which are without a pastor. Within the past eighteen months, I have indeed been con-

nected with only about two hundred and fifty such families. But there is not a lane, nor is there hardly a single yard, which I have explored thoroughly. Boston, however, contains at least sixty-five thousand inhabitants. Suppose the average number in the families of the city to be five, and there will be thirteen thousand families. There are also, I think, forty-four places of worship. Giving two hundred families to each of these places of worship, — which will be as many as can be claimed for them, — there will be eight thousand and eight hundred families, which are connected with our religious societies; and four thousand two hundred which will be left without a ministry. But suppose that there are only three thousand families, or fifteen thousand individuals in our city, who, by various circumstances are shut out from the influences of our religious institutions. I would ask, Should they not be provided with a ministry, by which the blessings of our religion, as far as shall be practicable, may be extended to them? I feel strongly, and I have much to say, upon this subject. But I will confine myself within as narrow limits as I can, in the hope that I may thus obtain attention to it. Let the interests and the claims of this ministry be understood, and I think that they cannot be disregarded.

"I am inclined to believe that there is not a city in Christendom, in which the public institutions of our religion are more generally regarded, or in which their salutary influence is more widely felt, than in Boston. But it is incidental to the very nature of a city, that it should collect within itself very great numbers of those, who are dependent for their daily bread upon their daily labor. The demand for laborers in a city, considered, as it will always be, in connexion with the facilities which a city affords for association with many of the same class, and with the hope, often a very delusive one, of opportunities of more constant employment, and of better wages, than can be obtained in the country, will secure a supply far beyond what will be required, in all the departments of the service for which laborers are wanted. Some, also, will be brought into the city by the hope of living in it in unchecked idleness and beggary; and some, that they may here more securely indulge in vice, and support themselves in crime. From these, and other causes, there always has been, and there will be, a

very large number in cities who are very poor; who will feel, as it is not felt, because it is not so manifest, in the country, how wide is the distinction of their condition from that of the rich; and who either *cannot*, from feebleness, or sickness, or the want of suitable apparel, unite with us in worship in our churches; or from pride, or the influence of passions and habits not more commendable, *will not* join with us in our public religious exercises. The question, then, arises, and it is a very solemn one, What are our duties in regard to the moral, the spiritual wants, of this very large class of our fellow beings around us? If we have the means, to a very great extent at least, of meeting and supplying these wants, of rescuing many, who are very near to us, on our right hand and on our left, from the degradation, and misery, and ruin of sin; of sending to very many, who otherwise will not have them, the regenerating instructions and excitements, the supports and consolations of our religion; I would ask, Is our worship, or are our offerings to God in our churches what they should be, while we are blessing him for that dispensation of his grace and truth which he has given us by his Son, which, however, we are ourselves withholding from multitudes, who can receive them only through our Christian sympathy and benevolence? To my mind, it is as plainly the will of God, that there should be a permanent ministry for the poor of cities, — a distinct ministry for the special purpose of the poor, — as it is that we, who are not poor, should meet together to worship him. This is the sentiment which I now wish to bring before the opulent, the pious, and the charitable of our city. *There must be a ministry at large for the poor of cities; and the number to be employed in this ministry must be determined by the numbers in a city, which cannot be brought under the pastoral charges of the ministers of its churches.*"

It will be observed, that I have spoken of this service as *a ministry at large*. Let me say, that it was not affectation of peculiarity and distinction, which led me to this designation of it. I was led to it by the thought, and the feeling, that a ministry was wanted here, and in every large city in Christendom, for great and important services, which are not among the recognised objects of the ministry in our churches. Does any one ask, What are these services? I might answer, generally, that they comprehend all the offices which a de-

vout and devoted ministry, having distinctly in view all the objects of Christianity, and supremely desirous to do what it may for each of these objects, can extend to those in a city, *who are in regular connexion with no Church, and are known to no minister as members of his congregation.* Now I take the ground, which I suppose that no one will dispute, that of this number are at least one quarter part of the inhabitants of our city. All of these are not indeed poor. Nor will all,—for some are avowed infidels,—accept the offices of the Christian ministry for themselves, or their families. But a large proportion of them *are* poor. And another considerable proportion, though not receivers of alms, do but live by their industry; and, feeling at once that they cannot dress for Church as others dress for it, or pay for seats which they would not occupy without paying for them, are as effectually separated from our congregations, as they would be even by a law which should interdict their admission to them. Now it is a well ascertained fact, that many hundreds of families in our city, which belong to no congregation, and are known to no minister as a part of his flock, will very gratefully receive the visits of a minister who will seek them out, and connect himself with them as their Christian friend and pastor. Many of these families, through the extension to them of a Christian sympathy and interest, may be brought into one and another of our congregations and churches. Constituted, however, as our congregations now are, many, very many, cannot be brought into them. Is it asked, Why? I answer by inquiring, Are the members of these congregations ready to open their pews to all, of every condition, whom we might bring into our churches to join with them in worship? It may be said, that there is a reservation of free seats in many, and in most, of these churches. And where are these free seats? And for whom? Are they free seats for those, with whom we would worship one common Father as equally his children, however unequal in the circumstances of our outward conditions; with whom we would worship as brethren; as our fellow sinners, and fellow immortals; and as fellow expectants of a judgment to come, at which every one is to receive, not according to his attainments in knowledge, in wealth, or in reputation,—but, according to what he has done in the body, whether it have been good, or whether it

have been evil? The truth is, and it is not to be disguised, that, constituted as society now is, not only with us, but in every city in Christendom, ay, and not only out of the Church, but in it, the poor *are*, — and if we would understand either our duties, or interests in regard to them, we must realize that they are, — a class by themselves. The appropriate question on this subject is, How became they so? Were they made so, or were they first known as such, by the proposition of a specific ministry for them? Or, could it be supposed by any one, that, by the proposition of this ministry, it was intended to keep them a separate class; to erect chapels for them as a separate class; and then to employ that very religion, whose object it is to make us all "one in Christ Jesus," as an instrument for effecting more completely a separation of the rich and poor? I, certainly, have never so viewed my ministry. But I have viewed and exercised it, as an important instrument for effecting a higher and more Christian union of the classes of the rich and the poor. I appeal to my Reports upon the question, whether this has not been with me a leading object. It has, indeed, been the means to which I have looked for far the greatest amount of good to be attained by this service. — But here I would speak only of the *claims* of this ministry; and I rest its claims upon the number among us, not connected with our congregations; on the fact, that it has been found practicable to establish a pastoral connexion with those, who would otherwise have had no Christian pastor; on the design of our Lord, that, through his religion the poor should be blessed, as they cannot otherwise be blessed; and on his design, not less obvious, or less imperative upon us, that to the poor, and to all the poor, the Gospel should be preached. On these grounds I have proposed a ministry distinct from that of our churches; *a ministry at large;* a ministry whose object it shall be to seek out those, who, to be *found,* must be *sought;* and by all the means which our religion prescribes, and which an enlightened experience shall suggest, to endeavour to accomplish in regard to them the whole purposes of the Gospel. Let there be an administration of Christianity among us, by which, independent of such a ministry, the Gospel shall be preached to the poor, and to all the poor among us, and no one will more rejoice than I shall, when the necessity of a ministry at large shall be entirely superseded.

I have used also the expressions, "a permanent ministry for the poor;" "a permanent ministry for the special service of the poor." And I am free to say, that, were I now, with all the lights I have to guide me in this interest, for the first time bringing before you the proposition of a ministry at large for cities, I should not employ precisely these expressions. It may indeed be asked, "Is it not a ministry which is specially for the poor?" And without hesitation, I answer, It is. "Why then," it may be asked, "is it not so to be designated?" I answer, first, because, though specially, it is not exclusively for the poor. It is for all who are not within our congregations, and who will accept its services. Secondly, because I would not unnecessarily use terms, in defining the objects of this ministry, which I have found to be liable to abuse. I have said, that the poor *are* a class by themselves. It is the direct tendency of the whole machinery of society, not in Europe only, but throughout our country, (except as far as Christianity has interposed its spirit and influence,) to widen and deepen the lines of demarkation between the more and less favored in regard to intellect, to property, and to all the circumstances which give distinction and power among men. We are already experiencing, and bitterly too, many of the consequences of this unchristian constitution of society; and I would that we might be aware of these consequences, before it shall be too late effectually to check, or to remedy them. I regard the ministry I have proposed as an important instrument and means to this end. Yet all its objects may be sought, without thus making out the poor as its peculiar subjects. — Nor is this all. The proclamation of "a special ministry for the poor" is suited to awaken, and without doubt has awakened, the feeling, that its great design is not less to meet their temporal, than their spiritual wants. I have always been aware of this difficulty, and have wished to do what I might to obviate it. I have thought, and felt, and in my Reports have said, that, if the service should be committed to injudicious men, it might be an instrument even for the extension of pauperism and vice. But I have known, too, that it may be made the greatest blessing which can in this world be extended to many among the poor, and to some who are not poor; and that infinitely the greatest blessings within its scope are those which the wealth of the world alone could not purchase. For these

reasons I should wish to express the service by very general terms; and such are the terms by which I have designated it. — This explanation seems to be required at this stage of our progress, and I am glad of an opportunity to make it.

I have not, it may be thought, been sufficiently explicit in regard to our modes of operation in this service. This is a topic on which I might indulge in very extensive detail. But it will be enough to say, that our plan comprehends, first, the most extensive acquaintance which we can form with those, who are the proper subjects of our ministry; and the most faithful service, which, as Christian teachers, we can render to them, at once in their habitations, and whenever, and wherever we may meet them. To the best of our ability, we would bring home the interests and objects of Christianity to every individual with whom we may connect ourselves in our office; in every case regarding every circumstance, by which the ends of the ministry are to be attained. — Secondly. A specific object of peculiar attention is, the recovery of the morally exposed children around us. The immediate ends to be sought in regard to them are indeed very different, and as different are to be the means to be employed to save them. Some are to be kept at home, and some are to be removed from home. Some require only to be placed at useful service, and others must be brought under a corrective discipline before they will be qualified for such service. — Thirdly. We hold ourselves in readiness for every application which may be made to us for such counsel and aid as we may give in all the exigencies, in which the counsel and aid of a Christian friend are wanting; and in which, without this ministry, many a sufferer would not know where to look with confidence for them. I have met with no incidents in my life, and I have read of none, more affecting, or higher in their claims for sympathy, than have been some of the applications of this description, which have been made to me in my office as a minister at large. I refer here particularly to the applications of mothers, for aid in the rescue of their children, and especially their daughters, from ruin. I can conceive of no higher or holier service that can be rendered, than this. — And, on Sundays, my colleagues are preachers to children, — the children of large Sunday schools; and, I am happy to say, are, I think, remarkably successful in this exercise. They are making

the great experiment of the practicability of exciting in the minds of children *an interest in religion;* of giving them a kind of instruction respecting religion, and respecting the Bible, in its history, the characters it gives of good and of bad men, its geography, and all the objects of which it treats, by which the young curiosity may be excited and gratified. And, during a large part of the year, they preach on Sunday evenings to those who may be disposed to meet with them for worship. — It certainly is not one of our objects to form distinct churches for the poor. On the contrary, we should each of us rejoice to see all whom we visit, in one or another of our churches. But of these I have specified, and of any other means which you, or any of our friends shall propose, or which may be suggested by our own experience, by which we may accomplish the objects of our service, we shall gladly avail ourselves, as long as we shall find a field for our services, in which we may labor for the cause of the Gospel, and the best good of our fellow men, without trenching upon the lines, or taking upon ourselves the duties, of others.

I have said that our ministry has awakened the feeling, that it is designed not less to meet the temporal, than the spiritual wants of the poor. And, in truth, I have done much for the temporal necessities of those, whom I have visited in this connexion. Yet no one, I think, can be more alive than I am, to the evil tendencies of any known organization for the relief of those wants, of which it is the will of God that every individual, as far as possible, should obtain relief by his own exertions. I well know, that the *necessity* for shelter, and clothing, and food, is the call of Providence to labor for them; and that the supply of them by charity, where they might be obtained by the personal exertions of those who need them, is a ministry of virtue to vice. It is not a mere substitute of charity for the necessity of labor. It is an employment of charity for a direct violation of God's will; for the encouragement and support of reckless idleness. I have no more right to give to him who might, if he would, supply his wants by his own industry, but who chooses to live upon the industry of others, than I have a right to withhold that which he needs, from him who cannot obtain it, unless I shall impart it to him. Yet there are cases, which come under our ministry, and not a few, in which the demand for charity, in its highest sense, is impe-

rious; and we have no right, even if we had the will, to disregard them. Here, then, — I speak in reference to the cases at large in which applications are made to us for charity, or alms, — is often the most difficult and painful part of our service. Till recently, our custom has been, each to give, or to withhold, according to our individual judgments of cases, as they have occurred. We have been almoners of our friends, as well as the spiritual pastors of those whom we have visited. In this department, however, we propose a very important change, and from this change we anticipate very important consequences.

We wish to visit, and to serve in our office, as exclusively as we may, as the spiritual and religious friends of those with whom we shall be connected in it. We do not wish, — to use the language of the Report on a union of the Churches for the support of this ministry, — "to add another to the eleemosynary institutions of the city." Still, as we must see want in all the manifestations which can be made of it among the poor; as we are very desirous that want should be met and answered by charity, when we shall think that Christianity demands that it should be so met and answered; and, as we have benevolent associations for almost every description of want, to which we can refer the suffering subjects of our ministry, or to which we can ourselves appeal for them, in the various cases in which we shall think that relief should be given; we have determined, as *a leading general rule*, that, as far as alms-giving is concerned, we will aid those whom we shall be called thus to serve, rather by pointing out to them the means of relief, than by giving relief ourselves. It cannot, I think, be suspected, that our object in this mode of operation is any immediate relief which will thus be brought to ourselves. On the contrary, the immediate inconveniences of the plan to us, and the difficulties we shall have to overcome in it, as far as our personal feelings and exertions are concerned, are very great. It will at once, we think, be obvious, how much easier it would be, and, as a matter of mere feeling, how much more agreeable, personally to give relief, where we think it may be required, and where the individuals to be relieved are immediately before us, and are seeking from us the aid they need, than to send them to others, or ourselves to go to others for them. But we are taking measures, by which we

hope at once to aid our Benevolent Associations in meeting more completely their benevolent objects, and at the same time to do something, and all that we can, for the prevention of imposture, and the suppression of mendicity. We have therefore opened a central office, in which each of us, in turn, will pass a part of every day, except Sundays; and we propose to have tickets,—or rather, we have them, and they were used by my colleagues during the last winter,—which, obtained by our friends, and given instead of money, or other things applied for by those who beg from house to house, or in the streets, will refer these applicants for charity to our office, and thus give us the opportunity of looking into their necessities and claims. We are also obtaining information, from all our Benevolent Societies, of their specific objects; of their modes of operation; and of the name, residence, and character, of every individual relieved by them. And, by means of free and ample communications with delegates from each of these societies, we are endeavouring, with them, to settle the principles and the practice, by which each shall be made acquainted with the objects and operations of the others, and of the individuals relieved by each and all; by which each shall thus be saved from interference with any other, and equally saved, as far as may be, from ministering to the extension of pauperism and vice. We may thus at once coöperate with these societies, in the objects of their highest interest; and, we think, may greatly aid them in securing the efficiency of their benevolent efforts. We may thus interpose a strong check upon the demands of idleness and vice, and do something to excite and improve a sense of the importance of industry, of providence, and a sense of character. And, while our own connexion, as spiritual pastors, shall be as widely extended as it may be among all of every description in our department, and while we may be indirectly acting for the incidental, but very important objects, to which we have referred, we may ourselves be more exclusively regarded, and may more effectively act, as Christian ministers. I must be allowed to add in this connexion, that there will, and must be, exceptions to the general rule I have stated. There are cases of claims to charity, which I would not unnecessarily turn over to any association, or to an Overseer of the Poor, as such. To meet these cases, I shall continue

to look to the kindness of my friends, which I am quite confident will not be withdrawn. The proposed change, however, I consider as an important stage in the progress of our ministry; and the credit of it is principally due to my young colleagues. We are not yet fully prepared for this new mode of action. But we doubt not, that, when our plans in regard to it shall be completed, ministers at large, of other denominations of Christians, will heartily unite in them.

Of the organization which has been adopted to give permanency, and an increased efficiency, to this ministry, I have no terms for an adequate expression of my feelings. More than six years ago, in one of my Reports, I expressed my strong desire, that this ministry should be connected with our churches, or with the benevolent societies in these churches. I am devoutly grateful that this desire is at length realized. The fact is, that, while my interest in this service has been the strongest which I could feel, out of the circle of my family, in any human interest, because I have believed that there is no other conceivable way, than by a more extended administration of Christianity, by which the highest objects of our religion, in regard to multitudes around us, are to be attained; I have yet as strongly felt, that the greatest efficiency of this ministry is to be looked for, not so much in my personal connexion with the subjects of it, dear and important as this has been to me, as in the closer and more Christian connexion, to which it might be subservient, of the classes which are separated by those very distinctions, by which our religion would bind them to each other. Christianity contemplates, — and it is one of its greatest glories that it contemplates, — a universal interest of man in man. It inculcates universal brotherhood; and it even makes this spirit of brotherhood a test of discipleship. It recognises the distinctions of ruler and subject, of learned and unlearned, of rich and poor, of master and servant. But it also recognises in the servant, equally as in the master, in the poorest as in the richest, in the most ignorant as in the best informed, and in the most powerless as in him who is invested with the highest authority, an immortal nature; the capacities of an eternally growing virtue; and a nature intended, through that virtue, for an eternally advancing happiness. It addresses every individual as a child of God;

requires that each shall think of himself, and of his fellow beings, as children of God; and teaches every one to look up to God, alike as his own Father, and the Father of each one of his race. And to secure these great, these paramount objects, it brings before us every circumstance upon which we might be disposed to congratulate ourselves, in regard either to our natural endowments, to our acquisitions, or to any possessions which distinguish us from, or raise us above others, as *a responsibility.* In this view of the spirit and purposes of Christianity, I have felt, that, important as is its administration in our churches, and important as are the services of its ministers in their congregations, there is still far more to be done, than has yet been extensively understood, or seriously aimed at, in the administration of our religion. I mean that there are departments in its administration, — means of extending its spirit and power, and of obtaining the great results it contemplates, — which, according to their means and opportunities, devolve on *all its believers.* Churches, or Christian societies, as such, have great responsibilities beyond themselves; and every individual, in every church, who joins in the prayer, "May thy kingdom come, and thy will be done on earth, as it is done in heaven," to live consistently with his prayer, should be alive to the obligation to do what he may, for the extension of the cause and kingdom of God and of Christ. To this sentiment you have given a most distinct expression, in that organization which has been formed in our congregations, for the widest diffusion which may be effected of the blessings of our religion among us; and it is my hearty prayer, and most joyfully will my colleagues and myself coöperate with you, that this great object may as completely as possible be attained in our city.

I know not how the Association which has been formed for the support of the ministry at large may generally be regarded by others. But I do not hesitate to say, that, if it have been formed, as I trust that it has been, and as I know to some extent that it has been, under the excitement of a strong Christian sympathy of the more with the less favored portions of our community; under a feeling of the responsibleness of Christians for their Christian privileges; and with a view to the wisest direction which may be given to individual and associated efforts, for the greatest good of

those around us; — I should then look to this organization as the commencement of a new era in the administration of our religion. And, in truth, if it is not to conduce to these ends, I should have little pleasure in the thought of it. The great want in our society is not, and for a long time has not been, that of a disposition to provide alms for the poor, or religious instruction for those who need, and are willing to receive it. It is no indulgence of vanity to say, that, in these respects, we are at least behind no other city of equal population. But Christianity looks to far more important agencies, than those either of associated, or of deputed sympathy and interest. It addresses itself to every individual, and it calls every individual to the offices which he can perform in its cause. This seems to me to be one of its greatest objects, and one of the objects which have been most overlooked by Christians. It has indeed instituted, and it requires, a special ministry. No religion can be sustained without such a ministry. But while all the objects of other religions may be met by such a ministry, it is not so with the objects of Christianity. The great end of our religion is, not only to secure the instruction of the ignorant, and the most ignorant, and to raise the low and degraded, and even the lowest and most degraded. It is, to secure the instruction and salvation of *each* and *every one*, whatever may be his condition and his character. It even claims an interest in every one, and efforts for every one, proportioned to his exposures, or to his actual lowness and degradation; proportioned not only to his inability, but to his perversity; proportioned to his moral necessities in order to his salvation, whatever those necessities may be, and to whatever causes they may be attributed. And how are these claims to be met and answered? By the ministry in our churches? It may do, and it actually does, much for them. By an additional and special ministry for those not comprehended in these churches? It has been an instrument of great good, and I hope will be an instrument of still greater good. But, if it is to be made a substitute, on the part of those who shall support it, for personal interest in those who are, or should be, the subjects of it, — a substitute for personal connexion with them, and personal exertions for their greater good and happiness, — I can only say, that it will then certainly conduce to comparatively little benefit; and that even

the most liberal support that can be given it, will not, I believe, be accepted at the bar of God, as a substitute for one office, to which the Gospel calls man for his fellow-man. But if, on the other hand, the ministry at large shall be viewed, as I think it ought to be viewed, as a recognition on the part of our churches of the principles, that blessings are responsibilities; that Christianity is the greatest of blessings, and therefore brings upon its receivers the highest and greatest of responsibilities; that, if the poor are to be blessed through the Gospel, it must be by its influence on the hearts and characters of those who believe, and have the means of imparting the Gospel; and that the most efficient support to be given to the ministry, either in our churches, or at large, is, as circumstances may require, either a hearty coöperation with ministers, or an individual Christian service, wherever, and to whomsoever it may be rendered; — then, I believe, we may look for influences of our religion, such as it has yet very partially exerted upon society. There is no moral good within the purposes of the Gospel of Christ, there is no Christian object in regard to human society, which is not attainable by the means by which Christianity proposes its attainment. This is a great truth, to which I should be glad to give the greatest possible prominence. But these means comprehend, not only a special ministry, but the personal interest in them, and the personal efforts for them, of every receiver of the Gospel. Its instituted ministry is a special agency for this cause. But this agency, though special, not only is not exclusive; but, unaided by each and all, according to their means and opportunities, it will be, as it has been, comparatively inoperative. The question may arise, How are the churches to coöperate in this service? As briefly as I may I will state my sentiments upon this subject.

There are specific duties which belong to the office of a minister at large. He is, as he shall obtain opportunity, to preach the gospel from house to house. He is to connect himself with as many as he may, as a Christian pastor and friend, with a view to all the services, which, as a Christian pastor and friend, he can extend to them. He is, in the circle in which he visits, and the field in which he labors, to endeavour to accomplish all the objects of the Gospel. And, *he is to give himself wholly to these things.* This, the private Christian cannot do. Yet, in these offices,

one private Christian can do more, because he has more ability and more leisure, than another. Nor is there any private Christian, who, if he have the disposition, will not have also the opportunity, and the means, of many, — it may be very unostentatious, but still very important, — Christian services for others. To the question, then, How may the churches coöperate with the ministry at large in its objects? I would answer, Let there be as little machinery, and concert of plan in this work, as may be. I would even say, Let the means, and the modes of operation, be left to every individual. But, let every individual feel, that he has to do in it what he may for a great common cause, which has paramount claims upon him. He has to do what he may for the cause of a Christian connexion between the classes of society; what he may in the cause of Christian sympathy of man with man; what he may to aid those, who, without his aid, may sink under the temptations and trials of their condition. He is to look upon every man, in every condition, as his brother. The poorest, the lowest, the most degraded is the brother, and the fellow immortal, of the richest, the most intellectual, the most cultivated, the most virtuous. Man, therefore, is universally to feel, and to cherish, respect for man. In his own difficulties and defects, his own wants and dependence, he is to feel the trials, and needs, and claims of others. And, in reference to the claims, and needs, and trials of others, he is, as he has means and opportunities, to carry out the spirit of the Gospel towards and concerning them. I might easily fill pages in defining offices of Christian respect, interest, kindness, the opportunities for which are every day occurring to every individual. I will, however, only refer you to some of the circumstances, which may be regarded as calls for your sympathy and kindness; and with every individual I will leave the question, in what cases, and to what extent, he can answer them.

In the first place, I would call your attention to the fact which I have stated, of the great numbers around us who are not connected with any of our religious congregations. Do you ask, or do any ask, What have we to do in regard to this circumstance, any further than, as far as we may, to provide for them a ministry? I answer, that I think there is much, and of a very interesting character, and which may

be conducive to as much good to yourselves, as to those to whom you may extend your kindness in the service. I shall speak very freely upon this, and upon each of the topics, to which, in this connexion, I would ask your attention.

Of those who have no connexion with any of our congregations, I have said that some are infidels. Yet among those whom I have visited in my ministry, there have been very few who have not either believed in revelation, or feared that there might be truth in the Gospel. The multitude in the poorer, as well as in the richer classes, deficient as they may be in the principles and spirit of our religion, yet do not directly disbelieve, or explicitly discard it. And far the greater number are at least as hearty believers, and are as truly resting their eternal hopes upon Christianity, as the majority of worshippers in our churches. Why, then, it may be asked, are they not *in* our churches? I have said, that one class is excluded by their inability, real or imaginary, to pay for seats in them; and by their feelings in regard to such free seats, as are provided for those who are neither proprietors, nor renters, in our houses of worship. Another class cannot, or thinks that it cannot, provide suitable apparel for our Sunday assemblies. Another class, consisting of those who come from the country, and some of whom may belong to each of the denominations of Christians among us, are kept at home on Sundays, at first by the embarrassment felt in the thought of going to a place of worship in which all around them are strangers, and in which they know of no provision for them; and by the habit soon induced of continuing to remain at home, or of not going to church, only because, for a considerable time, they have not been there. Many mothers are kept at home, because they cannot leave their young children; and many husbands and fathers stay at home, because, should they go to church, they cannot take their wives and children with them. A large number, indeed, could go, but from one or more of these causes; and others, not unbelievers, are indisposed to go, because their tastes,and associations, and interests are of any and every character but that of religion and virtue. Now in view of these classes and circumstances, are there no indications of opportunities, of which many might avail themselves for Christian usefulness?

To me it seems very desirable, that the greatest possible number in every town and city should be members of one or another of the religious societies in them. It will require no long acquaintance with families, which are without the pale of these institutions, to learn that there is a very great difference in their conditions, in many and important respects, and those of the families, the members of which are every Sunday gathered in one of our congregations. To those who have no such connexion, Sunday may often be anticipated as a day of rest, and found actually to be a day of greater restlessness and trouble than any of the week. There is very often, I believe, a vague feeling, that the day is not passed as it should be, when it is passed without any religious observances, while yet there is not disposition enough, or energy enough, for that self-employment for religious instruction, by which either the monotony of the day so spent may be relieved, or security obtained against all the exposures of listless idleness. It is, therefore, generally a fact, to which there are not very many exceptions, that there is in these families neither the order, nor the thrift, nor the neatness, nor the feeling of connexion with society, nor the personal or domestic comfort, nor the desires or efforts for character and virtue, which are generally to be found in families, which look to some church as their church, where they are accustomed to go for worship; and to some minister as their pastor, in intercourse with whom they find religious instruction, excitement, support, and consolation. Now is there nothing that may be done by the members of our congregations, in aiding those, who have no connexion with any congregation, in forming this connexion? I have said that I would leave every one free to choose his own department, in which to act for the aid of others, and his own modes of operation. But I here propose a field for service, in which there is much to be done. Let me observe, in regard to myself, that when I find individuals, or families, of the classes to which I have referred, preferring the ministrations in a Methodist, or Baptist, or Episcopal church, or in the church of a Calvinistic or Unitarian Congregationalist, it is my practice to do what I may to persuade them to become members of either of these ecclesiastical bodies. The fact is, that men have, or at least think they have, the distinctive faith of each of these churches, and yet are not

Christians; nor is it the distinctive faith of either that can alone make a Christian. Yet one may be aided, or may feel assured that he will be aided, far more effectually under one of these forms of our religion, than under another. I am myself strongly sensible to this preference, and hold nothing on earth comparatively so dear, as is Christianity in the form and spirit in which I receive it. And, defective as I am in its spirit, I feel quite sure that I should not obtain more of it, by exchanging my form of faith, and with it, as I then must, some of my most precious associations in worship, for a very different creed, and as different associations in the worship of God. I would, therefore, leave every one as free as I would be left by him, in the settlement of a creed, and the choice of a church. There are, I repeat, men who think themselves Christians, under every form which Christian faith has assumed, who yet are thought to be Christians by no other than themselves. And I am happy to believe also, that the spirit of Christ is the life of the soul in many, under each of these forms. Now it is this spirit of Christ in the disciple, — it is Christian principle, reigning in the heart, and bringing every thought and desire into subjection to the Gospel, — it is true, thorough-going repentance towards God, and constant endeavours for assimilation to God, by a more and more complete conformity to his will; this it is, and not a conformity to the distinctive peculiarities of a sect, which makes, and can alone make, a Christian. So I think, and therefore so I act in this department. Let others follow the guidance of their consciences in it. But to conscience I appeal, and to the consciences of those who acknowledge, that in their Christian privileges they have great responsibilities, whether, among these responsibilities, it be not one, that they should do what they can to extend these privileges to all around them.

But, secondly, many may be desirous to be useful to the poor around them, who would yet feel no disposition to this kind of usefulness. I would then say to such an one, here is a class of virtuous widows who have children. These mothers, with extreme difficulty, obtain the means of feeding and clothing their children. Some of them, however, while in health, ask for very little or even for no pecuniary aid. They want nothing on earth so much, as the aid which can be given them in keeping their children in school, in keep-

ing them from the contamination of the streets, and in making them obedient to maternal authority. A better charity is not to be exercised, than that of meeting the wants of these mothers, and of aiding them in the moral education of their children. — Again. There are families, many families, which are principally, or at least to a great extent, supported by charity, in which, if the heads of them were temperate and provident, there is entire ability for self-support. It is not difficult to form a connexion with such families. And would not a Christian feel that he had obtained for himself, as well as imparted a great good, by bringing one, or two, or three such families to cleanliness and order, to temperance and providence, to industry and independence? — Again. There are families beginning life, which, by some difficulties, — embarrassments into which they soon fall, and which might easily, in an early stage of them, have been prevented, or remedied, by the counsel of some one wiser than themselves, are yet, by the want of this counsel, brought first to intemperance, and then to poverty. — Again. There are poor families in which a husband, or wife, is sinking to the grave under lingering disease; and, during a long protracted sickness, the resources of their former industry have failed them, and they are exposed to the keenest sufferings. They may have been virtuous, or vicious. But, whatever has been their character, their condition is now a deplorable one. And does it not call for sympathy? Or, in the families of the virtuous, and the vicious, there may be a long continued illness among the children. Or, there are husbands, and wives, and widows, who, without any distinct form of disease, are yet very feeble, and great sufferers, and are capable of but very little service. Need I say what interesting and very useful services may be rendered to them by a Christian friend? There are families, to which no form of charity could be so great a boon, as that of a direction of their industry to some useful employment; and there are some, accustomed to depend on alms-giving, who are not to be excited to any means of self-support, and should therefore be compelled to that to which they cannot be persuaded. And, in a very large part of all these families there are children, who, if left wholly to the interest and care of their parents and immediate friends, will be the victims of vice, and will be lost. The moral exposures of these children, and the

early depravity of very large numbers of them, should be felt to be one of the highest moral interests of our community. A few of them are transferred to the boys' or girls' Asylum. But, if we would save those of them whom we may, there is very much more to be done for them. I have known an extent of corruption among very young children in our city, which could hardly be heard but with a feeling of horror. And there is now, and continually, a great extent of this corruption. What, then, is to be done to arrest it? Or, rather, what might not be done, if a strong and widely extended Christian sympathy should be awakened, and exerted in regard to them? Some of the female children of this class might be placed in well-ordered families in the city; and to a greater number the most important service that could be performed for them would be, to obtain for them places in good families in the country. And situations of usefulness might be found also for very many boys, either in the town or country, who are now forming for confirmed vagrancy, as fast as idleness and vice can train them for it. Is any one solicitous to accomplish the greatest good that he may, at the smallest possible expense, except of time and personal effort? Here are objects for all his benevolence, and here are opportunities for its fullest exercise. More, and much more, should be expected from the ministry at large in all these services, than from other Christians. But may not much be done in them also by other Christians? Have other Christians no personal responsibilities in view of these services?

I need not, and I would not, enter into much detail on this subject. Yet there are other objects, in this connexion, to which I am very desirous to call your attention.

Great improvements, it is well known, have been made in the organization and government of our prisons. These institutions are now, to an important extent, very favorable to the maintenance of a moral discipline, and the moral reformation of their inmates. This moral reformation is, in fact, so far accomplished in a considerable number of them, that they are prepared to leave the prisons with very sincere purposes of an upright and virtuous life. But they no sooner return to society, than they find themselves, by the very fact that they have been prisoners, cut off from all hope of employment wherever they are known. I have said they were

sincere in their purposes of a better life than they had formerly led. But their virtue has not strength to withstand that universal suspicion, which views and treats them as men who only want the opportunity of crime, to commit it. They are not allowed a trial of the sincerity they profess. They are treated as still criminals. And is it therefore wonderful, or even an argument against their sincerity, that they again fall into crime? Measures are therefore to be devised, and taken, to enable the reformed convict to obtain employment, to live like an honest man if he be sincerely disposed to live so. Now I should not have much confidence in any artificial and systematic arrangements for this purpose. But it seems to me, that, in proportion as a community shall become truly Christian in its character, it will sympathize with every form of human penitence. It will wish that the really penitent convict may be restored to society, and to the means and opportunities of improvement which society would give him. It would be willing to extend to him the means and opportunities of proving and perfecting his reformation. Am I not right? If I am, here then are circumstances which call for your sympathy and coöperation. Would it be impracticable, or either above or below the demands of the Gospel, for one and another of private Christians, each to interest himself in one or two prisoners; to interest himself in the families of these prisoners, during the separation of the convict from them; to meet these prisoners when they pass the threshold of their prisons; to obtain for them the employment by which they may support themselves and their families; and thus reinstate them in a condition of virtue and happiness? I am sure, that to a considerable extent, this is quite feasible, if there be a will to do it. I can indeed easily anticipate difficulties and objections. But I think that these would be unfelt in an advanced stage of Christian feeling among professed Christians. Nor do I believe that much will be done in this last stage of moral demand for the benefit of prisoners, till something like this connexion shall be formed with them, and this aid shall be extended to them.

Again. One of the best directions which can be given to benevolence, is that in which it is employed in aiding and encouraging the poor in all possible means of honorable self-support. And a means which may be effectual to this end, to a very great extent, is, their instruction in personal and

domestic economy; and in the circumstances and ways by which they may avail themselves, in the most favorable seasons for labor, of those small daily and weekly savings, which will go far towards the supply of fuel and clothing for the winter. I have said that there are many among us, who, as a matter of course, and of habit, look to the overseers of the poor, and to our benevolent societies, for their winter resources, whose earnings, wisely appropriated, are yet quite sufficient to secure to them all the comforts, which they now obtain through the aid of our benevolent institutions. Is it asked, How are such individuals, or families, to be excited to this forethought, and frugality? I answer, There are those, and I think they are not a few, to whom the offer of a premium, — for example, ten per cent., — would be an inducement to deposit weekly, with a friend, such small savings as they can make from their earnings; which savings, through the spring, summer, and autumn, would be sufficient to meet the extraordinary demands of winter. Why, then, allow me to ask each one, can you not seek out one, two, three, or four such families, upon which you will agree to call every week, for such sums as they can deposit with you? Do but become acquainted with these families, and let there be a distinct understanding between you and them of the whole plan, and of the manner in which it is to be executed, and the tax it will impose upon your time will not exceed half an hour in a week. If five dollars shall be thus saved, a premium must indeed be paid of fifty cents; and, if ten dollars shall be saved, a premium of a dollar. But not only is all which is so saved by a family, an equal saving to the community. The moral good is immense, of rescuing this family from pauperism, and from the dispositions and habits which belong to an accustomed and a willing dependence on charity. — I refer here to a class below the depositors in our Savings Bank. This is a means of doing good, which is now, to a considerable extent, in operation in England. It has done much to bring the rich and poor into a very interesting and useful connexion there, and to save many from dependence, and abjectness, and misery.

Look at those to whom you are extending your sympathy through the ministry at large, in the great diversity of their conditions. I do not say that their trials, their difficulties, and exposures are in themselves greater than are those of

many in far more favorable outward circumstances. They are not. It is well known that there is no greater destitution and misery among men, than are to be found among the most affluent; among those, who, it would seem, have the command of the greatest resources for enjoyment. But these are exceptions, and not a rule. There are men who are rich and honored, and are yet poor and unspeakably miserable. Yet property is a good. And so is an honorable standing in society, and an honored character. And so are friends. It is a very great good, in our difficulties, our trials, our exposures, to have those near us who are interested in us, and to whom we may look for the sympathy and assistance we may need. It is a very great good to have means at our control, which will relieve, if they will not remove, the causes of our trouble; and which, if they cannot inspire gladness, will at least help us to support affliction. And in the times of our great and pressing embarrassments, of our most painful conflicts, and of our most distracting cares, and fears, and sufferings, what would be our conditions, if we were at the same time without any of the aids which we now have in our standing in society, and in the sympathy for which we are indebted to it? Let these conditions be fairly and fully imagined, and faithfully brought home to ourselves, and we shall, perhaps, better comprehend, than we otherwise could, the pressing wants, and the Christian claims, of many about us.

The deepest, strongest, most pressing necessities of man, — what are they? Is it said, they are his necessities for shelter, for clothing, for food? I say, No! Shelter, and clothing and food are indeed necessities. They cannot be dispensed with. It is, ordinarily, the great business of life to provide them; and so absorbed is thought and care by these most obvious, obtrusive, and importunate of our wants, that our necessities of an incomparably higher character, because belonging to an incomparably higher department of our nature, are too easily overlooked, and are therefore felt to be subordinate in their claims. But the great necessities of human nature, little as they are understood by many, and feebly as they are uttered, are, *the necessities of sympathy and of interest, of respect, and counsel, and encouragement.* We indulge poor and low sentiments of human nature, and of human life. We confine our views of human nature to

the manifestations which we see of it under the artificial and perverted forms of society around us; and we too generally think of life, and make our dispositions of it, as well in regard to ourselves as others, as if the present duration of it would be of an indefinite extent, and its outward good and evil were all which was to be either feared or hoped for, suffered or enjoyed. Here, I believe, is beyond comparison the most influential and operative of the causes of the unchristian character and condition of Christendom. We have not attained to the interest in our fellow beings, the sympathy with them, and the respect for them, which are due from man to man. Here, then, is the ground from which we are to look at the great question of duty in this concern. I rejoice in the union which has been formed in our churches, to sustain the ministry at large. But the mere support of this ministry is a secondary object. The higher, and far more important one, is the extended connexion, which, through this ministry, it is to be hoped you will form with the less favored classes of our fellow beings around us. Let this connexion be formed, and maintained, in the spirit of the Gospel, and society, in all its departments, and all its details, will be known by you as it could not otherwise be known. A great amount of evil may thus be arrested and prevented, and an indefinite amount of good may be done, and of happiness conferred. There is no cause from which society with us, or any where, suffers so much, as from the want of a strong connexion, and interest, and sympathy, and *respect* between its members; and there are no other principles, there is no other spirit, than of Christianity, to which we may look with any confidence for this connexion, founded upon enlarged and liberal interests and sympathies, and sustained by a mutual, an equal, and a generous respect for each other. The highest principles of a mere worldly morality will do nothing in this cause. Nor can much be hoped for in it from human laws, or from any civil institutions, or even from any merely associated service, even for the highest purposes of benevolence and piety. It is to be the work of each one, in his own way, and according to his own power. Let each one, then, aiming first at his own highest Christian improvement, at once as his own greatest good and the most important of the means of aiding and blessing others, — and, then, in the spirit of the Gospel,

bringing himself into connexion with those to whom he would extend the offices of Christian interest and usefulness, let him seriously propose the inquiry for his own consideration, "What have I here to do, or what may I here do, which, in the most enlarged views of right and duty, I could myself, in a change of circumstances with those about me, reasonably expect that they, if they had my means and opportunities, should do for me?" The question of duty here might be, and indeed sometimes would be, one of very considerable embarrassment and difficulty. But, were all of us who call ourselves Christians, in this way faithfully to seek for light, and then faithfully to follow it, we should do more to manifest, and to advance our religion, by this exhibition of its power and fruits, than could be done by the array of all the abstract arguments that could be brought to bear upon it.

I regard the institution of Sunday schools, as marking one of the most important stages which have been made in the administration of Christianity; yet not indeed simply, or principally, from a reference to what *has been* done in them, and by them. I do not mean that there is not abundant evidence, that they have already conduced, and are conducing, to a degree of good, which may well strengthen the hearts of their supporters, and carry them on their way rejoicing. I can hardly, indeed, conceive of a more delightful association, than is that which is brought to our minds with the return of Sunday, in the thought of the many tens of thousands, — in the thought of the hundreds of thousands, of teachers and pupils, who are then brought together in the city, and in the country, and throughout Christendom, for giving and receiving the simplest elementary instruction respecting those truths and principles, the knowledge of which is infinitely above all other knowledge; and, through the influence of which upon the heart and character, the greatest good is to be looked for in time, and in eternity. Here, already, we see one of the most beautiful and touching of the influences which our religion is to exert, in the very extended and most intimate connexion, which, through this institution, has been formed at once between the instructers and their scholars, at ages most favorable for the most beneficent action upon each other; — and, which is far from being the least interesting circumstance, between the highest and humblest classes of society. This connexion,

this expression and action of sympathy, this great union and effort for the advancement of those interests, which should be at once the highest and the paramount interests of childhood, and youth, and old age, of those of all grades of intellect, and of all conditions in society, — these seem to me to constitute the excellence and glory of our Sunday schools. In ten of the Sunday schools in our connexion in the city, we have 291 teachers, and 1632 pupils; and not a few of these children are from some of the poorest families among us, in which, without this institution, they would have received no religious instruction. What a means, therefore, have we here for carrying out the Christian doctrine of human brotherhood; the great, the morally sublime inculcation of Jesus, *He that would be greatest among you all, let him be the least of all, and the servant of all!* Here is the great lesson which should for ever be before the eyes and heart of the Sunday School Teacher, who would most effectually accomplish the great objects of his office. And let this lesson be learned, and faithfully practised, and new modes will be discovered of acting upon the minds and hearts of childhood, in the dispensation of religious instruction. Let this lesson be well learned and practised, and with it we shall acquire new power and means of giving an interest and an attraction to religious instruction. And let connexion with children, in this employment, lead teachers, wherever they have reason to believe it may be useful, to connexion with the parents of the children they instruct, for mutual knowledge and aid in regard to religious instruction, and the hopes of teachers and parents, to a greatly increased extent, will become realities. The ministry at large has, in our Sunday Schools, great facilities for its operations; and it has been among its objects to build up these schools, and to increase their efficiency as nurseries of religion and virtue. They are means of our own closer religious connexion with those whom we serve in our office; and may be means to any, who may be disposed to avail themselves of them, for a similar connexion.

The sentiment hardly requires illustration, that the constitution of society, and its tendencies, even under our free institutions, and with all the lights and aids we have obtained from Christianity, are of a character which calls for the strictest vigilance, even if it does not justify strong and most painful apprehensions. It is indeed most apparent, and it

would be very absurd to close our eyes or thoughts against the fact, that, within the freest institutions of the world, may be concealed the principles of the wildest anarchy, and of the most uncompromising despotism. The freest institutions of the world may become the nurseries, the hot-beds, of the most selfish and unprincipled ambition, of the most eager cupidity of wealth, and of every narrow interest and lawless passion, by which individual character may be degraded, and the very foundations of society unsettled and broken up. What, I ask, are the bonds of our civil union; or what are those of our religious connexions? What principles are generally discarded by us as unjust, either in our political plans or ends, or in looking at interests in one and another of the great departments of *industrial* enterprise, because they are inconsistent with a prevailing sense of acknowledged equal moral rights, and because Christianity therefore frowns upon, and condemns them? And how many are the connexions of the classes of society among us, and the intercommunications between them, which would not continue to be what they are, without a reference to any higher than immediate, and personal, or political objects? I have no ambition for the office of a censor of principles and manners. But if it be true, as I believe it is, that our government, and all our free institutions, are yet but experiments, and not settled results; — if it be true that our government is now in open conflict with itself and with the people, and that the people are in equally open conflict with themselves and with the government; if, instead of advancing in an identity of sympathies and interests in our various great circles of enterprise, and throughout the increasing subdivisions of employment among us, we are dividing and separating upon the principle, that our interests are not to be harmonized, and that each is therefore to be maintained by conflict, and to prosper only by victory; — and, moreover, if the rights of property, and of personal security, and of religious freedom, may be violated by mobs either in broad day, or at midnight, and decided by conflagration, or by other forms of outrage and violence; — then, I ask, what is the ground of our confidence, either of the long continuance of the union of the States, or of the permanence of those free institutions of which we boast as the greatest of our national blessings? There is no wilder delusion under which a community ever

existed, than that of the belief that a vicious, a corrupt, and a divided society, can very long continue to be *free*. The idea of freedom as necessarily comprehends *virtue* as one of its elements, — nay, it as necessarily comprehends virtue as the element of its very vitality, as it comprehends the idea of exemption from manacles and fetters of iron. This is a great truth; and it should be one of the first lessons inculcated and impressed upon the young, and one of the last to be lost sight of even in the last stage in the journey of life. Virtue, in its very essence, implies freedom; freedom of thought, of choice, and of will; and there can be no virtue without this freedom. It is, however, equally to be remembered, — for mistake on this subject may be fatal, and not only to individuals, but to communities, — that the action of thought, and of choice, and of the will, which is independent of virtue, and which disregards the lights and aids, the rules and ends of virtue, is, not freedom, but its greatest abuse and perversion. It not only is not freedom, but its necessary tendency is to anarchy, licentiousness, and every possible crime and misery. "The extreme of a thing," says the profound Bishop Butler, "not only is not that thing, but it is the very opposite of it." And what or where is the virtue, which will give so high a character, and so effectual a security to freedom, as that of Christianity? Let those who call themselves Christians be what their religion would make them, and freedom will be found among them, and security, and general prosperity and happiness, such as yet have never been found in any community. Who will not say, that this is indeed true? I reply, then, if it be true, and if other means of the greatest personal and social good have been found ineffectual and inadequate, why should we not set ourselves to the work at once of becoming better Christians, — more true to our religion, — as the means of securing these greater blessings?

There is no form of infidelity which has done, or is doing, any thing to check the progress of Christianity, compared with what has been done, and is doing, first, by the contradiction which is so manifest between the professions and lives of Christians; and, secondly, by the prevailing skepticism among Christians, first, of the possibility of any higher attainments than have yet been made in Christian practice, and, secondly, of any nearer approximation than has

yet been made to the objects of the Gospel. Nothing, indeed, can be more obvious, than is the fact, that, glorious as are the individual characters which our religion has formed, and great as have been the improvements which it has extended to society, it has yet done little in comparison with what it proposes to do; and little in comparison with what its believers think that it would do, if it exerted a greater influence upon those who receive it. Why, then, is not this greater influence exerted? And where, or how, shall we look for a better exertion of it? Here is a very wide field, not only for speculation, but for the most important practical lessons which can be learned by us. I cannot here discuss the topics which are thus suggested. But will you allow me to say, that, should the union which has been formed in our churches, for the support of a ministry at large in our city, be followed out, in these churches, as it should be, by making this ministry a medium of connexion and intercourse, and of higher Christian sentiments and sympathies, between the more and less favored classes in our community, I believe, and doubt not, that this union may be the means of a very great advancement of the Christian character among us, and thus of obtaining some of the highest objects of our religion. Nay, I believe that the moral good of this connexion, and the happiness consequent upon it, will be quite as great to those who serve, as to those who shall be served in it. — Let the principles be our starting points in this enterprise, — for with any other we may soon be discouraged, and shall at best do but little, — that their is no good to ourselves within human attainment, to be compared with that of our own daily advancement to a higher and purer virtue; and that we can in no way minister to so great a good to others, as through the influence, in ourselves, of a character, the simple and true virtue of which shall be *felt* by those with whom we may have intercourse. You have recognised the demand of the Gospel for an extended administration of our religion in our city. You have recognised the principle, that one of your responsibilities for your own Christian privileges, is, the widest extension which can be given of these privileges to those about you, who have them not. The measure by which you have expressed these recognitions, seems to me to be very far the most important which has for a long while been

taken by our churches. It is important, because it may lead, and, if on both sides we shall be faithful, it can scarcely fail to lead, to widely extended and most beneficial consequences to ourselves and to all about us. But your duty will be very partially done by a mere provision for the ministry. A very far greater work remains for you. I can say for my colleagues, as well as for myself, that either and each of us will be ready, at any time, and in any way, either to aid you, or to act for you, in any department of the service.

Respectfully,

JOSEPH TUCKERMAN.

Boston, September, 1834.

ART. VII. — *Phrenology, or the Doctrine of the Mental Phenomena.* By G. SPURZHEIM, M. D. of the Universities of Vienna and Paris, and Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians, London. In 2 vols. First American Edition. Greatly improved by the Author, from the Third London Edition. Boston. Marsh, Capen, and Lyon. 1832. 8vo.

"ALL our philosophy," said the sprightly Fontenelle, "is the result of excessive curiosity and imperfect vision." If this account be true of philosophy in general, it is eminently true of those speculations concerning matter and spirit, their relation to each other and their connexion in man, which, at almost every period in the history of thought, have occupied the transcendental inquirer. For, while subjects of this sort are peculiarly adapted to excite curiosity and to interest the imagination, they are of all subjects the most perplexing, and have hitherto baffled alike all the powers of sense and all the resources of conjecture.

Yet it is precisely such subjects as these, that philosophy has ever loved to entangle herself withal. Ever since the time of Thales, and how much earlier, — in the twilight of Indian, Egyptian, or Persian antiquity, — we cannot say, the relation of matter and spirit has been a vexed topic, and a cardinal question in metaphysics. Whether, indeed, there be any two such distinct agencies as these terms imply, or

whether all laws and all phenomena may not rather be resolved into one sole agency, is still a moot point on which different schools are at issue. And those schools, which assume but one agency, have, on the nature of that agency, again divided into separate and extreme courses.

So that in the very foundations of this department of philosophy, there is as yet nothing fixed, nothing permanent; and, however some may think to build upon loose conjectures and groundless assumptions, we are convinced, for our part, that there will be no real progress in metaphysics, until the great questions to which we have alluded, are finally solved, or, in case such solution be found impossible, until the impossibility has been demonstrated and some other foundation agreed on. Now there have arisen from time to time grave men, who spake with authority, saying that philosophy must not meddle with questions like these, and that it behoved philosophers to withdraw their efforts from the hopeless structure of transcendental theorems, on which ages had been laboring in vain, and to give them a more profitable direction. But, no sooner had these teachers ceased, than philosophers returned to the forbidden work and raised anew the old Babel, and wrought and wrangled upon its unfinished walls, until scattered again by new disorder and confusion of tongues. Nor were they wrong in their search after absolute knowledge. The strong craving of the mind for such knowledge is a sufficient apology for pursuing it, — a God-given charter and a free warrant for whatever course it may elect. The true seeker of wisdom may not suffer himself to be guided by authority. No one must say to him, Lo here! or lo there! His own experience and not another's must teach him what ways are practicable, and what are not practicable, to man. It is not well to inquire too curiously concerning the limits of our knowledge. When men affirm that nothing can be known *à priori*, they do themselves judge *à priori*, and that too in direct contradiction of the only science which has ever arrived at absolute truth. In like manner, when it is asserted that there is no knowledge beyond the limits of experience, the limits of experience are already transgressed. Therefore let trancendental inquiry continue, let speculation, the loftiest, the wildest, have free course, until it shall be proved, not by the negative tes-

timony of previous failures, but by positive evidence, how far philosophy may go, and where God hath fixed her bounds.

We have said that speculations about matter and spirit are as old as philosophy. Dualism, or the doctrine of two principles, was the prevailing theory of the most ancient schools. The *Spirit* and *Water* of Thales, the *Nous* and the *Homoiomeriai* of Anaxagoras, the *Monas* and *Dyas* of Pythagoras, the *Heaven* and *Earth* of Parmenides, the *Enmity* and *Friendship* of Empedocles, the *Fire* and *Density* of Heraclitus, are all different forms of this system. We must not, however, suppose that Dualism, as held by the ancients, involved that perfect antithesis which we understand by matter and spirit. Their notions of spiritual existence seldom went beyond the idea of an *aura* or *æther*, or some other infinitely attenuated form of matter. But there can be no doubt that they intended by this a separate and distinct principle, — an antagonist to grosser matter.

Socrates too, though on far higher grounds, was a Dualist, so far as the human constitution is concerned. The systems which immediately succeeded him, — the school of Megara, the Cynics, Stoics, Epicureans, &c., paid but little regard to these matters; and it was not till after their appearance, that philosophy developed itself in that two-fold direction in which it has come down to us. To the influence of Plato (who however was not a formal Idealist) must be traced that tendency to *idealism*, which in these latter times has been perfected in Berkeley and Fichte; and with the school of Aristotle, himself no materialist, originated those sensual views which have received their full developement in the systems of such philosophers as Hobbes, Priestley, and the French Encyclopædists. If, in addition to these two divisions, we reckon the various attempts made by Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Leibnitz, to reconcile the opposite principles which they represent, we have, without regarding minor distinctions and skeptical theories, three grand divisions or schools of philosophy; — the Ideal, comprehending all those systems which deny the objective reality, or, at least, the material basis of the outward world; — the Sensual or Mechanical, embracing not only the different schemes of Materialism, but all those systems which attempt to explain the origin of our ideas mechanically, i. e. by sensations and im-

pressions;* — and lastly, Dualism, comprising every philosophical recognition of two principles or agencies, accompanied with an attempt to define their limits and relations.

Our purpose in these remarks, — the bearing of which on the subject before us may seem somewhat remote, — was to determine, as nearly as possible the position which Phrenology must occupy in relation to previous systems of philosophy, if allowed to take its place among them. It is evidently a branch of the Sensual school, and must be considered as belonging to the lowest form of that school. It is in fact a system of pure Materialism. We are fully aware that some of its professors have labored to avoid this imputation, but, as it seems to us, unsuccessfully and unwisely. Unsuccessfully, because the fundamental principle, and indeed the whole structure, of their doctrine is an everlasting contradiction to any disclaimer which they may see fit to make on this subject; — unwisely, because the disavowal of Materialism gives an appearance of inconsistency to their system, and by this means deprives it of the small degree of consideration it might otherwise claim. If we are right in our suspicions, the motive of this disavowal proceeds partly from a natural, though very unphilosophical, dread of a consequence so startling, but chiefly from a fear of the discredit which it might bring upon their doctrine. This is mistaken policy. The worst feature which any philosophy can exhibit is inconsistency; and no system is entitled to respect, which does not candidly admit, and resolutely meet the consequences which naturally flow from it. Not that Phrenology would be any more true, if it assumed the form of avowed Materialism. God forbid! But it would certainly deserve in that form a more patient hearing. The Phrenologist may profess, if he pleases, that he is not a Materialist; such a profession is nothing to the purpose, except to prove, that his instinctive good sense is truer than his

* It need hardly be observed, that this division includes Locke and all metaphysicians of that class. With regard to Locke, indeed, the cool insinuation contained in his "Essay," (Book IV. c. III.), and afterwards defended in a letter to Bishop Stillingfleet, that God may have "superadded to matter a power of thinking," seems to discover in that philosopher a strong *inclination*, to say the least, toward downright Materialism.

philosophy; — but when he asserts that Phrenology is not Materialism, he shows himself utterly deficient in logic, and renders his whole system ridiculous. Phrenology *is* Materialism. Every theory of the mental faculties, professing to be the whole account of man, and not taking its stand within the mind as an immaterial substance, — but in a collection of matter, — does, by its very definition, come under that denomination. In vain would the phrenologist distinguish between the manifestations of the mind and the mind itself. The mind has absolutely and professedly no place in his system; it does not come into consideration. What does come into consideration? A mass of cineritious and medullary matter called the brain, to which all intellectual and moral phenomena are referred. Consequently the manifestations of which he speaks, are manifestations of this cineritious and medullary substance, and he has no authority whatever for calling them manifestations of the mind. He has found what he deems a sufficient cause for the phenomena in question, and it is altogether unphilosophical to speak of any other. When, therefore, the phrenologist talks of mind as distinct from the brain, he talks *extra scholam*, i. e. from a point not given in the philosophy itself, but assumed beyond it. He speaks, not as an expounder of the system, but as a critic sitting in judgment upon it. Now it must be evident, even to one less skilled in dialectics, if that were possible, than the author of the work before us, that every system of philosophy is to be judged from its own principles and the deductions naturally flowing therefrom, and not from the exoteric assertions of it disciples. The Phrenologist says, "The organs do not constitute the mind." That we well know; but what then are these organs? They are the causes of mental phenomena. What is the conclusion? Evidently that there is no mind. And this conclusion, derived from the direct testimony of the system itself, is confirmed by many hints which have fallen from its chief expounders. Mr. Combe is consistent, and boldly declares that we have no knowledge of mind independent of matter. "The mind, as it exists by itself, can never be an object of philosophical investigation"*! It is not easy to gather from Dr. Spurzheim's Introduction, made up as it is of in-

* See Combe's Phrenology. Last Edition. P. vi.

coherent and often unmeaning propositions, any definite opinion. The following sentence, however, the only one out of three pages, which can be considered as expressing the writer's own views, seems to corroborate the truth of our assertion. "The doctrine of immaterial substances is not sufficiently amenable to the test of observation; it is founded on belief, and only supported by hypothesis." Both of the abovementioned writers have labored to prove, that metaphysical inquiry is useless, and that anatomists and physiologists are the only true interpreters of man's moral and intellectual nature. This modest example has found ready imitators. The pretensions of these men have been loudly echoed by their followers. Phrenology is proclaimed, with that boastfulness which always distinguishes sciolism, to be the ultimate and complete science of man, — the last and highest attainment of human wisdom. The beautiful region of mental philosophy is to be converted into a barren *Golgotha*, or place of skulls. Yes! this ignoble doctrine, born of the dissecting-knife and a lump of medulla, betraying at every step its mean extraction, — thus carnal philosophy, with its limited conceptions, its grey truisms, its purblind theories, its withering conclusions, and its weary dogmatism, is to supplant the lofty faith of antiquity, and the sublime philosophy of the Bible, and to sit in judgment on the infinite and eternal! A great discovery has been made! It is ascertained, that there is no indwelling spirit in man. Those godlike powers which raise us above time and sense, — those thoughts which compass heaven and earth, and commune with the All-Wise and True, are not, as was once fondly deemed, the immaterial functions of an immaterial being. "*Nous avons changé tout cela.*" The anatomist has taken the subject into consideration. Those powers, those thoughts, are the products of little lumps of flesh, measuring each an inch in diameter, weighing altogether about two pounds avoirdupois. Behold here the true nature and the full dimensions of the human soul! A discovery so important certainly deserves attention. We can give it, however, but a brief examination.

The brain is the *sole* organ of the mind; it is divided into several compartments, each of which exercises a separate function, producing a corresponding manifestation of the moral or intellectual faculties. These are the fundamental

theses of Phrenology. On the truth of these, the evidence of the doctrine mainly depends. If these positions can be demonstrated, — established beyond the possibility of philosophical doubt, then there is a presumption in favor of the hypothesis, that the character of a moral agent, — no, not of a moral agent, for the supposition precludes moral agency in any proper sense of that term, — that the character of a human being is determined by, and may be interpreted from, the brain. The brain is the organ of the mind. This is not a discovery of the phrenologists. Nor do they claim it. The doctrine was advanced at a very early stage in medical science, and has been maintained by many eminent anatomists and physiologists ever since. Nor is it at all surprising that a philosopher of this class should be led to such a conclusion. Dealing solely with matter, knowing nothing *but* matter, and having found that many phenomena of human nature may be traced to organization, he naturally concludes that intellectual and moral phenomena are attributable to the same cause; and having once fastened them on the flesh, the brain, from the peculiarity of its structure and its situation with respect to other parts, is found a very convenient place for their location. But the question is, whether the testimony of the physiologist is to be received as the only valid evidence on this point. So Phrenology would have it. But we say, not. The physiologist must either admit or deny that there is an immaterial agent in man. If he deny it, we call upon him to prove that there is a material agent, — that man exists at all. And this, if we are not mistaken, he will find himself sorely puzzled to do, without appealing at once to an immaterial principle, — a principle, of which his five senses and his dissecting-knife, and all the surgical and all the chemical apparatus ever invented, can never give him the slightest knowledge. At all events, we will undertake to prove the existence of mind with as much conclusiveness, to say the least, as he can prove the existence of matter. If he admit that there is an immaterial agent, he cannot deny that that agent may act on itself, and, by such action, obtain knowledge of its nature and its relations, — in short, that the metaphysician may speak on these subjects as well as the physiologist. As metaphysicians, then, arguing from consciousness, from reason, and reflection, we affirm that the brain is not the sole organ of the mind; that, on the con-

trary, many of the mental faculties are wholly independent of this organ.* Reason and reflection cannot demonstrate this, but neither can the observations of the physiologist *demonstrate* the contrary. We have, then, assertions and arguments on both sides, and either testimony is equally valid.

When it is said that the brain is the organ of the mind, one of two things is intended, — either that the mind is manifested by the brain, or that it operates through the brain. If it be maintained that the mind manifests itself by means of the brain, we reply, that a great portion of the mind's action is not manifested at all, — which makes the brain, so far, useless; and that, when the mind does manifest itself, it is, as every one knows, by means of the hands and feet, the lips, eyes, &c., showing at least as great a dependence on these organs, as on the brain. If it be maintained that the mind operates by means of the brain, we throw the burden of proof on the physiologist, and demand *positive* demonstration of the fact. For we are by no means satisfied with the evidence hitherto adduced in support of it. And however we may be disposed to admit that those faculties and propensities which connect us immediately with the outward world, such as observation and calculation, the sensual appetites, and the earthly affections, are determined by cerebral developements, it seems to us utterly improbable — nay, impossible, — that the powers and propensities of our spiritual nature, the will (meaning thereby moral self-determination), faith, love of God (not veneration), consciousness, reason, &c., are thus determined; and nothing less than absolute demonstration will convince us of the fact. The only way to demonstrate this point would be, to show the brain

* This is not the place to offer the *metaphysical* arguments alluded to above. Our object at present is to examine the arguments of the phrenologists, meeting them on their own ground, and on ground common to all parties. We will, however, just glance at the nature of the reasoning, by which we conclude that there are mental faculties independent of the brain. Take *consciousness*, for example, or the faculty of self-intuition. We maintain, that this faculty cannot, from its very nature, be exercised by a material organ. In consciousness, we perceive *self*, with all its spiritual powers, to be an absolute, indivisible *one*; and of this we are more certain than we can be of any thing else. But matter is made up of separate *parts*, ergo, matter cannot be conscious. Granting even (what is absurd) that a particle of matter could be *self*-conscious, it cannot be conscious of other particles.

in the act of performing these functions. As this cannot be done, demonstration is out of the question, and all that can be offered is presumptive evidence. Mr. Combe, indeed, affirms that "consciousness" refers the mind to the brain as its seat. But this we do not hesitate to pronounce impossible. For, to be conscious of the location of the soul, — i. e. of our absolute self, — in space, would require us to perceive our *self* with the same sense by which we perceive surrounding matter, — just as we perceive our bodily position in the material world, by means of the eye, which determines the relation of the body to surrounding objects. But we know that the soul can distinguish itself only through the medium of consciousness; and its corporeal relations (whether external or internal), only by means of the senses. It is true, we sometimes hear men speak of *feeling* the operation of thought in the brain. This is because thinking is sometimes accompanied with sensations in that quarter. But the inference drawn from this fact, that thinking is felt in the brain, Kant has aptly shown to be an instance of that error in logic called *subreptio;* that is to say, an opinion concerning the cause of a feeling is confounded with the feeling of a cause.* Nothing is more common, as a late physiologist has remarked, than to confound the accompanying circumstance with the immediate cause.† *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc,* is a very natural but often a very unwarrantable conclusion. If those pains in the head, which sometimes accompany severe thinking, were the direct effects of thinking, they ought, according to phrenology, to be felt principally in the region of the organs corresponding to the particular faculties called into action. But this, so far as our experience goes, is not the case. When thinking on abstract subjects, the pain, — if we felt any, — was not in the region of "comparison" and "causality" as, in the absence of a special organ for thinking (a great defect, by the way, in Phrenology), it ought to have been; on the contrary, it was somewhere about "reverence," "firmness," and "conscientiousness," or else in the midst

* See Kant's Letter to Sömmering, "Ueber das Organ der Seele," in which the absurdity and contradiction, implied in the attempt to assign a locality to the soul, are ably exposed.

† Hunter on the Blood.

of that populous little colony situated just over the eyes,—"weight," "coloring," "order," &c. &c.

The pains in question we have not ourselves very often experienced (doubtless because we have not thought sufficiently), but we are convinced that they may be accounted for by a very different supposition; namely, by that very duplicity and antagonism of mind and body, which Phrenology labors to overthrow. It is a well known fact, that neither the bodily nor the mental powers can be exercised exclusively for any length of time without injury to the other. The latter, indeed, will suffer less perceptibly from this cause than the former; because it is possible, in this world, to live for the body only. But still, we are justified in saying that the intellectual and moral nature of one who lives thus, *suffers*. In like manner, when the mind has been long and intensely engaged, the body suffers. It suffers, not merely for the want of muscular exercise, but because the whole vitality of the system being, as it were, absorbed in mind, the action of the vital functions, circulation, secretion, &c., is impeded. And this suffering is, of course, felt soonest in the most sensitive (i. e. nervous) parts, consequently in the brain.

Of the arguments advanced by Dr. Spurzheim to prove the dependence of the mind upon the brain, the following only appear to us to have any weight. First, if the brain be not the organ of the mental faculties, it exists to no purpose, as no other use can be assigned for it. Allowing this to be true, there are other parts of the body, for which no use can be assigned, or which do not come into use. No satisfactory explanation has yet been given of the spleen. The muscles which move the ear, in common with many others, are never called into action, and, except in very few instances, cannot be exercised.* To what purpose are certain organs of sense double? since, according to Spurzheim, we see with only one eye, and hear with only one ear. Besides, is it certain that no other use can be found for the brain? Other uses certainly *have* been assigned. According to some physiologists, it is an organ of secretion, and, according to very many, the origin and source of the nerves. And, though we are not disposed to question the superior

* See Sömmering, "De Humani Corporis Fabricâ."

knowledge of cerebral anatomy, so constantly claimed in the work before us, in behalf of the authors of Phrenology, yet we suppose it will be allowed, that even "Gall and I" may be mistaken, not, perhaps, in their discoveries,* but in the hypotheses built upon them. It would seem that the brain is necessary to the vital functions from the fact, that *acephali* though frequently born alive, continue to live but a short time.

The second argument is the alleged fact, that the energy and perfection of the mental faculties are always proportioned to the developement of the brain, and that in idiots this organ is always defective. That there is a certain connexion between a sound organization and a sound mind, we do not pretend to deny. What the nature of this connexion is cannot be ascertained. It seems analogous to the connexion which exists between the perfection of the Divine mind, and the perfection of the universe. Men, who are destined to play an important part in the moral world, and to act powerfully on their age, are generally endowed with a sound corporeal frame. There are exceptions, but such is the rule. But this soundness of body is not confined to the brain; it is required to a greater or less extent in all the other parts of the system. Those who are by birth deficient in any essential part of the human frame, never become great men. A deaf and dumb person, or a blind person, may be capable of high intellectual effort, and exhibit many bright manifestations of mind. But such persons cannot exert any powerful influence on society; their intellectual manifestations are imperfect, and, so far as the defective senses are concerned, they even appear idiotic. A person destitute of all the senses, — if that were possible, — would probably appear wholly so. In like manner a native idiot has, doubtless, processes of thought going on within him. There is, evidently, a spirit at work in that crazy fabric. It is not in the essential properties of mind that he is wanting, but, owing to a very imperfect organization of a very important part, he is unfitted to the world in which he lives. So far as *that* is

* It should be remembered, however, that the Report presented to the National Institute of France, by a committee, of which it is sufficient to say, that Cuvier was at its head, was by no means favorable to the discoveries of the phrenologists.

concerned, he is foolish and inefficient. In many cases, if not in all, idiocy consists in a disease of the nerves; and, where this is the case, it can prove nothing with respect to the peculiar dependency of the mind on the cerebral parts; for we know that every disease tends to weaken the mental functions, whether its seat be in the chest, or the abdomen, or the brain.* We had other views to offer on this subject, tending to the same conclusion, but our limits press. For this reason we must pass briefly over the third and last argument, drawn from instances of insanity, which sometimes accompany injuries of the brain. On this topic we can only remark; 1st, that in most cases of insanity there is no injury of the brain, and, that such cases are not to be explained by the hypothesis in question; 2dly, that, according to the testimony of many physiologists, — among others, of Sömmering, whose authority on this subject will hardly be questioned, — the brain may be injured in any of its parts without any perceptible damage to the mental powers.†

The doctrine we are considering involves many difficulties which must be solved, before the confident tone assumed by phrenologists, in relation to this subject, can be justified. On the supposition, that the brain is the sole organ of the mind, how are we to account for our memory of the past and our consciousness of continued identity, since every particle of the body passes off, according to some physiologists once in five years, or, according to others, once in three? How are we to explain the fact, that men of a lean habit manifest the intellectual powers in as great perfection as those of a contrary habit? Since, according to Spurzheim, the volume of the brain increases with the size of the body. But, above all, if it be true, as phrenologists assert, that this dependence of mind on brain holds through all the orders of animated nature, why is not the brain in the lower tribes always proportioned to the amount of mind manifested by them? It requires but a cursory observation to perceive, that this is far from being the case.‡ Not to insist on the

* Thus, melancholy and monomania may be caused by disorders of the liver.

† "Nulla etiam pars est cerebri, quæ non subinde indurata, vulnerata, pure exesa, corrupta, sine tamen notabili et vitæ et animi virium damno, sit inventa." — Sömmering, De Hum. Corp. Fabricâ.

‡ Our author appears to be perfectly aware of this circumstance, but we do not find that he has made any attempt to explain it.

example of vertebrated animals, in several of whom the proportion of the brain to the rest of the body is larger than in man; what are we to say of the astounding manifestations of mind displayed by the insect world; exemplified, not only in the wonderful contrivances of the bee, the spider, and the common ant, but in actions more wonderful still, as having no immediate reference to the necessities of life, and as bearing the nearest brute resemblance to the peculiar manifestations of human beings. Such are the wars of conquest carried on by different nations of the termites, in which the vanquished become the captives and slaves of the victors, and are subjected by them to all kinds of servile labor. Now in these animals, the brain (if there be any) is not only small, absolutely and relatively; but its very existence is exceedingly problematical. Many physiologists, with Linnæus at their head, have denied it. Cuvier, whose authority on such subjects is paramount, called the ganglion above the œsophagus a brain, but denied that it bore any analogy to the cerebral organ in vertebrated animals.* And, if it be true, that some insects, as the caterpillar,† for example, will live, and even walk, for some days after the loss of their heads, it is evident that the *will*, at least, supposed by phrenologists to be a resident in the brain, cannot reside there in insects.

But, let us suppose for a moment, that some of the intellectual faculties, such as memory and observation, have their seat in the brain; it is evident that the arguments which are usually advanced in support of this supposition entirely fail, when applied to the affections, the passions, and all those feelings and emotions, which, in common phraseology come under the denomination of the "heart." Our experience refers the action of these feelings and emotions, neither to the cerebrum nor the cerebellum, but to other parts of the system. An emotion of anger causes the knees to shake, but leaves "combativeness" and every other *ativeness* in the phrenological *ennead* of propensities, unmoved. The remembrance of some luckless *étourderie* suffuses the cheek, but rises no higher than the temples. Desire lengthens respiration into sighs, but stops short with the intercostal muscles. Fear arrests the motion of the heart, mirth moves the

* See Cuvier's Anat. Comp. † See Kirby and Spence. Letter 37th.

diaphragm and the risorius muscle, and grief acts on the abdomen and the lachrymal glands; but not one, out of the twelve islands of the brain assigned to sentiment and affection by phrenologists, manifests any conscious participation in these effects.* It would seem, then, that there is as much reason for supposing that the heart or that the abdomen is the seat of the *affective* faculties, as there is for referring them to the brain; and the Scriptures may be considered as using language not wholly figurative, when they speak of those parts as synonymous with certain sentiments and affections.

But we cannot stop to argue this point any further, though much remains to be said. We trust we shall not be misunderstood. We do not mean to deny, that the brain is in any sense the medium of the soul. We repeat, that we have no objection to supposing a more intimate relation between that organ and some of the lower faculties; though we think even this far from certain. But we believe that there are many of the spiritual powers and affections which have no connexion whatever with the brain, except so far as that is connected with the essential functions of animal life. One need only review the history of opinions on this subject, to be convinced how hypothetical the whole matter is. While some physiologists have supposed that the mind occupied the whole of the brain, others, thinking that too large a space for so insignificant an agent, have placed it in the cerebellum, others again have confined it to the commencement of the spinal marrow, others to the corpus callosum, and so on. The errors into which phrenologists and others have fallen, on this subject, have arisen from the false notion, that the soul must have a local habitation, and every faculty and affection a local origin, thus applying the material relations of space to things in their nature immaterial. The connexion of the soul with the body is not *local* but *virtual*, and this connexion, such as it is, refers not to the brain only, but, in a greater or less degree, to every part of the system.

If, then, the first and fundamental principle of phrenology be yet undemonstrated, and, as we have labored to show, indemonstrable, what is to be said of the superstructure

* The mechanical connexion, which the nervous system supposes between the effects here described and the brain, is not to be confounded with their psychical origin and conscious manifestation.

which its advocates have raised upon it? What confidence is due to a system based on a mere hypothesis? And, if the first principle of this system is doubtful, the second is still more so. This, our readers will remember, supposes the brain to consist of a multitude of separate and independent organs, each of which performs a separate mental function. To those who are acquainted with the boastful pretensions of Phrenology to be a science of facts, and to eschew every thing but facts, it may seem rather surprising that no facts have yet been advanced in support of the abovementioned position. It will be understood that we speak now of *physiological* facts, which are to prove the multiplicity of mental organs in the brain and their independent action *physiologically*, and as it were, *a priori*, without reference to the historical coincidences, supposed to have been discovered between certain traits of character and certain protuberances of the skull. This is an after-consideration. It must be first proved, that the several convolutions act as independent organs, and then it may be shown what mental functions correspond to them. Of such physiological facts, we repeat it, there are none within our knowledge. Analogies and probabilities are offered in abundance, but no facts. We are, accordingly, spared all further trouble on this point, and shall proceed at once to the consideration of those *historical* facts, on which, so much stress has been laid by the defenders of Phrenology, and on which, alone, some of its non-professional advocates seem disposed to ground the system. And here we think it necessary to remark, that facts *prove* nothing in science, unless they are so universal as to become settled principles. Without such universality they admit of various interpretation, and, according to the interpretation given them, may be used for very different purposes. Universality is the necessary condition and distinguishing characteristic of science. If Phrenology, therefore, is to be considered as any thing more than a system of *craniomancy* or *skull-guessing*, which will sometimes hold good, and sometimes not,—the facts on which it rests must be uniform. A single exception destroys their validity; just as the doctrine of gravitation would sink into a mere hypothesis, if a body thrown into the air did not always fall to the ground, but only now and then; or as chemistry would cease to be a science, if it depended on chance, whether, under given conditions, the principle of attraction would hold or fail. If it can be proved, that in

every case, without exception, certain qualities of mind are accompanied with certain developements of brain, we shall, notwithstanding all that has been said, submit to the irresistible conclusion, that there is necessary connexion between those qualities and the corresponding developements. Yet, even then, we could not admit Phrenology to be a complete science of human nature, inasmuch as it leaves out of view some of the most important of the human faculties. But what is the fact? The coincidences between brain and character adduced in support of Phrenology, far from possessing the universality required, do not even outweigh the exceptions. If we may trust our own limited observation, and the testimony of many more competent observers, the exceptions are far more numerous. But it is with this as with other favorite theories. Zealous partisans magnify a few corroborating facts, and suppress, or even fail to notice, the cases which make against them. Bacon's aphorism, on this subject, is so much in point, that one might almost suppose it written with a prophetic reference to Phrenology. "When the mind is once pleased with certain things, it draws all others to consent and go along with them; and though the power and number of instances that make for the contrary are greater, yet it either attends not to them or despises them; or else *removes and rejects them by a distinction; with a strong and pernicious prejudice to maintain the authority of its first choice unviolated.** And hence, in most cases of superstition, as of astrology, &c., those who find pleasure in such vanities always observe where the event answers; but slight and pass by the instances in which it fails, which are much the more frequent. This mischief diffuses itself much more subtilly in philosophies and the sciences; where that which has once pleased, infects and subdues all other things, though much more substantial and valuable than itself. And, though the mind were free from this delight and vanity, yet it has the peculiar and constant error of being more moved and excited by affirmatives than by negatives, whereas it should duly and equally yield to both. But, on the contrary, in the raising of true *axioms*, negative instances have the greatest force." †

* Does not this describe exactly the method pursued by phrenologists in relation to unfavorable instances?

† Novum Organum, Aph. 46.

The "Novum Organum," from which these words are taken, though misinterpreted in the common acceptation of the Baconian philosophy, and improperly extended beyond the limits of natural science, is yet the best possible test of philosophies that appeal to observation. Tried by this test, Phrenology cannot stand. It has no sufficient foundation in facts; its boasted experience falls far short of the rigid demands of the "Instauration." We should transgress all bounds, were we to attempt any thing like an enumeration of the facts unfavorable to Phrenology. Let the following example stand instead of a thousand. We extract it from an article on this subject in a late number of the "Cyclopædia of Practical Medicine." "Some hundreds and even thousands of monomaniacs, in all of whom certain feelings and propensities have been developed even to morbid excess, have passed a part of their lives under the inspection of M. Esquirol, who possesses most extensive resources for elucidating almost every subject connected with the history of mental diseases, and has neglected no inquiry which could further the attainment of that object. At his establishment at Ivry, he has a large assemblage of crania and casts from the heads of lunatics, collected by him during the long course of his attendance at the Salpétrière, and at the Royal Hospital at Charenton. While inspecting this collection, the writer of the present article was assured by M. Esquirol, that the testimony of his experience is entirely adverse to the doctrine of the phrenologists; it has convinced him that there is no foundation whatever in facts for the system of correspondences, which they lay down between certain measurements of the heads and the existence of peculiar mental endowments. This observation by M. Esquirol was made in the presence of Mr. Mitivié, physician to the Salpétrière, and received his assent and confirmation.' There are few if any individuals in Europe whose sphere of observation has been so extensive as that of M. Esquirol; but testimonies to the same result may be collected from unbiassed witnesses, whose evidence taken collectively may have nearly equal weight."* We have no doubt that the

* Rudolphi, a German physiologist, says that he has examined many hundreds of brains without finding any thing favorable to the Phrenological theory.

ingenuity of phrenologists may contrive some evasion of the obvious inference which must be drawn from facts like these; but, with every one who does not stand committed on this subject, we are sure that one such testimony must be decisive. We will, however, add one more. Dr. Prichard, in his late work "on the Physical History of Mankind," after showing that the skulls of African Negroes allow less room for cerebral developement than those of Europeans, observes, on the question whether any difference of intellectual capacity be connected with this circumstance, that, as far as he has had opportunity of collecting information on the subject, the result has been a decided assurance that Negroes are not inferior in intellect to Europeans; that this has been the almost uniform testimony of intelligent planters and medical practitioners from the West Indies; and that among the former, notwithstanding their prejudices, he has not met with one out of a great number, who did not give a most positive testimony as to the natural equality of the African Negro and the European.

The phrenologist's account of what he is pleased to call the mind, is unquestionably the most absurd theory that was ever contrived to support a beloved hypothesis. His classification of the mental powers is an insult to consciousness. The whole system is framed with exclusive reference to this world; for even "veneration" does not necessarily imply a Supreme Being as its object. It has no point of contact with the world of spirits, and renders many spiritual phenomena, —regeneration for example,— altogether inexplicable. That Reason, Faith, Consciousness, and the power of moral self-determination should be left out of view in this system, as not coming within the experience of phrenologists, is not surprising. But how are we to account for the omission of so obvious and common a faculty as Memory? Is the whole ground preoccupied? Is there no more room in cerebrum or cerebellum? Cannot the advocates of this doctrine by a little different arrangement, by crowding or retrenching, by omitting *veneration*, say, or *conscientiousness*, find space for one more organ? If they can, we advise them to do so with all speed, and to call that organ Memory; for, if there is any thing certain about the human mind, it is the existence of such a faculty. Its operation is not to be explained by the combined functions of other powers. If any attribute of the mind is single and distinct, this is so.

The prevalence and popularity of Phrenological views may seem to require explanation. It is well known to most of our readers, how suddenly the doctrine established itself, and how rapidly it gained ground in this region. No sooner had its late distinguished apostle appeared in our city, than a *pentecost* was witnessed, such as philosophy has not known before, since the days of the later Platonists. All tongues were loosed, and a strange *onomastic* was in every man's mouth. Heads of chalk, inscribed with mystic numbers, disfigured every mantel-piece. Converts multiplied on all sides, some proselytes of the covenant, and some proselytes of the gate. A general inspection and registry of heads took place. In defiance of the Apostolic injunction, hands were laid suddenly on all men, and many by such imposition were ordained teachers. A cast was given them as a diploma, "*una cum potestate publice prælegendi*," &c. In short, this theory of man obtained a speedy and signal triumph, and all the higher principles of our nature were in danger of being entombed in the little *tumuli* of the brain. Happily, however, the prevalence of a doctrine is no test whatever of its soundness. On the contrary, there is much truth in what Bacon has said on this subject; "Consent ought to be so far from passing as any real authority, as to give a violent suspicion of the contrary; for of all characteristics that is the worst, which men take from consent in matters of the understanding. So that the thought of Phocion * may be justly transferred from intellectuals to morals; for men ought directly to examine themselves wherein they have erred, when the multitude consents and applauds them. This sign, therefore, of general consent, is one of the most unfavorable that a philosophy can have." † We are not at all apprehensive that this system will ever find much favor with philosophers and scientific men. For, not to mention the intellectual poverty of the doctrine, and the entire absence (manifested, for example, in the work before us) of all great and far-reaching views, — a philosophy which has been rejected by such men as Cuvier, Sabatier, and Pinel, and that too on purely physiological grounds, has but a slender chance

* Phocion, being once highly applauded by the multitude, turned round to his friends and asked what absurdity he had committed.

† Nov. Org., Aph. 77.

of success with the learned. Meanwhile its prevalence among the unlearned is easily accounted for. A philosophy of some sort,—a philosophy of human nature, which, whether true or false, may be paraded and talked about, is a luxury to which, in these days, almost every one aspires. But, unluckily, a system of philosophy was till lately a difficult acquisition. The aspirant was forced, either to turn his attention within himself,—a very uninteresting employment; or else to read books which required some degree of mental application,—an unpleasant alternative. But now there springs up a system which requires no such hard conditions;—a philosophy which appeals simply and solely to the senses, and is therefore suited to the humblest capacity and the coarsest taste;—a philosophy which lays out human nature in the form of a map, so that every man, woman, or child, who will take the trouble to spend a few hours over that map, and learn the names of its different provinces, with their respective location, may rise up a philosopher, completely versed in the noble science of man. Is it wonderful that a system so cheap and easy should find ready followers?

One word in conclusion as to the purpose of this discussion. It was not the heavy tax levied upon the credulity of the people, nor yet the irreligious tendency of the doctrine, evidenced by various symptoms, that induced us to take up arms against Phrenology. Our chief object has been to expose the presumption with which this doctrine arrogates to itself the supreme right to dictate on subjects beyond the reach of physical inquiry. While the discoveries, or supposed discoveries, of Gall bore the humble name of *Craniology*, we felt no disposition to interfere with them. We deemed it an innocent, though not a very profitable occupation for those who had no other employment, to hunt out coincidences between the heads and the characters of their friends. But when this science assumed the title of Phrenology, when it usurped the rights of mental philosophy, and presumed to pass judgment on questions which require far other discipline, and far other powers; when it brought to the dissecting-table the powers and properties of the inner man, and sought to lay bloody hands on the sacred image of God; we began to fear its carnal influence. And it is on this ground that we have thought proper to discuss freely its

character and its claims. The encroachment of the senses and of sensual philosophy on the domain of consciousness and faith, is a species of invasion which we shall never cease to resist with such force as our limited powers, and our strong convictions, may supply. We shall always render unto the physical sciences the things that are theirs, and we shall claim equal justice in behalf of "that interior truth, whose school and oracle are within the breast." *

ART. VIII. — *Memoir of S. Osgood Wright, late Missionary to Liberia.* By B. B. THATCHER. Boston: Light & Horton. New York: Moore & Payne; Leavitt, Lord, & Co. 1834. pp. 122.

THIS is an able delineation of an unpretending life and character, as interesting as it is instructive. The principal source, from which the details of the Memoir were derived, is the private journal of its subject. It is seldom, in this country, that literary justice is done the prominent members of the denomination of which this individual was so promising an ornament. Their honors of this kind have been reaped in England. Among us the Methodists are more known by their oral, than by their written productions, or biographies prepared by professional writers. Their labors, too, are as unassuming as they are sedulous. One, indeed, of their clergy, by his unremitting efforts and fervid eloquence in behalf of a neglected class of our population, has endeared himself universally, and become identified with the benevolent spirit of the day. And we welcome the little work before us not least, because it is the story of *his* younger brother's martyrdom in the cause of religion and humanity.

Mr. Wright was a native of Springfield, in Massachusetts, where his early years were passed under happy domestic and local influences, the genial effect of which upon his susceptible feelings, were fully manifested in his after life. He did not pass the ordeal of youthful temptation, however, without feeling, and, to some extent, yielding to its power.

* Norris's "Ideal World."

And there is not a more affecting and improving lesson in his history, not excepting its melancholy termination, than the conscientious record of his early dereliction from duty, the regret and mortification thus induced, and his subsequent and complete reformation. He dwells, with the bitterest self-reproach, upon this brief period of his life, nor attempts, even to himself, to qualify its folly by referring it to his youth, his circumstances, or any other palliative cause. In the struggle which succeeded the first conviction of his almost fatal error, between his old habits of thinking and his newly awakened sense of right, he seems well nigh to have yielded himself to despair; but the better purpose eventually triumphed.

"More than once," says he, "in the still hour of midnight, did I wander to the river's brink, with the rash resolution of there ending my troubles by a precipitate rush into a dread eternity! Eternity! ah! that was a word of fearful, untold import, and then it pealed upon my ear in terrible accents. Oh! if I could have read and believed then, what my heart so much wished was true, that death was an eternal sleep, I had not been here to record my presumptuous revellings. But no! the clear, deep stream before me, the slumbering dead beside me, the solemn silence of the night, — so many audible voices, uttering, in unison with my own conscience, the alarming truth, — *After death comes the judgment!* could I rush into the presence of a justly offended God, who seemed to be looking down upon me through every twinkling star that adorned the clear heavens? But there was the gently undulating river, and down, where the moonbeams seemed to be lost in the dark depths, I saw a grave where I fondly hoped I might be for ever, yes, *for ever* concealed! *And is God not there?* said a voice, which was heard above the conflicting, clamorous passions of my breast! I could not deny it, and nerving my heart, as for another dreaded combat, I sought again my bed." — pp. 30, 31.

Mr. Wright was first incited to self-examination by one of those eloquent appeals which characterize the preaching of his persuasion, and his most effectual religious impressions were derived from intercourse with its members. To them, therefore, he attached himself, though the circle of his sympathies extended far beyond the pale of any denomination. He was allied to many minds by the bond of a common interest in various benevolent and intellectual objects. And to these connexions he frequently and fondly reverts in his

diary. It was his intention, and he had in fact prepared himself, to follow the business of a printer; but, as his native propensities unfolded, he readily yielded to their dictates, seconded as they were by a deep sense of duty, and prepared himself for the Christian ministry. The brief term of his practice in the profession was marked by the strong attachment of those among whom he labored, and, on the other hand, by the expansion and improvement of his mind and feelings. It was at about this period that he seems most perfectly to have enjoyed that quiet happiness and pure satisfaction, which the consciousness of usefulness and growth never fails to inspire. Possessed of good native powers, and having a happy share of the poetical temperament with an active and liberal spirit, he deservedly gained upon the affections of all with whom he was in any wise connected.

The Missionary enterprise in Africa was brought more immediately before Mr. Wright in his capacity of editor of a religious journal. He inquired and reflected upon the subject until it deeply interested him. He saw, in its prospective fruits, a rare combination of useful and happy results; and, in proportion as his mind delighted in contemplating the probable effects and present circumstances of the mission, he seems to have desired, and finally to have felt impelled, to make Liberia the scene of his efforts. There was much in this noble purpose which harmonized with his native sentiments, and every thing that his Christian principle approved. Yet he was not insensible to the dangers and discouragements of the undertaking. These he appears to have realized, in anticipation, to a remarkable degree, considering the vein of idealism which belonged to his very nature. The enthusiasm of philanthropy, while it rendered the distant prospect cheerful, did not blind him to the extent of the sacrifice he was about to make. On the contrary, his sufferings, up to the time that the plan was definitely arranged, were extreme; and the touching manner, in which he describes his last visits to the paternal roof and the habitations of his friends, evidences his sense of the privileges he was thus about to renounce.

"The feelings of Mr. Wright on this occasion, and subsequent to it," says the author, "may be inferred best from the following passage of his journal, dated at midnight of October 2d. — 'For a few moments, after an evening of confusion,

I am left alone to commune with my own heart. Yesterday I visited Malden, and bade my beloved friends farewell! Many were the tears we shed; and many the blessings they craved on my unworthy head. It was one of the most trying moments of my life. God bless this affectionate people! I cannot cease to pray that I may yet return to their embrace. This evening my friends have called to take their leave, and we have said farewell, and pressed many a trembling hand, until our hands and hearts both ache! I would have been spared this scene. Separation is a bitter drop in the cup of friendship, but the nectar is sweeter when the poison is no more. My mind I find wonderfully sustained at this moment; and I feel a longing for that hour when my feet shall press the blood-wet ground of Africa. Over the sepulchre of a thousand pleasing, fond realities, I must write —

"'The beautiful is vanished and returns not.'"

His voyage was safely accomplished; he had already begun to acquaint himself with the character of the people whom he hoped to influence; many events of interest and incitements to hope combined to cheer him, and his journal betokens the alacrity with which he commenced the work so long anticipated. A few weeks passed, and the partner alike of his joys and sorrows, hopes and fears, fell a victim to the African fever. Ere long he, too, sunk under a relapse of the same disease; to the moment of complete exhaustion evincing, by his own recorded thoughts, that resigned, hopeful, peaceful state of feeling which springs only from the "faith touching *all things* with hues of heaven." In view of such incidents, who will not sympathize in the beautiful termination of the volume?

"No! weep not for him! He but rose to his rest,
From his own loved land of the fervid line,
With his silvery sheaves of the dawn all gleaned
Ere bright dews blazoned the noon's decline;
He shall toil, with tears, in the gloom of a dim
Lone harvest no more; — oh weep not for him!

"And weep not for her! they have laid the dust
Of the early exile so softly away,
In the pleasant shade of the plantain-tree,
That the Judgment angels who seek that day
The jewels of glory, will scarcely stir
So sweet a slumber; — weep not for her!

"Weep not! In the home where the sinless meet,
Lingers no lonely yearning for *this*, —
As the pilgrims sorrowed (and smiled the while)
In dreams, o'er the visions of vanished bliss:
No sorrow enters that radiant realm, —
No mourning, no yearning; — oh weep not for them!"
— pp. 121, 222.

Such is the outline of this memoir. There are those, perhaps, who will behold in the enterprise of these missionaries a zeal which overcame even just discretion. They will deem it almost presumptuous for two individuals, natives of the Northern States, to have expected immunity from consequences like that which so soon and so sadly terminated their existence. Let it, however, be remembered, that Mr. Wright's devotion to the cause he had espoused was not only instinct with ardor; it was calm and deliberate. The purpose he cherished, and in the advancement of which he found a premature grave, was a holy purpose. And the fact, that his ministry of love was thus early consummated, his martyr's crown thus early won, should lead us, in contemplating his character, to think more earnestly upon its leading principle, upon that feature which death itself served more perfectly to develope, — we mean the spirit of self-sacrifice.

The devotion of self to something beyond self, and yet for the sake of self, this philosophy recognises as an universal law. The leaf which sinks into the earthy bed whence it originated, only to assume a renewed form of life; the dew-drop that cools the drooping petal only to be borne thence on a sunbeam to its parent cloud; the animal which loses its identity beneath the sod, only to pour into other channels its ever varying beauty and being, — all are but faintly typical of the sacrificial spirit of the universe.

And if we ascend to human offerings, the eye but dimly discerns the power, interest, and extent of sacrifice. The mother, what does she devote at affection's shrine? Is it nought but strength, ease, and time? How much more of feeling, serenity, and thought! The philanthropist, — is not his toil, weariness, and wearing-away, but as dust in the balance, when compared to the sentiment and inward energy which he profusely expends for man's welfare? The studious devotee, — number his hours of confinement, the

throbs of his aching brow, the beatings of his fevered pulse, and then descend into that excited, watching, sensitive spirit of his, and view the numberless visions of fancy, the eager yearnings of ambition, the unfathomable depths of desire, which people with latent disappointments, with restless and destroying elements, the inner-world of his idolatry.

A holy, fondly-nurtured hope is the sustaining principle; — the hope of eminent usefulness and honor; — the hope of standing among the moral heights of the world to draw down the renovating influences of heaven. And when such a hope is checked or extinguished ere fully accomplished, the philosophy of improvement bids us remember that the philanthropic impulse, the determinate spirit, the noble intent it is ours to cherish; the occasion will proceed from him who prompts the sacrifice.

The source and end of the self-denying principle consists in its relation to the highest forms of spiritual force and activity. It is identical both as an evidence and result with power, — power of the most exalted character. Nothing truly great was ever effected without it. And the vigor and prowess of that spirit is indeed untested, which is a stranger to the trial, the strength-giving, joy-enkindling influences of holy self-sacrifice.

NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

The Sunday Library for Young Persons. Edited by the Rev. Henry Ware, Jr. — Vol. I. *The Life of the Saviour.* By Henry Ware, Jr., Professor of Pulpit Eloquence and the Pastoral Care in Harvard University. Second Edition. Cambridge: James Munroe & Co. 1834. 16mo. pp. 272. — Vol. II. *Lives of Philanthropists.* Volume I. John Howard. By Mrs. John Farrar, Author of "Congo in Search of his Master," "The Children's Robinson Crusoe," and "The Story of the Life of Lafayette." Cambridge: Brown, Shattuck, & Company. 1833. 16mo. pp. 274. — Vol. III. *The Holy Land and its Inhabitants.* By S. G. Bulfinch. Cambridge: James Munroe & Company. 1834. 16mo. pp. 298. — These little books, as many of our readers know, make the first three of a series, edited by Prof. Henry Ware, Jr., having for

its object to furnish suitable and attractive reading for young persons on the Sabbath. The general object of the publication must recommend itself to every one who is desirous that the Sunday should be productive of useful and serious thoughts, without becoming burdensome and distasteful to young and active spirits. We believe the publication we are noticing will contribute essentially to this desirable end. The volume first mentioned, containing "The Life of the Saviour," is characterized by a winning style, which cannot fail to lead the most roving lamb of the flock to the great Shepherd, and to stamp upon the tender soul of youth a new and bright image of the Beauty of Holiness. The second volume, containing "The Life of Howard," must, we should think, seize upon the best feelings of the young, and interest them strongly in one who deserves to be ranked among the most devoted disciples of Him who "went about doing good."

As far as regards *subject*, we should say that the third volume has fewer advantages than its predecessors. Biography seems to be peculiarly suited to interest the young from the singleness of object presented to the reader's mind, and from the personal sympathy which is awakened, and which, if the subject of the memoir be truly amiable and worthy, is not only kept up but strengthened to the end of the book. Whereas in history and description there is of course more detail; the memory is more taxed; the feelings are less frequently appealed to and excited; what is realized by the young mind after the first perusal of such works is likely to be less in amount, than what is carried off by the most rapid reading of the Life of an amiable and worthy person. These remarks are not made in disparagement of Mr. Bulfinch's work. All subjects are not equally interesting, and no skill can alter this inequality. We look upon the third volume as a task-book rather than a pleasure-book; as containing what ought to be studied attentively, rather than what would be eagerly caught at by the young. It seems to be just such a book as is needed in our Sunday schools; and, if a proper set of questions were appended to it by the author, to be answered by reference to the work itself, it would be an excellent text-book for such schools.

The first part of this little work is occupied with the History of the Holy Land. We regret to find omitted in this portion the Scripture account of the patriarchs, especially of Joseph, of the extraordinary providence that raised him to distinction in Egypt, and made him the arbiter of the fortunes of his family, and, in an important sense, the founder of the nation.

The whole of this portion of Scripture is intimately connected with the general History of Palestine and the Jews, and, besides, the story has peculiar charms for old and young.

We think, too, that our author might, even at the hazard of swelling his book a little, have added with advantage more particulars respecting the destruction of Jerusalem in the war with the Romans, in order that his young readers might be compelled to admire the wonderful and exact fulfilment of the prediction of the Saviour.

Our author's style, without being peculiarly adapted to the class of readers for which he wrote, is marked by simplicity and elegance; and, if it does not evince any great tact in writing for the young, recommends him to the more mature of his readers as a good scholar and a man of taste. One who can write with so much purity and beauty, may venture to appear often before the public in the character of author.

Poems, by S. G. Bulfinch. Charleston. 1834. 12mo. pp. 108.— About the time that the work on Palestine which we have just noticed was published here at the north, this collection of poetical essays was handed to us from the south. It speaks well for Mr. Bulfinch's industry, that amidst his professional duties, which he has been discharging, as we are assured, to the great acceptance of his congregation in Augusta, Georgia, he has found time to prepare these volumes for the public, in the course of a single year. Several of the the poems, however, had appeared previously, in other publications; as, for instance, the Devotional Pieces, which were first printed in the author's "Contemplations of the Saviour." Mr. Bulfinch's poetry is sweet and flowing, often elevated and inspiring, always pure in its tone and effect, and imbued with a warm and rational piety. The first piece in this volume, entitled "Chivalry," is the longest which it contains, filling twelve of its pages. If we were better pleased with one portion of it than another, it was with the following beautiful strain near its close.

"There hath been Chivalry where arms ne'er came;
Its pure and ardent flame
Hath shed a halo round the warrior's crest,—
Hath burned within the patriot statesman's breast,
Nor less has warmed the peasant's humble cot,
And cheered the outcast's friendless, hopeless lot.
For what is Chivalry?
'T is self-devotedness;
A spirit urging onward and still on
To some high, noble object to be won;

And pressing still, through danger and distress,
Regardless of them all,
Till that high object, whatsoe'er it be,
Friendship, or virtuous fame, our country's liberty,
The improvement of our race, the happiness
Of one poor individual,
Or of unnumbered thousands, be attained.
We know it by the burning cheek,
The excited voice, the flashing eye,
Where common souls would coldly speak
Of some high purpose gained.
Such, such is Chivalry!" — p. 19.

The Youth's Letter-Writer; or the Epistolary Art made plain and easy to Beginners, through the Example of Henry Moreton. By Mrs. JOHN FARRAR, Author of "Congo in Search of his Master," "The Children's Robinson Crusoe," &c. New York: R. Bartlett & S. Raynor. 1834. 16mo. pp. 155. — If Mrs. Farrar had contented herself with laying down dry rules for the aid of young people who desire to be made acquainted with the mysteries of the "Epistolary Art," she might and doubtless would have produced a much more "complete" Letter-Writer than any of those treatises so called, which modestly assume to be complete; but still, as a collection of dry rules, it would necessarily have been a dry book. The work which she has actually presented to the youthful public of epistolary aspirants, is quite an entertaining book. By supposing a clever lad, Henry Moreton by name, on a visit to his uncle, and carrying him through the process of corresponding with his distant friends, under the guidance of that uncle and his family, she has given the subject a narrative and dramatic spirit, which causes it to take hold of the imagination and memory, and throws an agreeable interest round the folding of a sheet of paper and the nibbing of a pen. We therefore recommend the work, not only as the completest, but most readable Letter-Writer which is to be had at the bookstores.

Meditations for the Afflicted, Sick, and Dying. Boston. Samuel G. Simpkins. 1833. 24mo. pp. 216. — This is the fifth volume in the series of books which has lately been issued by the Society for promoting Christian Knowledge, Piety, and Charity. It is chiefly extracted, as we are informed in the Advertisement prefixed to it, from a work published at Edinburgh, entitled "*Farewell to Time, or Last Views of Life, and Prospects of Immortality.*" The editor expresses his persuasion

that it will be acceptable to the serious reader. We have no doubt that it will prove so. Without pledging our assent to all the sentiments contained in it, we hesitate not to name it as in most respects the best book for its purposes which has yet been offered to the Christian public.

An Universal History, in Twenty-four Books. Translated from the German of JOHN VON MÜLLER. In Four Volumes. Boston: Cottons & Barnard. 1834. 12mo. pp. 286 – 300 – 304 – 264. — Whoever would read history for the spirit of history, for the moral instruction which it conveys as well as for the facts which it preserves, will do well to study this compend by the celebrated Müller. Since the publication of this translation, we have referred to it in several places, and for the histories of different nations, and have always found information, conveyed in a lively and interesting manner. We have heard it intimated, that the author has not spoken of Christianity as a believer in that religion or its miraculous origin. We think the charge is wholly unsupported by the History itself; and we will give our readers an extract from the section on "Jesus Christ," that they may judge for themselves.

"After he had openly testified, in the most impressive manner, that no other completion of the hopes of Israel was to be expected, but this blessing which was destined for all mankind, through the medium of their traditions and system of worship, Jesus knew what he had to suffer from the disappointed vanity, and the selfishness and ambition of the priests, and foresaw with compassion the misfortunes which their prejudices would bring upon the nation. But as Providence by the direction of events had combined in him the most striking traits of the ancient prophecies, by which the Jews might know the Saviour of Israel, Jesus had no other purpose than the completion of his destination. Hereupon he was calumniously accused by his nation before Pilate, the Roman governor, and sacrificed by him to the factious spirit of the Jews. With greater than human fortitude he suffered death; he rose again to life, confirmed his words, and left a world which was unworthy of his presence.

"The work of the Author of mercy and love was completed; the root which he had planted, namely, the renovated doctrine of the patriarchs, in the course of a few centuries spread its shoots beyond the boundaries of the Roman empire, and, together with the veneration of his name, subsists in the most essential points even among the disciples of Mahommed; expiatory sacrifices, polytheism, and the belief in annihilation, have vanished from the greater portion of the human race; the more clearly the true nature of his doctrine is displayed to our view, when purified from the corruptions of calamitous times, the more deeply does its spirit penetrate into the foundations of society; many who have supposed themselves to be his adversaries, have la-

bored in the accomplishment of his plan; and after Christianity, like its founder, had long suffered abuse by priestcraft, every developement of our sentiment for moral goodness, and every successive advancement in philosophy, gives us new feelings, and opens to us more exalted views, of its true principles and inestimable worth."—Vol. II. pp. 30, 31.

The Story without an End. Translated from the German by SARAH AUSTIN. Illustrated by WILLIAM HARVEY, Esq. London. Published by Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange. 1834.—The soul of childhood dwells in an earthly tabernacle, where is provided a resting-place, on which it may repose when it is weary,—unconscious even of itself, and where also is found a means of self-consciousness, on which it may look when the era of reflection comes.

But when this tabernacle is placed among the beauties of nature, the soul of childhood is attracted from its primeval repose, to go forth into the external world, and feast upon the simple and beautiful objects it finds; and when thus strengthened, it goes on under the guidance of ever active imagination, and communes with the light and the water-drops, the flowers and the birds and the tiny beasts, through the mysterious influence of that original sympathy by which God has wedded the soul to nature, in order that the affections of the soul may be touched, its intellect exercised, universal love be stimulated, and immortal hopes awakened.

Such is the hidden meaning which is symbolized by one of the most enchanting forms, with which imagination ever clothed spiritual facts. We will not anticipate the pleasure of the reader by giving him beforehand those details of the meaning of the several parts, which it is so delightful to feel breaking upon the mind from the symbols themselves. We will quote only the last passage, as a specimen of the beautiful English in which Mrs. Austin has set this gem from the German mine.

"And the child was become happy and joyful, and breathed freely again, and thought no more of returning to his hut; for he saw that nothing returned inwards, but rather that all strove outwards into the free air; the rosy apple-blossoms from their narrow buds, and the gurgling notes from the narrow breast of the lark. The germs burst open the folding-doors of the seeds, and broke through the heavy fissure of the earth in order to get at the light; the grasses tore asunder their bands, and their slender blades sprung upwards. Even the rocks were become gentle, and allowed little mosses to peep out from their sides, as a sign that they would not remain impenetrably closed for ever. And the flowers sent out color and fragrance into the whole world; for they kept not their best for themselves, but

would imitate the sun and the stars, which poured their warmth and radiance over the spring. And many a little gnat and beetle burst the narrow cell in which it was enclosed, and crept out slowly and half asleep, unfolded and shook its tender wings, and soon gained strength, and flew off to untried delights.

"And as the butterflies came forth from their chrysalids in all their gayety and splendor, so did every humbled and suppressed aspiration and hope free itself, and boldly launch into the open and flowing spring."

We are very glad to hear that this little work is to be republished in Boston. With all our books for the young, we have very few which address the faculty of imagination by giving words to nature herself. Thus children are rather turned aside by their own appropriated literature from that teacher, whose instructions it is the highest office of literature to turn into "thoughts that breathe and words that burn." This deficiency may be traced to that distrust of the soul and of nature, which, growing out of a superficial philosophy, for a long time has dried up the fresh waters of English literature in their fountains; — together with the fact, that the change of dialect and orthography which has taken place since the morning of our literature, has thrown its freshest products out of the reach of the young. Were Spenser in as plain English as Bunyan, it would probably be quite as much of a favorite with the young, as that masterly work, which has educated so many great men. As it is, "The Fairy Queen" is in a foreign tongue to them. Yet when it finds an interpreter, the effect on the intellect is so great, as to be another of the many proofs that none can speak to childhood more effectively than those gifted with the highest poetic genius. On poetic genius the forms of nature make the liveliest and deepest impression, and, pre-occupying the mind, prevent its being swayed by the conventional and factitious, even when the latter come to be perceived. And thus, through the laws of natural association, all the thoughts are symbolized, in forms and colors which mean the same thing to all human hearts and minds, and the more certainly in proportion to their youth and freshness. It is true that of such works, and especially of so subtile an allegory as this "Story without an End," children may not be able to give in their own words so distinct an account, as of an experiment in natural philosophy, or a narrative of historical events; but, on the other hand, they will need much less stimulus to take hold of them, and the impulse of pleasure will supersede that of duty; to say nothing of the fact, that there are other faculties of the intellect to be cherished into life, besides the mere understanding, and there are certainly qualities of the

heart and great moral powers, which may be reached and cultivated by the mysterious language of allegory, which are too much neglected in our common methods of education.

The English edition of the work that is before us, is beautifully printed, and illustrated by the designs of William Harvey, Esq., who seems to have caught the very spirit of the German author. We have seen children gaze on the dear little child as he sits wrapt in the quietness of primeval happiness; as he kneels to the instructive water-drop; as he sleeps in the moonlight with dreams hovering over him; as he walks among the sociable flowers; as the lilies and the notes of the nightingale sing their nuptial song in his heart; as, with the sincere attention of unsuspecting youthful inquiry, he listens to the utilitarian mouse and the sensually selfish lizard; as he wanders into the deep shades of evening, and sits down amid sweets that fill his imagination and senses; as he gossips with the fire-flies, and worships the stars; as he stands in the light of his innocence, unable to understand the deceiver and envious; as he gazes on the sunrise, and gives himself up to the song of the lark; and as he at last ascends into heaven. And again and again they would have them explained, and "would have been glad to hear more and more and for ever." We trust that the publishers of the book will not omit these pictures.

A History of the United States, from the Discovery of the American Continent to the Present Time. By GEORGE BANCROFT. Vol. I. Boston: Charles Bowen. 1834. 8vo. pp. 508. — This first volume brings down our history to the restoration of the Stuarts. We trust that we shall receive from some one of our contributors such a review of it as its importance demands. In the mean while we feel it to be our duty, briefly to express our approbation of it, and delight in it. We have not perused it yet with that critical attention, which would qualify us to pronounce decidedly and comprehensively on its merits; but it appears to be executed with great fidelity and accuracy, and we are certain of the sprightliness and manliness of the style, and the deep interest which is kept up through the narrative. It is impossible to read the volume laggingly. It is impossible to read it without having our minds brought up closely and constantly to some of the highest questions which concern our country and all humanity. A fine spirit of philosophy pervades the book; a spirit equally of liberty and order, of universal charity and of serious faith. We think that at length Americans are to have a HISTORY. We hope that Mr. Bancroft will

be spared to complete his noble design. We are anxious to see the volumes which he promises, but we would not hurry him a moment. He is building a monument for himself, and for his country. For such a work he must take his time.

Rev. Samuel J. May's Letter to the Editors of the Christian Examiner, published in "The Liberator" for October, 1834.— We bear willing testimony to the eloquence, and what is still better, the good spirit of this Letter, although circumstances obliged us to decline publishing it ourselves. Mr. May was induced to write it by a paragraph which appeared in our July number of the present year, in a review of Professor Palfrey's Sermons, which charged the Abolitionists with interfering, in their ardent but mistaken philanthropy, "with the constitutions of civil government, and the personal rights of individuals." Against this charge, Mr. May defends himself and his coadjutors in the anti-slavery cause. Perhaps our paragraph was too hastily written, and too hastily admitted. Of the purity of Mr. May's motives in pursuit of his object, we never had the least shadow of a doubt. If we have done him and his friends any wrong, there is at present no other way for us to repair it, than to advise our readers to procure and read his Letter, and the documents to which it refers.

To Correspondents. It may readily be supposed, what is really the case, that among the articles which are offered by our friends for publication in this work, some will be, or appear to us, unsuited to our purposes, or not so well suited as others, and must therefore be, however unwillingly on our part, rejected. The authors of such articles will very naturally desire to know our reasons for not accepting them; but, occupied as our time is, it is impossible for us always or often to comply with that desire. We intend in future, to deposit those articles against the insertion of which we have decided, at the office of our publisher, Mr. Bowen, as soon as possible after our decision is made; where they may be had on application. If a writer should not find his article there, after a number of the Christian Examiner has been published without it, he may conclude, either that it has not yet been perused by the Editors, or that it has been accepted, and is awaiting its turn for publication.

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NEW SERIES — N°. XXXVI.

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ART. I. — *Sermons on the Principles of Morality inculcated in the Holy Scriptures, in their Adaptation to the present Condition of Society.* By W. J. Fox. Boston. Leonard C. Bowles. 1833. 12mo. pp. viii. and 291.

WE refer again to these Sermons, for they possess no common degree of interest. They come not within the ordinary range of sermons. Their aim is higher and broader; it is not their object so much to throw new light on specific moral duties, as to bring out and set to work those great and immutable principles of right, which are the source and the life of morality itself. This, to us, is their chief excellence. It is of little use to dwell on the mere details of duty. In these, men need but little instruction. It is not in these, but in those first principles that would make morality something living, controlling, and abiding, that they are most deficient.

We are aware that there has gone abroad a deep and obstinate prejudice against all disquisitions that touch first principles. Such disquisitions are termed "abstract reasoning," "metaphysics"; and that, in this age of steam-boats and rail-roads, is enough to stamp them with reprobation. The great cry of the times is for something "practical," something material, something that will spare the labor of thinking. But we can have no practice worthy of reliance without correct first principles. When not attached to first principles, our morality is only the fragment of a morality, without power to touch the heart and kindle the spirit, to make itself loved or its obligation felt. We have no true

morality till we have a living fountain within us, from which it may unceasingly flow.

We look in vain for a moral community where first principles are disregarded. Where nothing is said concerning first principles, where there is instruction only in the details of duty, there is only a routine of decencies or of heartless conventionalisms. Only a low standard of virtue is adopted, only a depressed moral tone obtains. But where first principles, — principles broad and comprehensive, — are brought out and insisted upon, we witness a result wholly different. At first, indeed, they may not be obeyed, they may touch only the understanding; but they become subjects of thought and conversation; gradually they find their way into the very heart of the community, become the mainsprings of its actions, the controlling influence of its measures.

Nobody is better convinced of this truth, than Mr. Fox. He therefore rises into the philosophy of morals, and attempts to furnish us, or to direct us where we may furnish ourselves, with first principles, which we may always bear about us, not only to point to right actions, but to create the will and the power to perform them. He may not always succeed, but we give him our hearty thanks for his aim, and the example he has given us. He considers himself a Utilitarian, but his Utilitarianism is so modified by enlightened thought, liberal feeling, and just sentiment, that he scarcely deserves the name. It is true, he makes happiness "our being's end and aim," and commends us to consult general utility, as the only means of securing it; but he understands by happiness little else than the developement and perfection of our intellectual faculties, and of our moral and religious sensibilities. In this there is not much to disapprove, except the application of the terms of one system to another, which sometimes confuses and misleads him.

The Utilitarian scheme of morals, however, as it generally is, and almost inevitably must be understood, is very far from being satisfactory to us. Like the selfish scheme, it takes it for granted, that happiness is the only legitimate object of pursuit. But this is a point by no means self-evident. The Deity, so far as his designs are manifest, seems very far from having made this system of things, of which we are a part, expressly for enjoyment. It, at best, is but a mixed state. It may have its smiles, but they are smiles

through tears. Pain grows by the side of pleasure, and often springs from the same root. Bitter waters are everywhere mingled with the sweet. When we propose happiness as the end of our exertions, we never obtain it. It invariably and eternally flies from those who pursue it, and no people are more miserable than those who try the hardest to be happy. It is with happiness as with health. He who is always nursing his health, making its preservation the end of life, is always sickly. He and the one who pursues happiness alike fail; and is it not because both make that which God has not made the end of existence?

The misery, however, which attaches to this system of things, does not necessarily detract from the goodness of God. The end he proposes is not happiness, but spiritual growth; we were placed here, not to enjoy, but to perfect ourselves. Nothing then, which contributes to this end can, relatively to this system, be an evil; and to this end pain contributes full as much, often more than pleasure. The only question, therefore, respecting the goodness of God, is, whether the end he proposes be a good one. Good or not, we can conceive nothing better. There is nothing but mind to which we can attach any real value. This outward universe, with all its furniture of worlds and beings, is valuable only as it displays the marks, or ministers to the wants, of mind. It is mind that seizes upon the idea of God, that is, that image of God in which we were created, and that enables us to "be followers of God as dear children." Nothing so completely fills us with admiration and awe, as the strong, varied, and continued exertions of mind. We do them homage, and secretly desire them, although coupled with the greatest possible sufferings. The unconquered and unconquerable mind, which Milton ascribes to Satan, and which sustains him, makes him a greater favorite with almost every reader of the "Paradise Lost," than Michael, with all his glory, and obedience, and happiness; and would, were it not for his guilt, be a rich indemnity for the "lowest hell" to which he is condemned. We look with infinitely warmer emotions of approbation upon the brave man, struggling with adversity and converting all he may suffer into the means of enlarging his mental and moral power, than we do upon the quiet, prosperous man, who never meets a cross incident to disturb his tranquillity, and knows not what it is to have

his course run roughly. And is not this because we never entirely lose all sentiment of the end for which we were made? Torture me with pain, load me with afflictions, and I can thank my God for it, if it become the means of the growth and maturity of mind.

That happiness is not the end of existence, few people who reflect on the nature of our ideas and duties, will be disposed to deny. Whenever happiness, whether it be our own or that of others, comes in collision with the right, it is pretty generally agreed, that the happiness should be sacrificed and the right maintained. This proves, that we have the sentiment of something superior to happiness, to which happiness must always be held as subordinate. Can that be the end of existence which is itself subordinate to another end, to one which we are to seek, let the consequences be what they may?

But were happiness the only legitimate object of pursuit, it might still be a question, whether consulting general utility would secure it; and this too, whether it be our own happiness, or that of others, that we would promote. Mankind are made happy only by satisfying their desires. But, however great our exertions, new desires will be pushed out, faster than we can satisfy the old ones. He, who is starving may fancy a good supper will make him happy; but should you provide him a supper, and then leave him to lodge in the street, he would hardly thank you. Could we multiply physical comforts a hundred fold, satisfy a hundred desires where now we satisfy but one, we should in no degree lessen the amount of misery. There would be remaining the same, if not a greater number of desires unsatisfied, to prey upon the soul and fill it with torment. Indeed all experience proves, that we cannot be more successful in laboring for others' happiness, than we are in laboring for our own.

Our prospect is not more flattering, to say the least, if general utility be consulted as the means of making ourselves happy. Mr. Fox tells us, — and it is the language of all Utilitarians, — that our duties are interests, and that we should seek the happiness of others as the only means of securing our own. What he has in mind is doubtless true. The pleasures of benevolence are the most exquisite and the most lasting of any which are allotted to mortals; but they are pleasures only for the benevolent. He, who loves

only himself, can find no pleasure in laboring for the happiness of others. The malicious, the envious, do not find their own happiness increased by seeing others happy. To be made happy by making others happy, we must love them and make their good the end of our exertions. But he, who seeks the happiness of others as the means of promoting his own, makes his own happiness the end to be gained; and, consequently, throws himself out of the condition, in which seeking the welfare of others could give him pleasure; he is selfish, not benevolent, and therefore cannot, although he do the deeds, taste the pleasures, of benevolence.

We know that it is customary to urge people to the practice of benevolence, by the consideration that the benevolent are happier than the selfish; and, although this is an appeal to selfishness, and might, if made the motive of action, defeat itself; still, under a certain aspect, it is very proper. People are all in the pursuit of happiness, but they fail, and this is merely telling them the cause of their failure. It assures them, that if they would be successful, they must cease to be selfish and become benevolent. It has an influence in fixing attention upon benevolence, in quickening the desire and in promoting exertions to become benevolent. Appeal may be made to men's hopes and fears. We may hold out the promises of the gospel to allure men to holiness, and its threatenings to make them pause in their downward course, and inquire the demands of duty; but he, who has no higher principle of action than fears of punishment or hopes of reward, is not virtuous. Hopes and fears may be useful means to prepare men to be virtuous, but they cease to influence, in proportion as they become perfect.

True, it is said that Jesus acted with a view to the "joy set before him;" but we see no necessity for supposing, that he had respect to any personal reward, nor to any joy that he himself was to receive. There is a higher reward, a nobler recompense to the good, than any thing which can be bestowed on themselves. The philanthropist, whose soul is wedded to humanity, who "hungers and thirsts" to set mankind forward in holiness and happiness, smiles in exile or in death, if he see them reaping, as the fruits of his exertions, the good he wished them. A just conception of the character of Jesus would, it appears to us, assign him a re-

ward similar to that of the philanthropist. The "joy," to which he looked, was not his, but that which was to "be unto all people."

That the internal joy of Jesus, as he beheld in prophetic vision the immeasurable good he was procuring the human race, was great, we do not deny. The internal joy of the good man, on seeing literally, or by the eye of faith, others benefited by his exertions, although he be expiring on the cross for having made those exertions, is unspeakable, and unimagined by him who has not within himself the moral power to be a martyr to the cause of humanity. But why is it so great? Simply because it was no matter of calculation, was not proposed as an end, was not anticipated, and is no subject of distinct consciousness. His soul is full of joy because he thinks only of the joy of others, and because it does not occur to him to ask himself whether he be happy or miserable. He who *could* turn away from the happiness of others, and say to himself, "How happy I am! how richly am I rewarded for the sacrifices I have made!" would prove that he could not be happy by suffering to make others happy. Where there is this return upon self, there is not the disposition to be delighted with others' joy.

The mistake of the Utilitarian on this point is, not that benevolence does not insure a reward, or that duty does not prove itself man's interest, but that he does not distinguish between deeds of benevolence done for the sake of others, and done for the sake of ourselves; between duty performed as duty, and duty performed as interest; between the right pursued as an end, and the right pursued as a means. And yet here is a very obvious and a very important distinction. It is not easy to mistake the difference between one, who pursues duty because he believes it to be duty, and one who pursues it merely because he believes it for his interest. The two men are governed by very different, not to say wholly opposite, principles. One of them is governed by a principle that bids him do his duty at all times, under all circumstances, and at all hazards; the other by a principle that, in case duty demanded a sacrifice, would bid him abandon it, desert his post whenever it became dangerous, and prove himself a coward on the approach of the enemy. He, who is governed by this principle, will never be a martyr.

To confound these two, is to confound the idea of the useful with that of the just, a thing which nobody in his senses is likely to do, unless compelled by a theory. A steam-engine may be useful, but who thinks of calling it just? A man is just or unjust, according to the principles by which he is governed, without reference to the utility or inutility of his life. There is a marked difference between the emotion one has on viewing a steam-engine, however useful it may be, and that which he has on reading the Life of Howard; between the one excited in us by contemplating the assassin, and the one excited by contemplating his dagger. The difference between these two emotions shows the difference between the idea of the useful and the harmful, and that of the just and the unjust.

The Utilitarian, as his name imports, is one who is governed solely by the idea of the useful. The just, the true, the beautiful enter for nothing into the considerations which influence his conduct. It is nothing to him that his course violates what he terms "abstract right," if he be satisfied that it is useful. He sees no men around him, no moral beings, with duties not to be neglected, with rights to be consulted and never abridged; but simply human machines, concerning which he has only to inquire what is the most advantageous manner in which he can employ them. Whatever is difficult, whatever demands a sacrifice, if it have nothing but its justice to recommend it, is abandoned as inexpedient. He may see his neighbour's house on fire and his family in peril, but before running to assist in extinguishing the flames or in rescuing the family, he must ascertain the bearing the assistance he might lend, would have upon the useful. His brother may be sinking in the wave; but if, upon a full and impartial discussion of the matter, he be convinced that his brother's death will be more useful than his life, he leaves him to drown. Murder, robbery, theft, and all those acts which the world has agreed to call crimes, are very good things in his estimation, if they promote, what he believes is general utility. He would have recommended the Athenians to follow the advice of Themistocles, which Aristides declared useful, but unjust.

Doubtless the Utilitarian would recoil with horror from these conclusions; but they belong to his system, and he reasons inconsequently when he rejects them. In refusing

to admit them he goes out of his system, and declares it "too strait" for him to dwell in. He, indeed, talks of the sentiments, the emotions, the affections, of the pleasure to be derived from diffusing love and joy among mankind; but, whenever he does this, he is away from his Utilitarianism, in a different order of ideas, where, instead of restricting himself to the useful, he appeals to the right, the benevolent, and the humane. We do not censure him for this inconsequence, which proves him better than his system; for it is inevitable. No one can pay the least attention to what is passing within him, without being conscious of ideas and wants that are for ever carrying him beyond the narrow circle, and away from the mechanical life, of the merely useful.

Let it not, however, be inferred, that we condemn the useful. The useful is a real element of our nature, and in its place it is as proper and as important as any other. We merely object to making it comprise man's whole nature, and to regarding it as the rule and measure of morality. We do not make it the basis of morality, for we do not find that it necessarily involves any moral consideration. We base morality on the moral sense, and what we term the idea of the just, or of the right. The idea of the just is common to all moral beings. He, who has it not, is no more accountable for what he does, than the assassin's dagger, for the act of assassination. This is not a derivative, but a primitive idea, a constituent element in human nature itself, whose destruction would involve our annihilation. It reveals to us that law of eternal justice, anterior to all other laws, on which all other laws depend for their authority, and which, as Marcus Antoninus says, "binds both Gods and men." He who has the sentiment of this law, is moral; he who has it not, is out of the pale of moral beings. He who obeys this sentiment is virtuous; he who disobeys it is guilty. We know no objection that can be brought against this, for it recognises a law which is known to all moral beings, and which is immutable, eternal, and universal, the same in all nations and in all ages.

If we are asked, why we are bound to obey this law, we send the interrogator to his own conscience and consciousness for an answer. But no man was ever yet, by his own wants, induced to make the inquiry. Theorists may have attempted to find a reason why we should obey the

right, as geometricians have attempted to define a straight line, but it has been labor lost. Convince a man that what you propose is right, and he will hardly ask you to prove that it is obligatory. No man ever yet doubted that he was bound to do right. Indeed, there is no real difference between the idea of right, and that of obligation. To say that a thing is right, is the same as to say that it is obligatory.

Moralists have thought differently, and have therefore attempted to show why we ought to obey the right. They have usually alleged authority, or utility. But authority, that is, the command or the will of the Deity, cannot create the obligation. Nobody is bound to obey an unjust command. It is not the command, but its justice that constitutes its obligation. The commands of God do not make the obligation, they merely declare it. Even the will of the Deity does not constitute the obligation, for it does not make the right. A thing is not right because God wills it; he wills it because it is right, because it is in accordance with the decisions of his wisdom, of his own infinite and unerring reason. Nor can the obligation be derived from the idea of the useful. Grant the right always involves the useful, the very moment you assign that as the ground of its obligation, you transfer the obligation from the right to the useful; and prove, so far as you prove any thing, that the right is not obligatory, and that we are bound to consult only utility. And why are we bound to consult utility? Is not the evidence on which it rests, precisely that on which rests the obligation of the right?

But in basing morality on our inherent idea of right, on the moral sense, we would guard against misapprehension. This moral sense is not a perception, but a sentiment of the right. It is that which constitutes us moral beings, but is not itself a code of ethics. It craves, but it does not see, the right; it makes us feel that there is a right, that it is obligatory, but it does not give us clear perceptions of what the right is, much less of all its bearings, of all its specific duties. This is done only by the aid of the understanding. Nature, — or rather God in nature, — has laid the foundation of a moral edifice, but its erection depends on us, and the just proportions of its parts, its beauty and strength, depend on the harmonious developement of all our faculties, intellectual as well as moral.

There must, then, always be a difference between the morality of the cultivated and that of the uncultivated man. The savage has the same nature, the same elemental wants, as the civilized man; he is carried away towards the right by the same inward sentiment; but the right which he is able to body forth as his ideal of excellence, falls far below the ideal of him whose mind and heart are well cultivated. Not that nature decides differently in one case from what she does in another, or, that she ever pronounces that right which is not right; but the one sees only a little of the right, while the other takes broader and more comprehensive views of it, and, consequently, is able to form to himself a less defective morality. In the case of the savage, the faculties, not having been exercised, are weak, and therefore able to take in but a little of the right, to see it only under one of its aspects; the faculties of the civilized man having been strengthened by exercise, he is able to see the right under several aspects, and to take in vastly more of it.

This same remark is applicable to Christian morality. Jesus Christ did not give us a body of morals, he merely gave us the law of morality. This law is the law of love, of love to our neighbour, which is merely the realization of the idea of the right, the moral sense clothed with a practical form. But this love varies, according to the mental and moral progress of him who harbours it. To him of narrow views and uncultivated soul, love to our neighbour will have a low and narrow meaning. It will, indeed, mean the greatest good he can conceive, but it will not be the less low and narrow on that account. The Western Indian's ideal of good, is the happy islands where his fathers have gone, where no bad Indian intrudes, where there is plenty of game and the hunter is never weary or hungry. Yet in wishing his neighbour a reception into those happy islands, he is as sincere, is as obedient to his sense of right, follows the dictates of as pure a love, according to the measure of his light, as the Christian who would raise a fellow being to his sublimer and more spiritual heaven. Give the Indian the Christian's cultivation, the Christian's spiritual growth, and his simple heaven "behind the cloud-topt hill," will no longer be the measure of good his love would bestow upon the object beloved. But without that cultivation, that spiritual growth, although he might adopt the Christian's

creed and the Christian's law, he could give to the terms of that creed and of that law, no higher meaning than he assigns to his own rude moral code, and to the simple religion he has received from his fathers. His ideal would not be changed by a change of names. Every man's ideal of excellence, whether he be savage or civilized, Christian or Pagan, Jew or Mussulman, is measured by his spiritual progress, and must be as different as is the degree of that progress; and that difference would remain the same, although all might come to bear the same name, and nominally profess to worship the same God.

This is a consideration of which we should never lose sight when we cause past generations or the less civilized portions of the present generation to pass in review before us. Each must be measured by its own ideal, acquitted or condemned as it comes up to it or falls below it. The savage should not be tried by the ideal of a Fenelon, the ages before Christianity by that of the Christian, nor the early ages of the Church, by that of the nineteenth century. Those who in the infancy of Christianity gave to love to our neighbour all the meaning in their power, are not to be condemned because it falls short of the meaning we can give it, any more than he who is just commencing simple arithmetic is to be condemned for not being able to solve the more difficult problems of the higher branches of mathematics.

It is also very important to bear this consideration in mind whenever we attempt to estimate the service Christianity has rendered the world. We are exceedingly prone to underrate that service. We look back and down upon ages which seem to us sunk in vice and crime, in barbarism and wretchedness, without reflecting that it is to Christianity that we are indebted for our advance beyond them, and for that moral elevation from which we look down upon them. It is because Christianity has been long at work, strengthening, purifying, exalting, that is, educating the mind, that we of the present, are able to see as low and comparatively worthless, what wise and good men in their day in the past saw as elevated and ennobling. When it was first disclosed by its Author, the world could not take in those loftier ideas of excellence which are common to our times; but it contained the very spirit of progress, and it constantly exerted itself to bring the mind up so as to perceive more and

more of its worth; and, had it not been for the influence its exertions have had in setting us forward in our career of improvement, we have no reason to suppose that the ideal of this age would have been superior to that of the age of Nero.

And this superiority is not trifling. In examining the monuments of the moral grandeur of the past, we are very likely to shed over them something of that purer and stronger light which belongs only to the present. When we meet among the ancients the same terms that are in common use among ourselves, we ascribe to those terms something of that deeper and fuller meaning which we alone can comprehend, — a meaning which was not, and which could not have been, suspected without that additional growth of mind which it has taken Christianity nearly two thousand years to effect. In fact when it is our object to discover, not the worthlessness, but the worth of past ages, we almost invariably ascribe to them a degree of wisdom and moral grandeur which is theirs only as it is thrown over them from our own more truly enlightened minds. If we guard against this too favorable estimate, common to the wise and the good, who read almost every thing by the benevolent light of their own pure and gifted minds, we may easily satisfy ourselves that our ideal of excellence is almost infinitely superior to that of the age in which Christianity was first proclaimed. Individuals then, indeed, might have stood out from the great mass, the representatives of the future rather than of their own times; but the age, taken as a whole, was immeasurably below the one in which we live. The advance has been great, has been, if we view it rightly, almost miraculous. Christianity has not been wanting to its mission; it has thus far fulfilled it nobly.

Indeed, it is refreshing to the philanthropic soul to dwell on the progress Christianity has effected. It has enabled us to take broader views of the right. Love to our neighbour means vastly more than it did. We have learned also to give to the term *neighbour* a broader meaning; we begin to comprehend something of that parable of the good Samaritan, so simple, touching, and sublime; and in proportion as we comprehend it, any one, — albeit our bitterest enemy, — to whom we can be useful, becomes our neighbour; and, as the means of usefulness open to us, as we see new methods

and opportunities of benefiting millions, the term *neighbour* comes to mean a greater number. He cannot help thanking God, who observes how this age has enlarged the neighbourly feeling and multiplied the number of neighbours. National prejudices are fast yielding to the influence of constantly increasing international intercourse; sects, classes, and parties are gradually losing something of their asperity, as they come to mingle with one another, and to know one another better. Indeed, sects, classes, and parties become brothers, nations become families, and a quarter of the globe a neighbourhood. Men become less and less vain of factitious distinctions, titles, and decorations, and more and more ambitious to appear in the simple dignity of human beings.

And this dignity of human beings means vastly more than it did formerly. Human nature, or that which passed for human nature, was formerly a small affair. It was, we suspect, no better than those, who, to show their superiority, speak slightingly of human nature, have pronounced it. What history presents us for human nature, is, in most instances, nothing but that part of our nature which we possess in common with animals. In the individual, we see the animal before we do the man. It is not in childhood or youth that we see the peculiarly human faculties predominant, but in mature age. So is it with the race. It has a growth of its own, — laws of developement precisely analogous to those of the individual. The animal propensities are developed first, and it is not till childhood and youth have passed away that they cease to be predominant. Up to the present, history has been concerned only with the childhood and youth of mankind. It has not yet presented us the full grown man of a ripe age; and surely it is no great stretch of charity to absolve those who are acquainted only with the weakness of childhood, or the fiery, impetuous passions of youth, from any very aggravated offence in pronouncing human nature a worthless thing. He who had never seen any human beings except children before they could walk or talk, might very innocently infer that to walk or talk does not pertain to human nature, unless he should *happen* to reflect that he can do both, and that there was, however, a time when he could do neither. We could pardon him who had seen the human body only when

wasted and distorted by disease, for smiling to hear us talk of its beauty, its symmetry, and its vigor; but his smile would not be less the smile of ignorance, because we could absolve him from guilt. So it may be with those who form their estimate of human nature from acquaintance merely with its infancy, imperfect developements, or its diseases. Their estimate will be natural, but hardly just. There may be more things wrapped up in human nature "than is dreamed of in" their "philosophy."

Although up to the present, the animal in our race has predominated, the man has not been wholly out of sight. There have been, at all times in all nations, exhibited proofs, that we have within us higher powers, something, — weak and half suppressed it may have been, — that is for ever looking towards the infinite and craving the perfect. Individuals in all ages have appeared, to enlarge our conceptions, and give us higher ideas of the capabilities of our race. And these individuals are not now, as they once were, held as prodigies, as exceptions, but as an earnest of what all may become, as a sort of first fruits, the sure pledges of the glorious harvest to follow. We do not now look to the multitude on whom tyrants have trampled, whose holy breathings are repressed, whose cries for liberty are stifled by misguided priests, to learn what human nature is, and what man may be; but to the Aristideses, the Socrateses, the Platos, the Confuciuses, the Pauls, the Alfreds, the Fenelons, the Penns, the Miltons, the Lockes, the Hampdens, the Howards, the Washingtons, the Lafayettes.

This new mode of judging human nature has been introduced by Christianity, and is not the least of the proofs that it has been faithfully executing its mission. The effects of this new mode of determining what human nature is, and what man may be, are not small. Man assumes a new dignity, and enlists purer and nobler feelings in his service. Love to our neighbour takes a deeper and broader meaning. It is no longer a mere instinctive feeling, or the cold and formal obedience to a positive command; but a reverence for human nature, a heartfelt conviction of its worth, a kindling desire for the lofty excellence it may attain, and the power to devote one's self unreservedly to aid it in accomplishing its destiny. It not only takes in a broader horizon of worth, but it discovers new and more effectual methods of promot-

ing the good it sees, desires, and wills. It involves new duties, and duties immeasurably more comprehensive. The greater worth we discover in human nature makes us feel a deeper and a more abiding interest in every individual who shares it. In the poorest, in the most worthless, the most abandoned, we do not now see the vile sinner alone, but a lofty and deathless nature, that links him with the world of spirits, and gives him the image of God.

The duty of preaching the Gospel to the poor has always been admitted, and considered one of the most important of the duties enjoined by Christianity; but the higher estimate we now form of human nature, gives to it a fuller meaning, and makes it, as Jesus declared it, one of the most striking proofs of the divinity of his mission. It now means something more than merely proclaiming to the poor the facts of the Gospel, and efforts to make them submissive to their unfriendly condition; it now means proclaiming to the world those doctrines, inculcating those principles, that make the poor, as a class, feel that they belong to the common brotherhood of humanity, have the same rights, the same duties, and in themselves the same image of God requiring to be developed, as the rest of mankind. Alms-giving, which once meant giving money, food, clothing, or shelter, to some few of the poor, now means infusing into the whole body of the poor, that moral tone, moral courage and energy, that will enable them to elevate themselves to their proper level in the social scale.

We are unwilling to dismiss this topic without a further remark. If we do not misread the signs of the times, this duty of preaching the Gospel to the poor is about to be felt as it never was felt before. The great doctrine of the fraternity of the human race, is beginning to make itself believed and comprehended; and hundreds and thousands are lamenting the low, degraded, and suffering condition to which so many of their brethren are sunk. There are those, who do not believe that the condition of the poor as a class, or that social policy of which they are the victims, is approved by the Deity, or that it is irremediable by human agency. In a word, there are those, who see no necessity for so wide a disparity in the condition of members of the same community, and brothers of the same family, and who are exerting themselves to lessen it. No one can mistake the

tendency of the times. Every thing is verging towards equality, and men are beginning to feel an interest in the masses which they never felt before. We rejoice in this tendency. It is to us a proof that Christianity has not been preached, that great and good men have not sighed, and labored, and suffered, in vain. But even this tendency, glorious and promising as it is in our eyes, may not bring all the good we could wish. The boasted "Reformers" of the age, have, in many instances, more zeal and benevolence, than just appreciation of the work they should perform. They do not penetrate deep enough. They would introduce equality in our external circumstances; but this, admitting it practicable, would hardly deserve the name of a reform. Poverty is not itself an evil, it is only the symptom of an evil. The inequality, which now obtains, is in itself a small affair; the mere physical suffering it involves, great as that may be, is hardly worth lamenting. The real evil lies deeper, and is infinitely greater. That evil is the injury done to mind. The waste of mind, is that over which the philanthropist weeps. The immortal mind, on which God has stamped his own image, is suppressed, is prevented from unfolding even the least of its mighty powers, in the vast majority of our race. Nine tenths of mankind are so situated, that they have neither the time nor the opportunity of attending to any thing but the wants of their animal nature. This is the real evil; and the real work for the Reformer, is to put into the hands of the whole, — not equal wealth, — but the means of spiritual cultivation and growth. This is no slight work. Much has been done, much is now doing, but vastly more remains untouched. It is painful to reflect how many are born every day, who must live and die mute, inglorious, and forgotten, who yet, had opportunity been afforded them, would have displayed as much power of mind, loftiness of soul, strength of purpose, and even creative genius, as the greatest and most venerated of our race. The great end of existence, we have said, is spiritual growth; and, though we are far from believing that all men are born with equal capacities, we do believe that all are born susceptible of a growth. To aid this growth to the full extent of our power, in the humblest as well as in the most gifted of God's offspring, is the aim of all enlightened philanthropy; and to this end, instead of being wasted on

efforts to accomplish that comparatively slight affair, equality in men's external condition, we hope will be directed the exertions of all those who have the sentiment of something better for man than what he now has.

We have here touched upon some points in which we think the ideal of our age is superior to that of the age when Christianity was first preached. It seems to us, that the great law of love, the distinguishing law of our religion, is now more fully comprehended than it ever was before. But that it is so we attribute to the influence of Christianity, which has been silently but effectually exerted, strengthening our minds, shedding new light on our duties, and bringing them home with more energy to our hearts. If it has done this, let us not say that it has not thus far faithfully and successfully executed its mission.

We also think that the influence of Christianity in enabling the mind to form to itself loftier ideals of excellence, has not been confined to those who have believed themselves Christians. When men break away from the reigning form of Christianity, and look down upon it with a sort of contempt, it is because that form does not come up to their ideas of the perfect; and that it does not, is owing to the fact that they have outgrown it, and become able to form to themselves a more perfect ideal. But it is not necessary to suppose that these are enemies to Christianity, as Christians are apt to suppose them, nor that they are what they are without the influence of Christianity, as they are apt themselves to imagine. Christianity demands a progress, and it invariably deserts those who refuse to advance. When its professed adherents become stationary, it breaks out in new sects, and sometimes joins with its professed opponents. This should teach us to listen to every new sect with interest and candor, and to hear without prejudice all that unbelievers have to offer in their own behalf. It may be they have, in some respects, had some more perfect visions of truth, and that we may, by their aid, enlarge our ideal of excellence. This should also admonish unbelievers that their work is to reform, improve, not to destroy; that, if they have discovered any truth which Christians generally have not, they have only discovered a little more of Christianity than others, and ought therefore to be its warmer friends. Infidel philosophers have told us some truths, but

they were Christian influences that enabled them to discover those truths; and as Christianity is not stationary, but always advancing, always meaning more, it can receive them without any injury, but with great benefit to itself. Unbelievers, — that class of unbelievers, we mean, who are so because they desire a greater good for mankind, — should return to the Church; because it is that which has given them that desire, it is that alone which can give them power to gratify it, and because the desire which governs them is the most peculiarly Christian desire of any which Christianity has quickened in the human breast.

One consideration more and we close. If Christianity has aided past progress, if it be to Christianity that we are indebted for that loftier ideal of excellence which belongs to this generation than that of the generations which are gone, who shall say that it has no power to aid a future progress; who shall say that love to our neighbour will not mean, two thousand years hereafter, as much more than it does now, as it now means more than it did two thousand years ago? May not the generations to come after us, improve as much upon our ideal, as we have improved upon the ideal of those who went before us? Shall we say that Christianity has spent its force, and that it has done all that it can do for the world? Great changes in men's views of the rectitude of specific actions have taken place, and are there none to take place hereafter? War was once deemed the business and the glory of nations, and was made the principal end of the most admired political and legislative institutions of antiquity. Armies could once be raised to fight for conquest and for glory; but that time has passed away. Wars can now be carried on only under pretence of securing or maintaining national or individual rights, or of obtaining peace. Armies cannot now be raised to fight for the mere honor of fighting, nor with the avowed object of stripping a neighbour of his territories. There needs some plea of right. Some even go further, and declare the resort to arms in all cases anti-christian and unjustifiable. There is greater advance still. When Christianity was introduced, slavery was deemed right. Cruelty to slaves was condemned, but slavery itself was not even considered as requiring an apology. But now, in a vast majority of cases, it is declared a crime, and it is nowhere tolerated except on the ground of

expediency, and that miserable plea bids fair not to be available much longer. The slave-trade, which almost within our own memory was deemed honorable, is now ranked with piracy; the traffic in ardent spirits, in which the best of men a few years ago saw no evil, promises soon to be considered no better than the slave-trade. And why have all these changes taken place? Why do we condemn practices which our fathers approved? Simply because we form to ourselves a loftier ideal of excellence. Christianity means more with us than it did with them. But do we not tolerate practices which a more comprehensive view of Christianity, a clearer perception of the right, would condemn? Are there now no methods of gain, of applause, of promotion, approved and deemed honorable by us all, and even recommended by parents to their children, which are not sinful, only because we have not reached that degree of moral progress which would disclose their iniquity? And who among us dare say, that degree of moral progress will not be attained, and that even the best of us are not approving that which after generations will view as we do war, slavery, the slave-trade, and as we shall soon the traffic in ardent spirits? We believe it will be so; but *in that belief we do not see the condemnation of the present, but its duty to be continually exerting itself to take more and more comprehensive views of the right, and to form to itself a less and less defective morality.*

The belief of the possibility of this, would perhaps dictate a change in our treatment of a class of individuals who are generally condemned. We allude to those who in every age demand reform. We have individuals of this class amongst us now. We call them "visionaries," or brand them as disorganizers; and this may be true of some; but perhaps the only fault of many consists in the fact, that in them the far-glancing sentiment of the future has some dim and shadowy visions of what generations to come will prove to be glorious realities. They may be the prophets of humanity. Half mad, it may be, as all prophets are to their contemporaries; but they should be listened to with interest, and their "burdens" should be received with respect.

ART. II. — *Remarks on the Classical Education of Boys.* By a Teacher. Boston. Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1834. 18mo. pp. 119.

We will not say, in common language, that the above little work is "unpretending," since, though small and simple in appearance, it nevertheless undertakes a great deal; — and, what may be accounted very remarkable, in these presuming, book-making days, — it accomplishes what it undertakes.

It is addressed to the highest class of society, emphatically so called; and by this term, we do not mean to comprehend simply those who are distinguished for rank, talent, wealth, or education; or, even those alone who combine all these desirable advantages; but we allude to that small number of persons, among these, who, sensible of the void in all our present school systems, and the highly injurious tendency of some of them, are capable of perceiving and appreciating, when presented, the best means which may and ought to be taken to remedy their defects. These errors and deficiencies are set forth briefly, but forcibly, in the volume before us, and the best remedies are prescribed. It is not to be supposed, that these remedies, like those for lesser evils, are very simple, or very cheap ones; nor are they expected to be embraced by the mass of the people. It is not necessary that they should be, any more than it is necessary for the mass of the people to be acquainted with the scientific cure of diseases; but it is highly expedient that some among them should know, and be able to apply their knowledge.

For the comparative few then, above mentioned, this work is designed; but there are some valuable hints which may be made useful to all.

The first error in the prevailing system of classical education, to which our author refers, is the vast disparity between the length of time spent, and the quantity of actual knowledge obtained. This, he depicts in strong, though not exaggerated colors; for what reflecting parent has not perceived, that the acquirements of his son, when prepared for College in the common way, are almost altogether superficial? It is true, that every bright, intelligent boy, fond of knowl-

edge, will acquire some, under every disadvantage; — but then how much more melancholy is the waste of time, than in cases of comparative dullness. For here is a waste of powers also, in a tedious, wearying acquisition of words; or, if any ideas are obtained, they are seldom owing to the manner in which the lessons are implanted in the memory; while, to learn a set of words which are not understood, or which have no distinct meaning attached to them in the mind, is certainly much more difficult than to acquire another set so illustrated as to reach the understanding, and touch the heart. Hence the years which are wasted in acquiringt hat, which by a different process, might be learned in half the time, and much more thoroughly.

Again, our author observes, that these years are years generally of heaviness and sorrow to both teacher and pupil, when they ought to be years of ease and gratification to both; that "the great length of time spent in the acquisition of Latin and Greek is a source of misery." "I have known children," he continues, "almost maddened with pure weariness of these almost interminable studies. Well do I remember the tiresome days, and weeks, and months, and years, which I dragged out with the dog's-eared lexicon and the tear-stained text-book before me, unaided even by hope itself;" — "nor is this weariness less felt by the teacher; — his temper is soured by the constant opposition which nature itself, his own nature, as well as that of his pupil, makes to the system he is pursuing. And when his day's work is finished, he looks back upon it with no satisfaction."

Thirdly, the quantity which the boys acquire is not only too small, — the deficiency is equally obvious as to the variety, number, and kind, of the studies pursued. And all must be aware, that our collegians are, in general, sadly wanting in the lighter and more graceful acquisitions, proper to their age and character, and which would contribute to render the heavier studies less irksome to them, as well as their general character as men more interesting and valuable.

Lastly, the evil, most injurious, perhaps, of all, because it involves or induces all the others, is the custom prevalent among teachers of receiving more pupils than it is possible for them to watch over and instruct in the best manner. Our author says,

"It should never be forgotten, that the duty of a teacher is

to supply the place of a parent, as far as circumstances will allow. He is to assume as much as possible toward the pupil, the feelings of a parent; he is not to imagine that the connexion between himself and his scholar is of a different nature from that between the parent and child; the connexion differs in degree, not in kind. He must, therefore, endeavour to establish, between himself and the young people confided to his care, the affection, confidence, and intimacy which subsist between them and their parents. This object cannot be accomplished, when the number of pupils becomes great." "I think it is one of the great faults of the present system, that it creates a necessity for a severer code in the school-room, than at the home fireside, and that it deprives education of its *parental* character." — pp. 7, 8.

The work proceeds ably to illustrate this and other grave faults in the present systems of education; and their more concealed, as well as their obvious effects, are displayed and commented upon. These remarks are followed by the full delineation (as to general principles) of a system, in which these various errors are necessarily corrected, and in which acquirements, thoroughly inculcated, and highly beneficial in their nature, take the place of crude and half-formed ones; a system which may likewise be carried on to the mutual satisfaction of master and pupil. Nor does our author, in attempting to simplify what is obscure, and render pleasant and comparatively easy, what is considered tiresome and difficult, imprudently disguise the laborious nature of every path which can lead to real knowledge; he only desires, and certainly with justice, that difficulties and discouragements, which activity and zeal may in time smooth away, may not be increased by false representations and ignorant guides. His system, on the contrary, lays out the years of school discipline in a delightful and alluring manner, taking up in turn every separate branch proper to the youth, from his earliest years, to those in which he should become completely fitted to enter one of our colleges. We propose, as briefly as possible, to give a sketch of the more prominent points in his plan.

To begin with the study of Latin, which he thinks should be commenced at an early period, he advises an entire overturn as to the method of teaching it; — and a change indeed that must be, which shall make the acquirement of the Latin language pleasant instead of distasteful to children. He

thinks it should be learned by speaking at first, rather than by translation. In this plan, as he says, there is nothing new; he but follows that of such authors as Milton and Ascham; and he goes on to give their reasons and his own for its adoption. And it is undoubtedly true, that the grammars and text-books usually given to illustrate and explain the lesson to the child, require quite as much explanation as any thing in the lesson itself can possibly do. There are many children too, and these of the brightest, who will not learn what they cannot understand. Of the rest, some are really unable to do so, and are set down as stupid, when, perhaps, the not having a parrot's memory, is their only deficiency. The author draws a parallel between the mode of acquiring a foreign language, and our own; in which he proves, we think, that the former can be taught to best advantage, as the latter invariably is first taught to a child, — by enabling him "to remember words, and to frame sentences according to idiom," — and by degrees he will "be prepared to read any book he chooses"; whereas, by learning the language as it is written only, "the young scholar, at each stage of his progress, knows just what he has been over and no more." Our author is certainly right in thinking, that he best knows a language, "who is thoroughly acquainted with the idiom, and is never at a loss how to construct his sentences; — who knows his grammar, not as containing rules, for the application of which a direct act of reasoning is necessary every time, but by habit applying the rules unconsciously and instinctively; and finally, who possesses a vocabulary sufficient for common use, but so acquired, that the words present themselves instantly and without effort."

The whole system, in regard to teaching the languages, is laid down with clearness and precision; so that every teacher can investigate it in all its parts, and judge for himself how far it can be applied in his own case. "I have said much upon this subject," observes our author, "because, in the usual system of instruction, which begins with grammar, the child is extremely apt to take the idea that grammar is authority for language, instead of the contrary." A series of works best fitted to be studied under this system, with the best method of using them, are mentioned in their order. For Greek also, he advises much the same course, and adds, — "In the plan I have here laid down for learning the

ancient languages, my object is to condense, not to diminish labor; to save time, rather than trouble; — the difficulties cannot be concealed, — and the pupil is only made indignant, and is mortified, when you insist upon it, that a study is easy which he finds hard." "If our children could be taught to speak, with fluency and correctness, French, Spanish, or Italian, before the age of eight or nine years, — which they might do well enough with proper instruction, — I should prefer that Latin and Greek should be deferred till this could be accomplished; simply, because these modern languages are easier to learn at first, and when thoroughly acquired, contribute much to aid the study of the ancient tongues."

The chapters immediately following that on the languages, contain a summary of the principal studies proper to be attended to, between the ages of five and sixteen. The author's opinions on these subjects are in keeping with those in the parts of the book to which we have already referred. The same free, clear, and easy system is to be pursued in every branch of education, from the more simple to the most abstruse. To his remarks on the geography of the earth, in connexion with its history, we cordially subscribe, as also to those of Mr. Woodbridge, one of which he quotes. "We have no patience," says the latter gentleman, in his Lecture before the American Institute, "with those who teach their pupils a science which may be termed *chartology*, but which has no more title to the name of geography, than the giving of names to an equal number of Chinese characters." We are happy to believe, that this lamentable mode of imposing on children names for things, and words for ideas, is rapidly giving place, with regard to this branch of instruction, to a more sensible and judicious method; and, that few teachers can now be found cruel enough to leave their unfortunate little pupils to the assistance of maps and books alone. Indeed we have always been of opinion with our author, that, in this and every other study, treatises should be used only as text-books, and as an aid to the teacher rather than as a creed to the taught. Oral instruction, when the teacher is himself deeply engaged and interested, always goes farther, and has a more powerful effect, than any thing acquired from books; particularly when the pupil becomes old enough to take notes of the parts of these familiar lec-

tures, which he can best understand and appreciate; a practice which our author warmly advocates, particularly in the studies of History, Mythology, &c. But long before this is, or can be the case, a child will receive ideas from the animated looks and gestures of his instructer, while he is explaining, which could never be infused into his mind, by the most attentive perusal of written language. All our author's remarks relative to the study of these sciences, by means of reading aloud books of travels, familiar descriptions, &c., the hearer's taking notes, (asking and answering natural and easy questions among each other, under a teacher's direction, might perhaps be added,) are admirable, and cannot be too highly recommended.

With regard to the attainment of Arithmetical knowledge, our own experience and observation do not lead us to coincide entirely with our author in opinion. He says: — "I have already expressed my approbation of the books of Arithmetic made by Colburn on the plan of Pestalozzi, and which I believe have come into very general use. Nor can I suggest any improvement upon this plan." It seems to us, however, that Colburn has carried his system, as almost all good things are in danger of being carried, too far. We think that Smith's book *is* a decided improvement on Colburn's. There the child regularly goes from the mental process to the practical illustration. We have known children, to whom mental arithmetic was painful, — practical, a delight. Why not give them one as a recreation after the fatigues of the other, or to exemplify it? It is a great deal to expect a child to take a page, as it may be, of Colburn's questions, and, abstracting his mind, not only from all around him, but from every employment for his hands, or particularly connected with the book he holds, to arrive at the result necessary to be obtained for each. Whereas, if he simply hold a slate and pencil, and is told that he may set down these results as they are discovered, the very connexion of his mental process with the action he is to make at its conclusion, will encourage his endeavours and fix his attention; and when mental arithmetic is taught, this method is a highly advantageous one. We have known very young children pursue it with delight and advantage. Smith's Arithmetic contains all that is valuable in Colburn's "First Lessons," and a great deal which his system excludes, but

which is attractive and useful to the learner. There is generally an advantage to be gained by combining two opposite systems, if both are useful; and Smith has successfully done this. Our author says, "The great merit of Colburn's books is, that they form good habits of mind." True; but are not expertness and facility in using the slate also important? Changes from one currency into another, and calculations in foreign currencies, can certainly be done with more exactness and expedition on paper than in the head, even allowing it possible to be done in the head alone; while the habit of rapid figuring is best acquired in childhood.

Next comes a chapter on Reading, Composition, Declamation, and Ethics. There are some judicious remarks in it on the vast importance of good reading, and the small degree of attention which it generally receives; and on the numerous and flagrant violations of the rules of our language, even among our best speakers. With the author's sentiments on the subject of composition, we cannot entirely agree. Though the importance which he attaches to the formation of an elegant style, is, perhaps, not too great, yet he seems to us to overlook some of the most efficient means of attaining it, in dwelling upon, and enforcing others. He says, — "I should recommend, that the exercise of writing composition, should be delayed till the pupil has had time to read, and to hear read, a number of works by standard authors; that he may thus, by habit, acquire some notion of sentences, different from those he has heard at Church." And yet, he says, and very justly too, "The formation of a style commences very early, generally before children begin to write." Certainly; it is formed from the conversation and manner of those about them, and from the peculiar cast of their own minds, and the forms into which their thoughts naturally bring themselves. Is it not then a mistake to suppose that a child's style is formed from hearing sermons? It is to be feared, that there are few children who pay so much attention to the discourses they hear from the pulpit, as to retain a very vivid, or very strong impression of their subjects, much less of the style in which they are written. We consider the advice of our author as to the "delay" in this exercise, quite as erroneous as that, which should recommend a child not to be taught to dance till he has had an opportunity of seeing fine dancing. Meanwhile, the elastic

spring and pliability of muscles, which will best enable him to become a graceful dancer, are daily losing something of their power. So with the infant mind. Early habit, in the art of composition, does more than in most other mental acquirements; and while the child is following our author's judicious advice, relative to his taking notes of all he hears from the instructive lips of his teacher, he is, in effect, forming and improving his style gradually, and in proportion to the progress of his mind in the attainment of ideas. Education, aiding habit and nature, will, in our opinion, form the only perfect style; for we cannot think with our author, that it "is an art," *exactly* as painting and sculpture are arts, because it comes from a mental process; and a pure style is, or ought to be, only the corrected expression of the feeling; it is the clothing of the sentiment, not the sentiment itself.

With regard to the study of Philosophy, treated in the same chapter, his remarks, though somewhat cursory, are beautiful. They express, in a few words, all that pious parents would desire a teacher to feel on the subject. We know no book which will fill the void of which he complains; but think a series of selections, from various gifted authors, well chosen and arranged, might answer the purpose.

In afterwards speaking of music, as one of the desirable accomplishments (in addition to gymnastic exercises, drawing, &c.), he has a passage, which we cannot forbear quoting.

"To the literary man, especially one who is to lead a more retired sort of life, music is a source of endless comfort. Above all to the teacher, whose life is almost identified with the name of patience, this divine art comes like a consoling spirit, to soothe his ruffled nerves, and give rest to his weary thoughts. Next to sleep it refreshes and invigorates; and a parent who places his child in a situation to acquire this art, bequeathes to him a blessing, which death alone can deprive him of. In the midst of busy life, in the land of strangers, where it is the only language he understands, in the hour of sorrow, even in the delirium fit, and the horrors of the mad-house, music never abandons him who has once welcomed her to his soul." — p. 106.

The tenth, and last chapter, though on more general sub-

jects, is, perhaps, the most interesting in this valuable little book. The author observes, in commencing it,

"It will readily be seen, that in order to finish to advantage the course of education I have now sketched, two things are necessary; first, that the scholars continue with the same instructer; and second, that the instructer shall not abandon his occupation, until he has at least carried one set through the whole course." —p. 107.

Again, — "So long as the business of school-keeping is made only a step to a profession, — a necessary evil, to be thrown off as soon as possible, we cannot expect to have permanent teachers; young and inexperienced persons will succeed to those who have but begun to know the duties of teachers, — and thus children are handed over from one to another, the unfortunate subjects of many men's experiments in teaching." —p. 109.

These, with the remarks immediately following, will, we hope, place in a new light the profession of a teacher, not at present understood, and far from sufficiently estimated. To all that is said relating to the "conduct and discipline of the school-room," we would direct the particular attention of teachers. He thus concludes.

"I would have the school-room as much like home as the case will admit; the same manner of addressing the children; the same manner of punishing, when it is necessary; the same freedom from restraint, if possible. I would, as far as practicable, have children preserve, in the school-room, the same *set of feelings* that they have in the drawing-room at home. In short, the best rule for the discipline of a school, may be summed up in these words, mutual affection and interest between the instructer and the pupil. And to establish this, depends in a great measure, upon parents. I close my remarks, therefore, with the beautiful prayer of Juvenal;

——'Umbris tenuem et sine pondere terram,
Spirantesque crocos, et in urnâ perpetuum ver,
Qui præceptorem sancti voluere parentis
Esse loco.'"

[For the Christian Examiner.]

Art. III. — *Essay on the Doctrine of Divine Influence.*

By the term Divine Influence, as it is used in this Essay, we would be understood to mean the agency of God, or, if the terms are preferred, the Spirit of God, or the holy Spirit, operating upon the minds of men, by which they are illumined, disciplined, and improved; all that support which God affords in temptation, trial, and sorrow; in a word, all that spiritual aid, which He imparts to man, for the moral and religious advancement of his character here in this world, and by which he is prepared for a higher state of being in the world which is to be revealed.

The subject is one of transcendent interest. It involves inquiries like these; whether, in our conscious weakness, we may look for aid to One who is mighty and willing to help; whether, amidst perplexing circumstances and conflicting claims, we may seek direction from an unerring Guide, and an almighty Friend; whether, when our spirits are sinking within us under the burdens of our lot, we may refresh them at the Fountain of all life and consolation; whether, when they are stricken with a sense of guilt and fear, we may yet seek a Comforter who will lead us to God's mercy-seat; whether, in fine, when they are bewildered and lost in their own dark and wayward imaginings, we may look to One who is "greater than our hearts," and who will dispel our darkness by His own ineffable light.

It is obvious, however, that the subject is one, which, from its very nature, is peculiarly liable to misapprehension and abuse. That mystical spirit, which always, in a greater or less degree, pervades imaginative and enthusiastic minds; and which, in a world of sense, imperfection, and sin, leads them to seek an unearthly abstraction from present objects, and an impossible approach to God, will easily find in the Christian doctrine of Divine Influence, the elements of a perverse nurture and unhealthy growth. Such has always been the fact. This spirit, which was by no means unknown to the Oriental and Grecian philosophy, early identified itself with the eminently spiritual religion of Christ, and produced,

as it was influenced by various circumstances,* almost every species of extravagance and fanaticism. The various sects of the Gnostics, from the first to the third or fourth century, partook largely of it. It drove the Anchorites, Ascetics, and Monks of what are commonly called the dark ages, to desert the incumbent duties of life, that they might bury themselves in useless and unhallowed retirements, and to torment themselves with various uncommanded austerities. In these retreats it survived the shock which the religious world received at the period of the Reformation. It discovered itself in almost all the different sects into which Christendom was afterwards divided. It found favor, in the same degree, amongst the Jansenists and Quietists of France, with the Pietists of Germany, and with the Methodists, Moravians, and Quakers of England and America. It pervaded minds which seem to have had little else in common. It mingled equally in the noisy and vulgar fanaticism of Peter Boehme, and in the wrapt abstraction, and deadness to the outward world and to all earthly desires, which Father Molinos preached, and Fenelon delighted to advocate. It was the animating principle of the pure and active, but somewhat overstrained and impracticable piety of men like Spener, and the learned recluses of the Society of the Port Royal; and was the very inspiration of the extravagant fancies and rapturous day-dreams of Madame Guyon, and of Elizabeth Rowe. But these are the least melancholy of the perversions of the doctrine of Divine Influence, since, from the nature of the case, they can never become permanent or widely spread. They are too much at war with man as he is, and with man as he is placed in this world, ever to gain a general acceptance. And they must be confined, moreover, mainly to persons of a peculiar temperament and habits of mind; to the susceptible, the visionary, the melancholic, the imaginative, and to those who are disqualified equally by inclination and by their prevailing tone of thought and sentiment, "to hold with fortune needful strife." It is such as these, who, feeling strongly the "divinity that stirs within" and the unsatisfactoriness of human pursuits, and sick of a formal

* These are popularly set forth in the 8th and 9th sections of the "Natural History of Enthusiasm." "Sketch of the Enthusiasm of the Ancient Church." "Ingredients of the Ancient Monachism."

piety, and lifeless ceremonies, and letter-killing doctrines, are led to aspire to an intimacy and communion with the Infinite and Eternal, which our present "veils of flesh" do not yet permit us to enjoy. This mystical perversion of the doctrine of Divine Influence can, therefore, never gain any very extensive prevalence; and is to be regarded rather as a subject of mournful interest than of serious alarm. And even where it is seen most completely to prevail, it is often delightfully redeemed by trains of holy thought, capacities of willing self-sacrifice, and sublime aspirations after unearthly purity and beatific peace, which seem to open upon the soul, like partial glimpses and momentary revelations of the heavenly world.

But there are perversions of the doctrine of Divine Influence, that are not thus partially redeemed, but which are wholly evil, — naked, unmitigated evil. They are those in which men mistake, or wilfully misunderstand the suggestions of their own unbridled passions and rank prejudices, for the suggestions of God's holy spirit, and commit excesses in consequence, at once the most absurd and shocking. The history of the Church, from the day of Pentecost until now, furnishes continual examples of this. The well authenticated laws of God, the rights, claims, feelings, and consciences of His rational offspring, have been ruthlessly trampled upon by men, who, in a self-deception more or less sincere, have believed themselves to be following a light from heaven. In like manner too, what is thus ignorantly and most presumptuously deemed to be the impulses of the Spirit of God, has been claimed as the highest authority in the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures; and thus superseding the use of our rational faculties, and the resources of learning, has been made to hallow errors the most bald, and contradictions the most palpable. Indeed it is a mournful saying, yet one but too well authenticated by the whole history of Christianity, that there is scarcely a folly, or an absurdity, or a fraud connected with our religion, for which the authentic impress of the Spirit of God has not thus been claimed.

The subject then is one of unutterable moment; and it is one which has been, and which is, greatly misunderstood and perverted. It is on both these accounts that we now address ourselves to the consideration of it, in some of its more important aspects and relations. We write for the benefit of

honest and serious inquirers, whose minds are yet open to conviction. We trust that we feel the deep solemnity of the inquiry, and would divest ourselves of every thought and feeling, which are not in entire unison with the theme. In the noble language of Milton, we know that the truth in respect to it "is not to be obtained but by devout prayer to that Eternal Spirit, who can enrich with all utterance and all knowledge;" and we are fully aware that our efforts can only be successful as they are guided by that Divine Influence, whose nature and manifestations we are attempting to ascertain.

The remarks we have to offer will be arranged under two distinct topics of inquiry. First, What are the grounds upon which the doctrine of Divine Influence rests? and, second, What are the methods in which this Influence operates, or is manifested?

Our first inquiry, namely, What are the grounds upon which the doctrine rests, is important, not only because it lies at the basis of all our subsequent researches in respect to it; but because it is a part of the subject, we apprehend, which it has been too common to pass over with only a slight and superficial attention. And this is one reason, why a doctrine so all-concerning as this, if true, is frequently received and maintained, even by serious and thoughtful spirits, in an apathy and deadness of mind, which is only one remove from absolute skepticism; and which, so far as practical results are concerned, is scarcely better than total unbelief. We propose, therefore, to state, in some detail, those arguments which appear to our own minds the most cogent and affecting, by which the reality of a Divine Influence over the human mind is substantiated. And privileged, indeed, shall we deem ourselves, if in this, or in any of the subsequent inquiries, we shall be able to suggest any thing, by which the great truths relating to this subject shall be taken out of the cold region of merely speculative belief, authenticated as realities, endowed with a living power, clothed with their rightful influence, and brought into a more actual, home-felt, and abiding presence with any mind.

What then are the proofs by which the doctrine of this Divine Influence is substantiated?

First, we observe, that there is no antecedent improbability that such an Influence should be imparted. There is no

intrinsic difficulty, there is nothing irrational, in the supposition. It is, at least, as probable as the opposite doctrine. For why should it be thought incredible or strange, or in any degree out of the ordinary course of things, that God should hold an intimate intercourse with the souls He has called into being? No one who is acquainted with the operations of the human mind, can doubt that this *may* be done, and this too, without interfering with its obvious and acknowledged laws of action. So far from this, there is an express provision, or at least a means, an opportunity furnished for such an intercourse, through the intervention of these very laws. We refer to that part of our mental constitution, by which thoughts, feelings, suggestions arise, and states of mind take place independently of our volitions. This is matter of every day's experience. Effective trains of thought long searched for in vain, results which have baffled our most earnest pursuit, truths which have evaded our keenest inquiry, often occur to us suddenly, and as it were spontaneously, in vivid and distinct reality. This, indeed, is often the fact when our minds appear to be passive, or engaged with other subjects, or partially buried in sleep, or struggling in the dim consciousness of our first awakening from slumber. In like manner it must be obvious to all who have tried to think, that some slight defect or flaw in a process of reasoning, which has vitiated the whole, is not unfrequently removed, we know not why, or how, and the whole argument is thus left clear and availing. In like manner, too, forms of beauty and loveliness unknown to earth, which no direct efforts of ours could have created or summoned, come as it should seem of their own accord, and stand revealed before our mental vision. Thus every faculty seems to have powers of its own, which are wholly independent of any specific action of the will. Every object which can be presented to the mind, may be thus endowed with a *suggestive* power, far beyond any resources it possesses in its own proper self; and this will vary and be indefinitely modified by the habits and associations of individual minds. In this manner it is that the fairy-land of the Drama, of Romance, of Poetry, and the imaginative arts is created and peopled; for

> "Nothing is lost upon him that sees
> With an eye that feeling gave;

For him there 's a story in every breeze,
And a picture in every wave."

The same account is to be given of the fact that results of a practical kind, and of the most momentous importance, are frequently connected in that sequence of events, which men call cause and effect, with circumstances so trivial, and with states of mind so evanescent, as to escape our notice. Inventions and discoveries, which have altered the whole aspect of society, have been thus originated. The swinging of a lamp at a Popish ceremony suggested to an observant mind, in a comparatively ignorant age, the best method we yet possess of measuring time. The connexion between the fall of an apple and the developement of the law which the planetary hosts obey, is familiar to every school-boy. The flight of some birds seen by a certain individual, at a particular point and place, and in a particular mood of mind, taken in connexion with the particular currents of the winds and waves then prevailing, seems to have been that event, in Providence, which saved these Atlantic states from a Spanish population, Spanish habits, Spanish manners and literature, from the Romish religion and all the abuses of the worn-out monarchy, under which a sister-continent is now suffering.* And, to take an example of the same general fact, but of a more personal concern, no man can look back upon the history of his past life, or of the past year, without perceiving that events of the deepest interest to him have sprung from circumstances, which, at the time, were so apparently trivial as not to arrest his attention. Nay, it is not too much to say, that a word, a look, a tone, yet further, that an impression, which we unconsciously give or receive, may influence the whole of life, here and hereafter. Now, to apply these remarks to the point, for the illustration of which they were introduced, is it not plain, that He, to whom all finite minds are perfectly known, to whom all their avenues are open; who can give a significancy to the most trivial circumstance, and add intensity to the slightest emotion; who can thus, in a thousand ways, give them clearer ideas, quicker apprehensions, more extended views of divine truth; and who can thus, even without their own consciousness, lead them to any result, — may interpose, and influence, and

* See Irving's "Life of Columbus," Vol. I. p. 144.

guide them, to will and to do of His good pleasure, and this too, not only without interfering with any known laws of the human mind, but by the very agency of these laws?

There is thus a provision made in what we would here call the moral providence of God, that is, in behalf of the human mind and the spiritual well-being of man, precisely analogous to that which is also made in His natural and physical providence, or, in the ordering of external things to effect His purposes. As, in regard to this, we know only the few proximate causes or circumstances which precede any given event, but are ignorant of those which are remote; it is evident that, by altering any of these remoter causes which lie beyond our ken or knowledge, God may bring to pass any event, not only without disturbing any of the established laws of nature, but by the direct instrumentality of these laws. In like manner in regard to the human mind, as we know not the order or connexion according to which ideas or feelings are regulated, it is obvious that any thought or sentiment may be suggested, or any mental result produced, not only without interfering with any known principles of the mind, but by the direct and natural operation of these principles.

But this is the lowest view of the subject. It is not only possible, and in strict conformity with the known laws of the human mind, that such an influence *may* be exerted, but it is, further, in the highest degree probable that such an influence *is*, in fact, continually exerted.

We think this is clearly to be inferred, first, from the known and acknowledged Attributes or perfections of God. Thus, for example, we ascribe to Him Spirituality. But can we conceive of an *inactive* Spirit? And if it be admitted that this Infinite Spirit is active, that it pervades as the life-giving principle all creation, that it is the first cause, the continuing power, and the last end of all material things, can we believe that it avoids or neglects that spiritual being which is but a part, an expression of itself?

Again; we ascribe Omnipresence to God. But can we believe He is everywhere else, above us, below us, around us, and yet not *in* us? And if thus in us, can we believe that He is there idle and inoperative?

Again; we ascribe Almightiness to God; and this we do not regard as an unused or useless prerogative. But if

used, and with an unceasing, ever-present, all-pervading energy, are human minds alone exempted or precluded from its sway?

Again; God is infinitely good, and this goodness is continually exhibiting itself in all that we behold. It is seen throughout the material world, in countless provisions for human happiness, where this happiness is the sole end of the provision, and where, but for this end, it would be a superfluous work, and this is goodness indeed! But is it rational to believe that human souls, which alone of all created things here on the earth can understand and appreciate this goodness, are passed by and forgotten in the midst of its ceaseless flow?

In like manner, it is obvious that the presence and agency of God with the human mind may be inferred from all the perfections of God; since it is irrational to suppose that these perfections would exhaust themselves on inferior objects, and leave untouched that "spirit of man," for the use and developement of which all things else were made.

But we turn to another view of the subject. The influence of God upon the minds of men is to be proved in the same way as the *particular* providence of God is proved; indeed it will be found to be but a branch of the same great doctrine. And here it may be proper to state what we understand by a particular providence. And it is, that God's care of the works of His hand is minute, and not merely general; that it extends to the parts as well as to the whole; that it is as essentially operating in the smallest particle of matter, as in the globe of the sun, in the most trivial circumstance of our individual history, as in those systems after systems, worlds after worlds, which reach far beyond human ken and human conception, deeper and deeper into the unfathomable abyss of space.

This doctrine of a particular providence is opposed to the thought, that God, having originally arranged a system of things, which is called, in an old and in a modern philosophy, an order of nature, and having established some general laws for its operation, threw it, as it were, aside, as an artist does a piece of finished machinery; henceforth dismissed it from any further and particular care; and left it to run its rounds, under the blind guidance of some leading principles originally incorporated with it, until its functions, by their own limitation, should cease.

It is opposed to the doctrine that God, in His universe, only takes care of some general and important results, and leaves small events to fall out as they may.

It is opposed to the heathenish notions of chance and accident as having any agency in human affairs, or in the world around us; notions, we may observe in passing, which the conduct and common conversation of men show to be, by no means, confined to the heathens.

In a word, it is opposed to every supposition, which, in any way, directly or by implication, withdraws the notice and care of God from any conceivable thing or circumstance which exists or takes place in His whole universe, from the grand and stupendous whole, to the minutest part of the minutest particle of matter; from those events which decide the destiny of kingdoms, to those which are so trifling as to escape our individual consciousness.

Now, as we have intimated, the doctrine of a particular providence thus explained, involves, as a component part of it, the doctrine of a Spiritual Influence; and the same arguments by which the one is sustained, apply with equal force to the other. Thus it is urged in favor of this particular agency and care of God over the works of His creation, that if He do not thus regard and superintend small things as well as great, it must be, either because they are too insignificant to be worthy of His notice, or because His knowledge and power are exhausted in the production of great results, so that there is none left for details; — in fewer words, that God will not, or cannot, attend to minute things. And it is rightly inferred that an argument which, when thus examined, is resolved into a limitation of those perfections, which all, at the outset, admit to be infinite, is necessarily unsound and worthless. But it is obvious that this argument applies to the operations of the mind as well as to the phenomena of matter, to the movements of every thought as well as to the movements of the external world.

Again; it is urged that the superintending care of God over things the most minute, is proved by the same course of reasoning as that by which His general providence is proved. And this appears from the fact, that all those events and circumstances, which are called small and unimportant, are *parts*, and indispensable parts, of that vast scheme, by which worlds are upheld and kept in their proper place and

order. The pebble which we throw into the air, returns by the same law which regulates the movements of the spheres. It is a fact, plainly demonstrable, that the removal of a particle of dust from our earth, would disturb the movements, and affect the condition, of the farthest star; and each and every one, therefore, of these minute particles, as well as the great luminaries of heaven, must have and hold its appointed place and commission in the great scheme of things. It is obvious, then, that the same train of reasoning, which we apply to the whole of this vast scheme, is equally applicable to every part of it. But is not this argument as clearly applicable to mental and moral phenomena, as to material things? If it be admitted that God exercises a superintendency over the minds of men in producing great results, can we deny it in regard to those which are of inferior importance? Is not the concurrence of these latter necessary to the former, and do they not, in fact, make an essential part of the great moral plan of the Divine Government?

And, further, as we infer that God's continual care is over all, from the fact that this is as necessary to the *preservation* and *continued* well-being of the things that are made, as was creative power to call them into being at first, so this is true of every individual thing however small or apparently insignificant; since this, as we have shown, is an essential part of the vast and all-comprehending scheme. In a word, continued preservation is as much an act and an expression of Omnipotence and Divine care, as was original creation, and this applies to every part as well as to the general arrangement of the whole; and hence it is justly held that there is no foundation for the distinction which is often made between a general and particular Providence. So intimate are the mutual connexions among all things that exist, and between general results and the minute methods by which these results are produced, that whatever we assert of the one must be asserted of the other; and the same argument by which it is proved that God cares and provides for any thing, must also necessarily prove that He cares and provides for every thing.

And now the application of this train of remark to the subject before us is obvious. Does the *continuance* of the material world and all that therein is, evince, at every successive instant of its continuance, the exercise of a Power

as active, and as efficient, and as *present*, as that which first called it into being? and can we doubt that God's spiritual and moral world is sustained and directed by a like continual exhibition of creative energy? Nay, is not this true for a stronger reason, since human spirits are the brightest manifestations of Divine power; and can we conceive that He would be present by His august agency to the insensate particles of matter, and direct them in all their appointed evolutions, and yet withdraw this agency from those spiritual natures, which, by their very constitution, He is declaring to us, are nothing less than emanations from his own Intelligence? Does He care for stocks and stones? does He establish a covenant of His providence with the clods of the valley? does He connect the vegetating seed in mysterious union with all the elementary principles of nature? does He so order the weight of the earth, and measure the sea, and arrange the length of the seasons, and temper the sun, and compound the atmosphere, that each may minister in its due proportion and influence to the developement of every little plant? — and can we conceive that He passes by, in unconcern, those spiritual and immortal beings, which are the most express images of Himself? For our own part, when we look upon the upspringing of a blade of grass, or upon an opening flower-bud, and observe the minute care that is taken of them in their early state, and watch their progress to perfection, we can have no doubt that God is nigh to human souls; and we feel, with our whole hearts, the full force and subduing power of the Saviour's appeal — "O ye distrustful, shall He not much more care for you?"

The relations that God sustains to His human family, in like manner, lead us to infer that a Divine Influence is exerted upon the human mind. We look to Him as our Moral Governor, the Inspector, Judge, and Rewarder of men. We believe that He has purposes to subserve in regard to every individual, as such, and also as being a component part of that kingdom, which is over all, in heaven and on earth, and is from everlasting to everlasting. And is it rational to suppose, that, holding these interesting relations, and having such objects to subserve, and possessing, moreover, entirely open access to the minds of men, He should confine His agency to the mere dead letter of certain positive laws? Even earthly governors, if they are wise, endeavour to give

effect to their enactments by every species of moral influence; well knowing that without this all their legislation is vain, and that constitutions, and compacts, and prescriptions, are but as paper-walls in the way of the aggressor.

> "Ill fares that land, to hastening ills a prey,
> Whate'er accumulates, where *men* decay."

The history of the world is one continued commentary on that vital principle in civil government, that when the moral sense of a community is perverted or deadened, its ruin is already sealed; the fatal hand-writing on the wall has been traced; and "God has numbered and finished it." And can we believe that in the Divine government, where not merely the execution of the laws, or certain general results are regarded, but where the moral welfare of every individual is the final end of the whole arrangement, those Divine Influences are withholden, which are so eminently adapted, if not indeed absolutely necessary, to secure the proposed result?

But this relation of governor and subject is one of the most loose and distant, so to speak, that God sustains in respect to man. We are His by creation; His by preserving care; His by a ceaseless, boundless, and ineffable love; His by various dear and intimate ties which bind us to no other being. No words can express the nearness of God to us. We make the best approach to it, when we take up the Saviour's language and call upon Him as "our Father, who is in Heaven." And what is implied in this relation? If we would know, we must inquire what is implied in it as it exists among creatures like ourselves. It is thus alone we can learn to understand it. And if we are conversant with what passes in human hearts, we know, that if there be any love, which, unmindful of all merely selfish aims, centres singly upon its object, it is this. We know that if there be any sentiment, which triumphs over all obstacles, and rejoices in personal sacrifices; which animates our labors day by day, and all the day, and wakes and watches by night; which gains new intensity from the trials it is called to endure, and new fervor, depth, and tenderness from unwelcome and forbidding events; which never wavers, never tires, never changes, never fails; which outlasts the absence, outlives the life, and survives the unworthiness of its objects,

— it is parental love. We know that words are cold and powerless to describe it, that there is more felt in any single pulsation of a parent's heart, that there is more seen in a single glance of parental affection, that there is more heard in any single tone of parental endearment, than the most gifted tongue can tell. And yet this sentiment, strongly and purely as it exists in human bosoms, is but a faint and shadowy emblem of our heavenly Father's love. It only gives us some intimation of the nature of the sentiment, but falls as far beneath the great reality, as the earth is beneath the heavens. And can we believe that a sentiment like this, pervading, if we may reverently use the expression, the bosom of the Infinite God, should prompt to no near intercourse with its objects? Is it not rather far more rational to infer, that it should lead to a communion with them, constant, intimate, suited to their natures, adapted to their wants, and answering to all their pure aspirations and devout desires? It is, indeed, so rational a conclusion, that it enters as an essential truth into various forms of religion, which have little else in common.

We next observe that this Influence of God upon the human mind, not only involves nothing strange or unnatural, but, on the contrary, may be regarded as analogous to what we know of the influence which human minds exercise over each other. If we examine the methods in which impulse and guidance are imparted from mind to mind, in the ordinary intercourse of society, we shall find, that it is by no means confined to direct and palpable instruction, but that, in addition to this, we are continually receiving impressions from those around us, which it is impossible to embody in language. These it is difficult to analyze, since they spring from very various and often very minute sources, but yet, in their combined effect, are as clear and decisive as the most full and elaborate instruction. They are given out often, indeed most commonly, without the consciousness of him from whom they emanate, and are received, in like manner, unconsciously into the minds of others. But their effect is not, on this account, less distinct, obvious, and permanent. These remarks apply with peculiar force to the influence which is continually exerted by superior minds over those around them. In every circle, and in every little community, much of the prevailing habits of thought, feeling,

and sentiment is to be traced to this unwritten and unspoken instruction. It is a part of the arrangement of Providence that it should be so; and the communication of an influence from the Infinite mind to inferior minds, to which they are open and accessible in countless ways, is in entire accordance with that system by which they are continually operating upon each other. And as an express revelation of important truth from God bears a strict analogy to that mode of instruction by which the better informed impart information to the ignorant; so the doctrine of a Divine Influence, proceeding from Him, is perfectly analogous to those less obvious or imperceptible impressions, which, in ordinary circumstances, superior minds impart to those around them.

There is one other illustration of this part of the subject which we are not willing wholly to omit. The doctrine of Divine Influence is rational, and commends itself, before inquiry, to our belief, because it is necessary to the growth of all the pious and devotional sentiments of our nature. What were God without the thought, not only that He is, but that He is the present Helper and Friend of all that call upon Him in truth and love? Let any one imagine, if he can, that He is a Being, who, having created the universe, and placed man therein, and enacted certain laws for his direction, then retired from any further care or interest for His work, and left man to go on and fill up, as he might, his trial scene of life. Will he not find by this supposition, that he has disrobed his God of all that is truly interesting or affecting in His character, and that he has left himself no object, that he can either love or adore. Is God still the Father of his human family? It is a Father wholly regardless of his children. Is he still their Inspector and Guardian? It is with the cold eye of indifference. Is he still their Everlasting Friend? It must be a relation they can neither see, nor feel, nor understand, since it cuts off all but formal and distant intercourse with its objects. Is it not plain, that a Being like this offers us nothing on which our affections may centre and repose? He may yet indeed, by His ineffable attributes of greatness, wisdom, and power, excite emotions of fear, wonder, and awe; but such a God presents to our hearts an idea as dead and blank, so far as tender and confiding sentiments are concerned, as are the heathenish notions of Nature, Fate, or Destiny. The God of Christians

is stricken out of the universe. For ourselves, we shrink from the denial of a doctrine which necessarily involves such consequences as these. And it seems to us far more rational to believe, that, as intercourse and sympathy with our fellow beings are necessary to the very existence of the social affections, so those which are peculiarly and essentially devout, need to be quickened and kept alive, at all times, by a direct and heart-felt communion with God, their appropriate object. Indeed, without this communion, and we trust that we speak to the experience of many of our readers here, some of the strongest wants and calls of our nature are neglected and unanswered. The Soul was made for a fealty more intense, confiding, engrossing, than any thing earthly can inspire. It yearns for an alliance which the earth cannot supply. It feels a weakness which none other than an almighty arm can sustain. It has longings, and hopes, and aspirations, which, passing the line of time and the boundaries of created things, can only find their fitting objects, and their true repose, within the throne of the Eternal. And can we believe that a communion so necessary to the Soul, and for which the Soul was thus evidently made, and without which the God of Christians is virtually stricken out of His moral universe, and man bereft of his highest reliance and disappointed in his most distinctive and cherished affections, is denied?

In these remarks, we are aware, that we have only made an approach to the precise question at issue before us. This is, whether the Doctrine of a Spiritual Influence, in the sense in which it has been explained, is a Christian Doctrine; whether it is asserted authoritatively in the New Testament; whether it is to be ranked among those new and *additional* prerogatives, which belong to the disciples of Jesus Christ? Still we deem these preparatory remarks important to a right understanding of this subject. Since, if it can be shown that the doctrine is a rational doctrine; that it contains and involves nothing, which, before inquiry into any alleged revelation concerning it, should excite doubt or distrust; but, on the other hand, that it is one which is rendered highly probable by all we know of the constitution of the human mind, of the character of God, of His relations to His creatures, and of the connexion of these creatures with each other,—we shall be better prepared to examine and estimate

the direct evidence, which is urged in its support. Indeed, we apprehend the most fatal obstacles, which prevail in the minds of men, both against the claims of Christianity in general, as divine, and against its leading doctrines, rightly understood, arise from objections existing antecedently to all inquiry, and which are never thoroughly examined. Of this description are all those doubts which are suggested by what is vaguely thought to be the strangeness of the Gospel scheme, and its want of conformity with things already admitted to be true. And in respect to the particular inquiry before us, we are persuaded that much of the half-believing and skepticism which exists on this subject, springs from an ignorance or forgetfulness of those relations, which God has established between Himself and us; and, that if we could feel any thing approaching to an adequate sense of the intimacy of His union to our souls, we should no longer be doubtful in regard to His gracious Influence upon them.

We now proceed to ascertain what additional light the Scriptures have thrown on this important subject. But, as these pages are not the proper place for minute or elaborate Scriptural criticism, we shall cite only those passages, which, in our apprehension, have a direct bearing on the question at issue, with as few remarks as possible in illustration of their meaning and pertinency.

Those who are familiar with this subject, are aware that the principal difficulty attending the investigation, arises from the necessity of distinguishing between those promises of a Divine aid, which were given to the first Apostles of our Lord, in furtherance of their mission as the first heralds of the cross, and which, in consequence, were strictly miraculous in their character; and those ordinary, or not miraculous aids of the Spirit of God, which, as we believe, are promised to every devoted follower of Jesus in every subsequent age.* In the discussion now before us, we shall con-

* It is somewhat remarkable, that so accurate a thinker and so sensible a writer as Dr. (now Archbishop) Whately is, should have made such a loose and unsatisfactory argument on this subject, as is found in his recent publication, the "Essays on some of the Difficulties in the Writings of St. Paul." We may refer, in illustration of this remark, to Essay ix. page 281. He seems to have taken as granted, too, that the phrases "abide with them for ever," and to "the end of the world," admitted of none other than a strictly literal interpretation.

fine ourselves entirely to those passages, which, in our apprehension, belong, beyond all question, to the latter class.

We shall probably be anticipated, by all who have attended to this inquiry, in the first reference we shall make to the Christian Scriptures. It is to the remarkable conversation of our Lord with Nicodemus (John iii. 3—14), and especially to the words "*unless a man be born of* water and *the Spirit*, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." We are aware of the various interpretations which have been given of the words "born of the spirit." But if they be viewed in connexion with the illustration of them, which is afforded in the 8th verse following; and in connexion with the language of Paul to Titus, (iii. 5,) of Luke (xviii. 27,) in which God's agency in the salvation of men is contrasted with their own weakness and inability; and especially if they be brought into comparison with various passages, in which a change from sin to holiness is denoted by the phrase "born of God," (as for example, John i. 13, and in various places in the 1st Epistle of John); it will be apparent, that the phrase "born of the spirit" can mean nothing less than a special effect, produced by an influence proceeding from God as its cause, and operating through the religion of His Son, as the means.

Luke xi. 13, "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children; how much more shall your heavenly Father give the holy spirit to them that ask him." It is then promised to all who seek it.

In the last solemn and affecting interview of our Lord with his disciples, previous to his crucifixion, and in immediate connexion with the promise of divine aid in their peculiar mission, which, under the designation of Paraclete, Helper, Advocate, and Comforter, was to be with them in all their labors and trials, for guidance and support, he subjoins the following words, (John xiv. 21,) "He that loveth

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The Essay contains many judicious remarks, but, as it seems to us, is liable to the fatal objection referred to in the text, that, namely, of frequently confounding those texts in which the promise of a Supernatural aid was given to the Apostles and early Disciples of Jesus Christ, with those which were intended for all Christians of all ages.

Indeed the same mistake is very common in most treatises on this subject. It runs through and vitiates the Scriptural argument of Dr. Sprague (see Sprague on Revivals, pp. 74, 75,) on this subject, which is, moreover, very weak and inconclusive on other accounts. And the same error is apparent in many of the letters of the twenty-three Divines, which make up the remaining part of the volume.

me, shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, *and will manifest myself to him.*" It is obvious, that whatever this promise may mean, it is not confined to those whom he then immediately addressed, but is general in its application, and is extended to *all who love* him. What then is the import of the promise, "I *will manifest* myself to him." We cannot stop to notice the various meanings which have been put upon these words. The only unforced and rational one, and that which best answers to all the circumstances under which the promise was uttered and received, is, "To those who love me, I will show myself beneficent, and kind, and ready to assist, as if I were in real presence with them." It is equivalent to the promise made to his immediate followers, in the preceding verse; "I am in you." And as this, in regard to them, included a promise of all necessary aid in the extraordinary labors to which they were destined, in the first propagation and establishment of the religion of Christ among men; so the words under remark can be understood as meaning nothing less than a promise of all needed assistance to "all who love him," in the ordinary circumstances of their discipleship on earth.

This construction is sustained and fortified by the explanation which our Saviour himself gives, in immediate connexion with the passage cited. In reply to Judas, who asked an explanation of the words, Jesus said, "If a man love me, he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and *we will come unto him,* and *make our abode with him.*" This was a metaphorical phrase, well known to the Jews, and was used to express intimate presence, especial favor, and essential aid. It will be observed, too, that this promise, like that in illustration of which it is used, is general; it is made to "all who love Christ." If these views are correct, the words "I will manifest myself to him," and "we will make our abode with him," contain the promise of all needed spiritual aid, and it is made to all, in all times, "who love" the Saviour. We are unwilling to crowd our pages with the learned lumber of quotations and references. Those who have gone into this inquiry will perceive, that the interpretation we have here given is sanctioned by the most learned and unprejudiced commentators, from Grotius down to the present day, including those, who, in regard to many other important points of doctrine, are much at variance.

We think, further, that this doctrine of a Divine Influence is clearly taught and strongly urged by St. Paul, in various parts of his Epistles.

Thus the Apostle wrote to his converts in Galatia, (iv. 6,) "Because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father." There seems to be no reason for restricting this promise to the Galatian converts. They were called sons, because they were redeemed from the slavery of the Jewish law. And so were all Christians. And whatever we understand to be the import of the promise "the spirit of his Son,"—whether, as some think, the effusion of the holy spirit, whereby they received the assurance of their adoption and sonship; or whether, as others argue, by this term is meant the spirit or temper of Christ;—it is equally evident, that the boon is not one of those miraculous gifts which were often imparted by the Apostles to their disciples, but is a spiritual blessing, in which all Christians may participate, and is, moreover, ascribed directly to God as its author.

To the Ephesians (i. 13, 14) the Apostle writes, "In whom (that is, in Christ) after that ye believed, ye were sealed with that holy spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance," &c. *Spirit of promise* is a well known Hebraism for *promised spirit*. We know no reason why this sealing of the promised spirit should be restricted to mean only the extraordinary gifts which were imparted to the first converts of the Apostles, and not extended also to that religious preparation of the heart, which is in like manner the effect of the spirit of God coöperating with ours, and which is to all who receive it, in all ages, the earnest of an immortal inheritance.

Again, the Apostle writes to the same body of disciples, (Eph. iii. 14—17,) "I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,——that he would grant you to be strengthened with might *by his spirit* in the inner man, that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith." Here a Divine Influence, even the spirit of God, not any miraculous gift, is recognised as important to the Ephesians, in strengthening their faith in Christ. And, if thus important to them, it cannot be less so to all Christians of all times. And if it were not to be imparted, it certainly would not have been prayed for. The same remarks apply with equal force, to

the earnest aspiration of the Apostle in behalf of his converts at Rome. (Rom. xv. 13.) "Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope through the power of the holy spirit."* Here a *spiritual* blessing, and not those extraordinary powers by which the first disciples were distinguished, is sought in prayer, by an Apostle, through the agency of "the holy spirit." The doctrine of a Divine Influence is then clearly implied and virtually taught by St. Paul, at least so far as those are concerned to whom he wrote. And as there was nothing in their peculiar circumstances, which confined the application of the doctrine to them, it is a fair, and, indeed, a necessary inference, that it is not so to be confined; but, as the blessing implored was a *spiritual* gift, and one necessary, and equally necessary to all Christians, so all may hope to receive it, on the same terms, and through the same agency. We add a few more passages, to which the same reasoning applies.

Eph. iv. 30. "Grieve not the holy spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption." Here, as in the passage above cited (Eph. i. 13, 14), the Apostle meant by "the spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed," those Christian gifts and graces, that religious preparation of the heart, which were wrought by the spirit of God, and whereby they were marked, designated, set apart for the day of redemption; and there is nothing from which we can infer, that any gift was thus possessed by them, which may not in like manner and degree be possessed by all sincere Christians in all ages.

2 Thessalonians ii. 13. "But we are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, *through the sanctification* of the spirit, and belief of the truth." In this passage, "sanctification" is ascribed to the agency of the spirit. See also 1 Peter, i. 22; Jude 20;

* Not "Ghost," as the mistranslation in our common version expresses it. It is much to be regretted, that this term should hold its place in our Bibles. We would also take this opportunity to observe that it is in like manner to be regretted that the terms Holy Ghost, Holy Spirit, and equivalent ones, should be continued to be printed with capital letters, as if a *person* were meant. It is well known to those who read the original language, that there is no authority for this.

where a like agency is ascribed to the holy spirit; all of which passages are distinctly and explicitly, though concisely, explained by St. Paul in his letter to the Philippians, (ii. 13,) "*For it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure.*"

On all these texts, three things, we think, are especially to be noted.

First; Spiritual blessings, sanctification, religious improvement of the heart and life, and not those miraculous gifts, which were conferred by the Apostles on their early converts, are the blessings imparted.

Second; They are ascribed to the holy spirit, the spirit of God, or simply to God, through whose peculiar agency they are imparted. And

Third; As they are equally needed by all Christians of all ages, and as there was nothing in the peculiar circumstances of those to whom the language was originally directed, to confine its application to them, it is not so to be confined.

We conclude these quotations by referring to the Epistle to the Romans, viii. 26, 27; "Likewise the spirit helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for, as we ought; but the spirit itself maketh intercession for us, with groanings which cannot be uttered. And he that searcheth the hearts, knoweth what is the mind of the spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints, according to the will of God." We are aware that the term here translated "spirit," has been differently interpreted. Some learned commentators have considered it as standing for the religion of Christ;* others, as indicating that temper or frame of mind, which Christianity is intended to form, but which is yet to be referred to God, or the spirit of God, as its author.† But without further remarking on these opinions, which our limits forbid, we shall only observe, that the explication of the term as given by Locke seems to us to be the true one, namely, that it is intended to indicate a "new quickening principle and power," which operates upon the mind through the instrumentality of the religion of Christ.

* See this ingeniously urged in *Jo. Aug. Noesselti Opusculorum Fasciculus* II. Halæ, 1785.

† Jo. G. Rosenmüller, Scholia in N. T. Rom. viii. 26.

Such are the Scriptural authorities on which we rest our faith in the doctrine of a Divine Influence, proceeding from God, the Father of our Spirits, and operating upon the minds of men. We have felt the necessity of condensing this part of the subject as much as possible, and in our endeavour to be brief, may have rendered the argument obscure. However this may be, one great source of error, at least, which frequently obscures and destroys the reasoning of inquirers on this point, who are otherwise judicious and accurate, we have sedulously attempted to avoid, namely, that of confounding the extraordinary and miraculous aids promised to the first Apostles, and imparted by them to their immediate followers, for a special purpose, with those spiritual influences, which, as we believe, are imparted to all sincere and devoted Christians of all subsequent ages, and intended for their own spiritual improvement.

Such are the grounds on which our belief of the doctrine of Divine Influence rests. We shall proceed to inquire, in the next place, what are the methods in which this influence is afforded to the human mind. But this must be deferred to our next number.

ART. IV. — *The Diegesis; being a Discovery of the Origin, Evidences, and Early History of Christianity, never yet before or elsewhere so fully and faithfully set forth.* By the REV. ROBERT TAYLOR, A. B., and M. R. C. S. Boston: published by John Gilbert. 1832. [Second Edition. Boston: published by Abner Kneeland. 1834.] 8vo. pp. viii. and 440.

AMONG the means employed at the present day to disseminate the doctrines of irreligion, the press, as might be expected, is active and efficient. This indeed is no new thing. On the contrary, it appears that in this as in the other departments of its operation, it labors more for the republication of former works, than for the creation of new ones. We do not then introduce the subject of Infidel Publications, solely or principally because religion is threatened by new arguments, but rather because we find something worthy of notice in the new forms and bolder claims of very familiar acquaintances.

It is a debated question, whether Infidel publications should now meet with that attention which has formerly been so lavishly bestowed upon them. Some, being properly indignant at the spirit which pervades them, so far from an honest inquiring temper, and by no means too well assured of their poverty of argument, are decidedly opposed to a public examination of them. Others, equally aware of these circumstances, are alarmed at the influence they may exert over the ignorant and the vicious, and desire an answer to even the weakest of them. If it be asked, as a general rule, whether the friends of religion are bound to repel every attack against Christianity, however cowardly or weak, by a formal examination and refutation, the answer would we think be on all sides in the negative. But if it were asked, whether those, who are set for the defence of the Gospel, are free to pass by, unexamined, the plausible objections of its enemies, all would return the same answer. We would be more particular in stating the question, to which a general answer cannot, and ought not, to be given. Irreligious publications, which are now sent forth in large numbers, comprehending every possible variety between the profitless and harmless cogitations of the philosophic deist, and those of the scurrilous reviler of his own moral and intellectual nature, should be divided into two classes; as they are merely opinionative and theoretical, or as directed against the authorized evidences of an acknowledged system of religion. Thus there are treatises which acknowledge and uphold Natural religion, while they reject the idea of a Revelation as unnecessary or impossible, or attack the evidences of Christianity as founded upon such a revelation; — and there are others which discard every idea of religion, whether natural or revealed, as superstitious and chimerical. There are likewise the objections of honest and professedly philanthropic unbelievers to abuses which they seem to consider the necessary concomitants of religious institutions, — and there are the more dangerous and insidious ravings of political, irreligious fanatics. Now, as a general rule, we should object to a formal consideration of such publications. Notwithstanding the bold challenges and idle threats in which those, who are instrumental in sending them forth, urge upon us the alternative, as they fancy, of answering them, or of surrendering the foundations of our faith;

we think more would be lost than gained by meeting them as they desire. We have room only to state our reasons, without enlarging upon them.

In the first place, there is a great presumption against the honest intentions of their authors. If the information of any one be sufficient to justify him in the belief that others will be the wiser for a communication of his knowledge, he must be aware that the evidences of religion are no new topic. It will cost him but little literary labor to discover that they form a large part of the literature of the last two thousand years; and that a good proportion were called forth by objections more or less reasonable, dictated by every possible variety of unbelief. He will discover, that when any thing under the shape of an argument has been advanced against Christianity, no matter whether it were dictated by an honest or a dishonest heart, it has always been freely and fairly met by writers who have stood first for talents and piety. Objections which have been raised in a moment and spoken in a word, have ever received prompt attention, and, without a single exception, have been thoroughly weakened and set aside, though the labor of years has been necessary to prepare a bulky treatise for their refutation. Though the task of meeting over and over again the same idle and nonsensical objections, which have been a score of times refuted, was unobligatory and thankless, it has ever been cheerfully performed. Every absurd and ridiculous fancy upon which ignorance might hang a plea of superior wisdom, or daring impiety could fasten its cobweb tissue of excuses, has been treated in a spirit of charitable and well-instructed zeal, as if it were the argument of a sound and healthy mind. If Christianity be with any one a matter of doubt, either in its origin, nature, or evidence, he can look about him and see that there are many satisfied with both; that the religion is connected in the most indissoluble manner with all the institutions of society, and that since it is, with thousands of his fellow men, an object of deep reverence and regard, it is not to be lightly assailed. What, then, is the duty of an honest man, when a doubt forces itself upon his mind? The difficulty suggested may be such as a further examination would convince him might easily be removed, or it may be such as, unless overstated, to disprove nothing of consequence. Is

he to commit his objections to paper, and by means of the press to give them a wide circulation, which will infallibly place them in the hands of those who are not at all likely to obtain a refutation of them, however ready and able it may be? This would argue rather a desire to disturb the faith of others, than to strengthen his own. If satisfaction in his own mind be all he desires, this he can obtain by application to those whose duty and delight it is to convince the understanding, as well as to improve the lives of men. Experience, however, shows that such a course has not always been followed. Many writers have not hesitated again and again to issue their bold objections, without so much as putting themselves to the trouble of reading the ablest refutation of them.

Another reason why Infidel publications should not be formally noticed, is, that reviews or refutations of such books, are sure to find a very different circulation than those whose influences they are intended to counteract. Could we be certain that only those whose faith had been disturbed by the objection, would possess themselves of the answer, this reason would then indeed lose part of its force, but by no means all of it. For, as we have just said of the author of the objection, so we now say of those who adopt it, they will not often trouble themselves to read a refutation. Still we know that the refutation would fall into the hands of those who never heard of the objection. As such do not stand in need of it for their own conviction, they can employ their time more profitably than in perusing it. Not that we fear disturbing their faith, but would avoid, if possible, the sullying of their purest reflections by associating with them the degrading and abusive language which a reckless impiety may have attached to the objects of them.

The last reason we shall offer, is alone sufficient to justify our opinion. By leaving the majority of irreligious works unanswered, we add one more to the weighty motives for the study of the Scriptures, by those who are satisfied of their value, and prize their possession. No one can peruse the treatises which have at any time been written against our religion, without observing that much of the argument contained in them, is founded upon a misunderstanding or perversion of the Scriptures. This is peculiarly the case with the more modern works. It must increase the pleasure

of the believer, when he sees the character of the Saviour ridiculed or his existence denied, to be able to call from his own acquired knowledge, ample refutation of the falsehood. He cannot have studied very carefully, even if the Bible without note or comment has been his only text-book, without being convinced of the perfect symmetry of all its parts, whether he dwell upon the nature of its instructions, or the mode of their conveyance. Why needs such an one to have the existence of the Saviour, or the morality of the Gospel, vindicated to him? He certainly can say, with Rousseau, "that the inventor of such a personage would be a more astonishing character than the hero;" and, with Rochester, "a bad life is the only grand objection to the Bible." Indeed, a thorough understanding of the Scriptures, would be a sufficient means of refuting every objection that has ever been brought against them. Take one example from a modern unbeliever. Carlile, an Infidel leader in England, professes to reject the belief that such a person as Jesus Christ ever existed. It will hardly be believed that a man of such consummate impudence or ignorance, whichever it may be, should set himself forward as the great light of the age; such however is the case. His argument is very defective, being made up of a false assumption and a false inference. "The words, *Jesus* and *Christ*," says this learned philologist, "are convertible and synonymous terms; such a name had never been adopted by those who understood the meaning of both words, it is a tautology which no people ever adopted in the way of title," therefore, "the history of Jesus is a fable." * Now a child of common understanding can, not only tell the distinction between the two titles of our Lord, as Jesus, the *Saviour* of men, and Christ, the *anointed* of God, but can see likewise an appropriateness in applying them both to him who at once fulfilled both these offices. But if this were not the case, —if the two words, instead of having a derivation and signification as distinct as possible, were, as Mr. Carlile's ignorance suggests, absolutely synonymous, the conclusion he would draw is equally unwarranted. His own name instead of being 'Richard Carlile,' might with no more labor have been 'Richard Richards,' and his friends would probably

* The Republican, London, Oct. 14, 1825.

have admitted his existence, and his testament, provided he has any thing besides his critical skill worth leaving behind him, would undoubtedly be valid. But it is not only for such silly arguments as this, that a knowledge of the Scriptures provides an answer; it is of equal value in the more plausible, not to say better sustained objections, with which an unhallowed or misguided hand has endeavoured to slur the sanctity of our Religion by disputing its claims, or cavilling at its doctrines. We are fully confident that no one who valuès his faith aright, and improves his opportunities for informing and training it, will meet with any argument which he cannot render powerless. It is the duty of every one to be able to do this. We talk of the harmony, the consistency, and the appearance of truth which mark a theory in Natural, Moral, or Intellectual Philosophy; and it is by the presence or absence of such internal signs that we form an opinion of its value. We examine it likewise in connection with admitted truths, and, if the whole recommends itself to us as worthy of our reception, we embrace it. We should set him down as a simpleton, who should endeavour to shake our faith in it by showing some inaccuracies in the printing of the book in which it is contained, in the handwriting of its author, or some unimportant discrepancies in the statements of those who had in turn chronicled its origin and history. If any book may be thus allowed to tell its own story, and rest its claims upon a general and particular scrutiny of its contents, the result of which is to fix an opinion, such we may safely assert is the case with that book, in which is recorded a Revelation from God.

We are aware that it will be answered to all we have said, that it is proper for those, to whose peculiar care the defence of Christianity is committed, to show themselves as active as its enemies. "Nothing," says Horne, "is unworthy of notice, that is calculated to mislead the ignorant and unwary." In this we perfectly agree; the question is, how shall this notice be expended, — in what manner shall a zeal and readiness in the cause of Christianity be manifested? Our arguments have been adduced to support our opinion that the authors, or rather the publishers, of irreligious treatises have now no right to claim a *formal* attention; that the friends of religion are under no obligation to bestow it. We hope to be understood as confining this remark to

those treatises where assertion is put for argument, libellous personalities and insults in place of facts, or where nothing more is attempted than merely the broaching of an absurd opinion, harmless indeed, unless bringing into jeopardy the peace of society, when the law of the land must be the instrument of conviction. But when, in the words of Bishop Watson, "however much we may question the wisdom of their authors, we can give them credit for sincerity," or "when silence begins to be looked upon as an acquiescence in what they advance," then, as inclination prompts an answer from any one, by consulting his own ability and opportunity, he may employ himself usefully in meeting them. But we have yet to learn the name of the book containing a solid argument against Christianity, which the anatomical criticism of such men as Watson, Douglas, and Campbell, has not thoroughly dissected, and laid by among the curiosities of former times.

Here we might leave our subject, and decline even acknowledging our acquaintance with the existence and contents of the irreligious publications of the day. But, as it is the desire of many that silence on these points should not on any side be construed into an expression of indolence or fear, and as we said there was something worthy of notice in the different forms and pretences of old arguments, we would state in a few words the general character of the books, and then bestow a more particular attention on that one which embodies the whole wisdom of the Infidelity of the nineteenth century.

Of these publications it may be said in general, that all they contain of argument is old, and has been proved unsustainable, while their novelty consists in their connexion with ignorance and error on other points than those upon which they profess to treat. The authors of some of them seem to have employed their time in perusing every thing of an irreligious nature, which their predecessors have left behind them, whether they themselves saw reason before their death to retract it or not. Others have manifestly possessed themselves of the works of Christian authors, and, passing by the main purpose of them, have selected with scrupulous care all objections there anticipated, solely for the pleasure of removing them. Some pretend to found their objections upon the philosophy of revelation, and

quote the life of Voltaire, forgetting that his death likewise would teach them a lesson. Some lay claim to the possession of a soul, while others refuse to believe in the existence of what they cannot see and handle. Some hope for a life after death, while others know of no reason why it should be granted to them, even so much as to the beasts of the field. Some in fine believe in a God, in his moral government, and in a future state; while others maintain that the harmony and order of creation, like the confused beauty of the kaleidoscope, is the work of chance; that man must look for his heaven upon earth, and that all the institutions of society are based upon narrow, false, and unjust principles.

Here indeed would seem to be a formidable host, for though using such different weapons and with such different skill, these are all directed against a common foe. They comprehend, as we see, three classes: 1. Those directed against revealed religion, attacking both the Old and New Testament Scriptures; 2. Those which aim to set aside natural as well as revealed religion, denying the existence of a God, and the certainty of a future state; 3. Those treatises which oppose the existing state of society in all its most important institutions, as defective and oppressive, while they aim their blows against religion as the cause of the difficulty. It is of the first class exclusively that we wish to speak. Some who use them, indeed, profess to honor the evidences of Christianity with a calm discussion. They produce objections founded upon imperfections ascribed to the Saviour and the character of the Apostles, upon the want of originality and perfection in their precepts and morality, and the tendency of Christian institutions. Here we find all those old objections which in the moment of their first publication were satisfactorily refuted. The sophistical objection of Hume which was so overturned by Campbell, and since by Brown, that it would seem, if there were any fellowship in types, they would refuse to reproduce it, now makes its appearance in a thousand forms, at each time stated with all the gravity of a newly discovered truth. But the greater part of the arguments are founded upon such points of the evidence, as superficial thinkers suppose may lose their power by the progress of time. Those facts which the early opposers of Christianity dared not question,

are now most unblushingly denied. If there be any thing in the infidelity of the present day which did not belong to that of any former age, it is an unlicensed freedom of statement arising from such presumptions. There is a catching at names and dates, as if the great truths of Christianity lay in a perfect system of chronology, or in an examination of geological and geographical theories. There is a comparing of minute expressions in different parts of the Scriptures, and a consequent outcry of interpolation and discrepancy. Whether it be from wilful malice, or more frequently from ignorance, we cannot tell, but the fact is clear that a most glaring misrepresentation, on the part of Infidel writers, of the contents of the Scriptures is a prominent characteristic of most of their publications. We not unfrequently find the language of bad men, which for proper ends is necessarily introduced into the Scriptures, taken entirely from its connexion and represented as the very words of God. We are aware that there is much honest misunderstanding of the real design of the Old Testament, and of its true connexion with the New; but such miserable attempts at argument as have been founded on this misunderstanding can hardly be ascribed, by the most long-suffering charity, to ignorance alone. These general characteristics of all the modern Infidel publications are united to perfection in that of which we have placed the title at the head of this article. It was with the design of bestowing some attention on this book that we have been led into the preceding remarks.

The author of the "Diegesis," was formerly a clergyman of the Church of England, though, we believe, never invested in that capacity with the duties of a settled pastor. That he has for some time however renounced his belief in Christianity, if he ever possessed any, appears from the following extract. "In the Times newspaper (London), of Dec. 11, 1818, Mr. Taylor published a Latin advertisement stating in the most solemn terms his extreme grief and penitence that he had uttered *certain horrid and mad effusions*, and imploring the charitable forgiveness of all Christians. Some years afterwards when he had made himself still more notorious as a blaspheming Infidel, the same newspaper revived the recollection of the preceding fact. Upon this Mr. Taylor inserted a letter in the Times acknowledging the truth of the statement, and not blushing to affirm that the

whole was done to appease the distressed feelings of his pious mother; and this avowal of deceit, and hypocrisy he made without the least expression of regret or shame! Very shortly after, another letter appeared in the Times, purporting to be from Mr. Taylor's own brother, contradicting his assertion, and declaring that he had made that solemn recantation of infidelity in hopes of obtaining a curacy."* These, however, are incidents in Mr. Taylor's literary history independent of the publication before us. The title-page of the Diegesis certainly excites high expectations and promises much. But it is a good rule, which critics have established in discussing the worth of an original publication, (and this certainly professes to be one,) to discover something if possible of the ability of the author for the proper performance of his undertaking. For such information concerning the author of the "Diegesis" we need not look further than the book itself. St. Paul speaks (1 Cor. ii. 10—15) of judging of spiritual things by spiritual faculties; and as Christianity professes to teach of spiritual truths, we expect that one who would examine these truths fairly, whether to receive or to reject them, should at least profess the power of spiritual discernment. But that this is not the case with Mr. Taylor, his own words will prove. He adopts for his motto, and afterwards repeats in his "Diegesis" (p. 54),† the words of Euphrates, "The philosophy which is agreeable to nature, approve and cherish; that which pretends to commerce with the gods, avoid." On page 99, Mr. Taylor says: "As for the pretence to any thing supernatural, philosophy teaches us to view it only as a certain and incontestable mark of imposture, by whomsoever advanced. Prophecy! the very name of such a thing is a surrender of all pretence to evidence, 't is the language of insanity! The fetor of the charnel-house is not more charged with its admonition to our bodily health, to withdraw from the proximities of death, than the cracky sound of the thing is, with warning to our reason, that we are out of the regions of sobriety, whenever it is so much as seriously spoken of: no honest man ever pretended to it."

* See "An Answer to the Manifesto of the Christian Evidence Society." By John Pye Smith, D. D. London. 1830. p. 52.

† The references to the pages of the "Diegesis" are adapted to the first American edition.

From these plain words we should infer a state of mind in the writer rather unfit for the examination of the evidences of a revelation. He professes, we know, to believe in a God, but it is a Being who, it seems, whatever other attributes he may possess, cannot communicate with the creatures of his own formation.

The "Diegesis" itself, is what Archbishop Whately would call "a collection of dried specimens." The author appears in it as absolutely dead to all sense of high moral feeling, and even to a decent respect for simple purity of sentiment. Many sentences in his book could proceed from nothing but a heart drenched in the most loathsome depravity. His reasoning is singularly lame and inefficient; and where this fails him he endeavours to gain his point, by means of the most diluted sophistry, or the most consummate impudence. These we know are plain assertions, but we intend the proof to be as plain.

The design of Mr. Taylor, though by no means original with him, is to prove that Christianity is of Egyptian origin; that it took its rise in the mystical conceptions of the Essene Philosophers at Alexandria. It is to them, therefore, that he would trace the existence of the primitive doctrines of Christianity, and the composition of our sacred writings. But probably considering that it would still remain a question how these philosophers became possessed of such a system of religion, he would go back to a still earlier period, and prove that Christianity is an Eclectic Philosophy, that is, according to his definition of the term, Christianity is a compilation from the moral teachings of ancient philosophers, — the furtive patchwork of Heathen Mythology. To establish this assertion he brings together an endless mass of quotations from writings ancient and modern, good and bad, garbled and perverted into such a form, that their authors would seem to have been his firmest friends. The whole course of his reading seems to have been guided by the single principle of picking from every writer some material both for offence and defence; of straining every private opinion, unproved assertion, or incautious admission, on the part of an individual writer, into an argument against Christianity. Guided by such a motive, the heterogeneous mass of ecclesiastical literature would afford means to a much more honest and credible

person than Robert Taylor, A. B., of placing himself in a ridiculous position. Indeed the manner in which he perverts the sense of authors, and the use which he makes of their opinions, unjustifiable even upon grounds of opinion and comment, to say nothing of the obligations of honesty, would be matter for fruitful discussion. We shall give a few instances of this, after noticing his main position.

Mr. Taylor's argument may be divided into two parts;—first, his proof that Christianity is a compilation from Heathen Mythology; second, that this compilation formed the religious code of the Essene Philosophers. To trace every step in this argument would be a most wanton tax upon the patience of the reader, besides arguing a puerile fancy in the writer, so near akin to that of Mr. Taylor as to render the imputation of it by no means desirable. We will give only a general statement of some of his positions, at least upon the first part of his argument. On page 137, he says, "The first types of the Gospel story sprang from the Egyptian monks [Essenes], and constituted the substance of the mystical romance which they had modified from the Pagan Mythology." Here is a bold assertion, and what is the proof? The author presents us with more than a hundred pages, containing what he calls the "Resemblances of the Pagan and Christian Theology." He opens his remarkable argument with this truism; "If before the date assigned to Christianity, and in regions and countries where a religion under that name was not known, we shall find all the ideas which that religion involves pre-existent and already familiar to the apprehensions of men; there is no alternative but that the conclusion must be endured." With this we perfectly agree; and though it cannot be supposed, that the proof of his position would have afforded us any pleasure, we must confess that we were somewhat disappointed that a man who evidently has heard of the titles of so many books as Mr. Taylor, should have made out so poor a case. There is however enough in his pages to entitle him to a character of one kind, a character for which, for the sake of decency and truth, to say nothing of religion and sound learning, we hope he is the only aspirant.

Among these "Resemblances" are many containing the boldest blasphemies which a depraved heart could invent; with these of course, we shall not sully our pages. Those

which are comparatively free from this stain, are such as any school-boy could put aside with no other assistance than his Classical Dictionary and Tooke's Pantheon. The author had already given us in an early part of his "Diegesis," a "collation of the Christian and Pagan creeds." He has placed in one column that forged composition of some early Christian called the "Apostles' creed," divided into short paragraphs in order that it may appear more like another, in a parallel column, with but three verbal differences of importance, which he calls the "Pagan creed." In place of Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary, he substitutes "Jasius and the Virgin Electra," and instead of death by crucifixion, —"was struck by a thunderbolt." * This wonderful exhibition of impudence, occurring as it does in so early a part of his volume, before we were acquainted with its character, took us by surprise. We thought at least that Mr. Taylor had fallen upon some hitherto unknown writer, who had far surpassed his age and nation in his religious acquirements, and we expected to be referred to the identical book, containing this interesting creed. An unsuspicious reader would undoubtedly believe that Mr. Taylor was able to point out the parts and the whole of this "Pagan creed," in the writings of the ancients; to produce such a belief was undoubtedly the dishonest intention of the author in placing it in his book; but his own impudence was unable to digest such a monstrous absurdity, and he accordingly retracts half his design, by asserting that "this creed, though not to be found in this form in the Pagan Scriptures (the ancient classics), is evidently deducible from them as their sense and purport." It would be idle to say any thing in answer to such an absurd statement, more than that, as it stands, it is a mere "begging of the question." Let us see some of those "deductions of the sense and purport" of the ancient classics which contain the doctrines of Christianity. If they can be shown, they will accomplish one good purpose at least, in setting at rest for ever a question so long and severely agitated by the ablest scholars and divines, —"the moral tendency of the study of the ancient classics."

* Mr. Taylor alludes here to the fable of Jasion or Jasius, the son of Jupiter and Electra, one of the Atlantides. Jasion married the goddess Ceres and practised agriculture in Arcadia, but, having provoked Jupiter, was slain by one of his thunderbolts.

Moses is hardly to be considered a Christian name; but if Christianity is of heathen origin, Judaism is likewise. Mr. Taylor tells us, on page 21, "that the name of Moses himself, as it stands in the Greek text is composed of the same consonant letters as Mises, the Arabian name of Bacchus, of whom precisely the same adventures were related." No words are necessary to prove that the last clause of this sentence contains a most deliberate and wilful falsehood. As it respects the first, an impartial inquirer might be tempted to ask by what authority Mr. Taylor makes use of the Greek rather than the Hebrew name of Moses. The name certainly existed in the Hebrew language first. The Greek letters, though the only construction which the nature of the language admits, still give but an imperfect rendering of the Hebrew מֹשֶׁה (Mosheh). As Mr. Taylor does not pretend to bring proof of the similarity of Bacchus and Moses, any further than this, we must conclude that a "resemblance" may be traced between any two systems of religion, when two words used in those systems, taken from two different languages, and rendered into English, have two letters in common. But it will require no very attentive reading of the "Diegesis" to discover that less similarity than this is sufficient to constitute, what the author (p. 7) in his very classic style calls, "the full amount of the predications necessary to establish the identification required." We see very plainly how much Mr. Taylor meant to convey by stating this absurd idea. If ignorance is not his own great fault, it is evidently upon the ignorance of his readers that he depends. What could have been his purpose in suggesting this pretended similarity of the names of the revelling deity of the heathen and the stern law-giver of the Jews, unless he would have the superficial and credulous adopt much more than he advances? Though the author of the "Diegesis" is far below the historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, in ability and ingenuity in suggesting causes for a light estimation of sacred things, he is still a ready disciple of Mr. Gibbon, in the dark and deceptive trickery of conveying by a hint, all the falsehood and malice of his heart, which his pen fairly refuses to transcribe.

The first heathen deity between whom and the Saviour, Mr. Taylor would trace a "resemblance," is Æsculapius,

the fabled god of medicine (p. 149). This "resemblance" lies in the fact that "Æsculapius was god of healing, and there are miracles of healing and raising the dead recorded in the Scriptures." Besides, (p. 151,) "the cock and serpent were especially consecrated to Æsculapius, — while the serpent is prime agent in the story of human redemption, and the cock really bears a very important character in the Gospel, in rebuking Peter for cursing and swearing."

Again, on page 156, it seems that the Son of God is no other than the fabled Hercules; but which of the forty-three of that name who figure in Pagan Mythology, we are not told. Here Mr. Taylor finds the origin of the oath in use in the English universities. "Hercules was expressly worshipped by the Latins under the name of Divus Fidius, *the protector of faith.* They called this deity to witness by the oath, '*Me Dius Fidius,*' that is, 'So help me the God Fidius' or Hercules. I should *take* the original form of the oath to have been, '*Me Deus Filius,*' the filling up of which formulary, with the words *ita adjuvet*, makes the sense complete, *So help me God the Son.*" This is truly a very lucid and remarkable piece of reasoning. Well may Mr. Taylor say, "It is Satan himself who hath blinded our eyes, if we cannot see that Hercules and Jesus are one and the same identical personage; that the labors of the one are the miracles of the other; and that the most mysterious and abstruse doctrines of the New Testament were but the realization of the emblematical types of the ancient Paganism." Again, on page 158, the hunting deity, Adonis, who met his death in a contest with a wild boar, has claims to be considered the original of Jesus Christ. As Hercules seems to have been the original voucher of a Christian oath, so it seems that the Christian festivals took their rise in the worship of Adonis. "The Adonia," says Mr. Taylor, "were solemn feasts in honor of Venus, and in memory of her beloved son Adonis. Venus, as sprung from the sea, *mare*, could not be more honorably distinguished than by her epithet Maria; Adonai is literally *our Lord;* so that these solemn feasts, without any change or substitution of names, were unquestionably celebrated to the honor of Mary and her son our Lord." Then it is Apollo, then Mercury, who was the original of Jesus. After this, the miracle at Cana seems to have suggested to Mr. Taylor a

"resemblance" between the Saviour and Bacchus, who taught mankind the culture of the vine, and was moreover so free in the use of its production. The resemblance here is the more remarkable, because, as we are informed in a note, "Volney has shown, that YES was one of the names of Bacchus, which, with the Latin termination, is nothing less than Yesus or Jesus"! We used to think that Dean Swift's "Dissertation to prove the Antiquity of the English Language" was the most ingenious play upon words that could be easily invented. Jupiter, he thought, might have been obtained by the ancients from the words *Jew Peter;* Archimedes from *Hark ye maids;* Strabo from *Stray beaux;* and Aristotle from *Arise to tell.* This indeed was a harmless exercise of the Dean's talents of invention and humor, and we believe that Mr. Taylor is not a whit more in earnest than he was. Whatever may have been the purpose of the author of the "Diegesis" in bringing forward these ridiculous attempts at argument, we have no idea that they were of any avail in convincing him that Christianity was drawn from the corrupt fountains of Paganism. It would seem as if he had been obliged to stay his pen for a moment, and laugh at the thought of the ridiculous appearance he would make as an author, when his sapient reflections should stand forth in the immortality of ink and paper. Such, indeed, seems to have been the state of his mind, when, after enumerating some of these sickeningly ridiculous "resemblances of the Pagan and Christian theology," he says (page 160), "The great source of difficulty and mistake in tracing the identity of the parent figment through the multifarious forms of the ancient mythology seems to arise from the change of epithets and names;" that is, when he cannot find a resemblance even in a few letters, (which is always abundantly sufficient to satisfy him,) he meets with a great difficulty. Yet, he hopes, "the reader will do himself the justice to observe, that throughout the Diegesis no merely fanciful or conjectural interpretations are admitted, and no new lights struck out from ingenious etymologies; he is here presented with the calm, dispassionate evidence of facts, on the authority of Christians themselves." Mr. Taylor must possess a very accommodating conscience, to speak of no other questionable gift.

After giving some of his resemblances between Christ and

Prometheus, who he impiously asserts might from the nature of his punishment (bound for thirty thousand years to a rock on Mount Caucasus, with a vulture feeding on his liver,) be said to be crucified as well as the Saviour, he proceeds to bind together the whole of his wandering thoughts upon the Astrological origin both of Paganism and Christianity. "The Jews," he says (p. 160), "in vain endeavour to disguise the fact, that they were sun-worshippers." If they have never labored to free themselves from this imputation, we are inclined to believe that it must be because they never before heard of it. However this may be, "the Christian Saviour," says Mr. Taylor, "is no more after all than what the Æsculapius, Hercules, Adonis, Bacchus, and Apollo were; that is, an emblematical personification of the Sun." (p. 174.) Again;—"There is not one single phrase or form of speech either in the New Testament or in our best Protestant or Catholic liturgies, but in the most strict and literal sense is predicable of the Sun." (p. 182.) Once more;—"Various are the allegories and fictions of his [the Sun's] passing through the zodiacal sign of the Virgin; his descending into the lower parts of the earth; his rising again from the dead; his ascending into heaven; his opening the kingdom of heaven to all believers; his casting his bright beams of light, through twelve months, or Apostles, one of whom (February — Judas) lost a day, and by transgression (or skipping over) fell that he might go to his own place"! (p. 160.)

Such is the process of reasoning which this remarkable author makes use of to prove that Christianity is of heathen origin. We have given as fair a transcript of it as our limits will permit, and the reader may rest assured, that if Mr. Taylor's intellectual pretensions appear to rest upon a slender foundation, it is no fault of ours.

His medium of connexion between the Pagan gods and the Saviour, is the Hindoo deity Krishna, or Crishna. Here, as throughout his work, we find Mr. Taylor neglecting many "weightier matters," in his determination to exhibit a similarity of names, if he can do nothing more. The "Asiatic Researches" of Sir William Jones afford him all that he offers of any pretensions to truth upon this point. But, before we speak of the nature and extent of the evidence put into his hands by that distinguished author, we

must note his unauthorized spelling of the name of the Indian deity. Mr. Taylor, in all his pretended quotations from Sir William Jones, and in every instance in which he uses the name, spells it "Chrishna," — his purpose being to create a similarity where in fact there is none. In the first Calcutta edition of this author's works, and in all the subsequent foreign and English editions, the word is invariably spelt "Crishna." In the Hindoo Pantheon and Rees's Encyclopædia, it is "Krishna." In the latter authority, it is said, "The name of Krishna is variously written in European languages, Crishna, Cristna, Krustna, Kishna, Kistnah, Quixena, Kishen, &c., and is differently pronounced in different provinces of India."* Sir William always spells the word Crishna, and dates his letters from "Crishna-nagur." Mr. Ward (who certainly was better acquainted with the Mythology of India than he, however inferior to him in other Oriental learning) in his "Mythology of the Hindoos," spells the name "Krishna."

But it is of no consequence which of all these modes of spelling is the right one. If Mr. Taylor would show a similarity between the names of the Hindoo idol and the Saviour, he must use the word Jesus, which is his proper name. Or at least the resemblance must be shown between Crishna and "Messiah," which is the proper original appellative of Jesus, though the change from the Hebrew to the Greek renders it necessary to employ the Greek word answering to the Hebrew for "anointed." But it is idle to waste words upon such obvious absurdities. Let us see if Mr. Taylor can produce any "resemblances" between the history and characters of his "*Chrishna*" (if he wishes so to spell it) and Jesus. If, as he says (p. 175), "the identity of the mythological personages, Christ and Chrishna, and the absolute derivation of the Christian from the Hindoo religion, admits of the utmost corroboration," he is able to produce something in support of his assertion. But this is nothing more than an assertion, made to deceive most cruelly those who are ignorant enough to be duped by this bold blasphemer.

* See An Answer to "The Manifesto of the Christian Evidence Society," by John Pye Smith, D. D., London, 1830.

By a few garbled extracts from Sir William Jones, he would leave an impression upon the minds of his readers, that this writer had discovered certain similarities between the religious systems of the Hindoos and the Christians, and particularly in the lives and characters of their founders. Sir William Jones had investigated thoroughly the nature and antiquity of the Brahminical religion, and the influence of his "Researches" upon his own mind will appear in a few short sentences extracted from them as revised and published by himself in 1786.* "The adamantine pillars of our Christian faith," he says, "cannot be moved by the result of any debates on the comparative antiquity of the Hindus and Egyptians, or of any inquiries into the Indian Theology." † — "One or two missionaries have been absurd enough, in their zeal for the conversion of the Gentiles, to urge that the Hindus were even now almost Christians, because their Bramha, Vishna, and Mahdesa were no other than the Christian trinity; a sentence in which we can only doubt whether folly, ignorance, or impiety, predominates." "The Scriptures bear no resemblance in form or style to any compositions that can be produced from the stores of Grecian, Indian, Persian, or even Arabian learning." True, Sir William Jones thought, that the fable of Crishna, and some of the miraculous stories related of him, such for instance as his holding a mountain upon the tip of his finger, when playing with a party of milk-maids, at the age of seven years, might be traced to a period anterior to the birth of Christ; but not a syllable is found in his whole dissertation which suggests the idea, that he thought there was any thing in the history of the Hindoo deity with his sixty thousand concubines, identical with that of Jesus of Nazareth.

Sir William Jones engaged in his laborious task in order to form his own opinion upon the account in Genesis of the creation of the world. It is said by his biographer, Lord Teignmouth, that his early religious faith was tinged by doubts; his inquiries therefore would certainly be conscientious. To use his own words, if he had found the Scriptures contradicted, instead of attested by his researches,

* "A Dissertation on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India," in Asiatic Researches, Vol. I.

† Ibid. p. 272 *et seq.*

he would have made his conclusions public, "not indeed with equal pleasure, but with equal confidence; for truth is mighty, and whatever be its consequences, must always prevail." We return our thanks to Mr. Taylor for his deserved encomium upon the "piety" of Sir William Jones, "his unequalled and unrivalled learning, which stands as a tower of strength," while we vindicate for both these undisputed excellencies, the honor, the love, and the sanction of his Christian faith, exhibited throughout his life, and at his sudden and unexpected death. The only possible support which Mr. Taylor can find in this "great author," to aid him in assimilating the scraps and systems of heathenism, is found in this quotation; — "I am persuaded that a connexion existed between the old idolatrous nations of Egypt, India, Greece, and Italy, before the time of Moses." This is all that Mr. Taylor found it convenient to quote. What follows is likewise the language of the same author. "The divine legate [Moses], educated by the daughter of a king, and in all respects highly accomplished, could not but know the mythological systems of Egypt; but he must have condemned the superstitions of that people, and despised the speculative absurdities of their priests, though some of their traditions concerning the creation and the flood were founded on truth."

Could we for a moment think that a reader of sane mind, and a heart still susceptible of honest impressions, would be duped by this monstrous deceit of the author of the "Diegesis" in describing Crishna as the original of Jesus, we might here discuss the question whether indeed the fable of Crishna was not long subsequent to the birth of Christ and the triumph of his religion. That such a question might well be contested, is apparent from later researches into the Indian Mythology. Mr. Bentley in his astronomical calculations to test the antiquity of the Hindu festivals, many of which as marked in their calendar had every appearance of being modern, traces the origin of the fiction of Krishna to the beginning of the seventh century.*

But we have already spent too much time in stating what is evident to every person of sound judgment. We were

* Mr. John Bentley's "Ancient and Modern Hindu Astronomy." Mr. Taylor has confounded this author with the celebrated critic, Dr. Bentley.

obliged to exhibit Mr. Taylor's views on this point, however ridiculous they may appear, in order to put Christianity, in conformity with his sage discovery, into the possession of the Egyptian Therapeuts. As we before observed, the discovery set forth in the title-page of the "Diegesis," is nothing more nor less than that Christianity is an Eclectic system which was in the possession of the Essenes in Egypt, ages before the reputed era of Christ. It was necessary to stop for an instant and give his epitome of the Heathen Mythology, then to unite the whole in the worship of the Hindoo idol, and thus prepare the way, so that (p. 201) "the superstitions of India might get footing in Egypt, and the C*h*rishna of the Ganges become the Christ of the Nile." "Every thing of Christianity," says Mr. Taylor, "is of Egyptian origin." (p. 61.) The language with which he ushers in his proof of this fact is remarkably characteristic; a hurried enumeration of the evidence to be expected; a certain display of acquaintance with the works of celebrated authors; a patronizing familiarity in praising their ingenuity, acuteness, and research, — these, united with the utmost self-complacency at what he thinks must be the necessary result of his discovery, form the introduction to the chapter containing the grand argument, a discovery which is to eclipse all the wonders of this curious age, and give to Robert Taylor, A. B., of Oakham jail, the wreath of immortal renown.

As the evidence which the author adduces is outwardly of some force, especially when stated in his extravagant language, and as moreover this contains the whole substance of his book, which throughout goes upon the supposition that his position here is undisputed, it may be well to give it a brief but thorough attention. Mr. Taylor quotes, or rather appears to quote, the very words of Eusebius, to this effect, — "that the ancient Therapeutæ (or Essenes) were Christians, and that their ancient writings were our Gospels and Epistles." He notes, likewise, that a chapter in that historian is headed, "That the religion published by Jesus Christ to all nations is neither new nor strange." Afterwards Mr. Taylor gives us about twenty pages, filled, as he says, with "references to the Therapeutan doctrines in the New Testament," and "corroborations" thence arising in proof of his assertion. "With these lights in thy hands,"

he says, "enter, reader, on the stupendous vista that I unlock for you." He has put himself to the trouble of translating the whole chapter from Eusebius, and recommends it as better than any translation he could find; but, after deducting from its large number of errors, as many as can fairly be ascribed to a defective copy of the Greek Lexicon, which he may have used, it will require more charity than we possess to enable us to free all the remaining ones from the charge of malice and design.

We would as concisely as possible consider these four necessary points;—1. Who were the Essenes, and what was their religious system? 2. How or why does Eusebius assert that they made use of our Gospels? 3. What did he intend by heading that chapter of his History in the manner specified? 4. Mr. Taylor's "references and corroborations from the Scriptures."

1. That the Essenes were a Jewish, and not a Christian sect, is evident both from their existence prior to the birth of the Saviour, and from the character of their religious observances, which seem to have been modified from the principles of the Pharisees. The time of their origin is very uncertain; it is probable, however, that they were a body of Jews, who, in the later ages of the Mosaic institution, abhorring the corruptions and degeneracy of their nation, withdrew from general society, and, forming a community by themselves, gave their time to the study of the Scriptures, and the purposes of religion, by no means neglecting in the mean while the ordinary duties of life. Perhaps they were the "Assideans," "merciful, pious men," mentioned in 1 Maccabees ii. 42, vii. 13, and in Ecclesiasticus xliv. 10. Philo,* Josephus,† and Pliny,‡ make particular mention of this sect, and from these three writers, all that is known of them is gathered. Philo divides them into "practical and contemplative"; the latter being more properly called "Essenes" from ὅσιος, *holy*, and the former "Therapeuts," this word signifying worshippers as well as healers, and therefore properly denoting those whose occupation was the cure of souls as well as of bodies. Their principal residence was in Egypt, in the neighbourhood of Alexandria; but they

* Philo, "Omnis Probus Liber,"—"De Vita Contemplativa."
† Josephus, Bell. Jud. Lib. II. c. 7. ‡ Pliny, Lib. V. c. 17.

were likewise scattered over Palestine and Syria. Their mode of living outwardly resembled that of the Shakers at the present day, as they held to a community of goods, and disapproved of marriage, while they avoided contact as much as possible with all who were not of themselves. They were strictly honest, temperate, and constant in their religious rites, in the formal ceremonies of which they far surpassed the Pharisees. That they were good men, and remarkably so, considering the state of the times, must be admitted, if the accounts given of them by the above mentioned writers may be relied on. It is highly probable, likewise, that being free from many of the failings of their countrymen, and really desirous of leading a holy life, they would early embrace Christianity. But that their mode of living, their formal and exclusive observances, and their mystical pretensions to an allegorical interpretation of the Prophets, as well as the writings by their own sect, were not in accordance with the spirit and teachings of the Gospel, is abundantly evident, and needs no proof. They observed, like other Jews, the seventh day as their Sabbath, and the seventh Sabbath as a great festival. They sent their yearly offerings to the Temple, and in all their ritual observances, fasting, purification, and abstinence from certain sorts of food, were, as indeed Philo calls them, followers of the Law of Moses. But we know that the earliest Christians, if, in any case, they conformed more or less to the Law, did it from choice or custom, not from obligation. Prideaux* asserts, "that almost all that was peculiar to the Essenes was condemned by Christ and his Apostles. Such were their superstitious washings; their over-rigorous observance of the Sabbath; their abstaining from meats which God had created for man's use; their will-worship in their neglecting and voluntarily afflicting the body. Moreover, contrary to the law of Christianity, they forbade marriage, which God had ordained from the beginning," &c.

2. This is the sect to whom Mr. Taylor would, upon the authority of Eusebius, ascribe the composition and first use of our Gospels, long before the birth of Christ. He speaks

* Connexion, Vol. III. p. 479.

of the chapter in Eusebius,* as the most important historical document in the world, "containing a stupendous admission; a surrrender of the key-stone of the mighty arch; a giving up of every thing which can be pretended for the evidences of the Christian religion." (p. 61.) And all this triumphant boasting, founded solely upon an idle, by-the-way assertion of Eusebius, dictated by a sudden zeal for Christianity, and at variance with the whole tenor of his writings. This useless and unsustainable assertion, when stated in Mr. Taylor's translation of the original, where his imagination supplies all which he thinks ought to have been said, presents, at the first view, a show of reason. This, however, is entirely overthrown when the matter is sifted. But, even on the supposition that all Mr. Taylor's positions were undeniable, they would not in the least concern the evidences of Christianity, but only the merits of Eusebius.

To make this point clear, we will give from the history of Eusebius, all that is relevant to it. "They [i. e. history and tradition] affirm that Mark was first sent into Egypt, and there preached the Gospel which he had written, and established churches in the city of Alexandria. A great multitude of men and women, who there embraced the faith of Christ, had professed from the beginning, so strict and philosophic an institution† [Essenism], that Philo has thought it worth his while to describe in his writings, their exercises, meetings, feasts, and whole mode of life."‡ He then transcribes from Philo the character of this institution, their forsaking cities, and dwelling in fields, their using the laws and oracles of the prophets, whereby their piety is increased, and interpreting them allegorically, by secret types. "They have among them," says Philo, "the commentaries which ancient writers, the originators of their sect, have left them, for the most part, expressed in allegories; these they use and imitate as examples." Upon this Eusebius remarks, "It is very likely that the commentaries, which he says were among them, were our Gospels and the

* Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. Lib. II. c. 16.

† The purity of Mr. Taylor's translation will appear from his unwarrantable insertion in this place, of the words, "which he (Mark) both taught and practised." There is nothing like this in the original.

‡ Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. Lib. II. c. 15.

Acts of the Apostles, with certain expositions of the Prophets like that of Paul in his Epistle to the Hebrews." *

This is the remarkable passage from Eusebius upon which the whole machinery of the "Diegesis" rests; that it is incapable of being thus interpreted, will appear from an examination of its contents, and of the purpose of the historian. Mr. Taylor's argument rests upon the position that Philo wrote before Christ, and consequently that the books which according to him the Essenes used, must have been in existence before Christ. We know not whether Philo wrote his treatise before or after the death of Christ, as they were cotemporaries; but this is of no importance, as Philo says nothing of "our Gospels," &c., these being the words of Eusebius. It is with Eusebius, then, that we are concerned. He gives it as his opinion (nothing more), that the Essenes used our sacred books of the New Testament; this he does either honestly but carelessly, or without any reason and dishonestly. In conformity with the first supposition, his words may be thus interpreted, — "A large number of men and women in Alexandria, who had from the first (that is, from the foundation of the city) professed Essenism, adopted Christianity when Mark first taught it there; and, as before their conversion they had made use of the Old Testament Scriptures for their mystical interpretations, so they afterwards did with our Gospels and Epistles." This interpretation of his words, which is fully consistent with the character of an honest historian, is besides highly probable. For, as he wrote at least three centuries after Philo, he might well have supposed that he had written his treatise upon the Essenes after the Christian Scriptures had been circulated; indeed he mentions it as a report that Philo came to Rome in the time of Claudius, and had a conference with Peter.†

But if we must sacrifice the candor of Eusebius, and admit that here, as in a few other places in his writings, his zeal for Christianity induced him to employ means for its support not perfectly consistent with the duty of an historian and a Christian, we must put a different interpretation on his language. He was, perhaps, captivated with the description which Philo had given of the Essenes, their ascetic and

* Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. Lib. II. c. 16. † Lib. II. c. 6.

mystical system so nearly resembling in such points that of the degenerate Christians of his own day, who had already begun to depart from the pure doctrines of their Master; and he might thus have been tempted to claim them as Christians. We may take either of these suppositions, and Christianity still remains with its evidence as firm as before. Yet Mr. Taylor assumes from this, that the Christian Scriptures were anterior to Christ, and, throughout his work, goes upon the supposition that he has proved it from this passage of Eusebius. That an historian who wrote so voluminously upon the order and authority of the Christian Scriptures, the time of their compilation by the Apostles, and the design of each writer as addressing different communities of Christians, should be quoted in proof that these writings existed prior to Christ and the Apostles, is absurd. Mr. Taylor can indeed lay claim to nothing new, in starting this hypothesis, as the same incautious assertion of Eusebius has always been appealed to by the Church of Rome, to prove that monachism is of divine origin and was established by Mark at Alexandria. But this opinion has been most satisfactorily refuted by the best modern writers. Basnage * has proved from a careful examination of the works of Philo, that he wrote before the birth of Christ, and, to use the words of Gibbon, "has demonstrated, in spite of Eusebius and a crowd of modern Catholics, that the Therapeuts were neither Christians nor Monks." † Indeed, no argument can be drawn from the words of Eusebius, as they are in express contradiction to the words of Philo from whom he quotes. The whole argument to prove that the Essenes, as Essenes, had embraced Christianity as early as the time of Philo, rests upon the books which they used. The words of Philo are,—"*Εστι δὲ αὐτοῖς συγγράμματα παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἀρχήγεται γενόμενοι,* &c., —"There are among them the writings of *ancient men*, the leaders of their sect." How could this be, since it is not possible, that, at the time of Philo, the New Testament Scriptures could have been in existence more than ten years?

3. The other passage from Eusebius upon which Mr. Taylor founds his argument to prove the real existence of

* History of the Jews, B. II. chap. 18, p. 133.
† Decline and Fall, Vol. II. chap. 15.

Christianity, prior to the alleged period of the birth of the Saviour, is the heading of the fourth chapter of the first book of his Ecclesiastical History, — "That the religion published by Jesus Christ to all nations, is neither new nor strange." How widely different was the purpose of the historian in thus expressing himself, from the perverted construction which Mr. Taylor puts upon it with the design of imposing upon the unwary, will appear from the contents of the chapter. It was objected by Celsus and Julian, and the other early opposers of Christianity, "that the religion was not true, because it was recent; if Jesus, as his followers believed, was the Son of God, he would have made his appearance from the beginning." This objection, being wholly independent of the kind and degree of evidence upon which the Saviour rested his claims, called for an answer equally extraneous to historical and internal proof. It was set aside generally by the assertion on the part of Christians, that good men in every age would receive the reward of followers of Christ, though they might never have heard of him or of his Gospel. But a few of the ancient Fathers of the Church, who, in the words of Tillotson, "though very acute men, were likewise speculative, and wrought a great part of their divinity out of their own brains, as spiders do cobwebs out of their own bowels,"* made bold to assert, and attempted to prove likewise, that good men, previous to the Gospel dispensation, were in reality Christians. Justin Martyr says, "All those who lead a rational life, though deemed Atheists, are Christians, such as Socrates and Heraclitus among the Greeks; Abraham, Elias, and others, among the barbarians."† The chapter of Eusebius which bears the title so acceptable to Mr. Taylor, was written with a similar design. The substance of it, in a translation of his own words, is as follows.

"Though we [Christians] are but of late, and the name of Christians is indeed new, and has not been long in the world, yet our mode of life, and the principles of our religion, have not been lately invented by us, but were instituted and observed, if I may so say, from the beginning of the world, by good men, accepted of God, from those natural notions which are

* Sermon concerning the Unity of the Divine Nature.
† Apology I, sec. 61.

implanted in men's minds. The nation of the Hebrews is distinguished for its antiquity; they have writings containing accounts of ancient men, few in number, but eminent for piety, justice, and every other virtue. Some of these lived before the flood, others since, the descendants of Noah, especially Abraham. If any one ascending from Abraham to the first man should affirm, that all of them who were celebrated for virtue were Christians in reality, though not in name, he would not speak much beside the truth. For what does the name of Christian denote, but a man who, by the knowledge and doctrine of Jesus Christ, is brought to the practice of sobriety, righteousness, patience, fortitude, and the religious worship of the one and only God of all. About these things, they were no less solicitous than we are; but they practised not circumcision, nor observed Sabbaths any more than we, nor had they distinctions of meats, nor other ordinances, which were first appointed by Moses. Whence it appears, that that should be considered the first and most ancient institution of religion, which was observed by the pious about the time of Abraham, and has been of late published to all nations by the direction and authority of Jesus Christ." *

Eusebius elsewhere proves by similar reasoning the same thing. He says, as Enoch, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, with many other good men, who lived previous to any direct revelation, had the testimony that they pleased God, it could only have been because they conformed in reality, though not in name, to the doctrines of Christianity.† This language amounts to nothing more than Jeremy Taylor's assertion, "that immortality must belong as much to those who lived virtuously, according to their degree of light, before the Messiah came, as to those who lived after his coming." No one would think of arguing from this, that he denied that "immortality was brought to light by the Gospel." ‡

Such is the evidence, as drawn from Eusebius, upon which the author of the "Diegesis" depends for his whole argument. No more words are needed to expose its inefficiency. As we before said, his whole book goes upon the supposition, that such proof of his main position is satis-

* Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. Lib. I, c. 4.
† Evangelical Demonstration.
‡ Taylor's Scheme of Divinity, chap. 37.

factory, and this presumption gives a coloring to all the rest of his argument.

4. We will now give a few of the proofs from Scripture by which our author would establish the identity of the Essene and Christian institutions.

His twelfth chapter is headed, — "References to the Monkish or Therapeutan doctrines to be traced in the New Testament." Some specimens of this chapter afford a fine exhibition of Mr. Taylor's critical powers. We must first notice the sly attempt on his part to identify the Essene philosophy with Monachism. He says "Monkish or Therapeutan"; but the Therapeuts or Essenes were no more entitled to the name of "Monks" than are the Shakers among us at this time.

On page 92, he says our Saviour's words, Matth. xviii. 17, "Tell it unto the *Church*," — "betray, in the most indisputable evidence, the previous existence and established discipline of a Christian Church"! Can any thing afford more "indisputable evidence" of the ignorance or duplicity of Mr. Taylor, than his drawing such an inference from the employment by our translators of an English technical word in rendering a Jewish technical term? The word *Church* sufficiently conveys to our minds the Saviour's meaning, as did the word ἐκκλησία, or קָהָל (used in the Old Testament to express any "collection," or "convocation," of the people, for religious or secular purposes, with the Jews, in such cases, synonymous), to those whom he immediately addressed. We have a like specimen of the author's ignorance in arguing from the later technical application of a word, to its primary and universal acceptation, on page 102. "In my Father's house are many *mansions*," John xiv. 2. "Here," says this sapient critic, "a fair translation would be, 'In my Father's house are many *monasteries*.' Monastery is the correct rendering of the word μονή." This we deny. The proper and original sense of the word μονὴ is a "mansion or abode"; such is its use in the old classic authors, and in 1 Maccabees vii. 37. True, *later usage* has applied this word as signifying the place of abode of monks and anchorets; but, if this fact would prove the primary signification of μονὴ to be a "monastery," similar reasoning would prove, that Themistocles was an "abbot," because the title ἡγούμενος, or leader, by which he and

other generals were designated, has been, in modern times, applied to the priors or heads of monasteries. On page 62, Mr. Taylor, quoting John xvii. 16, where our Saviour expresses, in language by no means exaggerated, the infinite importance of his own and his disciples' instructions, above every thing of worldly interest and anxiety, in the words, "They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world," says, — "Christ himself is represented as describing his Apostles as members of this solitary order of Monks [meaning Essenes] and being one himself"! Is the maxim of this author true, "that the vileness of falsehood can add nothing to the glory of truth"? We are inclined to believe the contrary, especially when our eye falls upon such deliberate falsehoods as the following. Page 88. "The Preface of Luke's Gospel is an *admission* that his work was only a *compilation of previously existing documents*"! And, on page 91; "John the Baptist is described [in the Scriptures] as *a monk*, residing in the wilderness, practising all the austerities of the contemplative life"! Again, on page 91, Mr. Taylor quotes the passages, Matth. xiii. 10, Mark iv. 11, where Christ refers to a preparation of the heart, and an exertion of the will and affections, as well as of the senses, as necessary to the recognition and acceptance of his doctrines as sanctioned by his miracles; and how true is his thought, how beautifully is it expressed; — but Mr. Taylor would have us believe, that "here, and in the innumerable passages to the same effect, the principle of deceiving the vulgar is held forth in its most disgusting deformity."

Such are some of the texts, by which Mr. Taylor hopes to make good his promise of proving the identity of the Essene and Christian doctrines. We have purposely selected those upon which he himself relies most, and we hope that they do justice to his argument. Of those positions which we have not presented, some are founded, perhaps, upon the ignorance of the author, and others upon a most reckless deceitfulness of heart. While one sentence suggests to us the author as misled by his own fanciful and superficial views, a succeeding one will place before us, in all its deformity, the wretched, the wilful perversion of some degree of knowledge, to the most malicious purposes of sin. We know not who are the inmates of the prison in which Mr. Taylor is confined, nor what are the crimes which have

shut them out from the society of the world; but we should deem the fate of any one of them, for time and eternity, a desirable boon, compared with the inflictions of that inward hell which must burn in the bosom of one who dares thus deride his Maker, and trifle with the fondest hopes of his fellow beings.

We have observed, however, a few objections to the language and the contents of Scripture, for which we will not charge Mr. Taylor with any thing worse than ignorance. Thinking that his work would not be complete unless he produced specimens of inaccuracy from the Scriptures themselves, he has done his best to discover some. Under the head "Falsehood of Gospel Statistics," we have these statements; 1. "'Annas and Caiaphas being the high priests,' (Luke iii. 2,) when," says Mr. Taylor, "any person acquainted with the history and polity of the Jews, must have known that there never was but one high priest at a time, any more than among ourselves there is never more than one Archbishop of Canterbury." 2. "'Caiaphas, which was the high priest that same year,' (John viii. 13,) when no Jew could have been ignorant that the high priest's office was not annual." Now we apprehend, that Mr. Taylor, instead of showing the ignorance of the writers of the New Testament, has irremediably exposed his own. For, if he had been at all acquainted with the state of Judea at that time, he would have been aware, that though the Jews would have been glad to observe these rules, they were then obliged to submit to the will of the Romans, who had rendered the office, formerly for life, a temporary one, during their pleasure. The Roman governor removed the high priest whenever he saw fit, though the office was generally supplied by one of the same family. Such was the case at this time, Annas having been previously deposed by Gratus the Governor, and his son-in-law, Caiaphas, put in his place. It is possible, that the office was held by them in turn, at least it is a well established fact, that those who had ever borne the title were honored with it ever after, which satisfactorily accounts for two persons being thus named at the same time. 3. "'Out of Galilee ariseth no Prophet,' (John vii. 52,) when the most distinguished Jewish Prophets, Nahum and Jonah, were both Galileans." Passing by what in all probability is the proper rendering

of the original here, "Out of Galilee ariseth not *the* prophet," (meaning the great expected prophet, the Messiah,) or, perhaps, "Prophets arise not out of Galilee," that is, it is not usual; we can easily account for the assertion being made by the Jews, on a sudden emergency for an argument. But even if there were no solution of it, the blame for its untruth rests entirely upon the Jew who made it. Still Mr. Taylor is singularly unfortunate in his remark upon it, as it is by no means certain that both Nahum and Jonah came from Galilee. But, admitting that both of them did, they were very far from being "the most distinguished Jewish Prophets." These will do as specimens of Mr. Taylor's objections to the New Testament on the ground of their contents. All of them may be very satisfactorily explained; but it would be useless to introduce them here, as they may be found fully considered in the commentaries, whence, if we mistake not, Mr. Taylor collected them, since we have seen no reason to allow him the honor of having discovered them by his own researches.

We know not, however, but that we have ascribed to Mr. Taylor a trait rather too negative, in being willing to admit, that, in introducing such objections, he was only misled by his own ignorance. True it is, that we might tire the patience of the reader in dwelling upon some of the most glaring misstatements of the language and sense of Scripture, contained in the "Diegesis." It is not only supposable, but highly probable, that Mr. Taylor's readers, whether ignorance makes them his dupes, or their own depravity disposes them to believe what he asserts, would neglect to examine into the truth of his statements, even when the Scriptures would afford the means of refutation. Such readers undoubtedly have a right to suppose, that, let the purpose of the author be what it will, he would not dare to pervert the direct language of the Scriptures. That such a confidence, however, if granted to Mr. Taylor, would be misplaced, instances like the following will show. He would prove (p. 7), that Jesus had no right to the title of "Christ"; and to do this he asserts, that "when one of his immediate disciples applied the title to Jesus, he himself disclaimed it." It is unnecessary to say, that this assertion is a daring falsehood. We can hardly tell whether to wonder most at the audacity of Mr. Taylor in making the assertion,

or at his unparalleled impudence in referring to Luke ix. 21, and Matth. xvi. 29, as if it was there attested. The first of these texts contains merely an injunction to the disciples to refrain from a premature exposure of their Master's claims, till they had been supported by his works, lest his death, which he then predicted, should be hastened. Of his second reference we can say nothing, as neither our own copy of the New Testament, nor any other that we have examined, contains a twenty-ninth verse in the sixteenth chapter of Matthew. We are willing, however, to suppose this reference a mistake for the twentieth verse; but here the same is said as in the passage from Luke just cited, while the seventeenth verse of the same chapter, contains an express commendation of Peter, for the more than human wisdom displayed by him in his application of the title "Christ" to Jesus.

Some of Mr. Taylor's readers might neglect to examine 1 Cor. i. 27, to which he refers, and take it for granted, that, as he says (p. 33), "St. Paul, in the most explicit language, taught and maintained the absolute necessity of extreme ignorance, in order to attain celestial wisdom." Again; — "St. Peter (1 Peter ii. 2,) inculcates the necessity of the most absolute prostration of understanding, and of a state of mind but little removed from slobbering idiotcy, as necessary to the acquisition of divine knowledge." We think Mr. Taylor could have employed himself much better in studying out the real meaning of the Apostles, as, if we mistake not, he possesses certain qualities which they, in the passages cited, considered it the part of a wise and good man to divest himself of.

In Mark iv. 12, our Saviour, using a proverbial expression, defends his teaching in parables by showing his disciples that all, who like themselves had their hearts prepared for his instructions, might easily understand them, but that whatever obscurity might veil them from their countrymen, was but a proper punishment for their wilful blindness and folly. The beautiful truth contained in the remark, is, however, entirely lost upon Mr. Taylor, who discovers, that Christ is here represented "as inculcating the necessity and setting the example of deceiving and imposing upon the common people." (p. 45.)

We might multiply these instances in which the author of

the "Diegesis," by a most manifest perversion of plain language and wise precepts, would endeavour to blot from the sacred records the indelible marks of their origin. That he does this upon the presumption that his assertions will not be examined into, must be evident, because he might well fear, that if his readers should be so presumptuous as to desire a confirmation of his statements, his credit with them would be of small amount.

We have cited these instances for the double purpose of displaying Mr. Taylor in his proper character, and of attesting one of the reasons which we offered why the publications of Infidels did not deserve a formal notice. That no one, who had for himself examined the Scriptures with the best light he could obtain, would be in danger of being misled by a book containing such specimens as we have just exhibited, will be allowed by all. The most ignorant man is ready to pronounce upon the unworthiness of a cause, which needs or employs such support.

After a display of such bold malignity in his treatment of the Scriptures, we should not indeed be surprised to find that Mr. Taylor acted his pleasure in the interpretation and use of writers who have no claim to peculiar sanctity. Instances of this abound in the "Diegesis"; and though it would not be necessary to adduce them, yet as there is here a wider range for a display of his skill, we will notice a few of the many falsifications and perversions of the sense of authors, of which Mr. Taylor is guilty in his quotations from their works. We do not accuse him so much of neglecting to use their own words, or of not giving correct references to their writings. Indeed his "Diegesis" would lose all its formidable appearance were it not for the number and length of these quotations, the pedantic ornaments of his margin, and the six close octavo columns at the end, containing his list of "Authorities adduced." We accuse Mr. Taylor of a most gross garbling of language in many instances, and in still more of most wanton and unprincipled falsification. By taking from authors those words only which he can strain into his service, and introducing others from his own imagination, he would almost make us believe that the most orthodox writers were unbelievers like himself. He well knows that his "Diegesis" will fall into the hands of many, who, if they desired it, have not the means of examining the

authors whom he cites, and of judging for themselves whether he has given their language and sense fairly. We know of no greater literary crime of which a writer can be guilty, and for which, if clearly proved guilty of it, he should receive a more severe punishment, than that of perverting the sense of authors whom he quotes. That Mr. Taylor is guilty of this to the fullest extent, we are well prepared to prove. Indeed we honestly aver that there is hardly a quotation in his whole book, which does not wear a different appearance there, from what it has in the original.

In his hopeless attempt to prove the Egyptian origin of Christianity, misled as usual by the similarity of letters and names, he labors hard (page 125 *et seq.*) to make much of a certain document called "The Gospel of the Egyptians." This, he thinks, was the original history of the life and doctrines of the Saviour, "written many years, probably many *ages*, before the period assigned to the birth of Christ," and that this furnished the groundwork and materials of the canonical Gospels. The book itself had indeed been heard of before, a few short sentences from such a composition being now extant in the works of Clement of Alexandria. Lardner thinks it was a compilation made in the third century after Christ, from our four Gospels, and Mr. Jones thinks it without doubt to have been "the forged composure of some imperfect Christians in Egypt." But Mr. Taylor is determined to prove the contrary, and for this end is guilty of a most dishonest perversion of the language of a Christian writer, M. de Beausobre. As is usual with him in such quotations, which he intends by honest or dishonest means, shall tell to his credit, he prefaces the extract by some fulsome compliment, evidently designed to dupe the ignorance of his readers, and procure him the honor of allowing the merits of an opponent. Thus, "that most eminent, ingenuous, and learned of French divines, Beausobre," says, "At the head of the first class (of Scriptures) are to be placed two Gospels, that according to the Hebrews, and that according to the Egyptians." Beausobre is too eminent, ingenuous, and certainly too learned to say any such thing. Mr. Taylor is at liberty to tell as many falsehoods as he pleases, provided he tells them (if it be permitted us to use the homely, but expressive phrase) "upon his own hook." By his most unwarrantable introduction of the words "*of Scriptures*," in

his parenthesis, which are not in the original, thus making the phrase "first class" refer to the authority instead of the classification of the books, he would make his readers believe that Beausobre is speaking of the sacred writings of acknowledged authority; nothing can be more false. Beausobre is expressly treating in the essay quoted, not of the Scriptures, but of the *Apocryphal writings*, "those which, though ancient, were without authority, and those more modern, written to support heretical opinions." The running title is, as plain as print and paper can make it, "DISCOURS SUR LES LIVRES APOCRYPHES," and a marginal note directly opposite the sentence quoted, is, "Deux Classes d'Apocryphes, différens, 1. pour le tems, et 2. pour la matière;" that is, Two Classes of Apocryphal writings, differing (from each other and from genuine ones), first, in the time of their publication, and, secondly, in the nature of their contents.* Thus, he considers the two compositions which he mentions, as belonging to the "*first order of spurious writings*," not to the "first class of Scriptures." He afterwards gives it as his conclusion, that the Gospel of the Egyptians "was written by the Essenes who had believed in Jesus Christ," probably for the purpose of grafting some of their opinions upon pure Christianity.

The theory of Bishop Marsh relative to the origin of the first three Gospels, Mr. Taylor, as might have been expected, tortures into the assistance of his idle fancy of the existence of the Christian Scriptures anterior to Christ. That theory, so satisfactory to many, (though by no means the only one which offers itself in explanation of a presumed difficulty,) accounts for the verbal coincidences in the first three Evangelists by the supposition, that each possessed a copy of an original document containing the miracles and teachings of the Saviour compiled during his life-time, and after his death enlarged by them singly from their own remembrance. Mr. Taylor (p. 121) speaks of this theory as a revival of the "express declaration of Eusebius, that the Therapeutæ were Christians, and that their sacred writings were our Gospels." He refers to it (p. 117) as "Bishop Marsh's surrender." All this may do very well, if Mr. Taylor wishes it to be taken for granted that his word is

* Histoire Critique de Manichée et du Manichéisme, Tom. I. p. 455.

good for nothing; if not, he must be in possession of very little intellect to imagine that he can put this construction upon such a well-known treatise as that of Marsh. As another proof of Mr. Taylor's misrepresentations, his manner of quoting and speaking of the labors of Dr. Lardner, in numerous instances, appears in the following. Dr. Lardner, in view of the various knowledge of different languages, histories, and other documents necessary for the *critical* study of the Scriptures, says, "The *history* of the New Testament is attended with many difficulties." * This remark, which evidently refers to the state of the text, rather than to the contents of the Scriptures, Mr. Taylor is determined to have his readers suppose, was said of the facts and incidents therein contained. He asks (p. 138), "What could he mean by difficulties, but appearances of being untrue?" and he speaks of Dr. Lardner's valuable labors as an attempt at "making what he virtually admits appears to be falsehood, appear to be truth."

We know of no purpose to be answered by pursuing this subject any further. There is much in Mr. Taylor's "Diegesis," which we have not hinted at, because it has been so often discussed, that our eyes ache at the very sight of the paper which contains it. Could we take hold of any thing further in the shape of an argument, we would most readily examine its merits. But here are all the old stories of pious frauds, of pretended miracles, forged writings, and many other impositions, all of great value in attesting the merits of others which they counterfeited, but good, at the present day, for nothing else; we will leave Mr. Taylor in undisputed possession of them. Here, too, are charges of interpolation in the writings of Christians and Pagans, which are sometimes quoted in aid of the external evidences of Christianity; these we shall not attempt to vindicate, as their genuineness has been allowed by much wiser unbelievers than the author of the "Diegesis." Then we have the old objection to the argument drawn from martyrdom, with this slight variation only from the generality of his own persuasion, that, after a very free use of their arguments, he concludes by denying that its validity has ever been tried, that is, that there ever have been any martyrs. Lastly, we have

* Lardner's Credibility, Vol. I.

a very general collection of the testimonies of the early Fathers of the Church, with each of whom Mr. Taylor seems at variance, and by various means would weaken their evidence. We are glad, however, that he has inserted so long a list; for, though he probably did it "to make a book," he has put it in the power of any reader who is wise, to add much, very much, to the external defences of his Christian faith.

We have thus given as fair and as plain a statement, as we were able in our necessary limits to do, of the character of Mr. Taylor and of his "Diegesis." How far he is deserving of the eulogiums bestowed upon his talents by unbelievers, and how far his book is, as asserted by them, a satisfactory and invincible refutation of the authority of the Christian Religion, we leave to the judgment of our readers. The "Diegesis" has obtained a wide and rapid circulation over England and our own country; and if it has fallen into the hands of any who are willing to confide in the ability and integrity of its author, it will, perhaps, do some harm. There are, undoubtedly, a few ignorant and thoughtless persons, who will be misled by what may appear to them the candid and disinterested confessions of one who was formerly a Christian minister. A mistaken idea, that it was the expression and publication of his doubts, rather than his disorganizing journeys over the country, exciting discontent and riots, which has immured him in a prison, may raise a sympathy in his behalf. Such friends, if he have them, need to be better informed. His greatest influence, however, is over those, who, like himself, profess to believe that religion is an enemy to civilized society; that it has in reality no proper abode in the heart of man, and is not necessary to constitute or increase his happiness. Some restless spirits have, we know, already adopted the maxim, and by setting at defiance, not only the requisitions of religion, but likewise the plainest dictates of reason and conscience, have shown how rigidly they mean to follow it. Let such men use, if they please, the dubious phrase of "persecution and intolerance," as a spell against morality and law; they must, nevertheless, be convinced that the lives, property, and happiness of their fellow men are sacred possessions, and must be protected, if force and confinement are needed in their support. We shall expect to be an-

swered with the oft-repeated maxim, that "God is able to avenge his own wrongs"; we know that he can, and we believe that he will. But when the profligate and abandoned, behind the veil of denying their Maker, would thence hope for impunity in their excesses, man, in his turn, is able and bound to defend his rights.

We are led to ask, What has Mr. Taylor accomplished in his labors? He has attempted to overthrow the Christian Religion, and, so far from having succeeded, he has added one more to a long list of those who have labored with as little success, as if they had attempted to blot the sun from the heavens. Considered as an attack upon the Evidences of Christianity, the "Diegesis" is utterly harmless, at least with persons of sound judgment, and well-regulated, reflecting minds. We know not what are Mr. Taylor's ideas of a Christian faith, but he appears to consider it, as the result of the knowledge of a few names and certain combinations of letters. If such is the faith of any one, we care not how soon it is overthrown. Such, however, forms no part of the faith of an enlightened Christian. He who would disturb the evidences of Christianity, has more to do than to scrape together the shreds of Pagan Mythology, and base his positions upon a few extracts from any number of authors, whether they are fairly represented or not. We could wish for an unbeliever, no stronger conviction of the value of Christianity, than would necessarily result from a wise survey of what he must do to overthrow it. He may object that truths of so much moment should not have been earlier communicated, but he must be able to point out a fitter time for the revelation than that in which it was actually given. The unbeliever may speak of Christianity as indebted for some of its truths to Paganism; but he must explain what there was of magic in the words of those Jewish fishermen, which quenched the altars in the four hundred and fifty temples of the eternal city, and closed for ever the mouths of the oracles, to which, till then, the wisest men in the world had listened with profound reverence. Nor are such deep-drawn traces the only marks to which Christianity points for its evidence. There is the character of the Saviour; an exhibition of the most profound wisdom, and the loftiest moral excellence; humility, purity, and benevolence in perfect harmony; a sanctity of character, which a

single temptation never enticed from the path of rectitude; with the tenderest compassion for the failings of others; a disregard of self which endured even unto death, and a sympathy which wept tears of anguish at the deserved sufferings about to fall upon those who mocked and crucified him. Then, too, his instructions, as now in our hands, after the chances of so long and so far a transmission; — whether we look at the unequalled sublimity of their diction, or the consummate wisdom which pervades them; — searching the very bottom of the heart, and comprehending the passing duties of an hour, as well as the unremitted obligations of a life; eminently adapted for those to whom they were first delivered, and so full of the seeds of truth, that society will never reach that point, when it will look in vain in the New Testament, for counsel, direction, and incitement. Besides this, there is likewise all that experimental heart-evidence, which those who have ever studied the Scriptures, as they should be studied, could never lose, if the sacred records were to be lost to them for ever. There is a witness in the heart, which, in proportion as we yield ourselves to the direction of our higher powers, tells us that in the faithful obedience of the Scriptures, we are acquiring a knowledge of God and of our own natures, without which we do indeed "know but in part." It is the impulse of our minds, as well as the desire of our hearts, to acquaint ourselves with those truths which are to be found only in the Scriptures. We recognise in the Being there revealed, the Father of our own spirits; and acknowledge that it is only by walking in the path there marked out for us, that we can connect the ray of light within us, with the flood of glory from which it emanates.

Such are some of the evidences of our faith; absolutely inexplicable upon any other hypothesis, than that the Author of nature has given to man an intelligible revelation of his will, adapted alike to the highest powers of his spiritual nature, and to the marked deficiencies of his earthly condition. He who would otherwise explain them, must be a philosopher indeed. He must show us imperfections in the character of the Saviour, and, either from his own knowledge or his imagination, must delineate as a model of perfection, a different combination of the active virtues. He must describe a character, which will appear more fitted for our

imitation, when we view ourselves, not as mere spectators of heroic action, but as imperfect, dying men, the most dependent beings in creation, subject to affliction in a thousand forms, but still possessing affections and sympathies, by which, when properly exercised, we may advance our own and the happiness of others. He must show, that human nature has powers which Christianity does not recognise, aspirations which she does not cherish, and cannot conduct to the desired object. He must show, that, as the circle of intelligence is widened around us, we can discern truths within our reach, which Christianity would forbid us to acquire, by cramping the energies, or impeding the growth, of those faculties, by which alone we may comprehend them. He must show, that he has already apprehended all that Christianity contains of spiritual truth, that he understands the sublime extent of its revelations, and is still unsatisfied, still urged on by his own powers, still desirous to press on to higher attainments, if he could but find a guide to point out the way.

ART. V. — *Dacre: a Novel.* Edited by the COUNTESS OF MORLEY. In 3 volumes. London. 1834.

THE word *novel*, is said to be derived from the Italian word *novella* (news). It is now used to signify works of imagination, in which persons and scenes are represented. Works of this character are *new*, in comparison with many other literary productions; yet, their adaptation to interest, and to please, is founded in human qualities, well known in most ages and countries. The power of rational beings to associate themselves with persons and events, long gone by; sympathy in the woes and joys of others; propensity to follow out a chain of occurrences; forgetfulness of one's own physical existence, while the mind is ranging whereso-ever fancy can lead the way, may be among the reasons why novels are always read with avidity.

The novel is limited to descriptions and narrations of persons and scenes, within the range of *probability.* When this limit is transcended, the department of romance is in-

vaded, in which German genius has so much distinguished itself.

As novels address themselves to the most excitable feelings of our nature, and deal with the strongest passions, they deserve praise or censure, according to the effects which they produce. *Love* is the basis of all novels; we recollect but one exception in the English language. They are, therefore, read by those who are in love, or who hope to be. Thus, many young persons have their heads turned, and their hearts perverted. Many have devoured novels in secret, who would blush, as well they might, to have their parents know that such books had been in their hands. Novelists often seem not to know, or not to regard, how much their captivating fictions may affect parental hopes, fears, and realities. They can, and often do, so adorn vice and folly, as to make them seem to be deservedly imitable; while virtue and good sense are made uninteresting if not disagreeable.

If those who possess this descriptive power, would use it to show (through the charms of a fine style and an inventive fancy), how virtue can triumph in adversity; and how honorable and praiseworthy conduct is sure of lasting consolation, if not reward; and how vice and folly are sure to suffer in the miscarriage of their projects, or in the consequences of success, they would hold a far higher rank in the literary and moral world, than they have hitherto attained.

The English led the way in novel-writing. They have been imitated by those whose native tongue is not English, but not very successfully. If there were any respectable novels earlier than Richardson's Pamela (1741), they are not now recollected. Fielding and Goldsmith followed him; and, since their time, there have been hundreds who appeared only to vanish; while others, as Sir Walter Scott and Miss Edgeworth, seem likely to be long in view. The English, as they were the first in these works of fancy, so they have maintained their preëminence. Imitations on the Continent have done nothing to overshadow them; though they have been abundant in book-making Germany. We recollect to have heard of only two or three (though there may be more) good novels among the French; because we cannot give that praise to any novel, which leaves the mind less pure than it was, however attractively and ingeniously imitable vice and folly are portrayed.

We will not assume to pronounce, whether English men, or English women, are entitled to the palm in novel-writing; nor will we attempt to settle the rank of the sexes in history or poetry;—nor can we forget the eminence which one English lady has attained to, in mathematical science. But we are sure, that in the tender scenes in which *love* is to be pictured, the pen of the female frequently excels. Love is that passion in the female heart, which subdues, and converts to its own use, all others. A woman's pure, generous, genuine love, is the most intense feeling which the human heart can experience. It may, therefore, be expected that she can best describe it, who can feel it most. Maternal tenderness is a proverb; and some place it in the first rank, because it is so common. Refined, cultivated sensibility is best qualified to describe the operations of this tenderness; and it would be safer to trust a mother to tell what a mother feels (when she knows how to do it), than to trust that office to a father. Men are superior in those delineations which appertain to their own sex. War, politics, business, and the administration of justice, are affairs from which women are excluded. The art of novel-writing consists in making *pictures* by means of words. The reader should be enabled to see, what the writer imagines. A novelist may be considered deficient in the power most necessary to the purpose, who has not this graphic art. Nor is it enough to exercise this art in a single case; for every character should be always the same character, whatever variety of form it may have occasion to assume.

We have been led to these observations from having read an English novel, the title of which is placed at the head of this article, and on which, though unused to the work, and withal no friends of novels in general, we will make a few remarks.

The fable is taken from among that class of persons who inherit titles and wealth, under the monarchy of England. It is intended to be descriptive of the manners and customs of that class. It is, obviously, the work of a writer who describes from personal observation. One may say of the description, as can be sometimes said of a picture, *This is a likeness*, though one never saw the original. It is, of course, a love-story; and the vicissitudes of hope and fear, joy and misery, are ingeniously made to depend on a contingency,

which the writer keeps just before the reader, with great skill; and in constant expectation that the difficulty will be surmounted, until the close of the work is so near, that there does not seem to be space enough left to bring out the probable result. We think this very well contrived. Probability is, in no point, so strained as to disturb the reader.

As to *style*, we must be so ungallant as to say, that this is not always a feminine excellence. Female writers, sometimes, resemble ladies dressed for a ball-room, who think that all depends on the ornament of the person, and little on the head, heart, or person itself. We have no fault to find with this writer, in this respect; she writes in good, sound English, and frequently with great force and elegance. Throughout, her style may be likened to one of her sex, who is so appropriately dressed, that it is difficult to say how the effect of satisfaction is produced. There is some *French* in the pages, but, perhaps, not too much. It is well known, that, in the elevated classes in England, it is very common to find French and English used promiscuously in conversation; as though sentiment, opinion, and fact could not be expressed in either only. There are some French words, it is true, that have meanings which no English words can express; perhaps *persiflage* is one of them, *bizarrerie* certainly is. We could name some modern novels, in which this introduction of French is an obvious mistake; and intended only to show, apparently, the writer's familiarity with that language. An English novel rarely needs aid from the other side of the channel in matters of expression.

On the power of this novelist, much may be said in commendation. Her scenes are happily imagined. Sometimes they are in London, then in the beautiful country residences of England; then they change to the Continent, to Switzerland, Italy, and Rome. In all these alternations she describes like one who writes from knowledge, and not like one who has only read or heard. Real London life is brought home to the eye; and one may imagine himself actually looking into, and listening in London, in her description of that amusing city. The throng and heartlessness of evening assemblies, and her sketches of character to be found in these, are painfully instructive. She represents human life truly, in these circles, no doubt, because one can discern, through philosophical deductions, that it must be so. What

country residence is, among those who must invent modes of killing time, and what country life might be, if fashion and form had not usurped dominion in these beautiful abodes, are happily disclosed. The sunset and sunrising on the Alps are fine specimens of the mind and power of the fair authoress.

We have room but for a few extracts, and begin with this mountain scene.

In ascending the mountain, they passed the chapel, on the spot where Gesler fell by the arrow of Tell.

"'I almost doubt,' observed Mr. Howard, 'whether, at the end of five hundred years, the memory of Napoleon, or of the Duke of Wellington, will be more cherished or renowned in their respective countries, than that of this simple mountain hero in his. Time seems to have no power to lessen interest in his name and deeds.'

"'Because time cannot lessen interest in the cause for which he fought,' replied Dacre; 'others have fought for power, profit, fame; but this simple peasant fought from patriotism, — he fought for liberty, and his name is identified with the cause.'

"The summit of the mountain was now nearly gained, and every traveller pressed forward to catch a view from the top, of the cloudless sunset. It was a striking sight to see its brightness sink behind the mountain ridge." "They were desirous of watching, from the earliest dawn, the gradual approach of the sun." "The *Righi* is generally selected by travellers, as the spot from which to view the wonders of the Alps. It affords a fine panoramic display of the surrounding heights; and the spectator thus acquires some knowledge of the forms and positions of the different chains of mountains.

"When Dacre and Mr. Howard first gazed around them, it seemed as though they stood upon an island; nothing was to be seen above, but the cold, grey outline of the mountain ridge; nothing below, but the curling waves of some vast sheet of water; not a valley to be traced, not a village to be descried. Had a deluge occurred in the night, it could not more effectually have seemed to efface, by flood, every object from their view. They had heard of this perfect deception, produced by the morning mist, alluded to, the evening before; but till now, they had found it difficult to believe how complete was the resemblance to the waving waters. The sound of voices was heard; a motley crew were seen to hurry towards the spot, on which they stood. Sunrise was at hand. The

inmates of the two receptacles for tourists, came hurrying up with every imperfection of toilet, unshaved, unwashed, uncurled, and half undressed; cloaks, coats, shawls, nightcaps, and handkerchiefs were pressed into the service, to conceal the deficiencies which haste had occasioned, or to protect the wearers from the morning chill. The mist gradually arose and dispersed; the heavens were suffused with pink; and now the mountain top catches, from behind, the light; and the snow seems to blush at the approach of day.

" 'I never till now,' observed Dacre, 'felt in full force, the term of "rosy-fingered morn." '

"Fresh objects caught the increasing light. The coming day seemed to cast its brightness before, and all stood in silent expectation of that moment, when the sun should rear his head above the mountain's summit. At length the golden rays are seen to shoot above the earth; a blaze of light appears; and in the heavens sits the monarch of day, shedding life and heat on all below.

" 'There is no religion, unaided by revelation, which seems to me so natural as the worship of the sun,' remarked Dacre as they descended.

" 'I agree with you,' replied Howard; 'and it seems to me a so much purer religion than that which consisted in deifying our own degrading senses.'

"There is something, in the wildness and sublimity of mountain scenery, that tends to remind us rather of eternity, than decay. The perishable works of man, are nowhere to be seen. No city lies in gloomy ruins, to show the outline of its faded greatness, — no remnant of a sanctuary here stands, to show the worship that has passed away. We see no falling records of the glorious deeds of those whose names are learned from history's page. We stand upon the mountain, and we scarcely know that man exists upon the earth. This is not the land where arts have died, or science been forgot. These rocks never echoed the eloquence of orators, or the song of the poet. These waters never bore the proud ships of the merchant, this soil never yielded to man the fruits of his industry. It is not here, that the finger of time can be recognised. In vain would he set his mark on snows that never melt, or disturb the fast-bound forms of adamantean ice. In vain, he stretches out his hand where the rushing torrent and the roaring waterfall, blest with an eternity of youth, dash on their headlong course, regardless of the blighting power that withers strength, or lulls to rest the creations and the creatures of mortality. Here may we pause, and say, that Time has lost

his power. Here may we view the faint efforts of Time, overthrown in an instant. Changes there are; but the work of an hour has defeated the slow progress of decay. The lightning of the thunder-storm, — the blowing tempest, — the engulphing flood, — the overspreading avalanche, — have effaced from the surface of nature the impress of Time, and left nought, in the change, to remind us of age. Surely there are scenes in life which seem created to awaken in mankind, the recollection, that even Time can lose its power. Who will not feel the nothingness of the pleasures, — the cares, — nay, even the sorrows, of our petty span, when, for a moment, he dwells with his heart and soul upon the thoughts of an eternity! Yes! it will sober the gay, — it will comfort the grieved." — Vol. III. pp. 14 – 27.

The following sentiment is worthy of notice. It is not in European circles only, that its reality may be found.

"It is melancholy to think, how often the spontaneous agreeableness of an amusing companion is considered sufficient atonement for the deliberate vices of the profligate man. — Vol. III. p. 51.

We had marked many pages from which to make extracts, but it is difficult to choose, where it seems a wrong done to omit. We cannot forbear to add the description of the Pontine marshes, once the site of numerous cities, and of busy millions, but now a desert, over which the traveller hurries fearfully, hardly daring to breathe the air, without which he cannot live, lest it should be fraught with death.

"They had now reached the Pontine marshes. The moon was up, and its pale and sickly light came well in harmony with the plain of death which they traversed. Herds of buffaloes and horses occasionally broke the low, unvaried line of the horizon, whilst the shadows cast from the trees on the side of the road, marked the straight line of their route. By daylight, it is here a saddening sight to see the earth decked out in all the brightness of its freshest verdure, — to see the cattle grazing, and the horses, scarcely tamed by man, exert their speed in playful wildness. We think that scenes like these, should tell of peace and plenty, to the man who treads the soil; but we look around and see, that disease has preyed on every form; and on every cheek seems set the pale, cadaverous stamp of sure decay. We behold man, to whom all things were given for his use, thus droop and die, where other creatures live, and vegetation thrives. Here are the condemned of prisons, sent

to delay the doom their guilt has sealed. It is fearful to watch the work of justice, wrought by this slow-consuming poison; and still more shocking to gaze upon the mark of crime, that sits with death upon the convict's face; reminding us, each moment, of the life that has unfitted him to die. But night drops a veil over sights like these." — Vol. III. pp. 250 - 252.

We must venture to suspect this lady of an aptitude to be touched by the absurd and the ridiculous, and to have intended a little wholesome correction. Her representation of a charity school, *founded in vanity*, is well done. We readily concur with her in every sentiment, which she has expressed in the conversation between Dacre and lady Emily, in which she shows what real charity to the poor may, and ought to be. If our limits permitted, we should extract the whole of this discussion, because it is founded on the practical and the useful; such opinions ought to be known, and acted upon, in every land, where there are indigent persons, and where there are persons considerate enough to care for the indigent, and benevolent enough to help them. These are sentiments of the authoress, which accord with those of Degerando, eminently the benefactor of the poor.

Books are sometimes indications, though they cannot be called proofs, of the writer's own character. This lady need not reluct at being judged of, in these respects, by her book. There is often found in her pages a vein of piety, and a just perception of moral excellence. One always takes a general impression of a writer, and of a work, which may not be sufficiently defined to be expressed in words. The impression which this work has left on us affords the inference, that the writer is very capable of portraying, in an imaginary production, the power which her own sex have, and the influence which they might have, on the welfare and happiness of society. Men are usually so much involved in money-making, politics, or pleasures, (which would not recommend them to a refined and elegant woman,) that they contribute little to the charms of social life. It is not extraordinary to find instances of the most frivolous conversation among men, who have gained celebrity in literature or science. Perhaps they resort to such entertainment, as a compensation for their dry and solitary labors. Whether from these, or some other causes, *men* are disposed to consider life,

rather as a *triste* affair, and to be consoled by pleasures in which women have no part. Hence we see so many who are pains-taking and selfish; bent on accumulation, or on profitless distinction, or on disgraceful profusion. As the world goes, not a few of the fair sex may come in for a share of reproach, or commiseration. That which one would like to see from the authoress of "Dacre," is, a delineation of woman in her appropriate sphere. It belongs to her sex to discern the utility and beauty of all that was given to please and adorn. The other sex have little of this discernment, until they have been to school to woman. Thus men consider the plumage of the feathered race, and listen to their notes, as an affair of natural philosophy. The endless variety of tints, which the flower garden discloses, is to men an affair of botany. The changing of the seasons, when these are not associated merely with business, politics, or pleasures, has a tendency to make men sad. But all such objects touch the feeling heart of woman, and indicate to her what her own rank should be in intellectual and moral beauty. It is an often-repeated remark, that the refinement of society depends on the freedom from restraint which women enjoy, excepting that only which they impose upon themselves; and as women are not lawgivers, they must thank those who are, for having raised them to an eminence which enables them to humanize, polish, and refine their lords and masters. But this freedom may be misused; and this lady may have intended to show, that in her opinion it is so in her own country. If we have in "Dacre" a just representation of fashionable life in high circles, she may have meant a delicate chastisement where one would think it to be much needed. But, perhaps, there may be another mode of reforming, as applicable to society as to pupils. Reproach does not always do the good intended; when example and encouragement may be more successful.

Christian woman is commonly delineated in an unattractive manner, because she is not made to show her qualities in the daily intercourse of society, and in every act of life; but is brought out as though for dress occasions, and as though Christianity were made only for another world, and not for this. We know not, from reading this novel, how such uncourtly opinions, as to the best lights in which woman can be exhibited, would accord with the prevailing sentiments of

the circles, which one reads of in "Dacre." It may, however, be imagined, that if the trammels of form and fashion could be broken through, such principles of action might add to the sources of human happiness, in no small degree, even among classes who know of no stronger necessity than to contrive means of being pleased.

But it might better become us, perhaps, to limit our remarks to American society, in which, among the fashionable imitators, they would be quite as applicable.

In taking leave of the authoress of "Dacre," we have to tender our acknowledgments, first for awakening that eager curiosity, which drives one through her volumes; and, secondly, for the pleasure and instruction which a deliberate perusal has imparted. One who has written so well, the first time, cannot have written for the last, as well as the first. When she reappears, she will find that she has established a fame which will not need, however modest the motive, the veil of a relative's name, however illustrious.

ART. VI. — *Review of the Phrase "For Substance of Doctrine."*

THE long "Statement" which appeared in the Christian Register, September 20th, signed by "the Professors of the Theological department of Yale College," was to us an interesting document. It made us better acquainted with some facts of real importance. We had not been very well acquainted with what had heretofore been required of the President and other officers of the College, as to subscribing "the Confession of Faith in the Saybrook Platform, which is substantially that of the Westminster Divines," — nor with the changes which at different times had occurred in the form of subscribing. We were pleased with the account given of the frankness and independence of President Stiles. We have verily thought that serious objections might be stated to the practice of subscribing a formulary as agreeing with it "for substance of doctrine." Perhaps, however, nothing better could have been done at that time, than to give assent in that form. Dr. Stiles, however, did not hesi-

tate to let it be known, that he did not accede to all the articles; and he might doubtless say with truth, that, taking the Confession as a whole, he agreed "for substance of doctrine." From that period, this mode of subscribing appears to have been generally admitted and preferred. It now seems to be an established mode at that College. When this form shall have been duly analysed, and clearly understood by all parties, it may appear less objectionable than some have imagined. Yet the form may have both its disadvantages and its advantages, and have been rendered in some degree necessary by the imprudence of men of earlier times. Some of the supposed disadvantages and advantages we shall briefly mention. Among the disadvantages may be the following.

Many good men may be suspected of acting a deceptive part, and of pretending to be more orthodox than they really are. It may also be truly said, that this mode of subscribing tends to give an undistinguishing celebrity to all the articles of the Confession alluded to, — and to such as are really regarded as erroneous, as well as to those which are believed to be correct. Hence, of course, less care will be taken to inquire respecting the truth of the articles, and to correct such as are erroneous. Too long already have the Westminster Confession and Catechism obstructed the progress of light in our country; and whatever tends to keep alive an undue reverence for those formularies must be injurious to the cause of truth and love.

Clearly to discuss and duly to appreciate the advantages of the New Haven method of subscribing articles of faith, we should take into view such facts as the following: — Many of the churches of our country have been founded on a professed belief in the doctrines taught by the Westminster divines, or abridged formularies supposed to be nearly in accordance with those doctrines. Not only so; several theological institutions have been founded to teach and give celebrity to those doctrines; and donations have been made for the support of these institutions, on condition that those doctrines should be believed, avowed, and taught by the professors, — and no provision was made for such an exigency as an increase of light, which would render it impossible to obtain honest and well-qualified men for professors, who would subscribe these articles without reserve. Besides,

it is believed that, even at the present time, a majority of the clergy in our country are not prepared to make the Bible their *only* rule of faith. They cannot yet relinquish the idea, that long-revered formularies or confessions of man's devising are of great importance as a safeguard against heresy, and as a means of Christian union. While, in New England, it is very certain that nearly all the clergy have dissented from at least some of the Westminster doctrines, still it seems to be wished to preserve for them a deep reverence, and to have as little as may be said or done which tends to bring these formularies into disrepute. But there have been other men besides Dr. Stiles who could not subscribe without some reserve or qualification; and many worthy men would have been excluded from important offices, had not "for substance of doctrine" or some other qualifying form of subscribing been adopted. Indeed, we believe that, but for this device, all the present worthy professors, who signed the "Statement" before us, would have been precluded from their present situations.

But to see in full the advantages which do or may result from adopting this form of subscribing, we must carefully observe the import of the phrase "for substance of doctrine." The word "substance," according to Walker, has various significations; but those which are applicable in the present case are the following, — "the essential part; something real, not imaginary; something solid, not empty." There can be no doubt that the Westminster formularies, and the Saybrook Platform, contain some articles which are true and "essential," and some which are erroneous, "imaginary," and "empty." The erroneous, the "imaginary," and the "empty" articles, form no part of the "substance of doctrine," or what is "essential." It is true, that different persons may judge differently, as to which of the articles are essential, or which "imaginary" and "empty." But it so happens that in adopting the phrase "for substance of doctrine," each subscriber is at liberty to judge for himself, what is "essential," and what is "imaginary." Persons, too, of different opinions may be equally accommodated by this mode of subscribing.

It surely should not, and it is presumed will not, be forgotten, that this mode was adopted to secure for president, a man who was believed to be eminently qualified for the

station, and who could not have been obtained but by adopting this expedient; and the practice will probably be continued for a similar reason. As light advances in the church, a still greater number of the articles in the Confession may appear to be incorrect and imaginary. But the plan adopted will apply as long as any of the articles shall appear to be true or essential.

Our Saviour's answer to the lawyer who asked, "Which is the great commandment of the law?" may be found of great use in vindicating this mode of subscribing. The following was his answer, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. The second is like unto it, — Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. *On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.*"

The last remark seems to us about equivalent to saying, these two "for substance of doctrine," are all the law and the prophets. We may add, that "for substance of doctrine" these two contained the gospel, as well as the law. This, however, has not been the common opinion of Christians in our land, while they have been contending about the doctrines of the Westminster divines. With multitudes, a belief that all Adam's posterity "sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression," and thus became totally sinful, seems to have been regarded as of more importance than obedience to the two commandments on which "hang all the law and the prophets." The same may be said in regard to other articles in the Westminster confession, and of some others which we should class with the untrue, imaginary, and empty. But it is a happy circumstance, that what Christ deemed as the substance of the law and the prophets, found a place in the Westminster formularies. If this is also in the Saybrook Platform, the New Haven professors may yet further dissent from some of the articles, and still say that they agree "for substance of doctrine." Should they by faithful study be brought to agree as fully with Moses, as the Messiah did, that "Jehovah is One," not three, they may still subscribe "for substance of doctrine," as long as they shall believe what Christ said of the two commandments. When brought fully to agree with Moses, they will, of course, regard the doctrine as but

"imaginary," which affirms that God is three distinct persons. They will no longer regard this as belonging to the "essential part," or substance of Christian doctrine. Of course, they might repeat their form of subscribing with a good conscience.

Should the New Haven mode of subscribing become thoroughly understood, its benefits may be extended beyond the vicinity of Yale college or the boundaries of Connecticut. It may be found applicable to all the party formularies throughout the country, prevent much difficulty in churches, and become a means of salvation to the Theological Institution at Andover. If the Presbyterians of our country had but seasonably adopted this form of subscribing to their formularies, how much of contention and bitterness would have been avoided! Even now, if they would all cordially adopt this saving policy, they might yet enjoy the blessings of peace; but unless this, or some other conciliatory expedient shall be adopted, they will remain as a house divided against itself, until the two parties shall become two sects or denominations.

In regard to the Andover Institution, we have not a doubt that the time will come when its creed will occasion the same embarrassment that has been felt at New Haven, and when the New Haven policy may become necessary to save the Institution from ruin. We can hardly doubt that the present professors, and many others, would heartily rejoice, if they could see any way in which the New Haven policy could be fairly adopted at Andover, and obtain an approved establishment. Who can believe that the authors of the Andover creed were inspired men? Or that it was even probable, that they could form a creed, embracing decisions on some of the most disputed points of theology, which no subsequent inquiries could show to be incorrect? The time may be nearer than is now imagined, when it will be difficult to obtain well-qualified professors who can conscientiously subscribe the creed of that institution, unless it shall be done in some modified form.

There are still other advantages which we hope will soon result from the New Haven policy. A little impartial reflection may convince many intelligent men, that to subscribe "for substance of doctrine" to any human formulary is at best no better than for a man to say, I regard the Bible

as containing the only perfect rule of Christian faith and practice. For unless a man explain, further than to say that he agrees with the formulary "for substance of doctrine," no one can tell, but God and himself, to what extent he agrees, or from how many of the articles he dissents. By the "substance of doctrine" must doubtless be intended the substance of *Scripture* doctrine; and so far as the articles appear to him to agree with the Scriptures, he, of course, assents to them; but from his substance of Scripture doctrine he must reject every article, which he believes is contrary to the meaning of Scripture. When these facts shall have been properly considered, people will be prepared to give up the creed-making policy, and take the Bible as indeed their only rule of faith. They will be shocked at the folly and arrogance which are implied in the attempts of one generation to bind succeeding generations to think as they do, and reject the greater light which may hereafter arise on disputed questions or hypotheses. Then men will cease to form theological institutions based on a party creed, or to make donations for the support of such party purposes. Wise men will then found institutions, with a hope that their own errors will be discovered and corrected, as well as the errors of others. Truth and light will be their object, whoever may be found in error.

The advancement of light and truth should surely be the object of every theological institution; and for this reason the instructors should be as free as possible from party bias, and from all temptations to shut their eyes against the light which may arise respecting the opinions in which they had been educated, or which they adopted prior to being placed in the important offices of professors. The founders of an institution, and the donors for its support, may lawfully feel a preference for such doctrines as they at present believe to be true and important; but they ought to be aware that they are fallible men, and that greater lights may yet arise on disputed doctrines. Had the Andover Institution been founded on such reasonable principles, it would have been worthy of the patronage of every denomination of Christians in the land.

It is devoutly hoped that what has occurred at New Haven, will occasion an entire abandonment of the practice of founding institutions or churches on the bases of human

creeds. We admit, however, that such creeds or articles of faith might be formed for useful purposes, as means of instruction and topics of inquiry and conversation. They might also be useful for showing to future generations, what were the prevalent opinions among their ancestors, and what the progress of light and truth from the time of these ancestors to their own. But all such creeds or formularies should be regarded as the productions of fallible men, and not as standards of faith or tests of character. Men in Christian countries, as well as the heathen, are very liable to err, and the errors of one generation are frequently transmitted for many succeeding generations. Men, however, are formed with faculties for inquiry, and they are generally favored with constantly increasing means for mental improvement. How improper then it must be for men of one age, to attempt to prescribe what shall be believed by their posterity a thousand years hence, when far greater light shall be possessed than is now enjoyed. At a former period our ancestors were all Papists; and they had a creed which they doubtless wished to entail on their posterity. But further light arose, and some in the line from them to us became Protestants, or we might probably have all been Papists at the present time. Many of the present generation have dissented from some articles which our Protestant ancestors brought with them when they emigrated to this country; and we may doubtless reasonably expect that so much more light will arise, that our posterity will discard some opinions which we now deem of great importance.

In regard to what we have said relating to two theological institutions, we may truly aver, that we have not been influenced so to speak from any hostile feeling towards the institutions, or any one of the professors of either. We sincerely respect the institutions and the professors; but the greater our respect for them is, the more sincerely we regret that they were founded on a plan, which must naturally obstruct their usefulness, and involve embarrassment and difficulty.

It is, we believe, well understood, that a majority of the clergymen who were concerned in founding the institution at Andover, and in forming its creed, had themselves dissented from so many of the doctrines of the Westminster confession, that a new creed was necessary to satisfy their own minds. This creed, however, was intended to be a

kind of "for substance of doctrine" Westminster confession. The fact that these clergymen found it necessary to form a new creed, might, we should think, have led them to consider, that, at a future day, others would find it as difficult to subscribe to the new creed, as it was for them to adopt that of the Westminster divines. Was it possible that those worthy men were so bewildered by party passions, as to imagine that they had arrived at infallible certainty in regard to all the disputed points embraced in the new formed creed? If not, why did they not make provision that good and well-qualified men should not be exposed to exclusion from the professorships, if by inquiry they should happen to dissent from a single article in the formulary of faith? Such blindness may justly be deplored; and we presume it will be deplored by many in less than fifty years, unless some mode of subscribing shall be admitted equivalent to that of "for substance of doctrine."

ART. VII.—1. *Travels and Researches in Caffraria: describing the Character, Customs, and Moral Condition of the Tribes inhabiting that Portion of Southern Africa; with Historical and Topographical Remarks illustrative of the State and Prospects of the British Settlements in its Borders, the Introduction of Christianity, and the Progress of Civilization.* By STEPHEN KAY, Corresponding Member of the South African Institution. New York. Harper and Brothers. 1834. 8vo. pp. 428.

2. *South African Commercial Advertiser.*

THE writer of the principal publication above named has been for several years employed as a Missionary on the ground indicated by the title of his book, under the direction of the London Wesleyan Society; and having had occasion, in the ordinary course of his calling, during this period, to traverse the English Colony of the Cape, and the neighbouring country, repeatedly, from side to side, he must, with common intelligence, even though he were no "Corresponding Member of the South African Institution of Natural History," have collected a mass of information

respecting what may now be considered, on some accounts, one of the most interesting portions of the globe. More of this information, indeed, relates to the Caffers and other barbarians of South Africa,—the missionaries,—and the history of the intercommunication between these parties, than to the civilized settlements which have been planted near the extremity of the continent. So far, however, is that department from being devoid of interest, that perhaps no experiment of colonization in the world's history, in regard to its effect on the aborigines of the colonized territory, is open to more philosophical or profitable comment than this enterprise of the Dutch, followed up, as it has been, by the present possessors of the soil. We propose to furnish a summary description of the country which is, and is to be, the scene of this vast experiment.

The Dutch, as we have intimated, were the earliest European occupants of the Cape; a fact the more remarkable, since, long before that occupation commenced, the Portuguese,—after wasting nearly a century in vain endeavours to obtain even a sight of the great promontory, and after having been once deterred by the final discovery from the contemplated attempt of making it available to commerce,*— had at length succeeded (under the guidance of the courageous Gama, and the royal auspices of the name which the Cape now bears) in sailing round it, and making that route a part of the regular passage to the rich possessions of that nation in the East. The latter occupied so much of their attention, and the aspect of the Cape territory was, as it still is, to the passing voyager, so uninviting, that the idea of settling that soil perhaps never occurred to them.

The Dutch were more prudent, if not more ardent. Having followed the Portuguese into the Indian seas, and there supplanted them on their own ground, they soon began to calculate the commercial value, if no other, of the southern promontory, as a station of refreshment, and naval resort and repair. They founded Cape Town, with these views, in the year 1650; and this, as it led necessarily to communication with the interior, was the first step in the intercourse which has taken place between Europeans and

* Diaz, who commanded the expedition here referred to, returned, after obtaining a remote view of the promontory, unwilling to brave the stormy seas which beat around it.

the people commonly regarded as the aborigines of the soil. From that time the Dutch held uninterrupted possession of the settlement, with its gradual ramifications in different quarters, till about the commencement of the present century, when the English came in with force and arms. The Colony was restored to the Batavian Government in 1803, but finally occupied, three years afterwards, by the former conquerors, who have ever since retained their hold of the country.

The limits of what is called the Cape Colony have been, and still are, to some extent undefined, — or at least disputable, on the score of claims advanced by the various contending or contracting parties from whom most of its territory has, from time to time, been acquired, either by conquest in war, seizure in peace, or ostensible cession in both cases. An instance of this last kind of conveyance is furnished in the relinquishment, in 1819, by a distinguished chief named Gaika, of a large and fertile territory hitherto occupied by the Caffers, extending from the Great Fish River, the ancient eastern boundary of the Colony, to the Keiskamma. The treaty was negotiated between the English commandant of the frontiers on one side, and this chieftain on the other, without participation or communication of any sort with his fellows in authority, of the different tribes; and all the latter deny his authority so to convey. Still, there appears reason to believe, that the territory, though by the terms of the contract it was to remain neutral ground, has been at least encroached on by the English or Dutch settlers, or both, in the neighbourhood, to a considerable extent. There can be no doubt of its final, if not speedy accretion to the colonial domain. Offences, especially since such causes of provocation already exist, must needs occur between the claimants on either side, as they have been constantly occurring for a century and a half past, — and, in such case, it requires no prophecy to decide the result. The Caffer territory will be overrun by English troops, as it was in 1819 (after the attack on Graham's Town by nine thousand of those savages), their villages devastated, and their cattle driven off, — as no fewer than thirty thousand were, immediately previous to Gaika's cession just mentioned; and then they, or their chiefs, or some of them, will be ready to sign new treaties, and make

new cessions, while the civilized party will of course be abundantly able to maintain the validity of the conveyance by arms or argument, proclamation or "commando," as the circumstances happen to require.

The eastern or southern shore of the Colony may be understood to extend from Table Mountain to the Keiskamma, a distance, we believe, of something over six hundred miles, — but without dispute to the Great Fish River, five hundred and eighty miles. Its western or northern extent is to the Koussie, between three and four hundred. These limits comprise a surface of about 125,000 square miles.

This being a territory equal to twice that of New England, and considerably exceeding that of New and Old England together, might seem, at first sight, a more valuable domain, for the purposes of colonization or commerce, than it has proved, or is likely to prove itself for some time to come. Though explored and settled more or less for nearly two centuries, the population in 1798, according to Barrow, amounted to only 62,000, of which 26,000 were slaves and 14,000 Hottentots, — leaving but 22,000 whites. Since the English dynasty has commenced operations, indeed, this snail's-pace has been accelerated, at least sufficiently to show how much the Colony must depend, for its progress and prosperity, on the vigor of the government to which it is subject. In 1820 the total population was reported to be 100,000; and it has increased considerably, no doubt, since that time, several thousand emigrants having been, subsequently to the date of this estimate, introduced into the country under the immediate patronage of the British Government. The population of Cape Town in 1827 was nearly 19,000, of which much more than one half were slaves, and perhaps a moiety of the residue Hottentots, and half-castes of various mixtures.

Thus it appears that the entire Colony is peopled in the proportion only of one inhabitant to every square mile; a sparseness which, considering its age, and the extraordinary compliments lavished by late English writers on the inducement it holds out to emigrants, may be thought to demand explanation. The truth is, that as a territorial acquisition, the Cape is among the most insignificant possessions of the British Government. Thompson, who is one of our most recent and most intelligent authorities, estimates the quantity of

the sterile and worthless soil,—if soil it can be called,—as at least two thirds of the whole. A writer in the London Quarterly Review of 1820, deducts one half of the whole for the Karoo plains and naked ranges of mountains, and half the residue as "of little or no value;" leaving 30,000 square miles, according to his estimate, of productive land; of which only 10,000 are supposed to be arable, or ever likely to feel the ploughshare; the other 20,000 being however counted on as "exceedingly well adapted to sheep, and also for the grazing, or rather the browsing, of cattle."

The principles which have modified, for the most part, the cultivation and population of the Colony, may be quite reasonably deduced from the facts we have stated, and have been founded in a great degree upon the character of the soil. Water and pasturage are, of course, articles of the first importance to the grazier. Of these, the latter is generally so scanty as scarcely to clothe the surface, and the former so scarce that none too much for the supply of one family and their herds will usually be found within the compass of a number of square miles. The streams, as such, cannot be at all relied on, as the absorption of a dry soil, or the evaporation of a hot climate, may at any time reduce them to a bare channel. What is called a "river" in the Colony, from the relative dignity attached to what is rare, would cause a smile, as Mr. Kay thinks,—and he is by no means apparently disposed to indulge in gratuitous mirthfulness,—in any European. Perhaps he will find it a miserable little rivulet gurgling over pebbles, and perchance only "a few buckets of water here and there standing in pools."

It is owing to these circumstances that the settlement of the interior has been of the most detached kind, of which any specimen can be furnished, probably, by the civilized world. The farms, occupied by the old boors and their descendants, generally consist of about 6,000 acres. They were distributed originally by the Dutch East India Company to the graziers, in perpetual leasehold, for a meagre rent of some five pounds *per annum*. The volunteer settler, in this case, had only to find an unoccupied territory among or beyond the mountains, and erect a landmark, from which, as a centre, all the land that fell within the periphery of the circle whose radius was half an hour's

walk, or one mile and a half, was considered as comprised in the grant. If possible, he would take care to include in the boundaries so much of some water-course, as to leave a neighbour no temptation to encroach upon him; and it was one of the regulations of the Company, — additionally tending to scatter the population, — that if the interval left between the contiguous lines of two farms of this description was less than an hour's walk, no new comer should be allowed to take possession of the neutral ground.

Hence the term *neighbour* acquired, and still possesses, in South Africa, a construction quite unlike that which is given to it in other civilized countries; there being, in what are considered the occupied sections, not unfrequently a distance of five or six miles between the nearest limits of these immense estates, and sometimes of a whole day's journey. It is related of one corn-boor, — for all these people may be said to come under one of the three classes of grain-growers, wine-makers, or wool-raisers, — that when, upon a certain occasion, an enterprising Englishman benevolently proposed to lead the water of two neighbouring springs by an artificial process to *his* grounds, on condition of his sowing them with grain, Mynheer shrugged up his shoulders, and very composedly remarked, that, "it was hardly worth while, since he could just as well purchase what flour he wanted of *his neighbour*, who lived only five days' journey off." *

This incident is a true indication of the agricultural system, — if such management deserves that name, — which the old Dutch boors have universally pursued. "What," said one of them, within two days' journey of the Cape, to Mr. Latrobe, "what would you have us do? Our only concern is to eat enough, to get good clothes and houses, and be waited upon by our slaves; and as to our tillage, building, or planting, our forefathers did so and so, and were satisfied; and why should not we do the same?" The English, added this shrewd reasoner, "want us to use their ploughs, and so on, but we like our old things best."

The plough here alluded to is a utensil, which, if we rightly comprehend its construction, requires some ten or a dozen oxen to work, and therein may be considered a tolerably fair exemplification of both the ingenuity and economy of

* London Quarterly Review.

the enlightened proprietor of the team. One writer describes the instrument as "a couple of heavy boards nailed together," and the harrow as simply "a few brambles."

The wagons of the boors, used chiefly for travelling, are drawn by sixteen, and sometimes twenty oxen. Winnowing is performed by tossing the grain in the air with shovels,—it having been previously beat out, or *trampled out*, as the phrase is, after the antique fashion recorded in Deuteronomy, by spreading the sheaves on a floor kept for the purpose, and turning in upon them the farmer's whole *posse* of horses, colts and all, who are kept dancing and frisking about, by a Hottentot armed with a long whip, till the grain is separated from the ear. The writer just cited, states that he saw, on one of the best farms in the Kolburg District, eighty horses employed in this manner, working by relays of forty. Fourteen men were also engaged, and the quantity of grain thus trampled and winnowed in a day was about one hundred and twenty bushels. It is well remarked, that a threshing-machine of four-horse power, would accomplish this work in the same time, with eight hands, without mixture of sand or dust, and without loss of animal life, which in the case just mentioned amounted to the sum of £60. And yet the unwillingness to introduce new machinery is so strong, that when a threshing-machine was set up on one occasion by an Englishman, in what is called Hottentot Holland, it was well nigh destroyed by obstructions secretly thrust into it by the petty malice of his old-fashioned neighbours.* Its operations, too, excited probably much the same sort of superstitious consternation as that with which the Virginian Indians regarded, in Captain Smith's time, the discharge of a blunderbuss.

From the statement above quoted in regard to the force employed in treading out grain, it will be conjectured that horses are not particularly a desideratum, in some parts of the Colony; and it may be added, that they are generally of a serviceable breed. Cattle and sheep are owned in great numbers by the graziers. Dr. Lichtenstein, in his Travels, mentions one boor who was the owner of 690 head of cattle, and 1470 sheep, besides 80 horses; and another who had 300 horses and 1600 sheep. Twenty-two families

* Notes on the Cape. London. 1821.

in one district shared among them 80,000 sheep, with a proper proportion of other stock; and in another, thirty-six families had 100,000. Mr. Kay somewhere remarks, that owing to the mildness of the climate, (which makes it unnecessary to provide any winter subsistence for these vast herds and flocks, additional to what the equally vast domains of the owners supply in their pasturage,) four thousand head of cattle may probably be kept with no greater expense than ten would occasion in the cold latitudes of North America.

The progress which the Albany settlement, — founded on the eastern frontier about fifteen years since, by emigrants from England, under the charge of the Government, — has already made in the grazing business, is another indication of the importance which may be reasonably attached to it as a principal source of revenue and prosperity to all those sections of the Colony which are similarly situated. Here, over an area of 2,408 square miles, considerable portions of which are too sandy and too near the sea to be favorable to this sort of grazing, there were found to be, three years since, about 80,000 Cape and 10,000 Spanish sheep, besides 15,000 goats, and large numbers of horses and horned cattle. The district is said to be capable of supporting 300,000 sheep; and, therefore, it will doubtless be considered an object worthy of some attention, not only to increase the number, but to improve the breed of the animal by the introduction of the merino, Saxony, and other species. The native animal is described by the author of "Notes on the Cape," as a wretched beast, with wool that might be taken for frizzly hair, and fit only for stuffing cushions, while, in a culinary point of view, they are rendered as little desirable by a long-legged lankness which qualifies them, in our author's opinion, much better for the racing-ground than for the spit.

That something has been done for the improvement of this breed we infer, not only from the Reports of the Cape Agricultural Society (which may be seen in the Cape Town newspapers), but from the statements of Mr. Kay and others. That gentleman speaks of an Albany farmer who estimated the value of his next shearing, from a flock of 4,600 sheep, at £625 sterling, calculating at a price actually offered. The 90,000 sheep in the whole district, at the same

rate, had they been of the same breed (mixed merino and native), would have produced £12,500; instead of which we find, by reference to official returns of the exports from Algoa Bay, published in the Cape Town Commercial Advertiser of the last winter, that the wool sent off amounted, in six months of 1833, to only £1,374, while the value of their hides exported to Great Britain alone was nearly £16,000, their tallow nearly £6,000, and even their "curiosities," £896. The returns of the exports from Table Bay, for the months of October, November, and December, of the same year, give for the amount of wool £745, out of a total of between £40,000 and £50,000. It is remarkable, that the sheep-*skins* amounted to £1,785 during the same period, and even the "sheep-tail" (using the official phraseology) to £248. This latter term means, we suppose, that species of fat which the Cape sheep have the singular faculty of accumulating in the part of the body indicated by the name, in quantities almost exceeding belief. The author of the "Notes" says, "The tail of a sheep, which was driven near 200 miles from the interior, was known to weigh twenty-five pounds," and the average is understood to be over six pounds. Whether this article can be rendered sufficiently available in any other part of the civilized world, to make it a commercial substitute for good *wool*, may well be doubted;—it would probably be better used by the boors, as it generally has been, to answer the purpose of *butter*. In leaving this part of our subject, we must not forget the hospitable old farmer, mentioned by Thompson, who was the owner of 13,000 sheep, besides 2,000 horned cattle, horses, corn, &c., and whose extensive domestic establishment enabled him to accommodate twenty-eight other guests, at the same time with the traveller who tells the story, without the slightest apparent inconvenience. One shearing of such a patriarchal flock, if the wool were worth any thing, ought to make a boor's fortune for his life-time.

Between £5,000 and £6,000 worth of flour and grain of different kinds, appears among the returns of the exports from Table Bay, and these articles, together with wool and wine, have been considered the great staples of the Colony. How far either or all of them may be rendered available commercially, must depend, — independently of the capacity of the country, which indeed is not very ex-

tensive, — on the success of the efforts made by the English to introduce an improved agricultural system. We do not imagine, however, that the value of the Colony in this respect can ever be so augmented as to give much cause for envy to other nations. Excellent wheat may be raised there, but not on a very considerable surface of the soil. The other grains are rather inferior to the English, and the same is true of most of the vegetables and fruits, though doubtless the flavor of all may be improved by increased attention to the culture. Good samples of tea have been produced in the Colony, and some calculations made upon its becoming a source of profit; but there seems to be no good reason for such a belief. Silk may perhaps do better; and we see it stated in the Cape Town papers, that in one or two instances it has repaid the care of the cultivator with returns quite as encouraging as could be desired. Premiums have been lately offered by the Agricultural Society for tobacco, but not apparently with much success. Olives of good quality may be raised, but probably not in such quantity as to be named among exportable articles; and the same may be said of the orange, lemon, pomegranate, apricot, and other tropical fruits which flourish on this soil.

The result of the labors of the late emigrants to Southern Africa, perhaps sufficiently proves, not indeed that the Cape is a place to which the ignorant poor of the mother country should be indiscriminately advised and aided to emigrate, but rather that there is scarcely any portion of the globe's surface so destitute of natural resources, but that necessity, enterprise, and energy, were they less prominently developed than in the present condition and character of the British government and people, may avail to render it suitable and even comfortable in some decent degree.

The Dutch, it is true, have not distinguished themselves in the Colony by the qualities characteristic of their countrymen at home, — a diversity easily explainable by the circumstances under which they first occupied the soil, and by which they are still surrounded. The late English emigrants have, on the whole, done themselves credit by their perseverance, and by the degree of success attending their efforts. Albany District, though but fifteen years old, is now considered the most flourishing region within the colonial limits. The population, two years since, was 6,309,

including 1,693 blacks or free persons of color, and 126 slaves belonging to old Dutch settlers. About two thirds of this whole number are engaged in agricultural or grazing pursuits, and the residue chiefly in manufactures and different branches of trade. The face of the country, except in seasons of drought, is described as "beautifully adorned by a covering of verdant pasturage, and the settlers, under the direction of government, have been generally scattered over it, among the fertile ravines of the hills, and the numerous clumps of elegant evergreens," * in parties of ten or more families together, so as doubtless to make both the best show and best use of the scenery and the soil. Graham's Town has a population of 2,000, and five or six hundred houses, built, for the most part, of wood or stone, and very pleasantly interspersed with gardens and groves of fruit-trees. The river Kowie runs directly through it. Here are a church, jail, and government-house; and sessions are held every four months, with jury trials, by puisne judges from Cape Town. Graaf Reinet is an old town, inhabited chiefly by the Dutch, and contains about 300 houses, with a new church and school-house, and a chapel for the benefit of the natives.

The climate of the Albany District is healthy and pleasant, but too dry for the best interest of either gardening or grazing. Wheat has not succeeded, and maize is considered the staple bread-corn. The peach, apricot, apple, pear, quince, pomegranate, almond, and walnut, all flourish, — the vine not so well. The trade of the district with the Caffers and other native tribes has greatly increased of late, and regular fairs have been established, which are well attended, and produce considerable income. The articles brought in by the natives are chiefly ivory and hides, which are bartered for clothing, domestic utensils, beads, buttons, and other sundries of minor value. During five years preceding June, 1829, the imports from the interior were estimated at £50,000 at least; and in 1832, the imports into Graham's Town alone, for several months, were rated at from £700 to £1,000 weekly. Other commercial establishments have been attached to some of the mission-stations, under regulations apparently well suited to improve the condition and character of the natives who resort thither.

* Kay.

To the missionaries, let us here say, too much praise can hardly be given for the indefatigable zeal with which they have devoted themselves, in the face of all conceivable hazards, labors, and discouragements, to the noble task of introducing a knowledge of the Christian religion, and the arts of civilized society, among all the neighbouring tribes, and particularly among the Caffers. Their exertions have been very generally distinguished by a practical good sense which has not uniformly characterized similar movements in other countries, and least of all perhaps among the early Indians of our own. They have established settlements in the midst of the people they wished to improve; shown them, in actual experiment, the benefit of their own agricultural, stationary, and peaceful life; and conciliated their good will by kind and friendly acts; and the appearance of things, at all the stations where the natives either reside or resort, is such as might be expected from so rational a course. If the government shall do its duty so far, as to prevent or punish, in future, those encroachments of the frontier settlers on their barbarian neighbours, which have formerly been the source of every difficulty between the two parties, there is little reason to doubt that the Caffers especially, (who are universally allowed to be one of the finest races of savages in the world,) will be gradually induced to attach themselves industriously, as far as the nature of their country permits, to the cultivation of the soil. These people are supposed to be of Arabian origin. The Hottentots, who are the aborigines of the Cape territory, mingle freely with the European settlers, and make themselves serviceable in menial and mechanical capacities. The Bushmen, a troglodyte and warlike race, by some considered a variety of the Hottentot, still continue troublesome on the frontiers, and show a ferocious spirit more like that of the American Indians than of the tribes we have named above. The farther progress of the colonial settlements will probably prove fatal to this race. We had proposed to offer some comment on the treatment they have received from the whites, whether collectively or in individual cases, — both of glaring enormity, — but our limits forbid, and we do not at all regret to leave this part of our summary as it is. Those familiar with the history of the conquests and settlements made in North and South America may, without much exercise of imagination, form a sufficiently distinct conception of the details.

The indications of prosperity at Cape Town, which will always be the principal port of the Colony, must be equal to the expectations of its reasonable friends. From a file of newspapers of recent date, which lies before us, — perhaps the best index of the real condition of things which could be furnished, — we learn that the exports from Table Bay during three months of last year, amounted to £51,929, of which £46,217 was colonial produce; — nearly one half of the whole amount being sent to England, and the residue to Mauritius, New South Wales, St. Helena, South America, Java, the East Indies, Hamburgh, and Ascension. Among the minutiæ of the official returns, we were somewhat surprised to notice a place reserved for eau-de-Cologne, confectionery, haberdashery, millinery, and preserves.

The colonial commerce appears to have been regularly increasing for some years. In 1803, the number of merchant vessels, exclusive of those employed coastwise, was 83; in 1816, 131; in 1824, 135; in 1833, 298, — the tonnage this last year being 96,377. During the ten years subsequent to 1808, the number of entries was 1,062; during the last ten years, it was 1,950; showing an increase in favor of the last period, of no less than 890 vessels, or 89 for each year.

In the same paper which furnishes these facts, we find notices of a project for establishing a new market, of the Annual Meeting of the Cape Savings-Bank Society, the commerce of Port Elizabeth, the Fifth Session of the South African College (with three professors and one hundred students), and of the first report of the Georgetown Infant School. It is stated, that quite a number of these institutions are now flourishing in the Colony, some of them containing from 120 to 170 pupils; and that they have proved particularly beneficial at the missionary stations, "where nothing can exceed the eagerness with which they are adopted by both parents and children."

On the whole, no person can compare the present state of the Colony, with the accounts which travellers gave of it ten years since, without perceiving an encouraging improvement in every thing which goes to constitute both national character and commercial thrift.

Slavery has ceased by legislative limitation, at the date of the publication of our statement of the fact. This measure, though doubtless unpopular with individuals, can hardly fail,

under judicious management, to conduce essentially to the improvement of the agricultural as well as moral interest, — the peculiar nature of the soil and country rendering that system even less profitable, and more pernicious among the settlers, than in most other countries where it exists. It is much to be hoped that the recently appointed Governor will feel it to be his duty, — and more especially that parent authorities will feel it to be theirs, — to devote that highly desirable attention to the great interests of the education, no less than the emancipation, of the lower classes in the Colony, which we perceive is called for in the Cape publications with the earnestness which the importance of the subject demands. In such case, this territory may prove to the English emigrant, who is pretty much broken down at home, truly a place (as Vasco named it) of Good Hope. Otherwise, we should caution him to imitate the discretion of Diaz.

NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

The Spirit of Jesus. A Sermon preached at the Installation of the Rev. D. H. Barlow, in Brooklyn, New York, September 17, 1834; by W. H. Furness. With *The Charge*, by the Rev. William Ware, of New York, and *The Right Hand of Fellowship*, by the Rev. Mr. Farley, of Providence. Brooklyn. 8vo. pp. 28. — Ordination services have, with these days of multiplication or division of churches, become among the most frequent of our public occasions. But nothing in the intellectual or spiritual world, that is good of itself, loses either of its value or its interest by commonness. And among many excellent ordination discourses we have heard or read, this of Mr. Furness has afforded more than usual satisfaction. It is on "the Spirit of Jesus," as expressed in those pregnant words, "My meat is to do the will of him who sent me, and to finish his work," — a text and a topic altogether appropriate to such an occasion. The design of the preacher is to inculcate this spirit, — of devotedness to God and of delight in his work. It must, he urges, be *our* spirit, and the spirit of every human being. It must pervade and animate every Christian, minister and people, not merely for the advantages, personal or pub-

lic, with which it may be followed; not for the fame it may procure, or for the happiness it may yield, but for its own worth's sake. "Have we any great truth to maintain or glorify, any spiritual object that we wish to accomplish, we must find our happiest reward in our labor. It must have a charm and attraction for us independently of any of its results to ourselves or to others."

This general sentiment, as contrasted with the selfishness or policy, regard to reputation or to the "recompense of reward," by which even good men permit themselves to be chiefly actuated, is happily applied to the condition of the religious society immediately addressed. And among these dangers, common to individuals and communities in like condition, the preacher thus beautifully exposes the following.

"When one is surrounded by what he deems great errors and unscriptural doctrines, religious systems dishonorable to God and discouraging to man, he is liable to have his mind inflamed with an angry spirit of opposition. But the hatred of falsehood is not necessarily accompanied by a love of truth. Accordingly, we find everywhere not a few ranked among Unitarians, who are no further entitled to the name than that they are opposed to the popular modes of religion. They reject the Trinity and its associated doctrines, but the simple and vivifying idea of one God, an all-animating Spirit, our perpetual Witness and Judge, has never once been entertained by them in its divine power. The sun of Truth seems to have risen behind them, and they are so engrossed with the monstrous errors it has revealed, they never turn round and lose themselves in its unutterable glory. And so from their countenances no light beams. The passions they cherish and express, they excite, and the advocates of error only become the more settled and determined in their prejudices. The true and loyal servants of Truth, her only successful ministers, are those who, forgetful of all else, delight to turn and gaze upon her radiance, until, kindled and transfigured thereby, they reflect her light all around, and are recognised and reverenced as if they had just come down out of the central blaze of her glory."—pp. 11, 12.

The charge, by the Rev. William Ware, of New York, abounds in excellent remarks and sound counsel, offered, as becomes a coeval and cotemporary of the individual addressed, with a graceful union of fraternal kindness and dignity. We cordially concur with Mr. Ware in the views he here exhibits of some of the duties and dangers of the ministerial office.

"So far as I have observed, there is no one whom men of all characters and professions are more ready to honor than a useful, conscientious minister; one, who, they see, seeks not himself, but, in the true spirit of self-sacrifice, the moral and religious welfare of those committed to him. And, on the other hand, there is no one whom

they more thoroughly despise, with whatever outward respect they may treat him, — and this sort of hypocrisy is rarely wanting, — than a selfish, worldly man, who seeks himself and preaches himself. They are quick in discriminating character, and very soon learn how much of a man's heart is in his profession, and how much is everywhere else; and their respect rises or falls accordingly. If you esteem your calling as it is worthy to be esteemed, you cannot fail in its duties, you yourself will be honored in proportion, and religion through you. Begin by despising it, or even holding it too low, and the certainty is, that the contempt you feel for it will be visited upon yourself, and, through you, upon your faith. If I were to give modern 'reasons for the contempt of the Clergy,' one would be, that they are seen so often despising their own vocation, — abandoning it for some other, reaching after other things, aping the manners and ways of the world, covetous of some other and higher reputation than that which a quiet, faithful discharge of the duties of their great office would confer. This brings contempt upon the order, and justly. But the opposite character to this is quite as sure to bring it honor." — pp. 17, 18.

And, again, while for ourselves we must attach great importance to the private labors of the minister, and are persuaded, that much of his best influence and usefulness, *within the circle of his immediate charge*, must depend on a faithful discharge of pastoral duties, we believe, with this writer, that "the pulpit should be his chief care," — and this for many and obvious reasons. It is the great theatre, so to speak, for the manifestation of the truth, for the exhibition of the Gospel in its doctrines, sanctions, and whole power. Public preaching is the ordinance of God, the most effectual, because it has been, in every age since the teaching of Christ himself, the received and honored method of reaching the hearts and consciences of men. The great benefit of pastoral visits is, through the friendly religious interest and sympathy it expresses, in disposing the hearer to listen with affection and to give additional influence to the preacher. But it is in faithful public preaching, more than in any other *practical* method of address, that the hearer will so listen, as to perceive his personal concern in the truth, as to read in it his character, his needs, or his dangers. Therefore, says Mr. Ware,

"To be a faithful minister — *the pulpit must claim your principal care.* If you do any good, it will be accomplished directly or indirectly by this instrument. Let nothing interfere with your preparations for it. Think not to make up for deficiency here by increased familiarity with your people. It will be to no purpose. Your power of usefulness as a Parish Minister and a visitor, will be in proportion to your success and excellence as a preacher. No one will ever be coveted as a private counsellor and moral guide, who in the first place speaks not powerfully or profitably to the intellect and the heart, as a public dispenser of Religious Truth. There must be first this public respect,

or there will be little of any other. No matter how much you may go about from house to house, you will obtain scarce any thing better for your pains, than the reputation of a clerical gossip, except your character as a sound and learned, an eloquent or a useful preacher, make you welcome by making you respected. When respected, you will be desired. And when respected and desired, your intercourse with your people will be delightful to yourself and mutually profitable. Let the pulpit therefore, I repeat, have your first care. Bend all the energies of your mind to the production of that which shall inform the minds, warm the affections, awaken the consciences of your hearers. Let USEFULNESS be your aim in all that you write. Only remember whom you are addressing and for what purpose, and you will carefully abstain from topics suitable to any place rather than a Christian Church. Remember that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners, and never for one moment forgot or turned aside from his great object."—pp. 19, 20.

In Mr. Farley's Right Hand of Fellowship are well expressed the feelings of Christian sympathy and coöperation, with which fellow-servants and brethren in a holy cause will always welcome and seek to strengthen one another.

The Biblical Reader; consisting of Rhetorical Extracts from the Old and New Testaments; to which is applied a Notation, designed to assist in the public and private Reading of the Scriptures. By EBENEZER PORTER, D. D., late President of the Theological Seminary, Andover. Andover: Gould & Newman. 1834. 12mo. pp. 263.—Some such book as this has been long wanted, especially for family reading. We are therefore glad to see this, and we give it a welcome; though we should have been better satisfied if it had comprised a greater number of extracts. It is true that the preface informs us, that Dr. Porter intended to publish a separate volume, consisting of the Prophets and the Psalms, which accounts for the omission of these in the present volume; but could we not have had more than one passage from the story of Joseph, and more than one chapter from the Book of Proverbs?

Sermons, by the late Rev. EZRA SHAW GOODWIN, Pastor of the First Church and Society in Sandwich, Mass. With *a Memoir*. Boston. B. H. Greene. 1834. 12mo. pp. 268.—This small volume is a gratifying memorial of one whose memory is very pleasant to those who knew him. It is modest, like himself; but it contains beauties of thought and language, of which many men of more extended fame than his, would gladly be considered the authors. The Sermons are preceded by a short Memoir by a friend and relation, who, we are sorry to

see, does not give his own name on the title-page, or elsewhere. We can imagine no reason for this omission, especially as he prints, in his Advertisement, the name of a gentleman who assisted him in his editorial task. It is a mistake, we think, to withhold, in such a case, what may be a satisfaction to the public, and contribute to the completeness of a literary work, however unpretending its character may be.

The Sermons themselves, in number fifteen, are a fair transcript of the mind of their author. They are pure, spiritual, simple, sanctifying, imbued throughout with a serious yet cheerful and trusting piety. We will select one passage from them, not for its style, in which respect we might find many superior to it, but because it is the close of a sermon which was the last he ever preached, and which was from this remarkable text, "I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand." 2 Timothy iv. 6.

"A happier state of mind cannot well be imagined than that of a true Christian, waiting for his change, with no dismay nor disquieting terrors, but with humble hope, expecting to enter into the presence of his Lord, and willing to shake off his connexion with the flesh, that he may go forth into regions of the spirit, and commence a new course of obedience and enjoyment, in a scene of enlarged powers and increased facilities. And, contrariwise, a more wretched being can scarce be imagined than one who is perpetually disquieted through dread of death, starting at the sound of a shaken leaf, and seeing nothing in eternity but a fearful looking for of judgment. Surely it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God. And we, to whom the alternative of one or the other of these states is offered, shall do well, if we bring our souls to the trial, and enter into judgment with ourselves on this question, so essential to our everlasting welfare. 'I am now ready to be offered,' is the expression of a state of mind, which we, no doubt, every one of us, desire to possess, and our neglecting of which is literally sinning against our own souls. Let us, my brethren, who soon must die, whether we be ready or not, — let us think of earth, as a state with which, in a little while, we shall have no connexion; of its affairs, as what will soon cease to concern us; and of all its interests, as what will soon excite in us neither sorrow nor joy, neither hope nor fear. But think of God, of Christ, and eternity, of a world to come, as what shall concern us for ever and ever; — and, knowing that we must soon be offered, whether we be willing, or not, let us make sure of our peace with God, and give ourselves to him in an everlasting covenant, never to be forgotten in time or eternity, — and establish our hearts in Christ and his Gospel, for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh, — and without partiality or hypocrisy, finish what is given us to do, and then commit ourselves to our Maker, with all confidence, and be exalted in the faith of Christ, and the love of God, above the fear of death, which would keep us all our life-time subject to bondage. Remembering, also, that one day is, with the Lord, as a thousand years, and a thou-

sand years as one day, let us keep ourselves steadfast and immovable, in Christ Jesus, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as when ye are conscious of eternity, ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord." — pp. 266 - 268.

Views of Christian Truth, Piety, and Morality, selected from the Writings of Dr. Priestley. *With a Memoir of his Life*, by Henry Ware, Jr. Cambridge: James Munroe & Company. 1834. 12mo. pp. lxxx. and 207. — Mr. Ware has here erected a noble and enduring monument of the pure and truly Christian character of one of the most gifted and single-hearted of Christian confessors. The Memoir, compiled for the most part from Dr. Priestley's own letters, and other writings, and drawn up with care, is interesting throughout, and full of instruction. The same may also be said of the selection of Sermons and other pieces which make up the body of the work; for they are almost exclusively practical, and present "views of Christian truth, piety, and morality," remarkable for their good sense, strictness, and discrimination. We hope that the publication of this volume will lead the friends of Dr. Priestley to associate his name with the simplicity and excellence of his character, his great sacrifices to conscience and liberty, and his almost unequalled activity and versatility of mind; and not, as has been too generally the case, especially in this country, with his infelicities and mistakes. As for his malicious traducers, we may say to them all, now that he is dead, what he said to one of them while he was living. "As the Indian said to the Spanish priest, who would have persuaded him to be baptized in the article of death, threatening that if he did not submit to that ceremony, he would certainly go to hell, whither all his ancestors went before him, that 'he chose to go to his ancestors, rather than to any place whither the Spaniards went;' so Sir, judging of the tree by its fruits, I shall willingly take my chance with pious, virtuous, and candid Unitarians, with such men as Dr. Lardner, Dr. Jebb, &c., who brought no railing accusation against any man, (though sentenced by your Church 'without doubt to perish everlastingly,') rather than with those who scruple no misrepresentation or abuse to promote their cause, though in itself it should be ever so good. Fearing God and respecting his truth, I hope I shall never fear what man may say of me, or do to me; least of all in another world, where, happily, your power does not extend."

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